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Press Release - Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy
January 14, 2013
Press Release
Working Group Urges “De Facto Trade Embargo” to Stop Iran
from Reaching “Critical Capability”; Calls for Tough Nonproliferation
Standards in Middle East, Increased Support for Cooperative
Nonproliferation Programs in Region, Designating China as a “Destination
of Diversion Concern”
WASHINGTON, DC. Warning that time is running out as Iran accelerates its
nuclear program, the non-partisan Project on U.S. Middle East
Nonproliferation Strategy called on President Obama to use current U.S.
sanctions laws to implement a “de facto international embargo on all
investments in, and trade with, Iran (other than provision of
humanitarian goods)” before Iran achieves “critical capability” – the
point at which it could produce enough weapon-grade uranium (or
separated plutonium) for one or more bombs so rapidly that neither the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor Western intelligence
agencies could be able to detect the move before it was too late to
respond.
In their 154-page report
issued today, the five senior nonproliferation specialists who
co-chaired the Project detail how a set of recent U.S. laws, including
the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law on
January 2, 2013, “vigorously implemented, could provide the U.S.
government with all the authority it needs to impose near-maximal”
economic pressure on Iran in coming months, while permitting the
humanitarian needs of the Iranian people to be met. The report declares
that the possibility of a successful outcome in any negotiations with
Iran depends on the immediate implementation of these sanctions, along
with simultaneously reinforcing the credibility of President Obama’s
threat to use military force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. The report states that “the United States
should offer nuclear sanctions relief to Iran only in response to
meaningful concessions by the Iranians that are consistent with the
multiple relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of
Governors resolutions, and U.S. laws.”
The report urges that Washington reduce the threat of further
proliferation in the changing Middle East by taking steps to reduce
regional “demand” for weapons of mass destruction. The report also
suggest ways to more effectively control the “supply” of sensitive
nuclear technologies through enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency
inspections and by conditioning U.S. commercial nuclear trade on
regional recipients’ renouncing development of indigenous enrichment and
reprocessing technologies that can be used to produce nuclear weapon
material.
The report stresses that the U.S. should actively use the leverage of
foreign aid and political support with new governments in Cairo and
Damascus to check potential proliferation. Such an assertive policy is
critical for Egypt where a Muslim Brotherhood spokesman before the party
came to power called for Egyptian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and
in Syria, where any new regime must be strongly pressed to eliminate
Syria’s chemical arsenal.
The Project co-chairs urge the U.S. to take various specific steps to
enhance the capacity and will of regional states to control weapons of
mass destruction and key materials to prevent their acquisition by
additional state or non-state actors. The co-chairs also encourage
Washington and its partners to promote improved detection and response
capabilities in the region. In addition, the report calls on the U.S. to
“encourage improved implementation of UN sanctions by China, including
by designating China as a ‘Destination of Diversion Concern’” pursuant
to U.S. law.
The report urges creation of a Middle East Nonproliferation
Initiative to coordinate, and more nimbly and creatively advance, such
cooperative nonproliferation work in the Middle East. Noting that the
Department of Defense was recently granted authority to use its
substantial “Cooperative Threat Reduction” funds for projects in the
Middle East, the report details a number of key cooperative and
collaborative projects that should receive immediate funding. These
include projects to build bio-security and bio-safety capacity, track
infectious diseases, and organize Track II dialogues with emerging
leaders and ascendant groups on such issues as a regional
weapon-of-mass-destruction free zone. Another priority project would
foster the development of voluntary codes of conduct, for scientists and
institutions in the region, on responsible management of legitimate
chemical and biological research and materials.
The report contains dozens of specific recommendations arranged in
chapters focused on Iran’s nuclear program, proliferation by state
actors (other than Iran) in the changing Middle East, proliferation by
non-state actors in the region, cooperative nonproliferation programs
applicable to the Middle East, and enhanced partnership with Europe on
nonproliferation in this volatile region.
The Project Co-Chairs—David Albright (President of the Institute for
Science and International Security); Mark Dubowitz (Executive Director,
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies); Orde Kittrie (Professor of
Law, Arizona State University); Leonard S. Spector (Deputy Director,
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies); and Michael Yaffe
(Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National
Defense University)—prepared the report.
The Project convened five not-for-attribution roundtables at which
leading experts from the U.S. government, think tanks, and academia
discussed how to more effectively address Middle East nonproliferation
challenges and opportunities in light of paradigm-shifting regional
developments. This report includes the Project co-chairs’ analyses and
recommendations, many of which were drawn from or inspired by the
roundtable discussions. However, they are attributable only to the
Project co-chairs, in their personal capacities. Institutional
affiliations are included for identification purposes only.
by David Albright and Andrea Stricker January 16, 2013 Download PDF
Without past negotiated outcomes, international pressure,
sanctions, and intelligence operations, Iran would likely have nuclear
weapons by now. Iran has proven vulnerable to international pressure. It
now faces several inhibitions against building nuclear weapons, not
least of which is fear of a military strike by Israel and perhaps others
if it breaks out by egregiously violating its commitments under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and moves to produce highly
enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
—Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining Future Nuclear Options, ISIS Report to the United States Institute of Peace, March 5, 2012
The content of this statement was challenged in a recent report, Weighing the Benefits and Costs of International Sanctions against Iran, 1
released in September 2012 by The Iran Project. In the words of the
authors, William Luers, Iris Bieri, and Priscilla Lewis: “Some have even
argued that without sanctions and other pressures, Iran would already
have a nuclear weapon. We disagree with this judgment, however, since
U.S. intelligence officials have stated with a high degree of confidence
that the decision to build a nuclear weapon has not yet been taken by
Iran’s Supreme Leader.” While ISIS welcomes comments about its findings
and analysis, we find that the authors have mischaracterized our
statement and publicly available information about U.S. intelligence
findings. The report also appears to downplay a significant
international accomplishment in preventing Iran from building nuclear
weapons.
ISIS’s assessment summarized in the quote above is not a categorical
statement that without international pressure, negotiated outcomes,
sanctions, and other measures Iran would definitely have a nuclear
weapon, only that it likely would. In addition, the actions that have
deterred Iran from building nuclear weapons in the 2000s involved fear
of a military strike in the period up to and after the 2003 Gulf War, a
series of highly embarrassing discoveries of secret, undeclared nuclear
activities and facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and the negotiating skill of the foreign ministers of Britain,
France, and Germany in late 2003 to achieve a suspension to Iran’s
sensitive nuclear programs.
In supporting their criticism of the statement in the ISIS report,
the authors reference a March 2011 statement by Director of National
Intelligence James R. Clapper before Congress expressing a high level of
confidence that the Iranian regime had not decided to build nuclear
weapons. This is a widely shared assessment by most Western intelligence
agencies. However, this statement provides more support for ISIS’s
statement than evidence against it.
One important source of U.S. intelligence assessments is the 2007
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The unclassified NIE states:
We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program2;
we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a
minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge
with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its
decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an
Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards
Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s
previously undeclared nuclear work. (emphasis added)
The NIE states that “international scrutiny and pressure” were
instrumental in Iran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program,
which the NIE judges with high confidence existed in the fall of 2003.
Although most Western intelligence agencies agree that the Iranian
regime has not decided to build nuclear weapons since then, most would
recognize that continued pressure, including that resulting from
sanctions and the threat of military strikes, plays an important role in
constraining the regime from making that decision today. That
assessment is consistent with the Obama administration’s stated policy
to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Without such actions in 2003 and additional actions prior to and
after 2003, there are many reasons to believe that Iran would have built
nuclear weapons by now. Other countries faced with little effective
international pressure, such as South Africa in the late 1970s, Pakistan
in the early to mid-1980s, and North Korea in the early 2000s, did
build nuclear weapons. In 2003, there were strong proponents within Iran
for building nuclear weapons. Moreover, in 2003, Iran’s “structured”
nuclear weapons program was making progress on building a warhead
deliverable by the Shahab 3 ballistic missile, according to the November
2011 IAEA Iran safeguards report.3
Based on information from European intelligence officials, critical
evidence that a determined nuclear weapons program had indeed been
halted was intelligence showing the program leader protested the
decision to cut back or halt the program. Moreover, in 2002, Iran was
building and operating several secret gas centrifuge facilities; even
today the full extent of its past and, for that matter, current
centrifuge program is not known. Although Iran maintained that it
intended at some point to declare all of its secret enrichment
facilities, it also may have in fact intended to keep key facilities
secret. The Western discovery several years later of the secret
construction of the deeply buried Fordow gas centrifuge site further
supports that view. Iran was on a trajectory to produce enriched
uranium in secret and complete a nuclear warhead. Assessing that Iran
would likely have decided to build nuclear weapons absent international
discovery and actions in 2003 and afterwards is both logical and
defensible.
