The U.S. knew Hussein was launching some of the worst chemical attacks in history -- and still gave him a hand.
BY SHANE HARRIS AND MATTHEW M. AID |
AUGUST 26, 2013
The U.S. government may be
considering military action in response to chemical strikes near Damascus. But a
generation ago, America's military and intelligence communities knew about and
did nothing to stop a series of nerve gas attacks far more devastating than anything
Syria has seen,
Foreign Policy has learned.
SHARE:
In 1988, during the waning days of Iraq's war with Iran, the
United States learned through satellite imagery that Iran was about to
gain a major strategic advantage by exploiting a hole in Iraqi defenses.
U.S. intelligence officials conveyed the location
of the Iranian troops to Iraq, fully aware that Hussein's military
would attack with chemical weapons, including sarin, a lethal nerve
agent.
The intelligence included imagery and maps about Iranian troop
movements, as well as the locations of Iranian logistics facilities and
details about Iranian air defenses. The Iraqis used mustard gas and
sarin prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that relied on U.S.
satellite imagery, maps, and other intelligence. These attacks helped to tilt the war in Iraq's favor and
bring Iran to the negotiating table, and they ensured that the Reagan
administration's long-standing policy of securing an Iraqi victory would
succeed. But they were also the last in a series of chemical strikes stretching
back several years that the Reagan administration knew about and didn't
disclose.
U.S. officials have long denied
acquiescing to Iraqi chemical attacks, insisting that Hussein's government
never announced he was going to use the weapons. But retired Air Force Col.
Rick Francona, who was a military
attaché in Baghdad during the 1988 strikes, paints a different picture.
"The Iraqis never told us that
they intended to use nerve gas. They didn't have to. We already knew," he
told
Foreign Policy.
According to recently declassified
CIA documents and interviews with former intelligence officials like Francona,
the U.S. had firm evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks beginning in 1983. At the
time, Iran was publicly alleging that illegal chemical attacks were carried out on
its forces, and was building a case to present to the United Nations. But it
lacked the evidence implicating Iraq, much of which was contained in top secret
reports and memoranda sent to the most senior intelligence officials in the
U.S. government. The CIA declined to comment for this story.
In contrast to today's wrenching
debate over
whether the United States should intervene to stop alleged chemical weapons
attacks by the Syrian government, the United States applied a cold calculus
three decades ago to Hussein's widespread use of chemical weapons against his
enemies and his own people. The Reagan administration decided that it was
better to let the attacks continue if they might turn the tide of the war. And
even if they were discovered, the CIA wagered that international outrage and
condemnation would be muted.
In the documents, the CIA said that
Iran might not discover persuasive evidence of the weapons' use -- even though
the agency possessed it. Also, the agency noted that the Soviet Union had
previously used chemical agents in Afghanistan and suffered few repercussions.
It has been previously reported
that the United States provided tactical intelligence to Iraq at the same time that
officials suspected Hussein would use chemical weapons. But the CIA documents,
which sat almost entirely unnoticed in a trove of declassified material at the National Archives in College Park, Md.,
combined with exclusive interviews with former intelligence officials, reveal
new details about the depth of the United States' knowledge of how and when
Iraq employed the deadly agents. They show that senior U.S. officials were
being regularly informed about the scale of the nerve gas attacks. They are tantamount to an official
American admission of complicity in some of the most gruesome chemical weapons
attacks ever launched.
Top CIA officials, including the
Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, a close friend of President Ronald
Reagan, were told about the location of Iraqi chemical weapons assembly plants;
that Iraq was desperately trying to make enough mustard agent to keep up with
frontline demand from its forces; that Iraq was about to buy equipment from
Italy to help speed up production of chemical-packed artillery rounds and
bombs; and that Iraq could also use nerve agents on Iranian troops and
possibly civilians.
Officials were also warned that
Iran might launch retaliatory attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle
East, including terrorist strikes, if it believed the United States was
complicit in Iraq's chemical warfare campaign.
