- Ali Ebadi -
Straining the Saudi government for actively addressing the challenges
and risks that it considers threatening to its political system.
Looks as if it is struggling in all directions: Adjust segments of
their audience internal escapes from the directives of political and
"allegiance guardian", and re-organized to hold the Gulf Cooperation
Council, which has become a forum periodically away from what I want him
from the unit Gulf, and the order of the regional situation, including
Approves Saudi interests which is based on finding and supporting
systems "ally" and drop or shook systems "hostile."
Comes the list of "terrorist organizations" issued by the Saudi
Interior Ministry to draw a clear distinction with the organizations,
trends and currents see the Saudi elite ruling that they represent a
threat to the traditional political system, and go doctrine away in a
warning to get out of their bases and require discipline within the
official standards, at the time can not be in it on any system that
determines the political behavior of the people in general and
especially the elites.
An internal state of emergency
Between the Royal Order issued by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz in
February 3 last and the Interior Ministry statement on the seventh of
this more than a month, and more than a little difference.
Royal Order seemed to focus on the priority of addressing the
involvement of a fight Saudi youth outside the country, and then to
belong to or support "currents or groups - and the like - religious or
intellectual extremist or classified as terrorist organizations
internally, regionally or internationally," while the statement the
Saudi Interior placing second in the affairs of his priorities, and deal
with the fighting outside Syria secondary theme (statement of Interior
and put it in the third item, did not stop him only in passing).
Why is this "difference"?
You must understand it from the perspective of non-contradiction, so
that the function of the Royal Order put an end break to cover or turn a
blind eye fighting abroad without permission from a guardian, which is
understandable in the reality of Saudi Arabia, which saw what looked
like an exodus of young people looking for the land of spacious
expressing his rebellion and his plans away from the tutelage of the
system.
And the need to "patch" dictated by considerations of internal security
and political linked documents the relationship with Washington.
But the king opened the door with it in front of targeted groups and
other currents ("terrorist" or "extremist") at home or abroad.
The statement by the Interior to form the Executive Decree to see the
King, and expands the scope of the prohibitions to include intellectual
trends of the opposition came from the custody of the system, and this
indicates that the real target is not the fighters abroad as much as the
individuals and organizations that carry currents and opposing ideas.
Hence the ban and criminalize every form of support or sympathy or
promote them; tweets, or even comments on sites reaching social fields
has become risky.
If the fighters overseas security concern seriously and easy to justify
targeted for security reasons and clear, the fight against
organizations and political trends or intellectual anti-regime seem more
difficult and more expensive than the political and moral because it
may affect the authenticity of the principle of freedom of opinion, what
will bring the reaction is difficult to estimate.
Difficulties within the UK and around the closest make the Saudi
leadership in a position dominated by anxiety and uncertainty,
particularly in the light of international changes that Avqdtha feeling
availability of Sindh Almkan, it all paid to take precautions
protectionist very harsh and the adoption of speech free of diplomacy
sometimes, so it was decided to confiscate political rights at home at
once, and determine the fate of policies and regulations in the near
vicinity or beyond.
It's an unenviable position Saudi leadership he should be required to
campaign against the aspirations of the elite civil in the country to
hold political and social reforms Vtendf to announce something like a
state of emergency, so that the list of "terrorist organizations" open
the update live up to the level of accountability for the support,
promotion and empathy to include:
"All of the support organizations, or groups, or currents, or
gatherings, or parties, or show affiliation with, or sympathy, or
promotion, or holding meetings under its umbrella, whether inside or
outside the Kingdom, including participating in all media Media audio,
or read, or visual, and means of social communication of all kinds,
audio, or read, or video, and Internet sites, or trading their contents
in any way, or use slogans such groups and currents, or any symbols
indicate support or sympathy " , as well as "seeking to destabilize the
social fabric and national cohesion, or call, or participating in, or
promotion, or incitement to sit-ins, or demonstrations, or gatherings,
or collective data in any suit or image was, or whatever affects the
unity and stability of the kingdom by any means" .
In short, he fits the era of a new security changes that have occurred
in the order of risk: the inside near the neighborhood, then the ocean
farthest.
Restrictions on the Brotherhood and isolate Qatar
Despite that statement, the Saudi Interior select different groups
within the framework of the ban and prosecution, there is no doubt that
the Muslim Brotherhood offshoots complex represents the first goal and
the "enemy" real in the circle of Islamic sectarian narrow, they are
considered a potential alternative for many of the regimes in the Muslim
world and possess the vision and cadres many and now holds the sympathy
from some who see it as facing a coup in Egypt and excluded in other
countries.
But the group "Brotherhood" tangible presence in the Gulf Arab states
back to several decades, and particularly in a period of conflict with
President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the fifties of the last century, where
embraced Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states cadres fleeing from Egypt, and
has to use them in educational and other institutions, and was the
beginning of mutual influence between the thought of the Muslim
Brotherhood and Salafi ideology traditional, giving the group a chance
to attend the organization in these countries. It is said that Saudi Arabia was until recently supporting international charities linked Brotherhood.
Saudi Arabia and the separation of "Brotherhood" began after the
September 11, 2001, while Saudi Arabia and found herself in front of a
dilemma involving many of their nationals in terrorist operations in the
international arena, which put them in an awkward position.
