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Scope of the Challenge
Nuclear weapons proliferation, whether by state or nonstate actors,
poses one of the greatest threats to international security today.
Iran's
apparent
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, what amounts to North Korean
nuclear blackmail, and the revelation of the A.Q. Khan black market
nuclear network all underscore the far-from-remote possibility that a
terrorist group or a so-called rogue state will acquire weapons of mass
destruction or materials for a dirty bomb.
The problem of nuclear proliferation is global, and any effective
response must also be multilateral. Nine states (China, France, India,
Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States)
are known
or believed to have nuclear weapons, and more than thirty others
(including Japan, Germany, and South Korea) have the technological
ability to quickly acquire them. Amid volatile energy costs, the
accompanying push to expand nuclear energy, growing concerns about the
environmental impact of fossil fuels, and the continued diffusion of
scientific and technical knowledge, access to dual-use technologies
seems destined to grow.
In the background, a nascent global consensus regarding the need for
substantial nuclear arms reductions, if not complete nuclear
disarmament, has increasingly taken shape. In April 2009, for instance,
U.S. president Barack Obama reignited global nonproliferation efforts
through a landmark
speech in Prague. Subsequently, in September of the same year, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed
Resolution 1887,
which called for accelerated efforts toward total nuclear disarmament.
In December 2011, the number of states who have ratified the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty increased to 157, heightening appeals to
countries such as the United States, Israel, and Iran to follow suit.
Overall, the existing global nonproliferation regime is a highly
developed example of international law. Yet, despite some notable
successes, existing multilateral institutions have failed to prevent
states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea from "going nuclear,"
and seem equally ill-equipped to check Iran as well as potential threats
from nonstate terrorist groups. The current framework must be updated
and reinforced if it is to effectively address today's proliferation
threats, let alone pave the way for the "
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."
Strengths and Weaknesses
Overall Assessment: Progress but crucial tests ahead
International instruments for combating nuclear proliferation were
largely successful before 1991, but are proving unable to meet today's
challenges. Although three states (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are
known or believed to have acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War,
for five decades following the development of nuclear technology, only
nine states have developed—and since 1945 none has used—nuclear weapons.
However, arguably not a single known or suspected case of proliferation
since the early 1990s—Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, or
Syria—was deterred or reversed by the multilateral institutions created
for this purpose. The continued
advancement
of Iran's nuclear program—despite the implementation of crosscutting
economic sanctions and near universal global condemnation—has elicited
serious concerns from states including Israel, the United States, and
Saudi Arabia. Additionally, recent nonproliferation success stories,
such as Libya's abandoning its nuclear program in 2003 and the accession
of all of the Soviet successor states except Russia to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) as nonnuclear weapon states, have been the result of direct
government-to-government negotiations and pressure rather than action by
global bodies.
In dealing with today's proliferation challenges, international organizations work in tandem with
ad hoc
forums of interested parties, such as the Six Party Talks on North
Korea, the P5+1 grouping on Iran, and the most recent development of
biannual global nuclear security summits. But such forums have often
proven inadequate to arrest the spread of nuclear technology, and states
such as Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear capability, if
not
outright weaponization. Given these trends, rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime are no surprise.
But nonproliferation as an international issue has recently benefited
from revived attention. The United States and Russia signed a legally
binding replacement agreement to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired in December 2009.
New START
entered into force in February 2011. President Obama has made nuclear
issues a centerpiece of his international agenda, convening a high-level
Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, dedicating serious political
effort to strengthen the NPT at the NPT Review in May 2010, and building
consensus in the
UN Security Council and
elsewhere for new economic sanctions targeting Iran. The Obama administration has also pledged to win U.S. Senate ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
reduce
the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense doctrine. Recently, it
initiated discussions with the Pentagon about potential deep cuts to the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. Yet even with these renewed efforts, major
challenges and threats remain, namely with regard to Iran and North
Korea.
Establishing a normative and legal framework:
Fairly comprehensive, but with significant gaps
The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) is the core component of the global nonproliferation regime, and
establishes a comprehensive, legally binding framework based on three
principles: (1) states without nuclear weapons as of 1967—a year before
the treaty opened for signature—agree not to acquire them; (2) the five
states known to have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967—the nuclear
weapon states (NWS)—agree to not assist other states in acquiring them
and to move toward eventual disarmament; and (3) the non-nuclear weapons
states (NNWS) are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology and
energy development.
NNWS are subject to safeguards to ensure that materials and
technology from civilian activities are not diverted to weapons
programs. The
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) is the implementing body for the NPT, monitoring compliance with
the treaty and assisting NNWS in developing civilian technology.
Although the scope and mandate of the NPT and the IAEA are relatively
broad, there is a critical gap in coverage: 189 states are party to the
treaty, but three of the world's nine nuclear powers—India, Israel, and
Pakistan—have never joined, and a fourth—North Korea—withdrew in 2003.
Thus, even if enforcement of the existing regime were not an issue,
nearly half of the world's nuclear-armed states are excluded from its
provisions.
By design, the NPT does not address proliferation by nonstate actors. After the September 11 attacks, the
UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted
Resolution 1540,
a legally binding instrument requiring all UN member states to enact
and enforce measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring WMD. Many
states in the
UN General Assembly,
however, have argued that the UNSC did not have the authority to impose
a binding resolution in this area. Partly as a result, some states have
resisted cooperation with the
1540 Committee established to oversee implementation of the resolution. The UNSC, however, recommitted itself to 1540 in April 2011 with
Resolution 1977,
extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee by ten years. In addition
to resistance facing the implementation of Resolution 1540, the legally
binding Cnovention on Nuclear Terrorism—which defines nuclear terrorism
and requires international cooperation to prevent and punish such
acts—had only
seventy-nine parties as of June 2012.
