Lecture #743 on Missile Defense
May 6, 2002
Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction
Thank you for asking me here to the
Heritage Foundation. I'm pleased to be able to speak to you today
about the Bush Administration's efforts to combat the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. The spread of weapons of mass
destruction to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups is,
in my estimation, the gravest security threat we now face. States
engaging in this behavior--some of them parties to international
treaties prohibiting such activities--must be held accountable and
must know that only by renouncing terrorism and verifiably
forsaking WMD can they rejoin the community of nations.
The New Security Environment
Eight months into the war on terror, the
United States and its partners have made great strides. We have
helped the Afghan people overthrow an oppressive,
terrorist-harboring regime in Afghanistan; foiled terrorist plots
in places such as Germany, Yemen, Spain, and Singapore; and
stanched the flow of funds that allowed al-Qaeda's schemes to come
to fruition. We have captured the number three man in al-Qaeda and
will bring him to justice. And this is just the beginning.
The
attacks of September 11 reinforced with blinding clarity the need
to be steadfast in the face of emerging threats to our security.
The international security environment has changed, and our
greatest threat comes not from the specter of nuclear war between
two superpowers, as it did during the Cold War, but from
transnational terrorist cells that will strike without warning
using weapons of mass destruction. Every nation--not just the
United States--has had to reassess its security situation and to
decide where it stands on the war on terrorism.
In
the context of this new international security situation, we are
working hard to create a comprehensive security strategy with
Russia, a plan President Bush calls the New Strategic Framework.
The New Strategic Framework involves reducing offensive nuclear
weapons, creating limited defensive systems that deter the threat
of missile attacks, strengthening nonproliferation and
counterproliferation measures, and cooperating with Russia to
combat terrorism. It is based on the premise that the more
cooperative post-Cold War relationship between Russia and the
United States makes new approaches to these issues possible.
Accordingly, President Bush has announced
that the United States will reduce its strategic nuclear force to a
total of between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads over the next 10 years. President Putin has made a
similarly bold and historic decision with respect to Russian
strategic nuclear forces.
In
preparation for the summit meeting in Moscow and St. Petersburg
later this month, we have been working closely with the Russians to
embody the reductions in offensive warheads into a legally binding
document that will outlast the administrations of both Presidents.
We are also working to draft a political declaration on the New
Strategic Framework that would cover the issues of strategic
offensive and defensive systems, nonproliferation and
counterproliferation. We are optimistic that we will have agreement
in time for the summit in Moscow, May 23 to 25.
Strengthening the U.S.-Russian
relationship has been a priority of the Bush Administration, even
prior to the September 11 attacks. In the current security climate,
cooperation with Russia becomes even more important so that we can
work together to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, which threaten both our countries.
Preventing Terrorism's Next Wave
President Bush believes it is critical not
to underestimate the threat from terrorist groups and rogue states
intent on obtaining weapons of mass destruction. As he said on the
six-month anniversary of the attacks, "Every nation in our
coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a
catastrophic scale--terror armed with biological, chemical, or
nuclear weapons." We must not doubt for a moment the possible
catastrophic consequences of terrorists or their rogue state
sponsors who are willing to use disease as a weapon to spread
chemical agents to inflict pain and death, or to send suicide-bound
adherents armed with radiological weapons on missions of mass
murder.
Every nation must commit itself to
preventing the acquisition of such weapons by state sponsors of
terrorism or terrorist groups. As President Bush said:
Our lives, our way of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction.
To
this end, we use a variety of methods to combat the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, including export controls, missile
defense, arms control, nonproliferation, and counter-proliferation
measures.
In
the past, the United States relied principally on passive measures
to stem proliferation. Arms control and nonproliferation regimes,
export controls, and diplomatic overtures were the primary tools
used in this fight. But September 11, the subsequent anthrax
attacks, and our discoveries regarding al-Qaeda and its WMD
aspirations have required the U.S to complement these more
traditional strategies with a new approach. The Bush Administration
is committed to combating the spread of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, missiles, and related equipment, and is
determined to prevent the use of these deadly weapons against our
citizens, troops, allies, and friends. While diplomatic efforts and
multilateral regimes will remain important to our efforts, we also
intend to complement this approach with other measures as we work
both in concert with likeminded nations and on our own to prevent
terrorists and terrorist regimes from acquiring or using WMD. In
the past, we looked at proliferation and terrorism as entirely
separate issues. As Secretary Powell said in his Senate testimony
April 24,
There are terrorists in the world who would like nothing better than to get their hands on and use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. So there is a definite link between terrorism and WMD. Not to recognize that link would be foolhardy to the extreme.