One could argue that in the absence of all these actions, Iran would
not have built nuclear weapons, but this point seems particularly
difficult to justify. One could at best argue is that it is not known
what Iran may have done if the pressure had not existed. That would be a
fair point. In reconsidering our assessment, we could agree with the
finding that we cannot know with certainty what Iran would have done
with regard to building nuclear weapons. However, ISIS still assesses
that absent the long list of actions taken to deter Iran, it would have
likely acquired nuclear weapons by today.
Why does this debate matter? It is important to point out that a
collection of actions in the early 2000s, sometimes taken with little
international coordination, managed to keep Iran from building nuclear
weapons. These actions led to sharp cutbacks in Iran’s declared and
undeclared nuclear programs and worked surprisingly well. It took the
U.S. intelligence community several years, until the preparation of the
2007 NIE, to realize and acknowledge these methods’ full effect in
stopping Iran’s structured nuclear weapons program in 2003. A key
lesson is that the Iranian regime was not fully committed to building
nuclear weapons and it was vulnerable to influence about its future
decisions with regard to its nuclear program.
Can such efforts work again? So far, they appear to contribute
importantly to preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons, although
the IAEA and European intelligence agencies have stated that some work
on nuclear weaponization may continue. When several Western
intelligence agencies assess that the Iranian regime has not yet made a
decision to build nuclear weapons, this assessment likely reflects
Iran’s hesitation to do so out of concern of the consequences.
The future is more difficult to predict, particularly as Iran
continues defying the IAEA and seeks to expand its nuclear weapons
capabilities. Today, compared to the early 2000s, there is more
emphasis on ramped up and more effective sanctions aimed at pressuring
the Iranian regime to change its nuclear positions, sanctions that
interfere in Iran’s ability to procure from overseas the equipment it
needs to expand and update its centrifuge and other sensitive nuclear
programs, intelligence operations that better detect and disrupt Iran’s
centrifuge program, and an overt U.S. policy of preventing Iran from
building nuclear weapons. The continuing use of these methods, albeit
in a different configuration than in 2003 and 2004, is the best way to
stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons today and in the future and
avoiding war.
1 The report itself appears to be undated. 2 Footnote 1 in the NIE: For the purposes of this
Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon
design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and
uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil
work related to uranium conversion and enrichment. 3 IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the National Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65,
November 8, 2011.
Taking Stock and Moving Forward on the Issue of the Parchin High Explosives Test Site
by David Albright and Robert Avagyan January 25, 2013 Download PDF
For almost a year, international attention has focused on Iran’s
Parchin military complex. This site is where Iran is suspected to have
conducted in the early 2000s high explosive compression tests pertinent
to the development and manufacturing of nuclear weapons. The
experiments are alleged to have occurred inside an explosive chamber
located in a compound in the north of the sprawling military complex.
As far as can be determined, neither the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) nor the U.S. government has alleged that the experiments
continued after 2004. Iran’s goal of using this chamber would likely
have been to hide its activities from overhead observation by foreign
intelligence agencies and minimizing the chance that material used in
testing would be dispersed off-site, increasing chances of detection.
Western intelligence agencies have historically devoted considerable
resources via ground and air-based methods to detecting nuclear related
facilities, activities, and material at Iranian sites suspected of
having been involved in nuclear weaponization and enrichment work.
According to IAEA information, the chamber was constructed in 2000
and designed to contain explosions involving up to 70 kilograms of high
explosives. The IAEA has not published a detailed rationale for its
request to Iran to visit the Parchin site. However, it reported in its
November 2011 safeguards report that Iran used the test chamber to
conduct high explosive tests in the early 2000s, possibly related to
nuclear weapons development. A senior U.S. official told CNN
(and the same official independently stated to ISIS), “We know
explosive compression was done at this chamber.” The use of such
chambers was pioneered by the Soviet nuclear weapons program; the
Soviet, U.S., and British nuclear weapons programs have each used
chambers for high explosive compression work related to nuclear weapons
development. Based on its information and assessments, the IAEA
requested a visit to this building in early 2012 to verify the chamber’s
existence and evaluate whether high explosive tests were conducted that
are relevant to developing nuclear weapons. So far, as of the January
2013 high-level negotiations with the IAEA in Tehran, Iran has refused
access while at the same time conducting major demolition and
construction on the grounds of the site.
Tests Conducted?
The IAEA has not provided complete information on which tests it
believes Iran could have conducted inside the Parchin chamber. It has
provided partial information and the media have reported on additional
types of possible tests. As best as can be determined, three types of
tests could have been conducted, each with appropriate diagnostic
equipment, although the IAEA has never confirmed such a list and still
other types of tests are possible. The three most commonly discussed
tests have been:
A test of the initiation components of a nuclear warhead, which could have involved
up to 50 kg of high explosives. This test would not contain any
uranium. The November 2011 safeguards report noted that the explosive
chamber at Parchin would be suitable for carrying out this type of test.
A test to ascertain the symmetry of an imploding hemispherical shell
of high explosives, surrounding a uranium metal hemisphere, in a scaled
down experiment. A technical advisor to ISIS with decades of
involvement in the experimental study of nuclear weapon mock-up
explosions evaluated this case. He assessed that based on the
constraints of this chamber and the use of powerful high explosives, the
explosive shell would contain about 50 kilograms of high explosives, an
amount within the constraints of the chamber.
A test of a uranium deuterium neutron initiator used in a nuclear
weapon. The initiator is located at the center of a compression system
involving a sphere of high explosives and possibly a non-nuclear
surrogate material for the weapon-grade uranium core. The goal of the
experiment is to compress the initiator, causing the fusion of the
deuterium and a spurt of neutrons. This test would involve only a few
grams of uranium and deuterium with variable amounts of explosives.
Update on Current Activities at Parchin
A reconstruction phase continues at a steady pace at the alleged
Parchin high explosives test site, as shown by recent Digital Globe
commercial satellite imagery acquired by ISIS. The site underwent a
demolition phase from April to August 2012 and entered what appears to
be a reconstruction phase in late September or early November. In
satellite imagery from January 17, 2013, several activities at the site
appear to be almost complete and there is also evidence of new
construction work (figure 1).
In a May 30, 2012 report
ISIS published satellite imagery showing the demolition of two
buildings located near the building suspected to contain the high
explosive test chamber (figure 2).
ISIS was not able to establish the purpose for why the buildings were
demolished. Debris from the larger of the two was completely cleared
from the site but some debris from the smaller building was left. As
seen in the January 17 satellite imagery, the smaller building has now
been reconstructed (figure 1).
The new imagery also shows what appears to be the foundation of a new
building not far from where the second demolished building was located.
The size and layout of the excavation, however, do not suggest that the
same building is being reconstructed.
Construction of the new security perimeter also appears to be nearing
completion. The new perimeter resembles the previous layout except its
southern section has been visibly extended and it now runs much closer
to the buildings on the western side of the site (figure 1).
There is also new construction of what appears to be a small building
located outside the northern side of the security perimeter. Earth piles
initially visible in early November 2012 are still visible in the
northern part of the site as are heavy machinery and materials
indicating the likelihood of further construction. There is also earth
displacement nearby the two support buildings located just south of the
suspected chamber building although at this stage it is impossible to
determine its origin.
