During Shalit’s captivity, Hamas continued to build tunnels of
all shapes and sizes. These conduits, say intelligence sources, allowed
the group to smuggle money, supplies, and weapons into Gaza from Egypt,
send operatives out through Egypt for advanced training in Iran,
Lebanon, Syria, and Malaysia, and bring mentors in from Hezbollah to
teach people how to manufacture rockets—and build better tunnels.
Hezbollah was particularly adept at tunneling, having learned the dark
art from its patrons in Iran who have burrowed deep underground to hide
nuclear facilities in places such as Fordow and Natanz.
According
to the Shin Bet, Hamas took what it learned from Hezbollah—about
subterranean rocket-launching sites, weapons bunkers, and command and
control rooms—and kicked it up a notch, building “an intricate layout of
tunnels connecting between posts, positions, mosques, training camps,
and rocket launching sites.”
Vanity Fair’s team was taken
to Glilot—an intelligence base north of Tel Aviv—to examine items
supposedly seized from Hamas hideouts, including a wall-size satellite
photo bristling with yellow Post-Its showing the names of various
operatives and their assigned areas of responsibility. While the
evidence
Vanity Fair was shown focused on military targets,
I.D.F. spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner claimed they also
recovered a variety of high-resolution maps that pinpointed potential
sites in Israel, and included civilian areas.
Tunnel Vision
While
seemingly low-tech, tunneling requires copious quantities of cash,
cement, fuel, and rebar. Fortunately for Hamas, world events conspired
to assist in this effort. During the Arab Spring, while Egyptian
president Hosni Mubarak was busy fighting for his political and personal
survival, Hamas built a virtual underground super-highway to the Sinai
through which it managed to import an ever-more-sophisticated arsenal,
including longer-range rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and
shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. By 2012, when Egypt elected
Mohammed Morsi (the head of the Muslim Brotherhood—and a Hamas ally),
Hamas was riding high. It had significantly expanded the scope and use
of what has come to be known as “subterranean Gaza,” even creating a
special engineering unit within its Al-Qassam Brigades to handle tunnel
excavation.
In addition, Hamas created a secret commando unit, called
Nukhba
(the “selected ones”), and trained its men to fight and maneuver
through the tunnels on foot and on small motorcycles. According to an
official in the Shin Bet, which has been interrogating Hamas members who
were captured during the fighting, “The offensive tunnels were top
secret not only because [Hamas] had spent a fortune building them, but
because they understood that once we found out about the project, there
would be no turning back.” Hamas detainees have told their Israeli
interrogators that they received $300 a month for excavation work and
that there were two tiers of laborers. The master tunnelers were
supposedly told where in Israel proper their excavation work would end
up; such knowledge was not shared with the work-for-hire diggers. As for
the Nukhba fighters, the Shin Bet official tells
Vanity Fair,
“They were an elite force . . . [trained] to execute strategic terrorist
attacks. . . . [For the eventual operation, they would be] heavily
armed: R.P.G.s, Kalashnikovs, M-16s, hand grenades, and night-vision
equipment.” To maximize the element of surprise, they would wear—as can
be seen from their own videos—I.D.F. uniforms, including
mitznefet, the distinctive helmet covers worn by Israeli soldiers.
Hamas’s
strategic advantage began to deteriorate last year, however, when Morsi
(later charged with, among other things, spying for Hamas and
Hezbollah) was overthrown in a coup. His replacement, General Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi, immediately went about targeting the entire Muslim
Brotherhood—and then Hamas. “The Egyptians started to exert real
pressure,” says a senior Israeli defense official. “They destroyed
nearly 1,000 smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Sinai. Think about that:
1,000 tunnels along a border that’s 13.8 kilometers (8.6 miles) long.
The fact that the border is standing and didn’t cave in is a feat.”
Mishal
disputes the notion that Hamas stepped up its rhetoric and war plans to
counteract increased regional pressures, particularly from the new
Egyptian government: “This is the Israeli version of the story,” he
says, “to justify what Israel has committed in Gaza. Sadly, it is also
the version of the story by some parties in the region—some are
Palestinian, others, not. But it’s incorrect. War is no game; it is not
an escape hatch for avoiding a few challenges.”
While the
Egyptians may have laid waste to the smuggling tunnels—in some cases by
literally flooding them with raw sewage—Hamas’s prized possession
remained untouched: a deeply burrowed network of cross-border
passageways into Israel.
Choices and Consequences
A
debate is now raging about what Netanyahu’s government knew and sought
to do about the threat; politicians are pushing for a formal inquiry.