America is determined to prevent the next
wave of terror. States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must
stop. States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part
of our effort. But those that do not can expect to become our
targets. This means directing firm international condemnation
toward states that shelter--and in some cases directly
sponsor--terrorists within their borders. It means uncovering their
activities that may be in violation of international treaties. It
means having a direct dialogue with the rest of the world about
what is at stake. It means taking action against proliferators,
middlemen, and weapons brokers by exposing them, sanctioning their
behavior, and working with other countries to prosecute them or
otherwise bring a halt to their activities. It means taking
law-enforcement action against suspect shipments, front companies,
and financial institutions that launder proliferators' funds. And
it requires, above all, effective use, improvement, and enforcement
of the multilateral tools at our disposal--both arms control and
nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes.
The Problem of Noncompliance
Multilateral agreements are important to
our nonproliferation arsenal. This Administration strongly supports
treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological
Weapons Convention. But in order to be effective and provide the
assurances they are designed to bring, they must be carefully and
universally adhered to by all signatories. Therefore, strict
compliance with existing treaties remains a major goal of our arms
control policy.
This
has been our aim in particular with the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). In 1969, President Nixon announced that the
United States would unilaterally renounce biological weapons. The
U.S. example was soon followed by other countries, and by 1972 the
BWC was opened for signature. This international treaty, to which
more than 140 countries are parties, prohibits the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological
and toxin weapons.
While the vast majority of the BWC's
parties have conscientiously met their commitments, the United
States is extremely concerned that several states are conducting
offensive biological weapons programs while publicly avowing
compliance with the agreement. To expose some of these violators to
the international community, last November, I named publicly
several states the U.S. government knows to be producing biological
warfare agents in violation of the BWC.
Foremost is Iraq. Although it became a
signatory to the BWC in 1972 and became a State Party in 1991, Iraq
has developed, produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents
and weapons. The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has
taken advantage of more than three years of no UN inspections to
improve all phases of its offensive BW program. Iraq also has
developed, produced, and stockpiled chemical weapons, and has shown
a continuing interest in developing nuclear weapons and longer
range missiles.
Next
is North Korea. North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort
to achieve a BW capability and has developed and produced, and may
have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Convention. Despite
the fact that its citizens are starving, the leadership in
Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources,
including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing
infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It
likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of
biological agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to
do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering
these deadly weapons.
In
January, I also named North Korea and Iraq for their covert nuclear
weapons programs in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. This year, North Korea did not meet congressional
certification requirements because of its continued lack of
cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, its
failure to make any progress toward implementing the North-South
Joint Denuclearization Declaration as called for under the Agreed
Framework, and for proliferating long-range ballistic missiles.
Finally, we believe that North Korea has a sizeable stockpile of
chemical weapons and can manufacture all manner of CW agents.
Then
comes Iran. Iran's biological weapons program began during the
Iran-Iraq war and accelerated after Tehran learned how far along
Saddam Hussein had progressed in his own program. The Iranians have
all of the necessary pharmaceutical expertise, as well as the
commercial infrastructure needed to produce--and hide--a biological
warfare program. The United States believes Iran probably has
produced and weaponized BW agents in violation of the Convention.
Again, Iran's BW program is complemented by an even more aggressive
chemical warfare program, Iran's ongoing interest in nuclear
weapons, and its aggressive ballistic missile research,
development, and flight testing regimen.
President Bush named these three countries
in his State of the Union address earlier this year as the world's
most dangerous proliferators. "States like these, and their
terrorist allies," he said, "constitute an axis of evil, arming to
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger."
