Ally unstable: trouble Bahrain and U.S. policy
Source: Getty
Summary
البريملخص
Bahrain drowning in a raging violence and social divisions, however,
does not look the government is ready to implement political reforms are
essential.
The divisions of the Interior, and the number of militants number
pragmatists, paralyzing the three main political forces in the country,
any opposition Shiite and Sunni Islamists and al-Khalifa family ruling
Sunni.
This exam is important for the ability of the United States to balance
the need to reform the political and strategic interests between the
military and long-term partnerships.
Dynamics underlying the impasse
- Failed Shiite opposition, represented by the Association Accord, for the conduct of important reforms through dialogue or political participation, but it is losing popular support.
- Young people rise up. Revolution Youth Coalition February 14, a commander of the network does not have formed in the early days of the uprising of Bahrain,
- The rise of a militant wing of the al-Khalifa family, led by the Minister of the Royal Court, and the commander of Bahrain's defense forces, above the voices of moderation.
- Sunni anger from the system because of the growing class differences, with the militant wings of the royal family has sought to exploit the discord and redirected against the Shiites. But this step is a losing strategy fueling sectarianism in Bahraini society.
- Feelings of hostility towards the United States is growing among both Sunni Islamist militants and Shiite elements outs. This anti Add to system design and the apparent determination to ignore calls for deep reforms, are nearly hurts the legitimacy of U.S. and endanger the interests of the United States and its people at risk.
Policy recommendations for the United States
Reconsider the defense relationship established between the United States and Bahrain.
This relationship may soon turn into an obstacle due to the impasse
reached by the reform, and to the rampant violence and the growing
hostility towards the United States.
Develop contingency plans long-term.
Should develop a U.S. Navy plans to gradually transfer equipment for
the U.S. Fifth Fleet and functions away from Bahrain, in order to be
used as a potential effect of changing the behavior of the system.
It should also seek Washington's support to change behavior in the
ranks of the Bahraini Defence Forces, through the exchange of officers
and training and security cooperation, as the political transitions in
Bahrain may be linked to an effort generations.
The-scenes diplomacy to strengthen the claims of a general reform more specific.
Due to the system's keenness to preserve its image abroad, can be
criticized U.S. officials for the public system to stimulate change.
The economic impact of the use of force and multilateral wisely. Brought criticism from multilateral forums some positive shifts in public policy.
As a more specific financial sanctions against regime officials
implicated in human rights violations that send a message stronger.
Introduction
After nearly two years of the uprising that shook the pillars, Bahrain
became Mhishma countries, beset by violence and social polarization that
is going on under the surface.
The Atbdi to the country's government, which is dominated by Sunnis
little willingness to implement fundamental reforms, as young people
become citizens - Sunnis and Shiites alike - more extreme. The recession hit the country's economy, which had previously been a vital and vibrant. Since early 2013, killing more than 100 people in violence linked to the uprising.
The failure of successive share of efforts to break the impasse,
because of the deep divisions in the three main camps in the country.
Within the royal family, dominated by the hardline wing government
responses to events, resorted to framing the crisis as a security
problem rather than being a symptom of a broader political disorder
requires comprehensive reforms.
Among the opposition, splits emerged among the stream of a similar
nature institutional open to dialogue and calls for a gradual change in
the framework of the monarchy, and networks, rejecting a more youthful
used confrontational tactics of the street and demanding an end to the
monarchy. The arena witnessed the Sunni similar splits between loyal opposition and more fundamentalist.
And promote all these dynamics sectarianism creeping at the community
level and alarming levels of hostility to the United States.
With the ongoing crisis, troubling questions have emerged about the
harmful effects of the United States strategic relationship with
Bahrain, which has long been a mainstay in the American show of force in
the Gulf.
However, more important is that Bahrain serves as the headquarters of
the U.S. Fifth Fleet and hosts a number of American air capacity and
those relating to special operations.