Moreover, two important elements of the nonproliferation regime have
never come into effect, largely because of resistance by the United
States and other nuclear weapon states. The
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 has been signed by
183 countries
but cannot enter into force until all forty-four states with
significant military or civilian nuclear capacity ratify it. China,
India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have not yet done so.
Efforts to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the
production of weapons-grade material have also stalled. The United
States has been criticized for blocking progress on both issues, but the
Obama administration has
signaledthat
it will move to again ask the Senate's advice and consent on
ratification of the CTBT (the body rejected the treaty in 1999) and to
revive negotiations on an FMCT with verification measures.
A review of the NPT in 2010 concluded with modest success. The
final outcome document
recommits signatories to the principles of the treaty, provides some
specific action plans for nonproliferation and disarmament, and calls
for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Middle East through the
establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. The need for
unanimous agreement resulted in some new U.S. initiatives, such as
stronger verification requirements, being eliminated from the final
document.
Preventing proliferation by state actors: Poor record on compliance, continued risk of breakout
Despite the broad legal coverage of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the
ineffectiveness of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter
would-be nuclear weapon states. In theory, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the
UN Security Council
(UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures.
In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock
at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive,
fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. The IAEA
did, however,
refer
Syria to the UNSC in June 2011 due to an "absence of confidence that
Syria's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."
Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement
mechanisms available to the IAEA, whose budget, intelligence
capabilities, and technological resources fall far short of what would
be needed to detect, prevent, or punish NPT violations. In 2010, the
IAEA's inspections budget was approximately $164 million. Not
surprisingly, even discounting nuclear facilities the IAEA does not have
access to, such as those in Iran and North Korea, nuclear materials
have reached the black market from installations under IAEA safeguards,
namely, from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the
adoption of
IAEA Additional Protocols,
which strengthen the agency's inspections mandate and is in force in
115 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon states and,
as of 2009, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member
states—including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented
the protocol)—have yet to agree to the toughened inspections regime. A
review of the NPT in 2010 failed to reach consensus on U.S. efforts to
make the additional protocols mandatory.
Other multilateral, informal organizations also play a role in implementing and enforcing the NPT, notably the
Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG). Made up of forty-six advanced nuclear states, the NSG prohibits
the transfer of civilian nuclear materials or technology to states
outside the NPT, or those that do not fully comply with IAEA safeguards.
However, the NSG's export bans are not legally binding, and members
(including the United States, Russia, and China) have taken advantage of
the weakness of the NSG regime to pursue civilian nuclear projects with
non-NPT members.
Interdicting illicit nuclear transfers: Some progress since 2001
In addition to legal frameworks, several multilateral initiatives
have been created in recent years to improve international coordination
in preventing nuclear terrorism. The
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT), launched in 2006, seeks to coordinate international efforts to
detect, investigate, and respond to proliferation by nonstate actors.
Alongside the efforts of the GICNT, many countries are developing a
comprehensive detection mechanism to monitor trafficking in nuclear
material and related financial transactions. The U.S.-led
Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), established in 2003, today involves more than ninety-eight
countries in developing the best practices, joint training exercises,
and information-sharing activities to improve multilateral interdiction
efforts.
Although often cited as a
flexible
approach to coordinating the international response to proliferation,
PSI does not grant any legal authority for ship-boarding or interdiction
beyond the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty
and various bilateral agreements. India and China, which do not
participate in PSI, have questioned the legality of its interdictions.
PSI also cannot interdict ships of nonmember states unless master
consents to being boarded are allowed, such as Iran and Pakistan.
Whether the 2003 interdiction of a ship supplying nuclear materials to
Libya was the direct result of PSI activities, for example, is still
disputed.
Analysts have also criticized the PSI for being a club of developed
economies and not addressing the problem of increasing independence
among a growing number of developing countries and nonstate actors from
the controls enacted by the traditional supporters of the nuclear
establishment.
Others have pointed out that the initiative is limited by having neither an independent budget nor coordinating mechanisms, and
does not provide
a legal framework in which to lock in long-term, verifiable, and
irreversible member state commitments. However, as a sign that progress
may be forthcoming, the United and States and China jointly
installed
a nuclear radiation detection system at the Yangshan port in Shanghai
in December 2011. Two years earlier, the U.S. Navy was also able to
successfully pressure a North Korean vessel—which many suspected to be
carrying illicit nuclear weapons materials destined for Myanmar—to
return to port by tailing the ship in open waters.
Securing fissile material and nuclear arsenals:
Significant progress since the 1990s, but incomplete
Possibly the most successful element of the nonproliferation regime
has been the effort to secure so-called loose nukes and fissile material
throughout the former Soviet Union. This is critical given that some
135 nuclear facilities worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as
fuel—enough HEU to create some 400 nuclear weapons. If terrorist or
criminal groups were able to buy or steal even a small portion of this
material, they could use it to
construct [PDF] a crude nuclear weapon or dirty bomb.
The United States and Russia have led this effort since 1991. By 2011, some
92 percent of sites in the former Soviet Union with weapons-usable nuclear material had been secured. U.S.-funded efforts such as the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program,
Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
have been complemented by other multilateral initiatives, such as the
Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD, which has
provided funding and technical assistance to secure nuclear facilities,
repatriate fissile material to origin countries, and promote
international cooperation to counter proliferation.
