“Innovation has nothing to do with
how many [research and development] dollars you have. When Apple came up
with the Mac, IBM was spending at least 100 times more on [research and development]. It’s not about money. It’s about the people you have, how you’re led, and how much you get it.” -Steve Jobs
It’s clear to me that very few people
in academia and the mainstream media understand the current issues
facing the Special Operations community. The recent Council on Foreign Relations report on
the future of SOF written by civilian Linda Robinson is a good
document, but is missing some key elements. For example, how
back-to-back combat deployments are affecting morale, family life, and
readiness of force. The report includes some very valid data and
conclusions, however, you can’t expect someone to complete the full
puzzle if they don’t have the required experiential background to know
what the overall picture looks like.
I do share the report’s observation
that the demand put on U.S. SOF since 2001 has outpaced the strategic
vision, and this is no doubt a major issue in itself.
U.S. Special Operations Command (US
SOCOM) has become very large. And when large organizations experience
fast growth they are at risk of becoming marginalized by smaller and
more innovative competition. In SOCOM’s case, their competition is
violent extremists who promote terror and a radical religious ideology
that does not tolerate freedom of choice.
The terrorists only rules? That there are no rules, and this gives them a major advantage.
A Look at US SOCOM
U.S. Special Operations Command has
become a massive organization, with 60,000 plus troops, a budget that
has grown from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $10.4 billion in 2013. There’s an
inherent inflexibility and bureaucracy that
comes with an organization of this size. The question that begs to be
asked is, “Are we moving towards conventionalizing SOF?” I believe that
this is the elephant in the room nobody is talking about.
U.S. SOCOM was established in 1987 out
of a necessity (the failed Iran hostage rescue) to create a central node
of communication and cooperation among the different SOF service branches
of armed forces. It didn’t come without regular military pushback,
which was understandable. Up to this point, Special Operations had
largely served as the bastard child of the military. But all this was
about to change, especially after Sept. 11 2001. SOCOM initially
included the Army, Navy, and Air Force - The U.S. Marine Corps initially
declined but later realized the error in that decision (read more here), and now have a seat at the table.
Credit: SOFREP
Credit: SOFREP
Credit: SOFREP
As I’ve stated previously, there’s
going to be growing pains and inconvenient inherent traits that come
with being so big. The biggest setbacks to most large organizations
(see The Innovator’s Dilemma)
are lack of innovation and losing the ability to act quickly in the
market place, and SOCOM has a global market to think about. These are
the biggest challenges I see facing U.S. SOCOM in its current form.
Admiral William McRaven, the current
commander of SOCOM, has done a great job managing Washington, D.C.
politic. But, I wonder, has the Admiral set up the necessary framework,
and culture within SOCOM to ensure that innovation and the ability to
act fast are not being marginalized? Are core SOF values of
unconventional thinking, and innovation instilled in the soul of SOCOM?
Everything I’ve seen so far does not
indicate that this is the case. I’ll only point to the current Rules of
Engagement in Afghanistan to make my point. Conventional rules put SOF
in a very vulnerable position when fighting an enemy with no borders or
play book. I can’t help but think that it’s very similar to how the
American revolutionaries defeated a much larger British force who
expected “civilized” warfare, and got unconventional instead.
On the larger scale, we’ve become good
at winning battles but terrible at winning wars in the 21st Century.
One of the reasons for this, and what SOFREP contributor Peter Nealen has pointed out, is that we’ve adopted the philosophy of “Limited War,” and its a fools strategy at best.
Issues facing SOCOM
A. Becoming conventional by size, structure, and nature.
The main advantage of the SOF unit of
the past was that it could act with autonomy. This methodology has been
slowly eroded since 2001, and replaced with a large command structure
and slow-moving decision tree. Hell, a few of my friends had Judge
Advocate General lawyers waiting to interrogate them after actions on
the objective.
“Risk aversion was the greatest
trend I saw. SOF, especially Army SF, were originally started to be able
to be small, fluid, flexible, and able to make serious international
diplomatic decisions on their feet. I had one instance in Iraq where a
[concept of operations] for a counter-mortar [listening post/observation
post] was disapproved because we “didn’t have enough team leadership on
the operation,” even though it was two [staff sergeants] with four
Iraqi Scouts.
The risk averse leadership is
promoted from within because their [officer evaluation report] looks
better, and the free-thinking, daring officers and [non-commissioned
officers] tend to leave the force for the civilian world… sometimes for
no other reason than getting away from the insanity.” - Former Army
Special Forces/Green Beret Blake Miles
B. Psychological issues that
come with sustained combat operations and promoting a culture of
“anything goes” at certain Tier 1 SOF units.