IAEA at a Crossroads
ISIS has consistently called for strong diplomatic measures to be
taken in support of IAEA inspectors gaining access to the Parchin site.
The legal justification for IAEA access is well established.
The IAEA is seeking to fulfill its mandate to determine both the
correctness and completeness of Iran’s declaration under its traditional
comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA).
However, Iran’s continued refusal to allow access and the degree of
alterations made to the site may have severely undermined the
possibility of the IAEA reaching a conclusion about allegations that
Iran conducted nuclear weapons related research at this site. The IAEA
has also reached this conclusion.
What should the IAEA do now? It could continue asking for a visit or
it could call for a special inspection, which it can use in
circumstances where there is sufficient suspicion of undeclared nuclear
weapons related activities and insufficient cooperation from a member
state that would allow for inspections. At this point, neither option is
attractive.
The IAEA has asked to visit the Parchin site as opposed to calling
for a special inspection. In the case of a visit, Iran would need to
grant it on a voluntary basis. Iran could impose limitations on
inspectors’ access during a visit, which is not the case under a special
inspection. During the IAEA’s first visit to Parchin in 2005, Iranian
conditions for allowing the visit forced IAEA inspectors to choose
between one of several sections of the sizeable complex. As a result,
the 2005 visit, while helpful, did not resolve the IAEA’s questions
about the activities in other areas of the Parchin military complex.
In the case of an IAEA visit to the building containing the alleged
high explosive chamber, Iran could likewise limit inspectors’ access and
the quality of sampling they could carry out. 1
It is conceivable that the original tests and considerable earth
displacement at the site more recently could have spread incriminating
radioactive material beyond the immediate area of the buildings. In the
scenario of a visit, Iran could legitimately prevent IAEA access to
areas of interest, thus limiting access to only those areas that have
been heavily sanitized, such as those inside the newly reconstructed
perimeter of the site. The example of the IAEA’s visit to the
Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran shows that extensive excavation and removal
of dirt can prevent effective sampling. During this visit, Iran
refused the IAEA access to extensive rubble and debris removed from the
site. It could also do so in the case of Parchin.
Finding incriminating evidence inside sanitized or reconstructed
buildings is challenging and often impossible. One of the inspectors’
key tools in uncovering undeclared nuclear activities is environmental
sampling, but such sampling can be thwarted by the types of actions Iran
has taken at the Parchin site. The Kalaye Electric site in Tehran is
often rightly given as a major success story of environmental sampling,
despite extensive Iranian efforts in 2003 to hide evidence of secret,
undeclared enrichment of uranium in two buildings at the site. But this
case should also be a cautionary tale. Although required under its
comprehensive safeguards agreement to declare the site as enriching
uranium, Iran chose to hide its activities in violation of its CSA. In
early 2003, when the site was exposed, Iran took major steps to hide its
past centrifuge related activities at this site. 2
It refused the IAEA access while it reconstructed the building that had
held a small cascade of centrifuges and undertook significant
renovations at another building that had conducted single centrifuge
testing. Subsequent IAEA environmental sampling of the building that
held the small cascade discovered no enriched uranium particles,
although Iran later admitted to significant enrichment in that
building. The reconstruction effort successfully thwarted such
sampling. But Iran had not sanitized the building containing the single
centrifuge tests, and inspectors took a sample in the unsanitized
ventilation system above where a single machine test stand had been
located. The collected sample showed evidence of enriched uranium
particles. The Kalaye Electric case shows that the reconstruction or
sanitization of buildings can prevent environmental sampling from
detecting uranium or at least make it difficult to uncover undeclared
work. In the case of Parchin, given Iran’s history of hiding its
undeclared activities, the IAEA cannot depend on Iran again making a
mistake.
The IAEA could call for a special inspection of Parchin and probably
should have done so early last year. However, today, Iran would be
expected to defy a call for a special inspection, especially since such
an inspection would place the IAEA in charge of establishing the
inspection procedures and methods used at the site. Pursuing a special
inspection would likely force a showdown with Iran at the Board of
Governors meeting. Furthermore, such an action taken now would focus
the conflict between the IAEA and Iran on this one facility. The
controversy over Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts is considerably
larger than one facility.
Most of the criticism of the IAEA’s call for a visit to Parchin has
offered few recommendations for a constructive way forward. Many
criticisms have focused on undermining the IAEA’s rationale for asking
to visit Parchin and have presented faulty, alternative interpretations
of the IAEA’s legal authority, satellite imagery of the site, and
technical details related to the site. Some have urged an acceptance of
Iran’s denials of any nuclear weapons related work at Parchin; still
others claim that Iran has done nothing suspicious at the site but was
deliberately modifying it as part of a clever negotiating strategy. Iran
has shown little interest in successful negotiations and its actions at
the site have significantly increased suspicion throughout the world
that it is actually removing evidence. One critic recently recommended
inspections of Parchin, although he recommended they be carried out by a
group other than the IAEA. No formula was offered for how to establish
such a group or how to achieve agreement among the many stakeholders
involved in that decision. Furthermore, the IAEA is accepted by the vast
majority of the world as the legitimate, credible nuclear inspection
authority and a non-IAEA inspection would undermine its authority.
Going to the Board
With little hope for a meaningful IAEA visit and recognition of the
risks of calling for a special inspection, what should be done next?
The IAEA cannot close the case on Parchin without a visit. And as
long as the IAEA cannot settle the Parchin issue, it will remain a
source of suspicion that undermines any effort to establish confidence
or achieve a negotiated outcome.
The best way forward is likely for the IAEA to take the entire issue
of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program to the Board
of Governors. The IAEA has tried for several years to negotiate an
umbrella agreement with Iran aimed at resolving the evidence of Iran’s
past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons and a past parallel,
military fuel cycle program. This effort has likewise reached an
impasse.
The Board of Governors should now pass a resolution condemning Iran’s
refusal to allow an inspection at Parchin and to answer the IAEA’s
questions about possible military dimensions, noting that such actions
thwart the IAEA’s ability to answer the fundamental question of whether
Iran’s nuclear declaration is complete. This resolution should then
refer the entire set of issues to the U.N. Security Council for further
discussion and action.
Figure 1. Satellite imagery from January 17, 2013 showing a new security
perimeter, reconstruction of one of the demolished buildings, and the
possible foundation of a new building at the Parchin site.
Imagery from May 25, 2012 showing the debris from the demolition of two
support buildings located near the building suspected to contain the
high explosive test chamber.
1 For example, during the IAEA visit to the Al Kibar
(Dair Alzour) reactor site in Syria in 2008, the IAEA was allowed to
collect sandy soil at the site but could not include any rubble mixed in
with that soil. In fact, the IAEA sample tubes were checked at least
once by a Syrian official, who removed a piece of rubble from one
sample. These soil samples still yielded a significant number of
uranium particles. Particles were also found in a changing room in a
building associated with the reactor. The IAEA reported that analysis of
the samples taken in June 2008 at the Dair Alzour site indicated the
presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not
included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material. The IAEA’s
assessment was that there is a low probability that the uranium was
introduced by the use of missiles since the isotopic and chemical
composition and the morphology of the particles were all inconsistent
with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions.
[From IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPTSafeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,
GOV/2009/9, February 19, 2009.] The analysis suggested that the uranium
originated in a metal form, which is consistent with the type of fuel
used in a North Korean gas-graphite reactor of the type alleged to have
been built by Syria. 2 Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010).
GUILT is trailing Obama like a shadow he can’t shake. Maybe
because the military’s VOTES WERE NEVER COUNTED for the 2012 Election?
Lots to feel guilty about. Firings always HELP Barack sleep better at night.. According to (shadowy anonymous blogger) Sorcha Faal the
Russian military’s GRU foreign intelligence unit presented a report to
Kremlin leadership late last month that said Obama removed one of the
United States Navy’s most powerful admirals from his command (in the
wake of Benghazi 9/11) specifically because he fears a military coup is
being planned against him.