In late 2011, the importance of securing nuclear material came into
focus again following the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime in
Libya. In September 2011, ten thousand drums of uranium yellowcake were
discovered in a Libyan warehouse,
virtually unguarded, although a UN official
claimed the material was only "slightly" radioactive and did not pose an immediate threat.
The Obama administration brought additional attention to this issue,
pledging to secure all vulnerable nuclear weapons materials by 2014 and
convening a high-level global nuclear security summits in 2010 and 2012.
The 2010 summit yielded tangible results, with Ukraine announcing that
it would get rid of all its Soviet-era highly enriched uranium, and five
other countries stating intentions to convert their research reactors
to run on low-enriched uranium, which is less dangerous. The next global
nuclear security summit is planned for 2014 and will take place in the
Netherlands.
A related concern, ranging from pioneering nuclear powers like the
United States to more recent powers like Pakistan, is the security of
nuclear arsenals, specifically regarding safeguarding warheads from
accidents, theft, or unauthorized use.
The
security
of Pakistan's arsenal is a serious concern, especially for the United
States. Reports have emerged that nuclear warheads are often transported
on normal roads with little to no protection. While Pakistan has always
countered that its arsenal is secure, some U.S. officials have voiced
concern about the possibility of one of Pakistan's weapons falling into
the hands of terrorists.
Similarly, there have been repeated safety issues related to the U.S.
nuclear arsenal. In 2007 and 2008, two nuclear safety incidents
prompted Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates to institute high-level
leadership
shifts within the U.S. military. In November 2011 a damaged component of an unarmed intercontinental ballistic missile
prompted
a partial evacuation and emergency response at a U.S. Air Force base in
North Dakota. In July 2012, activists broke into the Y-12 National
Security Complex in Tennessee. It would later come to light that
security weaknesses had been discovered
at the facility two years previously. These incidents demonstrate that
ensuring the safety and security of nuclear arsenal remains a serious
and important issue—even for countries with decades of experience with
nuclear weapons.
Oversight of civilian nuclear programs and dual-use technologies: Inadequate monitoring and verification mechanisms
Some analysts note that the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees states' rights to develop civilian nuclear technology, enables a
peaceful path
to proliferation through fuel cycle activities. Many of the processes
used to produce civilian nuclear power can be converted to military
ends. As noted, the
International Atomic Energy Agency does not have the capacity to adequately monitor every nuclear site. Iran has
almost certainly
used its civilian program as a cover for illicit weapons activities.
The challenge of monitoring and verifying NPT safeguards will likely
only increase as more countries look to nuclear power to offset volatile
energy prices and reduce reliance on carbon-based fuels.
In particular, several Middle Eastern countries that currently lack
robust civilian nuclear programs have increasingly looked to
diversify
their economies through nuclear power. Other than safety risks commonly
linked with the development of civilian nuclear programs, other
countries may also
fear
that such programs will be used in the future to develop nuclear
weapons. The latter concern is most commonly discussed in reference to
Iran potentially developing nuclear weapons—regardless of that country's
repeated assertions that its nuclear program is for peaceful
purposes—and how such a development could affect regional security
dynamics in the Middle East.
Disarmament:
Not enough action toward nuclear disarmament by NWS
The five recognized nuclear weapon states have committed under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) to pursue in good faith nuclear disarmament and a treaty on
general and complete disarmament. The NPT does not specify an end-date
for achieving disarmament. Although almost everyone believes that
complete disarmament or even nuclear disarmament remains a distant goal,
the record of NWS on pursuing nuclear disarmament is mixed.
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, in return for agreement from the
nonnuclear weapon states to extend the treaty indefinitely, the United
States and other nuclear powers reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear
disarmament. But despite major cuts in the numbers of U.S. and Russian
operationally deployed nuclear warheads, both countries still retain
massive stockpiles that account for more than 90 percent of the world's
nuclear weapons. Many NNWS have repeatedly called for the NWS to make
even deeper reductions in their arsenals and argued that the NWS
foot-dragging is undermining the legitimacy of the NPT. This perceived
failure to make progress toward disarmament has been one factor in the
unwillingness of many UN members to support sanctions against Iran for
NPT violations, which many developing countries see as a
justifiable—even admirable—response to the hypocrisy of the nuclear
weapon states. In 2010, the U.S. government
revealed it had 5,113 warheads in its nuclear arsenal.
Recently, the NWS have recommitted themselves to reductions in nuclear arms, particularly in the
New START Treaty and the
outcome document
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. There are also reports that, due to
heightened fiscal pressure, the Obama administration is considering
deep cuts
to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. However, specific estimates for the cuts
vary, and it is unclear if reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be a
politically viable option.
U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Issues
Introduction:
he United States deserves both praise and criticism for its recent
policies on nonproliferation. On one hand, since the Cold War, the
United States has been at the forefront of efforts to secure nuclear
material and facilities worldwide, spending more than any other country
through programs such as
Cooperative Threat Reduction and the
Proliferation Security Initiative. However, efforts to reduce and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons technology took up only a
small part of the resources devoted to nuclear weapons and defense under the Bush administration. According to an
independent analysis,
the entire 2008 U.S. budget for programs to secure nuclear material
around the world was only $250 million—less than the cost of one day of
the Iraq war.