Broken families, post-traumatic stress
disorder, domestic violence, non-disclosure agreement violations, and
illicit drug addiction, to name a few. These are major issues, and
something nobody wants to talk about outside of closed doors. SOFREP
isn’t naming names but we’re calling it like we see it, and left
unchecked by current leadership, this current culture will not end well
when these violations come to light in the mainstream media. It’s a bad
case of exemplary leadership that many should be ashamed of. To the men I
know who’ve stood up and said something, and been punished for it, at
least you can sleep with yourself at night knowing you were on the right
side of things.
C. Lack of clear overarching strategic objective for the organization as a whole.
What is SOCOM’s Mission statement in
two sentences? Most people I know in SOF cannot recite it. If it’s not
clear from the bottom up, then it’s a problem. In football terms, you
have players on the field who don’t know what it takes to win, or what
direction to run in order to score a touchdown. This was also addressed
in the current Council of Foreign Relations report on the future of SOF.
D. Tier One unit infrastructure and cultural issues.
Delta forces v. SEAL Teams. Delta is
composed primarily of active duty support personnel, making it move
faster but with some continuity issues. In comparison, SEAL support
units are mostly comprised of General Schedule employee or contractor
support, slower moving but this maintains continuity. Most I’ve talked
to prefer an active duty organization that rotates ideas, energy, and
morale over a long-term civilian organization. Culturally, Delta has
always been more of “the quiet professionals” when compared to my own
community and that of SEAL Team 6. SEAL Team 6 has done a better job at
the politics of war, and has traditionally been given more high-profile
missions because of it. Delta could take a lesson in politics from the
Navy, and on the flip side, SEAL teams could do a better job being the
“quiet professionals.” Many in my community will disagree with this, but
I only have to point to the book No Easy Day, active SEAL guys consulting for the video game Medal of Honor (Tactics, Techniques, Procesures?), and the recent Esquire article featuring one of the Osama Bin Laden team members to make this point.
“..you need a massive intelligence
and logistics infrastructure to accomplish complicated and technical
Special Operations missions, but it also leads to a bloated bureaucracy
filled with staff officers who have no real job other than to interject
white noise into the decision making process. However, I see the real
problem in SOCOM being careerism and [cover your ass] risk aversion
before the real obstacle and not a simple matter of the numbers
involved. SOCOM is still way too top-heavy with officers, though. It
is so bad that it is to the point that entire new bureaucracies were
created overseas just so that officers could have jobs. One is the
[Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force] which is not a doctrinal
part of Special Forces operations. [Operational detachment teams] do
[missions] all over the world without a [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force] and seem to do just fine. The [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force] may
be required for some logistical resupply operations and unit
deconfliction, but it has grown into a monster over time which has
created this inverse relationship in which Officers now see the [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force] as the maneuver element, and [Operational detachment teams] as the supporting mechanism for this bureaucracy.” – Former Special Forces/75th Ranger Jack Murphy
What Next
McRaven should look to ensure that
U.S. SOCOM gets off the path to conventionalization that is all about
conventional rules, shiny boots, starched uniforms, online sensitivity
training, and loss of cultural innovation. It’s ok to break the right
rules every now and then but the wrong rules are being broken (failed
drug tests, broken non-disclosure agreement, and violent crime etc.).
Unconventional warfare needs to remain the heart and soul of U.S.
Special Operations Command, and component commands. Small unit autonomy,
breaking the right rules, cultural influence, and relationship building
has always been the heart Special Operations. Something must be done to
ensure these are not lost to the big machine of SOCOM.
A clear mission plan written by
operators (not consultants) needs to be implemented to get everyone on
the same map. If we are going to engage in warfare in the modern
century, then we should do it with clear, achievable, and measurable
strategic goals that everyone can understand. We don’t have this now in
Washington or Afghanistan; we have Warfighters busying themselves in a
game of war with rules and objectives that are unclear. They are lions
led by the lambs of political elites in Washington.
Lastly, we must include an important
component that is missing in today’s modern Special Operations warfare:
the strategy of prevention. We can’t kill our way to peace. How do we
address, and reduce, not increase, the evil and hate in the world. Right
now we are minting radical extremists and feeding the hate machine at a
record pace.
One thing is clear: Special Operations
and unconventional warfare is the way future wars will be fought on any
scale. I only hope that the core values of SOF are not lost, and that
US SOCOM takes a hard look in the mirror at what it’s become, and to
steal a quote from Churchill, “However beautiful the strategy, you
should occasionally look at the results.” Both at home, and abroad.
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