"As Iraqi attacks continue and
intensify the chances increase that Iranian forces will acquire a shell
containing mustard agent with Iraqi markings," the CIA reported in a top secret
document in November 1983. "Tehran would take such evidence to the U.N. and
charge U.S. complicity in violating international law."
At the time, the military
attaché's office was following Iraqi preparations for the offensive using
satellite reconnaissance imagery, Francona told
Foreign Policy. According to a
former CIA official, the images showed Iraqi movements of chemical materials to
artillery batteries opposite Iranian positions prior to each offensive.
Francona, an experienced Middle
East hand and Arabic linguist who served in the National Security Agency and
the Defense Intelligence Agency, said he first became aware of Iraq's use of
chemical weapons against Iran in 1984, while serving as air attaché in Amman,
Jordan. The information he saw clearly showed that the Iraqis had used
Tabun
nerve agent (also known as "GA") against Iranian forces in southern
Iraq.
The declassified CIA documents
show that Casey and other top officials were repeatedly informed about Iraq's
chemical attacks and its plans for launching more. "If
the Iraqis produce or acquire large new supplies of mustard agent, they almost
certainly would use it against Iranian troops and towns near the border," the
CIA said in a top secret document.
But it was the express policy of
Reagan to ensure an Iraqi victory in the war, whatever the cost.
The CIA noted
in one document that the use of nerve agent "could have a significant impact on
Iran's human wave tactics, forcing Iran to give up that strategy." Those
tactics, which involved Iranian forces swarming against conventionally armed
Iraqi positions, had proved decisive in some battles. In March 1984, the CIA
reported that Iraq had "begun using nerve agents on the Al Basrah front and
likely will be able to employ it in militarily significant quantities by late
this fall."
The use of chemical weapons in war
is banned under the
Geneva
Protocol of 1925, which states that parties "will
exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the" agreement. Iraq never
ratified the protocol; the United States did in 1975. The
Chemical
Weapons Convention, which bans the production and use of such arms,
wasn't passed until 1997, years after the incidents in question.
The initial wave of Iraqi attacks,
in 1983, used mustard agent. While generally not fatal, mustard causes severe
blistering of the skin and mucus membranes, which can lead to potentially fatal
infections, and can cause blindness and upper respiratory disease, while increasing
the risk of cancer. The United States wasn't yet providing battlefield
intelligence to Iraq when mustard was used. But it also did nothing to assist
Iran in its attempts to bring proof of illegal Iraqi chemical attacks to light.
Nor did the administration inform the United Nations. The CIA determined that
Iran had the capability to bomb the weapons assembly facilities, if only it could
find them. The CIA believed it knew the locations.
Hard evidence of the Iraqi
chemical attacks came to light in 1984. But that did little to deter Hussein
from using the lethal agents, including in strikes against his own people. For
as much as the CIA knew about Hussein's use of chemical weapons, officials
resisted providing Iraq with intelligence throughout much of the war. The
Defense Department had proposed an intelligence-sharing program with the Iraqis
in 1986. But according to Francona, it was nixed because the CIA and the State
Department viewed Saddam Hussein as "anathema" and his officials as "thugs."
The situation changed in 1987. CIA
reconnaissance satellites picked up clear indications that the Iranians were
concentrating large numbers of troops and equipment east of the city of Basrah,
according to Francona, who was then serving with the Defense Intelligence
Agency. What concerned DIA analysts the most was that the satellite imagery
showed that the Iranians had discovered a gaping hole in the Iraqi lines
southeast of Basrah. The seam had opened up at the junction between the Iraqi
III Corps, deployed east of the city, and the Iraqi VII Corps, which was
deployed to the southeast of the city in and around the hotly contested Fao
Peninsula.
The satellites detected Iranian
engineering and bridging units being secretly moved to deployment areas
opposite the gap in the Iraqi lines, indicating that this was going to be where
the main force of the annual Iranian spring offensive was going to fall,
Francona said.
In late 1987, the DIA analysts in
Francona's shop in Washington wrote a Top Secret Codeword report
partially entitled "At The Gates of Basrah," warning that the Iranian 1988
spring offensive was going to be bigger than all previous spring offensives, and
this offensive stood a very good chance of breaking through the Iraqi lines and
capturing Basrah. The report warned that if Basrah fell, the Iraqi military
would collapse and Iran would win the war.