After September 11, the Bush administration led the world in creating
international normative and legal frameworks to address the threat of
nuclear proliferation by nonstate actors, supporting the passage of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention
(which the United States signed but has not ratified). On the other
hand, the administration did not support efforts to broaden constraints
on states' nuclear weapons programs, refusing, for example, to accept
verification measures as part of any treaty banning the production of
fissile material, and failing to push for
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) ratification. President Bush did call for, and achieved, a 65
percent reduction in U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons. But the Bush administration's position on missile defense
(among other issues) hampered bilateral negotiations with Russia and
contributed to the failure to extend the seminal U.S.-Russia
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before its expiration at the end of 2009. The much weaker 2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT) requires the countries to dismantle—not destroy—only a portion
of their warheads. The United States and Russia have signed and ratified
a treaty to replace START—New START—which limits both countries to
1,550 operationally deployed nuclear weapons. It entered into force in
February 2011.
By contrast, President Obama laid out his vision for a new nonproliferation strategy in Prague in April 2009, where he
reaffirmed
"America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without
nuclear weapons." In doing so, he pledged that the United States would
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security
strategy, negotiate a new START treaty with Russia, pursue U.S.
ratification of the CTBT, strengthen the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) with increased resources and authority for international
inspectors, work toward building a new framework for civil nuclear
cooperation and an international fuel bank, and create a new
international effort to secure vulnerable material globally within four
years. The April 2010
Nuclear Posture Review
identifies nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation as urgent
threats, necessitating a U.S. nuclear policy focused on rebuilding the
nuclear nonproliferation regime through international efforts.
Despite President Obama's shift in tone from the Bush administration,
several nonproliferation issues continue to spark debate in the United
States.
Should the U.S. pursue deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal?
No: The U.S. nuclear arsenal—already subject to significant cuts through the 2011
New START Treaty—should not be further reduced as suggested by the January 2012 policy planning document,
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. First, pursuing cuts to the nuclear arsenal, possibly to as few as three hundred warheads, risks
damaging perceptions
of the viability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which covers critical
U.S. allies like Germany and Japan. Furthermore, the United States needs
a robust nuclear arsenal to counter threats from states like North
Korea and Iran, who regularly flout international accords and norms. For
example, despite North Korea's February 2012
compromise
with the United States to accept a moratorium on the testing of
long-range missiles and nuclear weapon in exchange for food aid, it
broke the accord just two months later after
attempted to test what it claimed was a satellite, but more likely was a long-range missile. It followed this effort with a
successful launch of a satellite in December 2012. According to a recent
International Atomic Energy Agency report,
it is increasingly apparent that Iran's nuclear program is not peaceful
in nature, and that Tehran may be moving closer to developing a nuclear
weapon.
The United States also needs to be mindful of threats from great power countries like
Russia and China. Russia, despite acceding to the New START Treaty in 2011, still has a
larger
nuclear arsenal than the United States, and has even threatened to
target U.S. plans for a strengthened missile defense system in Europe.
In addition, reports have emerged that China's nuclear arsenal is
substantially larger than originally projected and growing. U.S.
congressional representative Trent Franks
claims
that further reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal would encourage
proliferation by countries seeking to outdo the United States, calling
plans for deep cuts "reckless lunacy." Now, more than ever, the United
States should avoid a major alteration of its nuclear posture and
reassure its friends and allies that its deterrent capability remains
robust.
Yes: Moving forward with the nuclear weapons
strategy put forth in the Obama administration's Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense document to "maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent" would strengthen national
security and make U.S. defense spending more efficient. Substantial
reductions to the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal is
unlikely
to harm U.S. national security interests given that the United States
can still rely on its advanced conventional military capabilities.
Additionally, a large stockpile of nuclear weapons is ill-suited to
addressing current threats the United States faces from other countries.
International sanctions targeting Iran's nuclear program, for example, have
escalated,
increasing pressure on the Iranian regime to change course. Moreover,
even if Iran did develop a nuclear weapon capability, some believe it is
extremely unlikely the regime would ever use nuclear weapons due to an
assured counterattack from the United States or Israel. North Korea,
which resumed multilateral negotiations over its nuclear program and
recently agreed to a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, is estimated
to possess only a dozen
weapons.
Moreover, despite fears of a new Cold War between the United States and
China, nuclear weapons appear increasingly exogenous to Sino-U.S.
ties—especially given the recent warming of relations between China and
Taiwan. Some experts have also pointed out that the size of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal inadvertently encourages nuclear weapons proliferation
by rogue states by placing too much value on nuclear weapons.
Should the international community move toward universal nuclear disarmament?
Yes: In a groundbreaking
op-ed piece
in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007, U.S. foreign policy
heavyweights George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn
set out the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and ways in which
the United States can lead the world toward this goal. The essay argued
that relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes was "becoming
increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective."As preliminary steps,
authors called for substantial reductions in the size of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, elimination of short-range forward-deployed nuclear
weapons, ratification of the
Comprhensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), creation of an international nuclear fuel bank, and a halt to
the production of fissile material (which the United States has not
produced since 1988). Because calls for disarmament had previously been
viewed as the purview of the Democratic party, the piece's high-profile
authorship helped shift the debate within U.S. government and other
policy circles. President Obama has endorsed this perspective by calling
for a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, UN secretary-general
Ban Ki-moon has
called global nuclear disarmament a "concrete possibility."
Many who support universal global nuclear disarmament posit that a
legally binding convention on nuclear weapons is the best means of
achieving universal nuclear disarmament. One prominent pro-disarmament
nongovernmental organization
suggests that such a binding global convention could be practically implemented by all nuclear capable states by 2030.