Rear Admiral Charles M. Gaouette
Photo Courtesy of USS Stennis/US Navy via BlackFive
On 9/11/2012, that officer -Rear Admiral Charles M. Gaouette, commander of Carrier Strike Group Three in
the Middle East- apparently felt obligated to come to the aid
of besieged US defenses at the Benghazi consulate, violating an utterly
bewildering White House command he probably had a hard time believing
was even being made. Gaouette was said to be attempting to help AFRICOM
commander General Carter Ham, also purged by Obama for violating of an
obstinate White House insistence to ‘stand down’.
Ham considered himself bound-by-duty to take action, but the story
goes that his second-in-command -a likely Obammunist- promptly
stepped-right-up and informed him he’d just been ‘relieved of his
command’, effective immediately- General Ham was then physically apprehended/arrested.
General Carter Ham
Subsequently -and despite Navy claims that he was NOT ‘replaced’ due to Benghazi- Admiral Gaouette was otherwise inexplicably removed as Carrier Strike Group commander on October 27th… Faal:
US news reports
on Obama’s unprecedented firing of a powerful US Navy Commander during
wartime state that Admiral Gaouette’s removal was for ‘allegations of
inappropriate leadership judgment’ that arose during the strike group’s
deployment to the Middle East.
This GRU report, however, states that Admiral Gaouette’s firing by
President Obama was due to this strike force commander disobeying
orders when he ordered his forces on 11 September to ‘assist and provide intelligence for’ American military forces ordered into action by US Army General Carter Ham,
who was then the commander of the United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM), against terrorist forces attacking the American Consulate in
Benghazi, Libya.
General Ham had been in command of the initial 2011 US-NATO military intervention in Libya who, like Admiral Gaouette, was fired by Obama.
And as we can, in part, read from US military insider accounts of this growing internal conflict between the White House and US Military leaders: ‘The information
I heard today was that General [Carter] Ham as head of AFRICOM received
the same e-mails the White House received requesting help/support as
the attack was taking place. General Ham immediately had a rapid
response unit ready and communicated to the Pentagon that he had a unit
ready.
General Ham then received the order to stand down. His response was ‘screw it’, he was going to help anyhow.
Within 30 seconds to a minute after making the move to respond, his
second in command apprehended General Ham and told him that he was now
relieved of his command…’
READ MORE: HERE
……………………………………………… TRUCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND GAZA.. LOOKS AS WORTHLESS AS THE PAPER IT’S PRINTED ON-
………………………………………….
BREAKING: Gaza Ceasefire That Took Effect Last Night
( And The Back Story) Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Egyptian
equivalent Mohamed Kamel Amr held a joint press conference today
announcing a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel with Egypt as a
mediating partner. The deal basically takes effect at 8 PM local time. Both
sides are to cease attacks on each other, Israel is to cease targeting
Hamas leaders, and to take some undefined steps to ease its sea blockade
of Gaza after a 24-hour period. Now,here’s what actually happened.
According to a couple of my notorious lil’ birdies who
are very much in a position to know, the Israelis fully intended to go
into Gaza and eradicate Hamas. A country like Israel doesn’t call up
that many reserves and affect its economy unless they were serious about
the matter. But then the Obama Administration intervened. They were perfectly happy for Israel to go in to Gaza and
take out Hamas, but insisted that they then turn Gaza over to the
Palestinian Authority. This was supposed to strengthen PA President
Mahmoud Abbas as ‘Palestine’s savior’ . As as a kicker, President Obama
insisted that Israel immediately declare a Palestinian State in Gaza and
most of Judea and Samaria, including areas currently under Israeli
sovereignty from which the Jewish residents would then be removed. These
were also to be turned over to Abbas.
If the Israelis were unwilling to have the IDF do Mahmoud
Abbas’ dirty work for him and then give up large areas populated by
Jews, then the Obama Administration told the Israelis the U.S. would not
back an IDF ground assault in Gaza. So they Israelis took the ceasefire, essentially meaning that
Hamas is going to be left in place to regroup and fight another day.
And can claim a victory. That’s way Israel appeared to be delaying their ground
operation for so long..the real back and forth was between the Obama
Administration and Israel. As a sop for being cooperative, President Obama said in a
statement that he congratulated PM Netanyahu for accepting the truce and
that the US would use the opportunity offered by a ceasefire to
intensify efforts to help Israel address its security needs, especially
the issue of the smuggling of weapons and explosives into Gaza. How what is going to happen is, shall we say, problematical?
Apparently – wait for it- The White House expects the new Muslim
Brotherhood government in Egypt to take charge of policing Hamas. After
all, that approach worked so well in keeping Hezbollah in Lebanon from
rearming after the 2006 war, even with a UN peacekeeping force on the
ground. The President also said that he was committed to seeking
additional funding for Iron Dome and other US-Israel missile defense
programs. What’s really behind this, of course, is an effort to
strengthen Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government
as a regional player and improve ties between the Islamists and the U.S. It also takes the heat off Morsi, had Israel gone into Gaza,
there would have been widespread agitating for Egypt to send
‘volunteers’ to fight the Israelis.
We’ll see if this takes hold. I’d be surprised if it didn’t, since it’s mostly on Hamas’ terms. http://joshuapundit.blogspot.com/2012/11/breaking-gaza-ceasefire-to-take-effect.html
………………………………………………
Surprise: Obama forced Netanyahu to accept one-sided pro-Hamas ‘cease fire’
Obama “commended [Israel’s] Prime Minister for agreeing
to the Egyptian ceasefire proposal – which the President recommended the
Prime Minster do,” said the 12.31 a.m. EST statement from the White
House.
The cease-fire terms released by Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s
office do not mention any measures to penalize Hamas for launching
another wave of rocket attacks against Israel.
“A. Israel should stop all hostilities in the Gaza Strip land, sea
and air including incursions and targeting of individuals. … All
Palestinian factions shall stop all hostilities from the Gaza Strip
against Israel including rocket attacks and all attacks along the
border,” said the statement. The announcement also seems to accept Hamas’s demand for an end
to Israeli restrictions on the importation of military-related items
into the enclave, and its ban on movement of Hamas’ people from Gaza to
the nearby West Bank, which is ruled by an unpopular Arab authority that has curbed attacks against Israel. “Refraining from restricting residents’ free movements
and targeting residents in border areas and procedures of implementation
shall be dealt with after 24 hours from the start of the ceasefire,” said the announcement.
The announcement does not include mechanisms to enforce Hamas’s
compliance. “Each party shall commit itself not to perform any acts that
would breach this understanding,” said the statement.
…
The absence of any enforceable terms in an inconclusive cease-fire
agreement, which would still prevent Israel’s threatened ground movement
into the enclave, will be touted as a victory by Hamas and its allies.
Hamas’ allies wanted to stop an Israeli movement that could have
killed many of Hamas’s jihadis and leaders, destroyed more of their
hidden weapons and demonstrated their inability to maintain control of
their territory.
Also, any cease-fire arrangement without terms is a de facto
rejection by the United States and Egypt of Israel’s goals for peace.
Israel’s government had sought new curbs on Hamas’ ability to smuggle
rockets and other weapons into the enclave, and for the creation of a
kilometer-wide buffer zone between Israel and Gaza. They sought the
buffer because local jihadis routinely launch rockets at Israeli border
patrols and farmers.
Morsi and Hamas are ideological allies.
Hamas is the Gaza-based affiliate of the international Muslim Brotherhood Islamist movement, which is based in Egypt.
It should be clear that the only way Israel agrees to such a
one-sided arrangement (although admittedly, it should also infuriate Abu
Mazen – see below) is that President Obama forces the Prime Minister’s
hand. In other words, Bibi caved in again. Why?
There’s an election two months from today. Netanyahu does not want to
give his opposition more ammunition about how he has spoiled Israel’s
relations with the United States – something which is assigned way too
high a value here in my humble opinion. Now, suppose Bibi wins. Does he continue
to kiss Obama’s butt after the election, at least for some period of
time. My guess is yes because (a) he wants Obama to strike Iran or at
least not veto an Israeli strike and (b) unlike the US, a Prime Minister
of Israel has no limit on the number of terms he can serve (Bibi has
already served two) but is subject to his government falling at any
time. Bibi may be afraid that Obama can bring him down if he’s not a
good boy.