Trouble Ahead
Beyond the axis of evil, there are other
rogue states intent on acquiring weapons of mass
destruction--particularly biological weapons. Given our
vulnerability to attack from biological agents, as evidenced
recently in the anthrax releases, it is important to carefully
assess and respond to potential proliferators. Today, I want to
discuss three other state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing
or that have the potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction or
have the capability to do so in violation of their treaty
obligations. While we will continue to use diplomatic efforts and
multilateral regimes with these countries, it is important to
review the challenges we face and to underline the issues that
these states must address. As the President has said,
America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate. Yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer.
First, Libya. There is no doubt that Libya
continues its longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe
that since the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya in 1999,
Libya has been able to increase its access to dual use nuclear
technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign
assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, Tripoli's nuclear
infrastructure enhancement remains of concern. Qaddafi hinted at
this in a recent (25 March) interview with Al-Jazirah when he said,
"We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction
that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand that. Otherwise,
the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon."
Among its weapons of mass destruction
programs, Libya--which is not a party to the CWC--continues its
goal of reestablishing its offensive chemical weapons ability, as
well as pursuing an indigenous chemical warfare production
capability. Libya has produced at least 100 tons of different kinds
of chemical weapons, using its Rabta facility. That facility closed
down after it was subject to media scrutiny, but then reopened as a
pharmaceutical plant in 1995. Although production of chemical
agents reportedly has been halted, CW production at Rabta cannot be
ruled out. It remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for
precursor chemicals, technical expertise, and other key chemical
warfare-related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions
in April 1999, Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit
foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the
Middle East, Asia, and Western Europe.
Conversely, Libya has publicly indicated
its intent to join the CWC. While our perceptions of Libya would
not change overnight, such a move could be positive. Under the CWC,
Libya would be required to declare and destroy all chemical weapons
production facilities and stockpiles, make declarations about any
dual use chemical industry, undertake not to research or produce
any chemical weapons, and not to export certain chemicals to
countries that have not signed the CWC. Libya would also be subject
to challenge inspections of any facility, declared or not.
Significantly for predictive purposes,
Libya became a State Party to the BWC in January 1982, but the U.S.
believes that Libya has continued its biological warfare program.
Although its program is in the research and development stage,
Libya may be capable of producing small quantities of biological
agent. Libya's BW program has been hindered, in part, by the
country's poor scientific and technological base, equipment
shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN
sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999.
Libya is also continuing its efforts to
obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology,
and expertise from foreign sources. Outside
assistance--particularly Serbian, Indian, North Korean, and
Chinese--is critical to its ballistic missile development programs,
and the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to
expand its procurement effort. Libya's current capability probably
remains limited to its SCUD B missiles; but with continued foreign
assistance, it may achieve an MRBM capability--a long desired
goal--or extended-range SCUD capability.
Although Libya is one of seven countries
on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terror,1 the U.S. has noted recent
positive steps by the Libyan government that we hope indicate that
Tripoli wishes to rejoin the community of civilized states. In
1999, Libya turned over two Libyans wanted in connection with the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, for trial in
the Netherlands. In 2001, it condemned the September 11 attacks
publicly and signed the 12 terrorist conventions listed in UN
Security Council Resolution 1273. And, as I have already mentioned,
Libya has also announced its intention to accede to CWC.
However, as I have also said, words are
not enough. The key is to see clear, hard evidence that Libya will,
in fact, live up to the public standards it has set for itself.
Libya can make a positive gesture in this regard by fulfilling its
obligations under WMD treaties and becoming a party to the CWC.
Moreover, Libya must honor the relevant UN Security Council
Resolutions relating to the resolution of Pan Am 103, arguably the
worst air terrorist disaster prior to September 11. Libya has yet
to comply fully with these resolutions, which include accepting
responsibility and paying compensation. It is past time that Libya
did this.
The
United States also knows that Syria has long had a chemical warfare
program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and is engaged
in research and development of the more toxic and persistent nerve
agent VX. Although Damascus currently is dependent on foreign
sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including
precursor chemicals and key production equipment, we are concerned
about Syrian advances in its indigenous CW infrastructure which
would significantly increase the independence of its CW program. We
think that Syria has a variety of aerial bombs and SCUD warheads,
which are potential means of delivery of deadly agents capable of
striking neighboring countries.