No: Opponents of nuclear disarmament
argue
that it would actually encourage would-be proliferators like Iran,
which would have far more to gain and less to lose by acquiring nuclear
weapons. Many experts, including the
authors
of the Wall Street Journal piece, also believe that the U.S. nuclear
umbrella has been a primary factor in preventing allies such as Japan,
South Korea, and Turkey from seeking nuclear weapons, and that U.S.
disarmament, in particular, could spark regional arms races elsewhere.
Critics of a convention on nuclear weapons also raise concerns of the
political feasibility of reaching an agreement on such a contentious
issue. Specifically, the UN organ that would be entrusted with drafting
such a covenant, the UN Conference on Disarmament, operates by consensus
and has historically faced serious internal
divisions. Another common critique is that an international convention banning nuclear weapons would require an intrusive
verification regime, which many states might be unwilling to accept. Furthermore, such a covenant could have the unintended effect of
nuclear blackmail
by a rogue state that covertly develops nuclear weapons. North Korea's
2003 decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
demonstrates the risks that the international community could by
agreeing to such a convention.
Should the United States ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
Yes: The Bush administration claimed to support the
CTBT, which was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999, but did not push
for ratification while in office.
Proponents
point out that Washington already observes a de facto moratorium on
testing, and that new technology and initiatives such as the
Stockpile Stewardship Program
mean that the United States can retain its nuclear capabilities without
testing. They add that monitoring technology would deter cheating by
detecting any secret testing on a scale large enough to ensure that
weapons are reliable. Supporters of the CTBT also note that President
Clinton pledged to ratify the treaty in 1995, and that doing so might
encourage other states, such as India and China, to do the same.
President Obama has stated his support for the treaty and his intent to
seek Senate ratification, putting Vice President Biden in charge of this
effort.
No: Critics argue that the CTBT would limit the
United States' ability to maintain functional weapons for defensive and
deterrence purposes, and could eventually lead to what has been referred
to as involuntary disarmament.
Opponents [PDF]
also believe that the treaty would be impossible to monitor or enforce
and that cheaters could use secret tests to advance their nuclear
programs, possibly putting the United States at a disadvantage. Finally,
they argue that only a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent and not arms
control treaties, which the international community will ignore, can
dissuade other states from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Should the United States go ahead with missile defense?
Yes:
Supporters
say missile defense will protect the United States against
nuclear-armed, adversarial states such as North Korea and, in particular
Iran, where deterrence may not work because the the rationality of
highlevel leaders is in doubt." Some believe this threat is likely;
others, such as former undersecretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz,
said
that even if the threat were only possible, Americans have a duty to
use existing missile defense technology to protect themselves.
Supporters of missile defense believe that the program will overcome
most of the technological hurdles it now faces, and some note that even
if the system isn't perfect, the difficulty of overcoming the defense
will be enough to deter enemies. They are also likely to point to the
successful
deployment of a missile defense radar system in Turkey in 2012 as well as the
successful use of Iron Dome missile defense in Israel during the Gaza-Israel clashes in March 2012.
No: Opponents argue that policymakers should
reallocate the considerable resources absorbed by the missile defense
system to more imminent, and arguably more plausible, dangers such as
terrorists smuggling improvised nuclear devices into the United States
in cargo containers. A great technological leap is required, they note,
to move from building a nuclear bomb (as North Korea appears to have
done, and as Iran may be close to doing) and designing a reliable
warhead that can be loaded onto a missile. Opponents also argue that,
because the United States would be able to identify the geographical
origin of an incoming missile within seconds from launch, the near
certainty of a devastating U.S. retaliation guarantees a strong
deterrent against any such attack. Some of these critics also dislike
the sense of invulnerability that such a system would lend to the United
States, which, they worry, could lead Washington to take increasingly
unilateral policies in a variety of areas, potentially alienating
friends and antagonizing others. During the 2008 presidential campaign,
then candidate Barack Obama
promised
to "responsibly deploy missile defenses that would protect us and our
allies," but "only when the system works." The European missile defense
system being pursued by the Obama administration has fewer technical
barriers than the one proposed by the Bush administration. Nonetheless,
Russia has suggested it will target the missile defense systems in
Europe unless it receives guarantees from the United States and NATO
that the system will not threaten Russia's strategic interests.
Should the United States introduce new weapon components into its nuclear arsenal?
Yes: The
National Nuclear Security Administration,
the agency in charge of nuclear weapons within the Department of
Energy, has recommended updating the U.S. nuclear arsenal to adapt it to
post-Cold War scenarios and ensure its long-term dependability, leading
to debates over plans to develop a reliable replacement warhead that
would be easier to maintain and would not require nuclear testing.
Although Congress decided not to fund the originally proposed Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program, advocates of the idea, including
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have argued that current methods of
maintaining the nuclear stockpile will work only in the short term and
that ensuring a strong nuclear deterrent is a fundamental U.S. national
security interest. They note that, should the United States one day no
longer be able to reproduce the materials and devices it used during the
Cold War, it may find itself having to choose between letting its
arsenal fade into irrelevance or resume weapons testing.
No: Opponents say that there are no technical
reasons to doubt the soundness of the current stockpile maintenance
system. They point to the
Stockpile Stewardship Programand
the Warhead Life Extension Program as evidence that confidence in the
safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal can be
maintained without nuclear tests or the development of new nuclear
weapons.
Opponents
also worry that the RRW may undermine the nonproliferation consensus,
either because other states will believe that it adds capability to U.S.
weapons or because it may eventually require nuclear testing. They
believe that RRW may be prohibitively expensive, and that the current
system ensures an adequate, long-term nuclear deterrent. The Obama
administration's April 2010
Nuclear Posture Review asserts that the United States will not build new nuclear warheads.