But Bibi is wrong. As much stock
as Israelis put in their relations with the US, they also recognize
that there are no good relations to be had with this President. Had Bibi
defied Obama, the public would have backed him. The proof? A Channel 2
poll taken before the cease fire went into effect on Wednesday night
found that 70% of the Israeli public opposes the cease fire, only 24% favors it, and only 7% believe it will last.
And you can bet that most of that 24% was not aware of the provisions I
highlighted above. So he caved in to Obama needlessly, at least from a
political perspective.
Finally, this agreement has a message for Abu Mazen as well. The
provision that allows Hamas terrorists to travel to Judea and Samaria is
bound to undermine Abu Mazen’s rule there, and is undoubtedly blowback
for Abu Mazen’s continued insistence (including Wednesday in his meeting with Secretary of State Clinton)
on pushing ahead with the UN vote. Obama essentially told him that if
he won’t play ball, he will be replaced by Hamas. Obama also proved to
Abu Mazen that he can bend Netanyahu and force him to make the
concessions Abu Mazen wants him to make. Will Abu Mazen get another
chance/? Maybe. Or maybe Obama has decided that he is going to try to
force Israel to reach an agreement with Hamas.
It’s a long time to 2016…. http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2012/11/surprise-obama-forced-netanyahu-to.html
In a recent interview with the London Telegraph, Bill Gates has
now claimed that his Foundation’s massive push for vaccination is not
just an exercise in philanthropy but that it is, in fact, “God’s work.”
Gates, who, according to the Telegraph, is worth an estimated $65
billion, is now dedicating his life to the “eradication of
poliomyelitis,” or, at least he is dedicating himself to the vaccination
program allegedly aimed at achieving these ends.
“My wife and I had a long dialogue about how we were going to take the
wealth that we’re lucky enough to have and give it back in a way that’s
most impactful to the world,” he says. “Both of us worked at Microsoft
and saw that if you take innovation and smart people, the ability to
measure what’s working, that you can pull together some pretty dramatic
things.
“We’re focused on the help of the poorest in the world, which really
drives you into vaccination. You can actually take a disease and get rid
of it altogether, like we are doing with polio.”
Yet, eradicating polio through a massive vaccination
program may be easier said than done writes Neil Tweedie of the
Telegraph. “There is another, sinister obstacle: the propagation by
Islamist groups of the belief that polio vaccination is a front for
covert sterilisation and other western evils. Health workers in Pakistan
have paid with their lives for involvement in the programme.”
To this question, Gates responded with seemingly atypical religious
zeal, noted by Tweedie in the published article. “It’s not going to stop
us succeeding,” says Gates. “It does force us to sit down with the
Pakistan government to renew their commitments, see what they’re going
to do in security and make changes to protect the women who are doing
God’s work and getting out to these children and delivering the
vaccine.”
Indeed,
the religious tone of Gates during the course of the interview may seem
confusing to Tweedie, but the nature of Gates’ work could very well be
described as a religion. Thus, the fact that it finds itself in direct
confrontation with another religion – the Islamist groups that Tweedie
speaks of – is of no real consequence to Gates as his solution is to
dutifully press forward.
Yet, before readers write off the vaccine resisters solely as Muslim
fundamentalists, many of the individuals opposing vaccination have a
very good reason to be skeptical. Especially those that believe Gates’
vaccine push is geared more toward sterilization and population
reduction than about life extension and better health conditions.
After all, it was Bill Gates himself who stated as much publicly when he said,
“The world today has 6.8 billion people... that's headed up to about 9
billion. Now if we do a really great job on new vaccines, health care,
reproductive health services, we could lower that by perhaps 10 or 15
percent.”
Add this to Gates’ statement is the fact that, time and again,
international vaccination programs have ended disastrously for third
world nations. Case in point: the recent Meningitis vaccine program that
resulted in the paralysis of at least 50 African children
and a subsequent cover-up operation by the government of Chad. This
large number of adverse events occurred in one small village alone,
leaving many to wonder what the rates of side effects might be on an
international scale.
Even more concerning is the fact that paralysis rates have flourished in
countries where Gates’ polio vaccine, the one he is dedicating his life
to, have been administered the most. Indeed, nowhere is this any more
apparent than in India. As Aaron Dykes writes,
But the real story is that while polio has statistically disappeared
from India, there has been a huge spike in cases of non-polio acute
flaccid paralysis (NPAFP)– the very types of crippling problems it was
hoped would disappear with polio but which have instead flourished from a
new cause.
There were 47,500 cases of non-polio paralysis reported in 2011,
the same year India was declared “polio-free,” according to Dr. Vashisht
and Dr. Puliyel. Further, the available data shows that the incidents
tracked back to areas were doses of the polio vaccine were frequently
administered. The national rate of NPAFP in India is 25-35 times the
international average.
In addition to this data, it appears that the polio vaccines are themselves the leading cause of polio paralysis in India.
In relation to the flawed data reported by the Polio Global Eradication
Initiative which attempts to minimize the numbers of both
vaccine-induced cases of polio paralysis and polio in general, Sayer Ji remarks,
According to the Polio Global Eradication Initiative’s own statistics
there were 42 cases of wild-type polio (WPV) reported in India in 2010,
indicating that vaccine-induced cases of polio paralysis (100-180
annually) outnumber wild-type cases by a factor of 3-4. Even if we put
aside the important question of whether or not the PGEI is accurately
differentiating between wild and vaccine-associated polio cases in their
statistics, we still must ask ourselves: should not the real-world
effects of immunization, both good and bad, be included in PGEI’s
measurement of success? For the dozens of Indian children who develop
vaccine-induced paralysis every year, the PGEI’s recent declaration of
India as nearing “polio free” status, is not only disingenuous, but
could be considered an attempt to minimize their obvious liability in
having transformed polio from a natural disease vector into a man-made
(iatrogenic) one.
Gates’ polio vaccines have likewise been blamed for deaths and disabilities in neighboring Pakistan, with offices of the government in that country even recommending that the vaccines be suspended.
In India, doctors heavily criticized the program not only for the heavy
cost to human health and quality of life but also the massive financial
burden hoisted upon the state. This is because the program was only
partially funded by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations,
which is itself partnered with the World Health Organization, Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, World Bank, and
United Nations.
The doctors criticized the GAVI-alliance by stating,
The Indian government finally had to fund this hugely expensive
programme, which cost the country 100 times more than the value of the
initial grant,” their report stated.
From India’s perspective the exercise has been an extremely costly both
in terms of human suffering and in monetary terms. It is tempting to
speculate what could have been achieved if the $2.5 billion spent on
attempting to eradicate polio, were spent on water and sanitation and
routine immunization.
. . . . . the polio eradication programme epitomizes nearly everything
that is wrong with donor funded ‘disease specific’ vertical projects at
the cost of investments in community-oriented primary health care
(horizontal programmes) . . . . .
. . . . .This is a startling reminder of how initial funding and grants from abroad distort local priorities.
Indeed, as the doctors assert, one cannot vaccinate away disease like
polio. Apart from the fact that there has never been a study conducted
which proves a vaccine either safe or effective that was not connected
to a drug company or a vaccine maker,[1] the so-called cure, if it comes under the guise of a vaccine, may well be as bad if not worse than the disease itself.
Again, Sayer Ji writes,
Polio underscores the need for a change in the way we look at so-called
"vaccine preventable" diseases as a whole. In most people with a healthy immune system,
a poliovirus infection does not even generate symptoms. Only rarely
does the infection produce minor symptoms, e.g. sore throat, fever,
gastrointestinal disturbances, and influenza-like illness. In only 3% of
infections does virus gain entry to the central nervous system, and
then, in only 1-5 in 1000 cases does the infection progress to paralytic
disease.