Syria, which has signed but not ratified
the BWC, is pursuing the development of biological weapons and is
able to produce at least small amounts of biological warfare
agents. While we believe Syria would need foreign assistance to
launch a large-scale biological weapons program right now, it may
obtain such assistance by the end of this decade.
Syria has a combined total of several
hundred SCUD B, SCUD C and SS-21 SRBMs, It is pursuing both solid-
and liquid-propellant missile programs and relies extensively on
foreign assistance in these endeavors. North Korean and Russian
entities have been involved in aiding Syria's ballistic missile
development. All of Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach much
of Israel, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the
country.
In
addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming from another
BWC signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles from the U.S.
mainland--namely, Cuba. This totalitarian state has long been a
violator of human rights. The State Department said last year in
its Annual Report on Human Rights Practices that
the Government continued to violate systematically the fundamental civil and political rights of its citizens. Citizens do not have the right to change their government peacefully. Prisoners died in jail due to lack of medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners.... The Government denied its citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association.
Havana has long provided safe haven for
terrorists, earning it a place on the State Department's list of
terrorist-sponsoring states. The country is known to be harboring
terrorists from Colombia, Spain, and fugitives from the United
States. We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state
sponsors of terror.
Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S.
war on terrorism. He continues to view terror as a legitimate
tactic to further revolutionary objectives. Last year, Castro
visited Iran, Syria, and Libya--all designees on the same list of
terrorist-sponsoring states. At Tehran University, these were his
words: "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring
America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are
witnessing this weakness from close up."
But
Cuba's threat to our security often has been underplayed. An
official U.S. government report in 1998 concluded that Cuba did not
represent a significant military threat to the United States or the
region. It went only so far as to say that "Cuba has a limited
capacity to engage in some military and intelligence activities
which could pose a danger to U.S. citizens under some
circumstances." However, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen
tried to add some balance to this report by expressing in the
preface his serious concerns about Cuba's intelligence activities
against the United States and its human rights practices. Most
notably, he said, "I remain concerned about Cuba's potential to
develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnology
infrastructure...."
Why
was the 1998 report on Cuba so unbalanced? Why did it underplay the
threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major reason is Cuba's
aggressive intelligence operations against the United States, which
included recruiting the Defense Intelligence Agency's senior Cuba
analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to spy for Cuba. Montes not only had a
hand in drafting the 1998 Cuba report, but also passed some of our
most sensitive information about Cuba back to Havana. Montes was
arrested last fall and pleaded guilty to espionage on March 19.
For
four decades, Cuba has maintained a well-developed and
sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the
Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in Latin
America and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines
that are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cuban defectors have long
cast suspicion on the activities conducted in these biomedical
facilities.
Here
is what we now know: The United States believes that Cuba has at
least a limited offensive biological warfare research and
development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to
other rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could
support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all
BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply
with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons
Convention.
Conclusion
America is leading in the fight to root
out and destroy terror. Our goals are to stop the development of
weapons of mass destruction and insure compliance with existing
arms control and nonproliferation treaties and commitments, which
the Bush Administration strongly supports, but experience has shown
that treaties and agreements are an insufficient check against
state sponsors of terrorism. Noncompliance can undermine the
efficacy and legitimacy of these treaties and regimes. After all,
any nation ready to violate one agreement is perfectly capable of
violating another, denying its actual behavior all the while.
And
so I close with four fundamental conclusions. First, that global
terrorism has changed the nature of the threat we face. Keeping WMD
out of terrorist hands must be a core element of our
nonproliferation strategy.
Second, the Administration supports an
international dialogue on weapons of mass destruction and
encourages countries to educate their publics on the WMD threat. We
must not shy away from truth telling.
Third, the Administration will not assume
that because a country's formal subscription to UN counterterrorism
conventions or its membership in multilateral regimes necessarily
constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions. We call on
Libya, Cuba, and Syria to live up to the agreements they have
signed. We will watch closely their actions, not simply listen to
their words. Working with our allies, we will expose those
countries that do not live up to their commitments.
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