However, the United States finds itself little by little in the
uncomfortable position to maintain close ties with the repressive regime
skillfully avoid important reforms, while engaged in a concerted public
relations campaign to polish its image.
Eventually, the Ekman overcome the impasse in Bahrain through the
promotion of human rights, but also to alleviate the security challenges
on the potential U.S. assets and U.S. persons - and perhaps eventually -
to pre-empt violent challenge to the monarchy.
Bahraini regime may be able to get out of the current crisis staggered
Msnoda financial support and Saudi military strong, and withstand the
pressure of exceptional Bahraini citizens and the international
community alike. However, the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.
In light of the possible fall of the government, which is dominated by
Alawites in Syria, will become the Al Khalifa family in Bahrain soon
sectarian minority in the Middle East, the only governing majority is
barely have a voice in government.
Recent history suggests that as a result of this arrangement will not
be peaceful in the absence of structural changes and wide.
Perhaps Mayazz opposition in Bahrain and the presence of a deep sense
of disappointment with the failure of the royal family in the activation
of the reforms promised in the beginning of this century.
After his accession to the throne, gave Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, who
was a prince at the time, the National Action Charter in 2001, which
called for, among other reforms, the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy and the structure of the legislative bicameral consisting of an
elected parliament (the National Assembly).
However, this stopped promised reforms or evaporated by 2002, which led to the fueling new levels of pessimism and discontent.
In addition, deliberately Prince, after he was appointed himself king,
to revise the Constitution of 1973, one-sided, and to subject the
elected parliament and convert the Shura Council of a particular deprive
Parliament of the ability to introduce new legislation formally or
exercise financial control of the government ministries.
Was the opposition's point of view, then and now, that the Parliament
is not more than one institution purely cosmetic, and "Club Talk"
helpless, as one of the activists said in an interview with the author
in 2006.
This has motivated this frustration, along with the policy of
redistribution of the constituencies followed by the system, which aims
to ensure the dominance of the year, the province wide by the Shiites
and the leftist forces for the elections of 2002 parliamentary and
municipal elections. This resulted in the election of a National Assembly dominated by Sunni Islamist groups disproportionately.
Eventually, entered the Shiite opposition in the core of al-Wefaq parliament in 2006. (Because the political parties are technically illegal in Bahrain, and political gatherings known as "associations").
At the same time, rejected a splinter group of Al-Wefaq Society,
Movement of Liberties and Democracy (right), participate in the
elections, and called for the continuation of the boycott.
Have formed a movement right and its supporters in the street point
opposed to the task and with the militant attitude accord under which
participate in the elections. Criticized the movement of the right routinely Wefaq, in rallies and speeches, as they came to the deception by the government.
Gradually became a young generation of activists are convinced that the
participation in the "dialogue" system and quasi-democratic structures
such as parliament is not only an exercise in futility.
Because of his frustration with the failure of older cadres in al-Wefaq
to provide any significant reforms, as well as the failed promises of
the system, this faction has proved that young are more likely to be
influenced by the wave of protests that have spread across the region in
2011.
Shortly after the start of the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt,
established a loosely organized groups of young pages on the site
"Facebook" which incite their followers to mobilize against the Bahraini
regime on February 14, 2011.
The invitations to events far from sectarianism to a large extent in
their view of things, where students mostly peaceful reforms and
refrained from criticizing King Hamad directly or call to overthrow the
Al Khalifa. However, he called for the little ones to "Revolution" and "overthrow the regime".
بدأت المفاوضات السرّية بين الأسرة المالكة والمعارضة عندما استدعى الملك
زعيم جمعية الوفاق الشيخ علي سلمان لإجراء محادثات. غير أن الجانبين لم
يتمكّنا من التوصّل إلى اتفاق.
Protesters took to the streets, and on February 16, joined al-Wefaq to
the Shiite Islamic associations and other leftist groups in the
formation of the coalition that called for increased support for young
activists. As income in the leadership cadre of moderate reconciliation in intense negotiations with the Office of the Crown Prince. However, the negotiations did not produce any result.