Should the international community do more to engage states like North Korea and Iran?
Yes: While states such as Iran and North Korea
admittedly present a challenge to the international community—whether in
terms of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or threats to regional stability—experts
contend
engagement should trump confrontation. Although international sanctions
targeting Iran's nuclear program have recently expanded amid increasing
calls for preemptive military strikes against Iranian nuclear
facilities, Tehran remains resolute. With that said, talks are
slated to begin
once again in February 2013 after recent delays. Similarly, despite
prolonged sanctions and international isolation, North Korea has
retained its nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, proponents of
engagement
argue
[PDF] that negotiations have yielded concrete results by checking both
countries' nuclear ambitions. Overall, supporters of engagement argue
that more coercive approaches would not only preclude the United States
and international community from reaching any compromise from such
states, but would also
unhinge
regional stability and facilitate nuclear proliferation. They also
argue that advocates of more hard-line strategies exaggerate the risks
of nuclear proliferation by states such as Iran and North Korea, as well
as underrate the value of deterrence and the mutually assured
destruction to ensure stability and prevent the use of nuclear weapons.
No: Rather than squander efforts on engagement, the
international community should take a harder line on intransigent states
such as North Korea and Iran to halt nuclear proliferation. Time and
time again, diplomatic negotiations—whether in the form of the Six Party
Talks with
North Korea or multilateral negotiations with
Iran—have
yielded little in terms of substantive results. North Korea, for
instance, has continued to conduct nuclear tests and repeatedly
threatened to attack South Korea, a critical U.S. ally. Iran also
appears to be
moving closer
to achieving nuclear weapons capability, and is openly enriching
uranium up to 20 percent. Either of these countries could also attempt
to
exporttechnical
expertise abroad, risking proliferation of sensitive missile and
nuclear technology to states such as Syria or Myanmar. In general, those
who favor coercive approaches argue that negotiations are little more
than delaying tactics rather than genuine attempts to reach an
agreement. Additionally, both North Korea and Iran can count on the
support of powerful allies on the
UN Security Council—Russia
or China—and thus have little incentive to change course. Specifically,
the United States and others should prioritize measures including
suspending foreign aid (in terms of North Korea), expanding economic
sanctions, launching covert espionage missions, and, as a last resort,
targeted
military action.
Should the United States provide Pakistan aid to improve the security of its nuclear arsenal?
Yes: As Pakistan is a U.S. ally, consistently faces external and internal
threats [PDF] from terrorists and extremists alike, and currently holds an
estimated
90 to 110 nuclear warheads, it is vital that the United States provide
Pakistan aid to secure its nuclear arsenal. Exemplifying the importance
of helping Pakistan in this area, U.S. congressional representative
Michele Bachmann has
labeled
Pakistan "too nuclear to fail" and has warned that suspending
Pakistan's aid would be "highly naïve." Proponents of providing Pakistan
aid to secure its arsenal also note that such a policy is a relatively
cheap way to prevent dangerous nonstate actors from stealing or
acquiring one of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In particular, aid set
aside for improving the security of Pakistan's arsenal has represented
only a
small proportion of the more than
$20 billion the
country has received from the United States since 2011. Additionally,
the United States, as a long standing nuclear power committed to nuclear
security, is uniquely equipped to provide nuclear security related
assistance to Pakistan.
No: Although the United States has a critical
national security interest in ensuring the security of Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal, providing the Pakistani government with aid will do
little to accomplish this goal. First, Pakistan has repeatedly denied
claims that its nuclear arsenal is
insecure; it also recently announced training of an elite team comprising eight thousand members to guard the nuclear arsenal. Even if
security gaps do exist in Pakistan, it is not clear that additional U.S. aid—on top of the tens of millions the U.S. has
alreadyprovided
Pakistan already to secure its arsenal—will fix the problem. There is
also the risk that certain actors within Pakistan's government could
divert
U.S. aid, and perhaps even to extremist elements in the country.
Similarly, aid designated for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal might actually
increase
suspicions in the Pakistani military that U.S. intelligence agencies
are spying, with potentially harmful ramifications for U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation. More broadly, providing aid to Pakistan to secure its
nuclear arsenal could be interpreted by some members of the
international community as a "reward" to Pakistan for developing nuclear
weapons—and inadvertently encourage the proliferation of nuclear
weapons elsewhere.
Recent Developments
November 2013: Breakthrough in Iran talks
On November 24, 2013, the United States and the rest of the P5+1
struck the first meaningful deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program
in over a decade. In return for limited and reversible sanctions
relief, Iran agreed to halt its nuclear program for a period of six
months. Though the agreement does not provide a long-term solution to
concerns about Iranian nuclear aspirations, it lays the groundwork for
further negotiations. As of January 20, 2014, the IAEA and the United
States
verified that Iran had fulfilled its initial commitments under the joint plan of action.
June 2013: Nuclear states defying NPT
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's latest yearbook has
suggested
that all five recognized nuclear states are either deploying new
nuclear weapons or delivery systems for nuclear systems or plan to do
so. The report contends that these states "appear determined to retain
their nuclear arsenals indefinitely." Such a development would violate
the terms of the nonproliferation treaty which states that recognized
nuclear states work toward disarmament.
April 2013: Egypts walks out of nuclear meetings
On April 30, Egypt
walked out
of the Geneva preparatory meeting for the 2015 Review Conference of the
State Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The Egyptian foreign minister for international organizations explained
that the delegation's walkout from the talks stemmed from Egypt's
frustration at a lack of progress toward a nuclear-free zone
encompassing the Middle East. The creation of such a zone was not on the
agenda for the current round of global nuclear talks.