Previously, the interior minister, the late Saudi Prince Nayef bin
Abdul Aziz said that railed against the group "Muslim Brotherhood", and
described it as "the origin of the scourge," saying: "Without hesitation
I say that our problems and Afrazacna all came from the Muslim
Brotherhood," he said, adding that they were "recruited people (in Saudi
Arabia) and currents grow up, and they are against the kingdom. "
The packages owner of the Saudi decision ordered early in the
consideration "Brotherhood," a non-credible and decided Thin opportunity
to get rid of them, and it was the Saudi king the first Arab leader
pays tribute to quickly overthrow the Egyptian military dictator Mohamed
Morsi, and completed the package of decisions of financial support in
collaboration with other Gulf states.
But it did not end up here, The cost of support you get older, because
of the political turmoil and the economic and security which surrounds
the payment of the Government of Egypt and the resignation of Hazem
El-Beblawi, in time finds Brotherhood lap warm and safe haven in the
vicinity of Saudi Arabia.
From here came the move to withdraw the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and the UAE from Qatar to express anger Riyadh to host Doha for a
growing number of "Brotherhood" and formed a launching pad for
counter-revolution against the current regime in Egypt, which is
preparing for the electoral benefits and constitutional works in order
to bypass without great difficulties.
It is noteworthy that not be Kuwait, which assumed the role of
assistant to the level of financial support the Egyptian rule of the
new, within the countries that withdraw its ambassador from Doha: Is it
just a difference with Saudi Arabia in the estimation of the situation,
or that Kuwait maintains a margin allows it to move on the line
brokerage to approximate the positions between the two shores of the
Gulf Cooperation Council?
Incidentally, this council has become practically disjointed since it
failed to achieve many of the major ambitions such as monetary union,
and also after the rejection of the Sultanate of Oman publicly King
Abdullah's call for unity among the Gulf Arab states.
How the relationship will evolve Qatar and Saudi Arabia?
This relationship is heading for more enticements and pressures,
especially after the announcement of a source close to the Qatari
government that Doha "will not change its foreign policy - regardless of
the price of this Moagaf- will not give up hosting members of the
Muslim Brotherhood."
The source added that the dispute regards "more disagreements about
foreign policy," in reference to issues such as Egypt and Syria.
Qatar has a history of difficult relations with neighbor Saudi Arabia,
which is as fortified itself treaties military with the United States,
seeking to resist the Saudi influence over the constipation tools
"soft", such as "Al-Jazeera" and employing its credit and financial
investments International in an attempt to bridge the disparity caused
by the imbalance in size demographic and geographic each of the two
countries.
What is the impact on the Saudi approach the situation in Syria?
It is known that Saudi Arabia and Qatar relations financing, arming and
directing with many of the armed groups in Syria, and these
relationships were not complementary, but that she believed the American
circles left negative consequences on the development of the
performance of the opposition, which stuck between various loyalties.
I've put a statement the Saudi Interior Front victory and Daash within
terrorist groups, and did not include other groups linked to al Qaeda,
such as "free-Sham."
It is certain that this trend will happen Saudi rift within the
"Islamic Front", which was intended to influence Daash face, and now may
have to determine the position of the classification of "victory."
There is a link to groups such as the "Army of Islam" led by Zahran
Aloush of "victory" in Saudi Arabia and at the same time, which may
re-shuffle the deck again in terms of alliances.
This reflects again Tdgda front corresponding to Syria, which began
with a move away from Turkey inherent in the Syrian file, and now with
the intensification of the dispute Saudi-Qatari.
It is noted that the Saudi authorities have retained the right to add
any names to the list, hoping - as Abdo- to regain all departed from the
official line.
International context of the Saudi decision
What can not be separated from the Saudi decision to seek Riyadh to re-heat to relations with the American administration.
The timing of the Royal Order and later the Interior Ministry statement
before a visit by President Barack Obama to Saudi Arabia this month, in
a message intended to reassure Americans that Saudi Arabia has taken a
trend is irreversible in the unification of official discourse and
policies about "terrorism", and that there is no disparity between what
is on the table and what is underneath, and in the wake of reports that
pointed to an American Saudi sponsorship of extremist organizations
operating in Syria and ignoring party headed for Saudi nationals to
fight in this country.
Eight Riyadh visit of trying to pre-empt the development of Qatar in a
difficult position, the position of the outcast accused of supporting
terrorism, whether "victory" or "Brotherhood."
It hopes to attract to the administration kept up the pressure on in
Doha, particularly in light of the rumors about the relationship linking
the recent victory Front, which is the official branch of al-Qaeda in
Syria.
Previously, succeeded Arabia with its allies in the change in
Washington's view on how to deal with the change that has happened in
Egypt, and hopes now to get American support pushes in the direction of
isolating Qatar, after it became clear that the replacement of the Emir
of Qatar and former prime minister, did not change from the use of this
state with regional crises, particularly Egypt, and with the Gulf House.
It must also be pointed out that Saudi Arabia -okdmt to promote
rapprochement with the United States-a significant change through the
appointment of Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef, the coordinator of
the security policy place Intelligence Director Bandar bin Sultan.
The farther from the house, which is divided on the Gulf itself (Saudi
Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in the hand, and in the other hand, Qatar,
Kuwait and Oman in the third hand), there is a big question about the
fate of the hardline Saudi policy towards Iran.
There is nothing that indicates that Saudi Arabia is in the process of
changing their accounts in dealing with the great neighbor, but the
concern is adapting its smaller neighbor feisty and internal house in
order may force it to temporarily ease of dealing with Iran, despite
showing signs of stress in Bahrain.
This reinforces the belief decline in Riyadh bet on a significant
change in Syria for the benefit of her team in the opposition.
