Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran
Updated: August 2013
This profile details which major arms control agreements, regimes,
initiatives, and practices that Iran subscribes to and those that it
does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and
holdings of Iran, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is
one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key
states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s
Website at
http://www.armscontrol.org.
Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties
|
Signed
|
Ratified
|
Biological Weapons Convention
|
1972
|
1973
|
Chemical Weapons Convention
|
1993
|
1997
|
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
|
1996
|
- - -
|
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
|
1968
|
1970
|
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
|
- - -
|
- - -
|
Outer Space Treaty
|
1967
|
- - -
|
Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
|
- - -
|
- - -
|
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)*
|
- - -
|
- - -
|
CPPNM 2005 Amendment*
|
- - -
|
- - -
|
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
|
- - -
|
- - -
|
*Participated as observer
Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards
Australia Group: Not a member.
Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member.
Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.
Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol:
Signed an additional protocol on Dec. 18, 2003. Iran submitted an
initial declaration consistent with the protocol in 2004 and abided by
the protocol for a brief period despite the fact that it has not entered
into force. But in February 2006 Iran ended its voluntary
implementation in response to adoption of an International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution referring Tehran to the UN
Security Council. The IAEA and UN Security Council have since called on
Iran to ratify and implement the measure.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.
Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Iran has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolution.
Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices
Biological Weapons: The United States maintains
that Iran’s biotechnology infrastructure gives it the ability to produce
at least small quantities of biological weapons agents for offensive
purposes. According to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report, Iran
has previously conducted offensive biological weapons agent research and
development and continues to seek dual-use biotechnology, which may
support legitimate biotechnology activities, an offensive biological
weapons program, or both.
[1]
U.S. officials have accused Iran of “probably” pursuing an offensive
biological weapons capability in violation of the Biological Weapons
Convention.
[2] Iran denies that allegation.
Chemical Weapons: Having suffered chemical weapon
attacks during its eight-year war with Iraq, Iranian officials
frequently speak about the dangers such arms pose. The United States,
however, has sanctioned companies for providing dual-use chemicals to
Iran. An unclassified U.S. intelligence report says that “Iran
maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare agents” as well as
the ability “of weaponizing [chemical weapons] agents in a variety of
delivery systems.”
[3]
Although an option exists for states-parties to request a challenge
inspection of alleged weapons sites under the terms of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, no state-party, including the United States, has
called for such an inspection in Iran.
Missiles:
- Ballistic Missiles: Iran is the only country not in
possession of nuclear weapons to have produced or flight-tested
ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers. The Iranian
missile program is largely based on North Korean and Russian designs and
has benefited from Chinese technical assistance. With around 1,000
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, Iran has one of the largest
deployed ballistic missile forces in the Middle East.[4]
Its most sophisticated deployed ballistic missile is the liquid-fueled
Shahab-3. Based on the North Korean Nodong missile, the Shahab-3 has a
range of about 1,300 kilometers. Variations of the Shahab-3, including
the Ghadr-1, are reported to have a range of almost 2,000 kilometers.
Iran has made progress in developing and testing solid-fueled missile
technologies, which could significantly increase the mobility of Iran’s
missile force. Iran first tested a two-stage solid fuel-propelled
missile, the Sajjil-2, which has a reported range of roughly 2,000
kilometers, in 2007. It conducted several more tests through February
2011. If Iran attempts to develop a nuclear bomb, it will most likely
use the Sejjil as a delivery vehicle.[5]
Recent reports, however, indicate that sanctions are preventing Iran
from developing the capacity to domestically produce solid-fueled
motors. This may also account for Iran's not having recently tested the
Sejjil II.[6]
In addition, a 2013 report by a UN panel of experts charged with
overseeing the implementation of sanctions on Iran noted that the Sejjil
II has not been sighted in over a year. Iran has also developed a
two-stage, liquid-fueled, space launch vehicle (SLV), the Safir. Between
February 2009 and February 2012 Iran successfully launched four
satellites into space using the Safir SLV. It is believed that Iran is
also developing a larger space launch vehicle, the Simorgh, which has
yet to be tested. A 2009 report by the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC) assessed that the Safir "can serve as a test
bed for long-range ballistic missile technologies" and could serve as
an IRBM if converted to a ballistic missile.
- Cruise Missiles: Iran has acquired a variety of anti-ship
cruise missiles, both through foreign sources and domestic production.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed in 2005 that Iran
illegally procured six Kh-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine four years
earlier. The Kh-55 is an air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile
with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. China has also provided Iran
with cruise missiles and technology. A 2011 report from the Director of
National Intelligence stated that despite export control legislation,
Chinese firms and individuals continued to supply Iran with missile
technology.[7]
Iranian made missiles include the Nasr-1, claimed to be capable of
destroying warships and military targets up to 3,000 tons. Iranian
officials have also announced the large scale production and deployment
of short-range cruise missiles including Zafar and Qader missiles. With a
range of about 300 kilometers and capable of carrying a 1,000 kg
warhead, the Khalid Farzh is Iran's most advanced missile.