The fact is that the longer the impasse, the greater the control of
hardliners within the ruling family and the opposition alike.
As has been the formation of a new opposition Sunni groups during this period of unrest. Most notably the group known as the "National Unity Gathering."
Coalition parliamentary commissions included two groups Islamist groups
Snetan - Forum Society associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafist Association of authenticity - as well as the group is
non-parliamentary Assembly of the Islamic Shura.
Initiated by the ruling family to act quickly. On the morning of February 17, 2011, Bahraini security forces closed the Pearl Roundabout, where protesters had gathered. Killing at least four demonstrators on the spot, while others died later. In a press statement, Foreign Minister spoke about the specter of "sectarian abyss" an advocate for the move.
In response, al-Wefaq withdrew eighteen members of Bahrain's parliament, adopted extreme positions on increasingly.
Turned logos that have been circulated in the street gradually "reform"
to the refusal of dialogue leading to "overthrow" the system.
The three associations formed a Shiite Islamic unlicensed "Alliance for
the Republic", which called for the overthrow of Al Khalifa and the
establishment of a democratic republic.
Alliance made its support for the Alliance of Youth Feb. 14 - The
author of a network of young activists lacking leadership was formed on
the foundations based on the biology and is characterized by adept at
using social media to coordinate protests - not associations Shiite
licensed such as reconciliation, which I consider bargaining.
Under pressure from U.S. officials, the Crown offer to discuss most of
the demands of the opposition in the public dialogue and present the
results of these talks to a referendum.
The Crown issued on March 13 / March statement select the "seven
principles" to guide the dialogue in the future, but Wefaq did not
formally respond to the offer, a delay attributed by some to its efforts
to build consensus among a series of various demands of the opposition.
Following the issuance of the Crown-mentioned principles, protesters
besieged biased to the Alliance for the Republic in the financial
district of Manama.
This was a provocation - for the Prime Minister and the hard-liners in
the regime and their supporters in Riyadh, along with the elusive
al-Wefaq on dialogue - an ambitious target too much can have it
eventually have serious consequences.
On 14 March / March, crossed the Saudi military armored convoys, as
well as a small unit of soldiers UAE, operates under the authority of
the Peninsula Shield force of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the King
Fahd Causeway and entered Bahrain.
This intervention was a far-reaching impact on the domestic balance of power in Bahrain. It has weakened significantly pro-reform elements in the Bahraini Royal Court, led by the Crown Prince. This process has raised polarized more pronounced in Bahraini politics.
Unhinge the legitimacy of the intervention as Wefaq by showing that the
restorative approach Assembly of dialogue during the early stages of
the uprising did not result in anything.
The Sunnis who have joined the protests, they were afraid of the
possibility that Iran stands to the side of the Shiites and the specter
of withdrawal reconciliation of political life. The Bahraini government has been able to exploit these fears to divide the ranks of the opposition and divided.
The deep roots of the dispute
There is a similar dynamic of the division was affecting the Sunni
opposition, and resulted in the emergence of a number of militant
groups, the most youthful. This was opposed by groups gathered near the national unity of the system in particular.
The National Unity Gathering material for controversy and confusion for
a long time, as claimed by many observers, especially opponents, it's
just a counterweight to the Shiite government-sponsored, and "opposition
to the opposition", and accused him of one of the activists in an
interview in the September / September 2012. But this description hides the real roots of the assembly in the growing disillusionment toward the Sunni government.
Certainly, the assembly expressed himself as a loyal opposition, unlike
in the most extreme members of the Shiite opposition, it is to Aidao to
overthrow the monarchy.
However, it also embodies the feelings of frustration of the lower
class of the year, especially in Muharraq, a suburb of Manama mixed
between Sunnis and Shiites, against corruption and the lack of housing
and reduced government support, as indicated by the Secretary-General of
the gathering, Abdul Latif Mahmoud (who is also a senior Sunni cleric
imprisoned in the past because of activity), the author of this study in
the September / September 2012.