April 2013: Chinese pledge for nuclear-free North Korea
During his visit to China, Secretary of State John Kerry said that China had
agreed
to help North Korea demobilize its nuclear arsenal by peaceful means.
It is hoped that China, as North Korea's primary trading partner and
financier, has the leverage to mitigate the increasingly aggressive
rhetoric from Pyongyang that has increased fears of military operations
on the peninsula.
February 2013: Third North Korea test blast
North Korea conducted a controversial nuclear test on Monday,
February 11, the country's third since 2006. North Korean officials
claimed the country has successfully miniaturized its nuclear
technology, a crucial step in developing long-range missile
capabilities, but details of the
test remain murky.
The United States
announced
that Washington would push for stricter sanctions in the wake of the
most recent test, which has been condemned by South Korea and Russia,
among others. Even China, North Korea's closest ally for decades,
strongly criticized the test—Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi
announced
that China was "strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed" to North
Korea's most recent provocation. Its subsequent threats against the
United States and South Korea, combined with its scrapping of a Korean
War armistice, have led to widespread
condemnation from the United Nations, European Union, and other states.
December 2013: U.S.-Russian disposal program ends
In 1994, the United States and Russia struck a deal to dispose of
large stockpiles of Soviet highly enriched uranium (HEU). Over twenty
years, Russia converted five hundred metric tons of HEU (enough
bomb-grade uranium for 20,000 warheads) into low-enriched uranium (LEU)
that the United States purchased. The United States-Russia Highly
Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, commonly known as the
Megatons to Megawatts program, ended with the last shipment of LEU reaching the United States on December 11, 2013.
Options for Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime
Introduction
Recent trends have brought the nuclear nonproliferation regime to a
moment of grave crisis. The regime is under siege from both rogue states
and nonstate actors, and its core bargain between the nuclear haves and
have-nots continues to erode. Bolstering international restraints on
the world's deadliest weapons will require the United States and its
international partners to adopt realistic, concrete steps to strengthen
and close gaps in existing treaty regimes, institutions, and
partnerships.
These recommendations reflect the views of
Stewart M. Patrick, director of the program on international institutions and global governance.
- Increasing the IAEA budget and reforming the safeguards, security, and personnel systems
The
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) is the world's technical agency in charge of ensuring that
countries maintain safeguards on their peaceful nuclear programs.
Safeguards help deter a country from diverting nuclear technology and
materials from peaceful to military programs. The major concern is that
safeguards capabilities have not kept up with the increased use of
nuclear power and the projected expansion of nuclear power to many
counties. In the words of the Bush administration's head of the
National Nuclear Security Administration,
"safeguards equipment is outdated and personnel preparedness declining
as the agency failed to replace retiring experts with new hires."
The IAEA provides services on improving nuclear security in order to
prevent nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the hands
of terrorists. In 2008, the Eminent Persons Commission advised the IAEA
director general that the agency needs to substantially increase its
budget for safeguards and security work. Unfortunately, this financial
support has not been forthcoming. The IAEA, however, needs member states
to commit to place the agency on a sustainable funding path. It also
needs to reform its personnel rules to allow experts to stay in one type
of job for longer than seven years and for highly qualified senior
personnel to stay employed beyond the mandatory retirement age of
sixty-two.The recent release of an IAEA report discussing Iran's alleged
covert nuclear weapons activity presents more evidence regarding the
need to
ensure the funding needs of the IAEA are satisfied.
- Increasing national and international efforts to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force
Increasing national and international efforts to bring the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
into force and boost funding to the CTBT Preparatory Commission is
required in order to continue to improve the international monitoring
system. The CTBT is specifically linked to the overall nonproliferation
regime, and entry into force would strengthen the norm against
proliferation of nuclear weapons and make it more difficult for states
to have confidence that nuclear weapons would work without testing. For
the CTBT to enter into force, forty-four nuclear-capable states must
ratify it. If the United States ratifies, it can then apply more
leverage to the remaining holdout states to do the same.
Nonratifying states include China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States. In a February 2010
speech, Vice President Biden reaffirmed U.S. commitment to ratify the
treaty. The United States will need allied states to reach out and apply
diplomatic pressure to holdout states to help secure entry into force.
To ensure the requisite technical support for the treaty, the United
States and its allies need to provide enough funding and other technical
resources to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) and Preparatory Commission.
Such support will improve the global monitoring system that is designed
to detect relatively low yield nuclear tests throughout the world.
- Negotiating new, emboldened nuclear arms control treaties
The United States and Russia replaced the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the
New START Treaty.
Successful negotiation and ratification of this agreement improved the
overall condition of U.S.-Russian relations, possibly making it easier
to work together on other multilateral efforts (such as ensuring the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, preventing further proliferation to
additional states, and implementing global best security practices on
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials). The New START
agreement preserves many of the best elements of its predecessor, such
as information exchange, predictability, and permanence in reductions,
verification, and transparency. But the United States and Russia must
also look ahead to
deeper nuclear reductions and focus on broader issues of contention, including missile defense and advanced conventional weapons.
In the longer term, the United States and its international partners should consider the following steps:
- Reforming and strengthening the NPT by creating automatic or binding UNSC mechanisms.