Yet in gauging the contentions of senior Israeli officials, it appears
that the failure to address the subterranean danger more proactively was
more a sin of omission than commission. The intelligence about the
ongoing tunneling was substantial but not definitive; the routes were
dug at varying depths, evading high-tech tools such as
ground-penetrating radar. “We knew about the existence but not the
extent of the tunnels and for years considered many, many proposals for
how to identify them,” a top intelligence official notes. “Some critics,
even some who worked [on] this issue, fault us for not accepting or
adopting their solutions. But I can tell you there were many solutions
being offered.”
At the same time, he says, “We were trying to
solve two problems at once in the mid-2000s: tunnels and short- and
medium-range rockets. In the case of Iron Dome, the solution was
developed almost in parallel with the problem. With tunnels, the
challenge grew faster than the remedy.”
A year ago, that
challenge was thrown into sharp relief as workers at Kibbutz Ein
Hashlosha, which sits on the border with Gaza, heard digging underground
and called in the I.D.F. A week later, officials announced the
discovery of a massive tunnel located some 50 feet below the surface. It
ran a mile and a half from the village of Abbasan Al-Saghira, in the
Gaza Strip, and ended on or, rather, under, the kibbutz’s doorstep.
To see the tunnel, I drove out in the back of a seven-ton I.D.F. armored vehicle called a
Ze’ev,
the Hebrew word for “wolf.” From the inside, the tunnel feels like a
colossal sensory-deprivation chamber. It is pitch dark and, 10 yards in,
it became impossible to hear
Vanity Fair’s photographer,
standing steps away. Our escort, Captain Daniel, whose last name is
withheld per I.D.F. regulations, explained, “They had a specific plan:
20 to 30 terrorists would emerge from the opening of the tunnel and
attack the residents of Ein Hashlosha [the nearby kibbutz].”
Hamas
made no effort to hide its handiwork when this passageway was unearthed
in 2013. Mishal’s deputy, Moussa Abu Marzouk, took to his Facebook
page, writing, “The tunnel which was revealed was extremely costly in
terms of money, effort, and blood. All of this is meaningless when it
comes to freeing our heroic prisoners.” He insisted, by way of
explanation: “It would not have been possible to free hundreds of our
prisoners without the Shalit tunnel.”
After the tunnel’s
discovery, Israel halted the transfer of construction materials into
Gaza, and Major General Shlomo Turgeman, the head of the I.D.F.’s
Southern Command, issued a prescient warning: if Hamas were to use such a
tunnel to carry out a terror attack, Israel would hit back hard and
“leave Gaza looking very different.”
Last March, another tunnel was uncovered, penetrating three times farther into Israel. By April, the Shin Bet tells
Vanity Fair,
Israeli officials firmly believed something big was in the works—and
Hamas did nothing to assuage their fears. “The occupation is hysterical
and confused in the face of the resistance army’s tunnels,” said Abu
Obeida, spokesman for Al-Qassam Brigades. “[B]ut we’re ready for any
scenario and we’ll teach the enemy a harsh lesson.”
Today, Mishal
seeks to downplay such talk: “If what Israeli leaders are claiming is
correct—that Hamas dug those tunnels to attack the Israeli towns and
kill civilians—how come Hamas hasn’t done that [before now or] during
the war? . . . The Israeli leadership is lying. Evidence of this is that
when they declared war on Gaza they did not declare the tunnels as part
of the military targets. But when they discovered the tunnels, this is
when they started to raise the issue. This proves that they first
started the war and then looked for justifications.”
ally admit that members of Hamas’s Al-Qassam Brigades had been
responsible for the initial abductions and murders, Mishal insists that
he and Hamas’s top brass were caught off-guard by the attacks, claiming
they had no advance knowledge, but defending the action nonetheless. “It
turned out that a Hamas field group in the West Bank had killed those
three settlers,” Mishal admits. “This was a legitimate operation . . .
[but] we never gave orders to execute this operation, or to stop that
one. We present general policies.”
With the Gaza economy
faltering and Hamas’s lifeline to Egypt severed, Israel, according to
two intelligence sources, was considering its options for launching a
preemptive tunnel attack. Both sides, it seems, felt a need to act, and
forcefully. Although Mishal contends that Israel instigated the initial
salvo, Hamas and its affiliates had been firing rockets off and on
throughout June—aimed largely at the sparsely populated western Negev.
Then, in early July, the group shot nearly 200 rockets toward more
populated areas, including Israel’s largest southern city, Beersheba.