Post Wefaq stunned many observers.
وقد كان أحد التفسيرات المحتملة لذلك هي ضغوط اللحظة الأخيرة التي مارستها
عليها الولايات المتحدة، والاعتقاد بأن من شأن المشاركة – ومن ثم الانسحاب
بصورة مسرحية وعلنية - أن تساعد على تعزيز السمعة الطيبة للجمعية لدى
الشارع الشيعي الذي بدأ صبره ينفد. شاركت في الحوار أيضاً حليفة الوفاق،
جمعية العمل الوطني الديمقراطي (وعد) الليبرالية التي يهيمن عليها السنّة،
على الرغم من إلغاء ترخيصها في آذار/مارس واعتقال رئيسها إبراهيم شريف
والحكم عليه بالسجن لخمس سنوات.
كان وجود العديد من الجمعيات "المعارضة" الموالية للحكومة في الحوار مسألة
خلافية بشكل خاص في واقع الأمر. كان من بينها تجمع الوحدة الوطنية بقيادة
الشيخ عبداللطيف محمود ـ وممثّلين عن الجمعيات الإسلامية السنّية الكبرى،
الأصالة والمنبر. كانت المسألة الأكثر إشكالية من وجهة نظر الشيعة، هي أن
الوفد الموالي للحكومة ضم عادل فليفل، وهو ضابط سابق في الاستخبارات
البحرينية متهم بارتكاب انتهاكات خلال حملة القمع التي شنتها الحكومة على
الانتفاضة منتصف التسعينيات. يضاف إلى هذه الاستفزازات اللائحة المكونة من
25 معارضاً الذين يحق لهم التصويت فقط على التوصيات التي يسفر عنها الحوار،
وشعور جمعية الوفاق بخاصة بأنها غير ملائمة لتمثيل مكوناتها.
"فريق
الحوار رأى أن الحوار لن ينتج حلاً سياسياً للأزمة في البحرين، مشاركة على
صفحة جمعية الوفاق في موقع فايسبوك، 17 تموز/يوليو 2011،
www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10150318246303072&set=pu.203200448071&type،
وكذلك، “Bahrain Shiite Opposition Pulls Out of Talks,” Agence
France-Presse, July 17, 2011
ARTICLE TITLE NEEDED Bahrain Online, July 18, 2011.
“Proposal to Expand Powers of Bahraini Parliament 'Lies': Shiite Group,” Reuters, July 26, 2011.
“Al-Wefaq Pulled Out on Orders from Abroad,” Gulf Daily News, July 19, 2011.
“Politician
accuses opposition party of planning Islamic Republic in Bahrain,” BBC
Monitoring Middle East/al-ʿArabiya TV, July 14, 2011.
ARTICLE TITLE NEEDED Bahrain TV, October 4, 2011.
"ولي
العهد يخرس فليفل، ولوزير الداخلية: قمعكم ينذكر بس ما ينعاد"، مرآة
البحرين، 5 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2011،
http://bhmirror.no-ip.org/article.php?id=2460&cid=73.
"وزارة
الداخلية: اعتراض المواكب الحسينية غير قانوني"، صحيفة الوسط البحرينية، 4
كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2011.
www.alwasatnews.com/3375/news/read/612663/1.html.
Dan
Murphy, “After Formula One scrutiny, Bahrain Hires a Fan of Saddam
Hussein to Improve Its Image,” Christian Science Monitor, April 25,
2012.
Human
Rights Watch, “Testimony of Tom Malinowski before the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission on the Implementation of the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry Report,” August 1, 2012.
"المتحدث باسم الجيش البحريني خالد البوعينين يصف الحوار الذي أطلقه الملك بـ"الحمار""، مرآة البحرين، 23 كانون الثاني/يناير 2013؛
http://bahrainmirror.com/article.php?id=7518&cid=73
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151472343783072&set=a.459171508071.254298.203200448071&type=1&relevant_count=
http://bahrainmirror.com/article.php?id=7518&cid=73
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