President Reagan read the
report and, according to Francona, wrote a note in the margin addressed to
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci: "An Iranian victory is unacceptable."
Subsequently, a decision was made
at the top level of the U.S. government (almost certainly requiring the
approval of the National Security Council and the CIA). The DIA was authorized
to give the Iraqi intelligence services as much detailed information as was
available about the deployments and movements of all Iranian combat units. That
included satellite imagery and perhaps some sanitized electronic intelligence.
There was a particular focus on the area east of the city of Basrah where the
DIA was convinced the next big Iranian offensive would come. The agency also
provided data on the locations of key Iranian logistics facilities, and the
strength and capabilities of the Iranian air force and air defense system.
Francona described much of the information as "targeting packages" suitable for
use by the Iraqi air force to destroy these targets.
The sarin attacks then followed.
The nerve agent causes dizziness, respiratory distress, and muscle convulsions, and
can lead to death. CIA analysts could not precisely determine the Iranian
casualty figures because they lacked access to Iranian officials and documents.
But the agency gauged the number of dead as somewhere between "hundreds" and
"thousands" in each of the four cases where chemical weapons were used prior to
a military offensive. According to the CIA, two-thirds of all chemical weapons
ever used by Iraq during its war with Iran were fired or dropped in the last 18
months of the war.
By 1988, U.S. intelligence was
flowing freely to Hussein's military. That March, Iraq launched a nerve gas
attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja in northern Iraq.
A month later, the Iraqis used
aerial bombs and artillery shells filled with sarin against Iranian troop
concentrations on the Fao Peninsula southeast of Basrah, helping the Iraqi
forces win a major victory and recapture the entire peninsula. The success of
the Fao Peninsula offensive also prevented the Iranians from launching their
much-anticipated offensive to capture Basrah. According to Francona, Washington
was very pleased with the result because the Iranians never got a chance to
launch their offensive.
The level of insight into Iraq's
chemical weapons program stands in marked contrast to the flawed assessments, provided
by the CIA and other intelligence agencies about Iraq's program prior to the
United States' invasion in 2003. Back then, American intelligence had better
access to the region and could send officials out to assess the damage.
Francona visited the Fao Peninsula
shortly after it had been captured by the Iraqis. He found the battlefield
littered with hundreds of used injectors once filled with atropine, the drug
commonly used to treat sarin's lethal effects. Francona scooped up a few of the
injectors and brought them back to Baghdad -- proof that the Iraqis had used
sarin on the Fao Peninsula.
In the ensuing months, Francona
reported, the Iraqis used sarin in massive quantities three more times in
conjunction with massed artillery fire and smoke to disguise the use of nerve
agents. Each offensive was hugely successful, in large part because of the
increasingly sophisticated use of mass quantities of nerve agents. The last of
these attacks, called the Blessed Ramadan Offensive, was launched by the Iraqis
in April 1988 and involved the largest use of sarin nerve agent employed by the
Iraqis to date. For a quarter-century, no chemical attack came close to the
scale of Saddam's unconventional assaults. Until, perhaps, the strikes last
week outside of Damascus.
Click to the next page to read the secret CIA files.
Hard evidence of the Iraqi
chemical attacks came to light in 1984. But that did little to deter Hussein
from using the lethal agents, including in strikes against his own people. For
as much as the CIA knew about Hussein's use of chemical weapons, officials
resisted providing Iraq with intelligence throughout much of the war. The
Defense Department had proposed an intelligence-sharing program with the Iraqis
in 1986. But according to Francona, it was nixed because the CIA and the State
Department viewed Saddam Hussein as "anathema" and his officials as "thugs."