Nuclear Weapons: During the latter half of 2002,
the IAEA began investigating two secret Iranian nuclear facilities, a
heavy-water production plant near Arak and a gas centrifuge
uranium-enrichment facility near Natanz. Since that time, the agency has
discovered a series of clandestine nuclear activities, some of which
violated Iran’s safeguards agreement with the agency. Much of Iran’s
uranium-enrichment program is based on equipment and designs acquired
through former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan’s secret supply
network.
After the revelations of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched negotiations with Iran
to address international concerns about the intent and scope of its
nuclear program. These negotiations collapsed in 2005. Subsequently, the
IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in noncompliance with its
safeguards obligations and referred the matter to the UN Security
Council. In 2006, China, Russia, and the United States joined the three
European countries in diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear
program. The six-country bloc is generally known as the P5+1, comprising
the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany.
Since 2006, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions
calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment-related activities and
cooperate fully with the IAEA investigation. In response to Iran’s
refusal to comply with these demands, the council has introduced four
rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian entities and individuals believed
to be involved in Iran’s proliferation-related activities.
Iran continues to expand its uranium enrichment program and has not
fully disclosed the extent of its nuclear-related activities. It relies
on a variant of Pakistan's P-1 centrifuge, which is known to be
crash-prone and unreliable. Iran has been developing more advanced
designs capable of enriching uranium three times faster, but its efforts
have been hampered by sanctions that prevent Iran from importing the
necessary materials that it cannot produce domestically, such as a
high-quality carbon fiber. In February 2013, the IAEA reported that Iran
had begun installing IR-2M centrifgues at its Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Natanz. Experts assess that when operational, these machines will be 3-4
times more efficient that the IR-1 models. Other advanced centrifuges
are undergoing testing. In September 2009, the revelation of Fordow, a
secret nuclear facility under construction near Qom, deepened
international suspicions about Iran’s uranium enrichment activities.
Iran has also refused to provide the IAEA with timely design information
and access to nuclear facilities and persons or discuss outstanding
concerns regarding a potential military dimension to its nuclear
program.
In an unclassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released Dec.
3, 2007, the U.S. intelligence community concluded with “high
confidence” that Iran had “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003”
and expressed “moderate confidence” that the program had not been
restarted.
[8]
The 2007 NIE defined “nuclear weapons program” as weapons design and
weaponization activities, as well as covert uranium conversion and
enrichment work. Since that time, Western intelligence agencies have
reportedly assessed that Iran has resumed research related to
weaponization, but has still not restarted all of the weapons-related
activities shelved in 2003. An update of the 2007 NIE finished in 2011
appears to have maintained many of its core conclusions. Iran has
consistently rejected allegations that it is pursuing nuclear weapons.
In October of 2009, Russia, France and the United States negotiated a
draft agreement with Iran to transfer a portion of Iran’s low-enriched
uranium (LEU) out of the country in exchange for fuel for a rector that
produces medical isotopes. Widely referred to as the fuel swap deal, the
agreement fell through when Iran tried to amend the terms of the LEU
transfer. During 2010 Iran scaled-up a portion of its uranium enrichment
from 4 percent to 20 percent, the level required for the medical
reactor fuel. An effort by Brazil and Turkey to mediate a similar
arrangement in May of 2010 was met with skepticism by the United States,
Russia, and France who expressed doubts over the terms of the
announcement as well as its timing. The P5+1 group has continued its
diplomatic efforts, meeting with Iran on four separate occasions in
2012. These negotaitions did not produce any significant agreements. The
proposals from 2012 served as the basis for the 2013 talks, which took
place in February and April in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Talks were supsended
after no progress was made during the April meetings. For more
information on the proposals, see ACA's factsheet "History of Official
Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue," available
here.
Iran's stockpile of low enriched uranium (3.5 percent) reached almost
9,000 kilograms by May 2013, of which about 2,500 kilograms has been
further enriched to 20 percent. Iran also produced 324 kilograms of 20
percent enriched uranium by this date. However, 142 kilograms were
converted into a solid powder to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor, which
produces medical isotopes. This reduced Iran's available stockpile of
20 percent enriched uranium to approximately 182 kilograms. Iran
continues enrichment of both low enriched uranium and 20 percent
enriched uranium.