Rights in the NPT come with responsibilities. Nuclear weapon states
have the responsibility to ensure access to peaceful nuclear
technologies, and the recipient states need to show that they can manage
nuclear power safely and securely. Although Iran has cited its
inalienable right under the NPT to access peaceful nuclear technologies,
including dual-use enrichment technologies, it has not met its
responsibility to ensure adequate safeguards on its peaceful nuclear
program. It has also not provided enough transparency into suspected
nuclear weapons development activities to assure the world that it is
meeting its responsibility to not acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea
left the NPT under the Article X supreme national interests clause, but
it did so while under suspicion of developing nuclear weapons. Moreover,
it never placed its nuclear program under safeguards.
Although amending the NPT is admittedly a difficult task, states
should commit to strengthening the interpretation and application of the
treaty's rules. In particular, the UN Security Council should require
that any state in violation of its safeguards agreement should suspend
the suspect activity until the violation is resolved. The Security
Council should also require any state in violation of its safeguards
agreement that wants to leave the NPT to return nuclear technologies and
materials obtained while a member to countries of origin. In addition,
the Security Council should call for a special inspection in any country
that has violated its safeguards commitment and is under suspicion of
having a nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapon states have a special
responsibility to reaffirm their commitment to pursue nuclear
disarmament. They need to demonstrate what concrete actions they have
taken and intend to take on the disarmament front. The 2010 NPT Review
Conference provided an opportunity for treaty signatories to recommit
themselves to a world free of nuclear weapons; however, U.S. efforts to
include language on stronger verification measures in the final document
failed.
- Determining whether to institutionalize PSI.
In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama advocated that the world should "come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative...into
a durable institution." The purported benefits of creating a formal
institution out of PSI are still being debated. For example, turning the
PSI from an informal cooperation agreement into an organization with a
secretariat and a budget has the potential to increase its resource
endowment and expand its reach. Institutionalizing the initiative may
also help clarify commitments and increase operational transparency,
making it easier to evaluate performance and measure progress. Bringing
the PSI under UN aegis, some analysts have argued, could boost its
international legitimacy and appeal to China, India, and Middle Eastern
states, whose cooperation in policing the nuclear trade market remains
important. One way to put PSI on a firmer institutional footing without
folding into an explicitly formalized institution would be to strengthen
its legal foundation. This would place interdiction on grounds
consistent with international law.
- Creating a global alliance against nuclear terrorism.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, while nonnuclear,
renewed fears of catastrophic nuclear terrorism. In response, the United
States and partner countries have revived or initiated international
efforts to counter this threat. In particular, the Group of Eight (G8)
countries in 2002 launched the
Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,
in which the United States committed to spend at least $10 billion over
ten years, and other partners pledged to match that sum. In 2004, the
United States formed the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative,
which was an umbrella program including several programs to secure and
reduce fissile materials as well as radioactive materials. Russia is a
major partner in this initiative. In 2006, Russia and the United States
joined forces again when then president Bush and then Russian president
Putin began the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,
which as of early 2010 had eighty-two countries voluntarily taking part
in sharing intelligence on nuclear terrorist threats as well as
pledging to work toward better security practices over nuclear and other
radioactive materials.
These programs and initiatives have achieved significant results, but
more committed and coordinated global efforts are needed. The challenge
for the new U.S. administration is to urge countries to meet their
financial and resource commitments pledged under these programs and to
increase funding and personnel to ensure that President Obama's goal of
securing all vulnerable nuclear material can be achieved by 2014. The
institutionalization of biennial global nuclear security summits—with
the next summit planned for 2014 in the Netherlands—is a solid step in
the right direction.
- Developing a system of layered nuclear fuel assurance.
The spread of nuclear fuel–making facilities under a single state's
control can increase the risk of diversion of peaceful nuclear
technologies into weapons programs. Issuing an edict to prohibit this
activity runs into the barriers of state sovereignty and the
"inalienable right" to pursue peaceful nuclear programs. States have
built fuel–making facilities for reasons of satisfying national pride,
developing a latent weapons capability, and trying to make a profit. To
take away or at least to reduce the economic rationale for these
facilities, several fuel assurance programs have been proposed. Many of
these proposals were studied decades ago. Concerns about proliferation
in response to Iran's nuclear program have prompted a dusting off of
these proposals or a dressing up with more incentives. The important
point is that the nuclear fuel market has worked effectively and there
is no reason to expect it to fail in the foreseeable future especially
with the expansion plans of the established nuclear fuel producers.
To further strengthen nonproliferation, it makes sense to offer a
layered system of fuel assurances that would be available to any country
that is in compliance with its safeguards commitments. The first layer
would be the existing market in which a handful of major producers have
been meeting customers' needs. The second layer would consist of
political commitments and insurance policies that would form in effect a
virtual fuel bank to back up the existing market. The final layer would
consist of an actual fuel bank containing sufficient fuel or
low-enriched uranium that can be readily converted to fuel. Such a bank
should contain at least enough fuel or enriched uranium to supply the
needs of a few large power reactors over a two to three year period.
Even with this layered approach, certain countries may still decide to
pursue new fuel–making endeavors, but a robust layered fuel system will
at least expose that these countries are doing such activities for other
than economic reasons.
Starting
weeks before Islamic militants attacked the U.S. diplomatic outpost in
Benghazi, Libya, longtime Clinton family confidante Sidney Blumenthal
supplied intelligence to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
gathered by a secret network that included a former CIA clandestine
service officer, according to hacked emails from Blumenthal’s account.
The emails, which were posted on the internet in 2013, also show that
Blumenthal and another close Clinton associate discussed contracting
with a retired Army special operations commander to put operatives on
the ground near the Libya-Tunisia border while Libya’s civil war raged
in 2011.
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