The situation changed in 1987. CIA
reconnaissance satellites picked up clear indications that the Iranians were
concentrating large numbers of troops and equipment east of the city of Basrah,
according to Francona, who was then serving with the Defense Intelligence
Agency. What concerned DIA analysts the most was that the satellite imagery
showed that the Iranians had discovered a gaping hole in the Iraqi lines
southeast of Basrah. The seam had opened up at the junction between the Iraqi
III Corps, deployed east of the city, and the Iraqi VII Corps, which was
deployed to the southeast of the city in and around the hotly contested Fao
Peninsula.
The satellites detected Iranian
engineering and bridging units being secretly moved to deployment areas
opposite the gap in the Iraqi lines, indicating that this was going to be where
the main force of the annual Iranian spring offensive was going to fall,
Francona said.
In late 1987, the DIA analysts in
Francona's shop in Washington wrote a Top Secret Codeword report
partially entitled "At The Gates of Basrah," warning that the Iranian 1988
spring offensive was going to be bigger than all previous spring offensives, and
this offensive stood a very good chance of breaking through the Iraqi lines and
capturing Basrah. The report warned that if Basrah fell, the Iraqi military
would collapse and Iran would win the war.
President Reagan read the
report and, according to Francona, wrote a note in the margin addressed to
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci: "An Iranian victory is unacceptable."
Subsequently, a decision was made
at the top level of the U.S. government (almost certainly requiring the
approval of the National Security Council and the CIA). The DIA was authorized
to give the Iraqi intelligence services as much detailed information as was
available about the deployments and movements of all Iranian combat units. That
included satellite imagery and perhaps some sanitized electronic intelligence.
There was a particular focus on the area east of the city of Basrah where the
DIA was convinced the next big Iranian offensive would come. The agency also
provided data on the locations of key Iranian logistics facilities, and the
strength and capabilities of the Iranian air force and air defense system.
Francona described much of the information as "targeting packages" suitable for
use by the Iraqi air force to destroy these targets.
The sarin attacks then followed.
The nerve agent causes dizziness, respiratory distress, and muscle convulsions, and
can lead to death. CIA analysts could not precisely determine the Iranian
casualty figures because they lacked access to Iranian officials and documents.
But the agency gauged the number of dead as somewhere between "hundreds" and
"thousands" in each of the four cases where chemical weapons were used prior to
a military offensive. According to the CIA, two-thirds of all chemical weapons
ever used by Iraq during its war with Iran were fired or dropped in the last 18
months of the war.
By 1988, U.S. intelligence was
flowing freely to Hussein's military. That March, Iraq launched a nerve gas
attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja in northern Iraq.
A month later, the Iraqis used
aerial bombs and artillery shells filled with sarin against Iranian troop
concentrations on the Fao Peninsula southeast of Basrah, helping the Iraqi
forces win a major victory and recapture the entire peninsula. The success of
the Fao Peninsula offensive also prevented the Iranians from launching their
much-anticipated offensive to capture Basrah. According to Francona, Washington
was very pleased with the result because the Iranians never got a chance to
launch their offensive.
The level of insight into Iraq's
chemical weapons program stands in marked contrast to the flawed assessments, provided
by the CIA and other intelligence agencies about Iraq's program prior to the
United States' invasion in 2003. Back then, American intelligence had better
access to the region and could send officials out to assess the damage.
Francona visited the Fao Peninsula
shortly after it had been captured by the Iraqis. He found the battlefield
littered with hundreds of used injectors once filled with atropine, the drug
commonly used to treat sarin's lethal effects. Francona scooped up a few of the
injectors and brought them back to Baghdad -- proof that the Iraqis had used
sarin on the Fao Peninsula.
In the ensuing months, Francona
reported, the Iraqis used sarin in massive quantities three more times in
conjunction with massed artillery fire and smoke to disguise the use of nerve
agents. Each offensive was hugely successful, in large part because of the
increasingly sophisticated use of mass quantities of nerve agents. The last of
these attacks, called the Blessed Ramadan Offensive, was launched by the Iraqis
in April 1988 and involved the largest use of sarin nerve agent employed by the
Iraqis to date. For a quarter-century, no chemical attack came close to the
scale of Saddam's unconventional assaults. Until, perhaps, the strikes last
week outside of Damascus.
Click to the next page to read the secret CIA files.
More...