On
July 7, Israeli jets bombed a tunnel that began in Rafah, in the
southern Gaza Strip, and exited near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom, killing seven
members of Hamas, who were trapped inside. To outward observers, it
looked as if the casualties may have been incidental. But highly placed
government sources tell
Vanity Fair they feared these operatives
were the first wave. “When the operation started, we expected the mass
attack in July,” a senior military intelligence official explains. “We
suspected they would hurry up and do it during the air war, before the
ground operation.”
Hamas considered the men who died in the
tunnel bombing to be among its most elite, warning publicly, “The enemy
will pay a tremendous price.” The next day, all hell broke loose, with
Hamas firing some 150 rockets. Over the next 10 days, Hamas would send
some 1,500 more, while the Israeli air force and navy would pound sites
in Gaza with little letup. Despite warnings by Israel to leave their
homes, thousands of civilians were caught in the crossfire. Human-rights
groups charged that Israel failed to exercise sufficient restraint when
hitting populated areas. Israel argues that Hamas used local citizens
as human shields and fired rockets from civilian areas.
“Netanyahu
has perpetrated a real holocaust in Gaza,” Mishal now says—offering his
assessment, as it so happens, in an interview conducted in Qatar on the
first day of the Jewish New Year. “He is replicating what Hitler did to
the Jews in the 30s and 40s.” Netanyahu, for his part, would stand on
the floor of the U.N. General Assembly last month and declare, “When it
comes to their ultimate goals, Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas.”
As
the air war raged, Israeli troops sought to find and neutralize all
cross-border tunnels, even though they were uncertain about their
precise locations. Colonel Ghassan Alian, a Druze, is the first non-Jew
ever to command the prestigious Golani Brigade (and the highest-ranking
member of his faith in I.D.F. history). He says that there were not only
long “offensive tunnels” but also countless, smaller “defensive or
tactical tunnels” in the Gaza Strip that were used by Hamas as supply
channels, escape routes, or hiding places for Hamas fighters.
Once
the I.D.F. entered Gaza, dodging R.P.G.s and fire from heavy machine
guns, says Alian, they came to a harsh realization: “Entire houses were
rigged to explode and collapse on our soldiers. There were all sorts of
explosive devices. Some [were set to be] triggered by cell phones and
other remote controls. Others were pressure activated and hidden under
ordinary looking house tiles.” His cohort, Sergeant Rafi (whose last
name has also been withheld for security reasons), concurs, “We went to
many houses and found tunnels inside houses, outside houses, defensive
tunnels, offensive tunnels. They spent years planning for this.”
Golani’s
mission was to destroy what intelligence officials believed were four
particularly lethal tunnels that began in the Gaza Strip town of
Shejaiya and ended a stone’s throw from Israeli kibbutzim. Shejaiya had
long been Hamas’s first line of defense and Israel’s efforts to warn its
100,000 residents to flee only reinforced its symbolic and strategic
importance in Hamas’s eyes. “In this war,” claims Alian, “the biggest
fight, the hardest battle, was for control of that neighborhood.”
I.D.F.
soldiers in Shejaiya and elsewhere quickly came to understand that
tactical tunnels presented as imminent a threat as the strategic
cross-border variety they were sent to find. On August 1—two weeks into
Israel’s ground campaign—Lieutenant Matan (who offers only his first
name) was in the Gaza town of Rafah, when he and his fellow soldiers
heard shots, he says in his first interview about the incident. Tracing
those sounds to a nearby guard post, a tunnel opening was discovered. He
and another soldier clambered down three meters, descending into the
darkness. After firing some warning rounds, he stopped in the dank
passageway, only to find portions of a bloodied uniform belonging to a
23-year-old lieutenant named Hadar Goldin, later determined to have been
killed and his body kidnapped, according to the I.D.F. spokesperson’s
office. (Goldin, unbeknownst to his abductors, turned out to have been a
relative of Israel’s Defense Minister, Moshe Ya’alon.) “The Hamas
operatives were like ghosts—honestly, like ghosts,” recalls Golani’s
Sgt. Rafi. “If they wanted to shoot, they came out of a tunnel, shot,
and ducked back into the tunnel.”
Israel’s elite Golani and
Givati brigades eventually dismantled much of subterranean Gaza, but at
considerable cost—with Golani alone losing 14 soldiers in the initial
hours of the ground war. The Palestinian town of Shejaiya, meanwhile,
would lose 60 civilians, its landscape, from certain vantage points,
left looking almost apocalyptic. As for Rafah, Hamas officials allege
that the I.D.F. bombed indiscriminately during its search for Lt.
Goldin, resulting in the deaths of dozens of Palestinian civilians.