Due to the fact that polio spreads through the fecal-oral route (i.e.
the virus is transmitted from the stool of an infected person to the
mouth of another person through a contaminated object, e.g. utensil)
focusing on hygiene, sanitation and proper nutrition (to support innate
immunity) is a logical way to prevent transmission in the first place,
as well as reducing morbidity associated with an infection when it does
occur.
Instead, a large portion of the world's vaccines are given to the Third
World as "charity," when the underlying conditions of economic
impoverishment, poor nutrition, chemical exposures, and socio-political
unrest are never addressed.
The fact is that the root cause of diseases like polio are not a lack of
vaccination but poor sanitation standards, poverty, lower living
standards, chemical pollution, and lack of proper nutrition. If money
were spent correcting these ills, as opposed to providing ineffective
(in their stated purposes) and dangerous vaccinations, then polio and
many other such diseases could indeed be eradicated.
In the end, the answer is about raising living standards, reducing
pollution, increasing knowledge and access to proper nutrition and clean
drinking water – not chemical and virus-laden needles. Perhaps this
method could be more accurately described as "God's work."
[1] Flu and Flu Vaccines: What’s Coming Through That Needle. Dr. Sherri Tenpenny.
Brandon Turbeville is an author out of Florence, South Carolina. He has a
Bachelor's Degree from Francis Marion University and is the author of
three books, Codex Alimentarius -- The End of Health Freedom, 7 Real Conspiracies, and Five Sense Solutions and Dispatches From a Dissident.
Turbeville has published over 190 articles dealing on a wide variety of
subjects including health, economics, government corruption, and civil
liberties. Brandon Turbeville's podcast Truth on The Tracks can be found
every Monday night 9 pm EST at UCYTV. He is available for radio and TV interviews. Please contact activistpost (at) gmail.com.
The Qatar Leaks: The Secret Business of Foreign Affairs
Leaked minutes from Qatari Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Conversations with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu and Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi, from Russia’s
involvement in Syria to Gaddafi’s fall
By Radwan Mortada
Al-Akhbar publishes leaked minutes from the Qatari Ministry of
Foreign Affairs that have Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and
Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi discussing regional affairs – from
Russia’s involvement in Syria to Gaddafi’s fall – with Qatari officials.
An important dimension of the Syrian crisis is the electronic war
being waged by both sides. One of the groups active in this area calls
itself the Syrian Electronic Army and it has recently succeeded in
hacking into several official Qatari, Saudi, and Turkish websites and
downloading thousands of secret documents from them. Al-Akhbar gained access to some of these through an
intermediary and, after confirming their authenticity, agreed to publish
them in coordination with the Syrian Ajelwebsite.
Today, Al-Akhbar begins publishing these documents, starting with three correspondences from the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The first one is the minutes of a meeting between Qatari Prime
Minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani and Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi
that took place in September 2012, in which they discussed the situation
in Syria.
In it, the Qatari prime minister talks of contacting Russia to
convince it of abandoning Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, offering
guarantees from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that Moscow’s naval base can
remain in Syria.
The document also reveals that what Qatar offered Egypt in terms of
financial assistance after the revolution is little more than loans with
interest in return for giving the Qataris incentives such as investing
in Egypt’s steel industry.
The second document is the minutes of a meeting between Sheikh Hamad
bin Jassim and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The meeting
took place in mid-March 2011 during the early stages of battle in Libya
and the discussion revolves mainly about the situation on the ground
there.
As for the third document, it also contains minutes of a meeting,
this time between the Qatari Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani and
foreign minister Davutoğlu.
In it, the foreign minister stresses the importance of not allowing
Assad to complete his term in office, which ends in 2014, because he
will use it to defeat the opposition. Document 1: Hamad bin Jassim and Mohamed Mursi
(Confidential)
Minutes of Meeting Between His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin
Jaber al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, with His Excellency
President Mohamed Mursi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Thursday, 6/11/2012 Sheikh Hamad: [...] Hamad: His Highness the Prince [Hamad Bin Khalifa
al-Thani] appreciates your role. Today we discussed with Mr. Hicham
Qandil the [Egyptian] Prime Minister and agreed on some issues. One of
them is the remainder of the agreed upon one and a half billion US
Dollars. We reduced the rate of interest to 1.5 [percent] and increased
the [loan] period. This is in addition to the additional amount that we
will work. Together, we are “family” and each day one of us has a
demand. As well as the electricity, where we suggested a study and the
agreement will be done in a month’s time. Egyptian Prime Minister: I am sure that your hearts are with us. Hamad: We also agreed on the steel. We have partnerships with several countries in this area. Mursi: I have a suggestion to reinvigorate and
reactivate the Iron and Steel Company in Helwan, which is the largest
steel factory in the Middle East, built by the Russians with Russian
technology [...] It consists of four furnaces. The first is old, but it
can be rehabilitated and rebuilt. The fourth is advanced and a port was
constructed for it in Dakahlia to provide coal, in addition to the rail
from the port to Helwan and the raw materials rail from the oases
region. We have large quantities of raw materials. But [the furnace] is
built based on the end product. The complex is beginning to lose money,
because it used to produce 2 million tons, which is the break-even for
the project. It used to be an industrial fortress with 25,000 workers,
but the Ahmed Ezz company [Ezz Steel] appeared and started seducing away
the engineers. Hamad: We are with you and we can announce the
project from now. We will include it to be studied by the team that will
come to study the projects. Finance Minister Yusuf Kamal: We have all he studies
and it fits with a similar idea we have in Algeria, which is a
partnership with the Extra Trade company. They can organize with us. Hamad: Your Excellency, we assure you that we are
under orders from His Highness the Prince. You know his feelings towards
you. We are ready and we have amounts [of money] that were not included
in the minutes. We will look into steel and electricity, there’s a
deal, also the outstanding issues related to Barwa and Diar, which is a
positive indicator. We also agreed on the issue of aviation and invited
the Minister of Civil Aviation. But your Excellency, we have a problem
in terms of the surplus. It is that we don’t want it to be deposited
anywhere, while you lend 14 percent. If agreed, we are ready to deposit
between 10 and 20 billion Egyptian Pounds [$1.5 to 3 billion]. We hope
you consider this and we can keep it for one year and then renew. We are
ready to do this. Mursi: Why should it be in Egyptian Pounds, because the Chinese are saying the same thing. Hamad: Because interest on Egyptian Pounds is high
and we are ready for it to be for one year and then it can be renewed.
We agreed on the minutes of an agreement between the two sides and on
the specific times and dates of each operation, so we can begin. This
will include the deposit of $1.5 billion, according to the agreement
between His Highness the Prince and Your Excellency. We are sincere to
begin work and our trust increased following your speech in Tehran.
Everyone praised it and, yesterday, in the Arab League meeting,
positions changed. Mursi: There is no room for the word reform. He must leave. Hamad: We suggested to him that he leaves. Really, it was a powerful speech. Mursi: How could the Saudi King surprise us with the
initiative of dialogue between confessions, while we had agreed about
the Syrian issue. Hamad: Us too. We had met him a day earlier and nobody mentioned it. Mursi: We want to take a serious position. Hamad: I think everything will change after the US
and German elections. If Obama returns, and it does not matter if he
waits till January for his new term. He can do it automatically and he
has made commitments. Mursi: If the Iranians get involved in solving the issue in Syria, they will win and become closer to Turkey and the Gulf. Hamad: They are starting to think of names. In the
past, they had good relations with us and we have common [oil] wells.
But on the Syrian issue, unfortunately it’s the Russians. If they say
the word, the Syrian regime will be finished. But Russia is still
insisting on the issue. I spoke to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin on
the phone for 40 minutes. It was a bad conversation, although my
relationship with him used to excellent, but the call was a failure.