In May 2011, Iran’s first nuclear power reactor at its Bushehr plant
began operations. This light-water reactor does not produce weapon-grade
plutonium, but its operation does raise concerns regarding Iran’s
growing nuclear capabilities.
Work on Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak is also ongoing. Plauged
by delays due to sanctions, Iran says that the Arak reactor will begin
operations in 2014. Iran claims that the reactor will be used to produce
medical isotopes, but experts say it is ill suited to that task. When
operational, the Arak reactor will produce enough plutonium for 1-2
nuclear weapons every year. To be useable for weapons, however, the
plutonium must be separated. Iran does not currently have a separation
facility and there is no indication that it is building such a facility
at this time.
In a 2011 report, the IAEA stated that Iran still refused to
cooperate on oustanding issues regarding possible military dimensions of
its nuclear program, saying that since 2008 Iran had not engaged the
IAEA "in any substantive way on this matter." The report cited Iran's
involvement in activities relevant to creating a nuclear explosive,
including efforts by military entities to acquire dual-use equipment, to
create "undeclared pathways" for nuclear material, to acquire weapons
development information through clandestine means, and to test
components for a potential nuclear weaopn design. The IAEA stated that
these activites were part of a "structured programme" before 2003, and
concluded that they may still be continuing. At the June 2013 meeting of
the Board of Governors, Director-General Yukiya Amano said that
negotiations between Iran and the IAEA over an approach to resolve these
concerns had made no progress after 10 meetings since February 2012.
In June, 2012, Iranian news agencies reported the announcement of the
Iranian Navy's plan to develop a nuclear-powered submarine. Experts
have questioned the ability of Iran to go through with this plan, saying
it lacks the technical ability to build a nuclear-powered submarine.
Many assert that the plan was made simply to serve as political
justification to increase uranium enrichment levels, as some nuclear
submarines--such as those used by the U.S.--use as high as 97 percent
enriched uranium as fuel.
Conventional Weapons Trade: In a September 2011
arms trade report, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that
Iranian weapons purchases have largely focused on air defense systems,
presumably to protect their territory and nuclear sites from possible
U.S. or Israeli air attack. In September of 2010, Russia announced
that it was canceling the 2007 sale of the S-300 air defense missile
systems following the introduction of the UN arms embargo.
Proliferation Record
In 2000, Iran exported rockets and several ballistic missile
components to Libya. It also has been accused of violating a Security
Council resolution barring arms transfers to the anti-Israel militia
Hezbollah operating in Lebanon. A 2007 UN Security Council resolution
bars Iran from selling conventional arms and prohibits any country from
importing arms from Iran. Iran has been a major supplier of weapons to
the Syrian government according to a 2012 report by a designated panel
of experts to the UN Security Council. The report describes three
illegal transfers that took place in the prior year, two of which were
to Syria and the third to Taliban members in Afghanistan. Illegal
transfers to Syria included "assault rifles, machineguns, explosives,
detonators, 60mm and 120mm mortar shells and other items."
Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities
Iran was one of the first states to formally call for a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, joining with Egypt to
propose the goal to the UN General Assembly in 1974.
During the 1996 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Iran
proposed an amendment to the convention to expressly prohibit the use
of biological weapons.
Beginning in 1999, Iran sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution
establishing an intermittent panel of governmental experts to consider
the issue of missiles “in all its aspects.” The panel, which held three
sessions in 2001-2002, 2004, and 2007-2008, has explored several topics,
including missile proliferation, missile defenses, and
confidence-building measures. Meanwhile, Iran has elected not to
participate in the voluntary Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation, which calls upon states to provide pre-launch
notifications of their missiles and to annually report on their missile
holdings.
At the 2012 Conference on Disarmament, Iran said that it was not
opposed to negotiations of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), but
that it should not infringe on any state's right to use fissile material
for peaceful purposes or naval propulsion.
ENDNOTES
1. Central Intelligence Agency,
Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-31
December 2004,
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf.
2. Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security and Nonproliferation John C. Rood’s presentation
to the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, November
20, 2006,
http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/2011Rood.html.
3. Central Intelligence Agency,
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf.
4. Department of Defense,
Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran April 2010, http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/dod_iran_2010.pdf.
5. Crail, Peter, "Progress Seen in Iranian Missile Test,"
Arms Control Today, June 2009,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/IranMissile
6. International Institute for Strategic Studies "Iran sanctions halt long-range ballistic-missile development," July 2012,
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/july/iran-sanctions-halt-long-range-ballistic-missile-development/.
7. Director of National Intelligence,
Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January
Through 31 December 2011, February 2012,
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd-acq2011.pdf.
8. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007,
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/iran120307.pdf.
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