Now, they are starting to lose balance and want a solution.Mursi: Why do they want it? Hamad: They have a marine base in Syria. We told
them we will work on an agreement between you and the Free Syrian Army
(FSA), but they did not accept. Mursi: They are part of the problem and he will leave. Hamad: As for the visas, we agreed, and the Egyptian side can begin taking visas. Egyptian Prime Minister: There is also a positive indication in the issue of partnership with Sudan. Hamad: Yes. We will send our delegation for this
matter and create a partnership in Africa. It will strengthen relations
and we are ready. There is a project for the Diyar company for $120
million. Things will move. We are honest and we want to inform the
public of the issue. Mursi: We do not have any conflicts. You are our brothers and your hands are clean. Hamad: We thought it would be better to do it
through Egypt. You are in Africa and you have the people and experience.
Rest assured, Your Excellency, we will be with you. Document 2: Hamad bin Jassim and Davutoğlu
(Confidential)
Minutes of Official Negotiations Between His Highness Sheikh Hamad
bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and
His Eminence Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey
Doha – Sunday 13/3/2011
(Following greetings) Sheikh Hamad: Your meeting with His Excellency the Prince was good. Davutoğlu: The situation in the region is moving fast. We should be coordinating. Hamad: We are trying to push the [UN] Security Council to do something. Davutoğlu: Gaddafi must leave and he will leave. Now
he is winning the battle and we are worried. We tried to pressure him
to leave Syria, but he began recruiting mercenaries from Sudan and
Egypt. The West has different positions. France is of one opinion, but
Europe has another, also the Americans. Hamad: The US secretary of state called me three
times and might call back today. We asked the Arab League to issue a
decision for a no-fly zone over Libya. Syria is against and Yemen is not
decided. Davutoğlu: Why does Syria oppose? Hamad: I don’t know. Davutoğlu: I was surprised when the Syrians said they did not receive a message from you [concerning Lebanon]. Hamad: This is not true. We sent three copies. Davutoğlu: I told the Syrians, why do you ask us to travel to Lebanon, while you had already made up your minds. Hamad: I think they will lose if they continue to
lie to their friends. What is happening now in Libya cannot be accepted.
The Security Council must be pressured to impose a no-fly zone. Davutoğlu: We are not members in the Security
Council, but we are a member of NATO and we can do something. They told
us that the decision has to come from the Security Council and the Arab
countries. If NATO attacks Libya, Gaddafi will claim he is defending the
Arabs. Hamad: Some Arab countries can participate and Turkey has to play a role. Davutoğlu: We say that Gaddafi must go. [Turkish]
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, but
the security council decision concerning the international tribunal shut
the door on Gaddafi. He is now either regaining control of Libya or
dying a hero. Hamad: Even if he controls Libya, he is finished. I
think it is important to push for a decision on a no-fly zone over
Libya. He is gaining in his war, but he is finished because he killed
his own people and said terrible things about Arabs. Davutoğlu: What’s important is how to save the Libyans. Hamad: No-fly zone and attacking the radars. Davutoğlu: As far as NATO is concerned, it was Germany that blocked the no-fly zone decision. Hamad: Don’t oppose the decision. You are not required to send forces. Davutoğlu: We are now charged with Portugese interests. Are you in contact with the tribes? Hamad: Some of them. Davutoğlu: Gaddafi might take control of Benghazi
and this affects the situation in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen. He could
bring back the two former leaders into power. We are trying to find an
exit for him, but I think it’s too late. Hamad: [Former Libyan security chief] Abdullah
Senoussi called me and started making threats. I don’t care. This is our
policy and we will keep it up. I told [Saudi Foreign Minister] Saud
al-Faisal and [UAE Foreign Minister] Abdullah Bin Zayed that we need to
be clear. And actually Saud al-Faisal’s statement was clear and direct
and I am happy with that. Davutoğlu: I spoke to His Highness the Prince today about the economic situation in Tunisia and Egypt. We must support them. Hamad: We can make announcements about investments in Egypt, but the situation in Tunisia is still not clear. Davutoğlu: We used to have Turkish companies working
in Egypt, but they left after the revolution. It is important to invest
in garment manufacturing and tourism, because they can employ many
people. Hamad: We have an industrial zone in Port Said. We can do that. Davutoğlu: We can form a joint Qatari-Turkish committee to work on this. Hamad: Send us the proposal and we will study it. I
am thinking of visiting Turkey, but this time Istanbul not Ankara. And I
am still waiting for an answer about Qatar Airlines. Davutoğlu: The transportation minister resigned and
we will have elections on 12 June 2011. The military cooperation
agreement has not been activated. What is happening? Hamad: We will follow it up.
(Fin)
Minutes prepared by:
Ambassador Zayed Bin Rashed al-Nuaimi
Director of the Department of Asian and African Affairs Document 3: Tamim bin Hamad and Davutoğlu
(Confidential)
Minutes of the meeting between His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad
al-Thani, the Crown Prince (God Keep Him) with His Excellency Mr. Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
Beach Palace – Tuesday, 25/10/2011
(Following greetings) His Highness the Crown Prince: We’re happy to see
you. We were hoping to offer aid to Turkey to deal with the earthquake.
We have a specialized rescue team. How is the situation in Turkey now?
We want to offer support in light of the warm relations between us,
for we are brothers and Muslims. We respect your policies and the step
you are taking. What is happening in Syria? The Guest: Sound policies have kept the region in a
positive situation for the past one hundred years. At first, we worked
separately, but now we are intertwined and we must work together in
order to achieve prosperity.
Qatar and the Emirates are able to think in a positive manner and
that is because they are healthy countries. When we look around us to
speak to others, who can we talk to in the region? In Iraq, there is
Talabani, Alawi, Barzani, and Maliki, and Syria is that way too. Egypt
is the biggest Arab and Muslim country, but it has its internal
problems. I met with the general secretary of the Arab League and I
spoke with him about Arab matters. His Highness the Crown Prince: You will find us everywhere. We headed the Arab League delegation because no one wanted it.
There was a dispute between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegations during
the Islamic Summit which was held in Doha. Izzat al-Douri was there;
this was the Baath’s problem – they have problems with minorities.
In Syria, there are problems between the Alawis and Sunnis. You
cannot blame the minority for thinking about what might happen to them
in the future. This problem has to be resolved in the future. The Guest: I met Nabil al-Arabi, I think he is here. His Highness the Crown Prince: He will be at the meeting tomorrow. The Guest: We thank you for the condolences. We want
to coordinate with you. We have a general debate in parliament, but I
decided to go to Qatar because it is important to us. What is your
message tomorrow? His Highness the Crown Prince: We will be sending a
message to Bashar. He had said that he was going to talk to opposition. I
believe that we have to send him a message that if he doesn’t continue
down that road, the matter will take its course all the way to the
Security Council. His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs: The
killing must stop and the army must be pulled out of the cities, in
addition to amending Article 8 and conducting elections after
negotiating with the opposition. His Highness the Crown Prince: He is not taking the
matter seriously; he wants to destroy the whole region. Iran has changed
its tone. I spoke to Burhan Ghalioun and he values Turkey’s role. I
told him that our relations with Turkey are good and whatever Turkey
decides, we are with them. We will let you know what happens. The Guest: Coordination between us is important.
Bashar is relying on two things and he has a lot of problems. He thinks
that Russia and China are with him, and he thinks he can play the
Russian and Chinese card with the West.
We helped him break his isolation in 2006, when he was isolated by
the West. We offered him a 14-point plan and we discussed everything
with him. We know him and his regime very well. Our ambassador in Syria
was with me, and Bouthaina Shaaban was present. He agreed to pull the
army out of Hama, Homs, Daraa, and the rest of the cities, issue a new
media law, allow the foreign press to enter the country, amend Article 8
of the constitution, hold elections, [...] and sit down with the
opposition – he agreed to all this.And after two days he attacked the
mosques, launched an offensive on Latakia, killing people [...] Our plan
was to back him if he implemented the plan. He pulled out of Hama as
our ambassador watched on, only to return and attack it. Our ambassador
notified us in a secret letter that they are in the process of
destroying Hama. He was deceiving us.
When he attacked Latakia, I called him and asked him how is it that
you are destroying the mosques, we will not remain quiet over it. I told
him that the president must make his speech according to the agreement.
But Muallem asked us to wait. I told him that his integrity was at
risk. Muallem called me and told me that the president will give a
speech in a week. And I said no and we clarified our position. We have
not had contact with them since last August 14.
In Libya the situation was different. There, the Arab League gave
Western intervention legitimacy. We in Turkey do not want Western or
NATO intervention, despite the fact that we are a member of NATO.
Foreign intervention in Syria will cause problems in Lebanon and Iran,
and Hamas is able to act individually against him – we support the
opposition and he is afraid of it. In 2006, we held joint military
exercises and we supported him economically, but now he has to be
isolated economically and he is bankrupt. We spoke to Iran and they told
us to give him a few months time. We told them: try if you can. Salehi
is a good man. His Highness the Crown Prince: We should use that. The Guest: We want to send a message to the Russians
and the Chinese, and the Arabs must talk to the two countries to
confirm to them that we do not want another Libya situation and we must
convince them not to support Bashar – he cannot be given the opportunity
to rule until 2014, so that he can get rid of the opposition. His Highness the Crown Prince: He must stop the
violence today before tomorrow. You have done all you can but there has
to be Arab support and this has to be the Arab message to him. The Guest: Yes, this is the right message and he
cannot be given any more time. We must act now. What is the position of
Algeria, are they against the revolution? His Highness the Crown Prince: It will change its position and they will back the revolution. The Guest: We are a member of NATO and we do not
want foreign intervention. As Muslims, Arabs and Turks, we do not want
Western intervention in Syria. What is the decision that will be taken
if the Syrian president does not abide by the Arab initiative? His Highness the Crown Prince: I cannot say now. The Guest: It is easy to win the war on the ground, but the rebuilding will be difficult, so will the situation in Syria. His Highness the Crown Prince: The Turkish vice defense minister is here. The Guest: I will be visiting Jordan and will meet
with the King tomorrow. Is Khaled Meshal in Damascus? Can he come to
Doha? If such a step is sensitive for him, there is no need. There is a
matter I wanted to speak to your highness about. Al-Jazeera is directing
criticism against our position and this is not good. His Highness the Crown Prince: Our relation with you
is bigger than al-Jazeera and you can speak to Hamad bin Jassem, and we
will talk to him about the issue. The Guest: Thank you your highness. His Highness the Crown Prince: You are welcome and we hope you have a pleasant stay in Doha. This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
US-NATO “Economic Terrorism”: The Collapse of Syria’s Industry and Agriculture
The Syrian economy is being hit by the combined impacts of
the US-NATO sponsored terrorist attacks and the economic sanctions
regime. The ultimate objective of the US-NATO covert war on Syria is the
destabilization of the Syria economy and the destruction of Syria as a
nation state.
Economic destabilization is conducted through various means:
An economic sanctions regime which has contributed to paralyzing trade and investment,
Acts of deliberate sabotage and piracy directed against the country’s industrial base.
Confirmed by the Syrian Chamber of Commerce, the Turkish government has sponsored the outright “stealing of production lines and machines from hundreds of factories in Aleppo city” with a view to disabling Syria’s industrial base.
The closing down and/or bankruptcy of the country’s industrial enterprises.
According to a recent report: “More than half of the
country’s larger factories and small- and medium-sized workshops have
shut down”.
“The state-owned Syrian General Organisation of Engineering
Industries announced that it had shut eight of the 12 companies it owns
because of sabotage, looting, burning of production lines and
warehouses, and the destruction of machines.” albawaba.com
The destruction of the country’s agricultural base, leading to food shortages, undernourishment and child malnutrition.
The Sanctions Regime
The Obama administration has imposed sweeping sanctions on Syria.
The sanctions regime was initiated in August 2011 through the issuing
of an executive order
“prohibiting the exportation, sale or supply of services from the
United States to Syria.” as well as concurrent legislation by the US
Congress.
Obama’s Executive order:
“…blocks investment and the export of oil from Syria. On May 30 [2011], the U.S. levied sanctions on the Syria International Islamic Bank.
The Treasury Department said the bank has acted as a front for other
Syrian financial institutions seeking to circumvent sanctions. A few
days prior to this, the U.S. and around a dozen other countries expelled Syrian diplomats following a massacre in al-Houla, Syria, that was blamed without conclusive evidence on al-Assad’s military.
In August of 2011, Congress introduced S.1472,
a “bill to impose sanctions on persons making certain investments that
directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of the ability
of Syria to develop its petroleum resources, and for other purposes.”
In November 2011, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership and
adopted “unprecedented sanctions at a meeting in Cairo by a vote of 19
to three,”
In the United States, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the Syrian Freedom Support Act
by a unanimous vote in March of this year. It is intended to
“strengthen sanctions against the Government of Syria, to enhance
multilateral commitment to address the Government of Syria’s threatening
policies, to establish a program to support a transition to a
democratically-elected government in Syria, and for other purposes.”
(See Kurt NimmoCrippling Sanctions against Damascus, Global Research, June 2012)
The Collapse of Syrian Agriculture
The terrorist actions of the US-NATO sponsored “Free Syrian Army”
(FSA) and its affiliated death squads directed against civilians
including farmers has led to the dislocation of agriculture. The supply
of farm inputs including seeds and fertilizer has been disrupted.
The distribution of agricultural goods in urban areas is affected.
Terrorist attacks on the transportation and distribution of agricultural
commodities is another related factor.
The terror attacks have uprooted small scale agriculture and have led to the devastation of commercial agriculture.
In a recent report, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) confirms a massive drop in agricultural production:
“Twenty-two months of conflict have left Syria’s
agricultural sector in tatters with cereal, fruit and vegetable
production dropping for some by half and massive destruction of
irrigation and other infrastructure, a UN mission has found.
“Destruction of infrastructure in all sectors is massive and it is
clear that the longer the conflict will last, the longer it will take to
rehabilitate it,” he said.
Of the 10 million Syrians who live in rural areas – about 46 percent
of the population – 80 percent derive their livelihoods from
agriculture.
…
Wheat and barley production dropped to less than 2 million tonnes last year from 4 to 4.5 million tonnes in normal years.
Vegetable, fruit and olive production declined significantly in both
Homs and Dara’a Governorates, including a 60 percent drop in vegetable
production in Homs and a 40 percent drop in olive oil production in
Dara’a.
Only 45 percent of the farmers were able to fully harvest their
cereal crops while 14 percent reported they could not harvest due to
insecurity and lack of fuel. There is a lack of access to agricultural
inputs including quality seeds and fertilizers. There is a lack of
irrigation due to damage to main irrigation canals especially in Homs
and lack of fuel for irrigation pumps. Movement of livestock to grazing
areas has not been possible and their survival is compromised by the
lack of animal feed and veterinary drugs, the importation of which is
hampered by sanctions. The production of poultry, a traditional source
of cheap animal protein has also been severely hit with major farms
destroyed in Homs, Hama and Idleb.FAO Media Centre: Syrian agricultural production drops massively as conflict continues
Hikes in Fuel and Gasoline Prices
In recent developments, there have been significant hikes in fuel and
gasoline prices which have contributed to disrupting production as well
as transportation. These hikes in prices have also led the compression
of real purchasing power by households.
The economic sanctions as well as the demise of local industries have
led to shortages in essential commodities including medicine.
The monetary system and foreign exchange market are in crisis,
characterized by a major decline in the value of the Syrian pound.
The State fiscal structure has been disrupted as the government is
no longer able to collect taxes from companies which have closed down. Reversing the Achievements of Economic and Social Development
Prior to 2011, Syria’s external debt was low when compared to other
developing countries.Syria’s foreign debt burden had been reduced
through bilateral rescheduling deals with its main creditors including
Russia, Germany, Iran and France. Syria also managed to settle its debt
with the World Bank
According to World Bank figures:
primary school enrollment (% gross) was of the order of 118% (2010),
life expectancy at birth –which is an indicator of the state of
health of the population– was of the order of 76 years, compared to 72
for the Middle East and 65.5 years for the average of lower middle
income countries. (World Bank, Data on the Syrian Arab Republic)
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Rear Admiral Charles M. Gaouette
