
The
Supreme Court in
Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp. holds that Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination means that employers cannot discriminate
on the basis of sex plus other factors such as having school age
children. In practical terms, EEOC's policy forbids employers from
using one hiring policy for women with small children and a
different policy for males with children of a similar age.

In
Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., the Supreme Court decides that where an employer
uses a neutral policy or rule, or utilizes a neutral test, and this
policy or test disproportionately affects minorities or women in an
adverse manner, then the employer must justify the neutral rule or
test by proving it is justified by business necessity. The Court
reasons that Congress directed the thrust of Title VII to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.
This decision paves the way for EEOC and charging parties to
challenge employment practices that shut out groups if the employer
cannot show the policy is justified by business necessity.

In
McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v Green, the Supreme Court holds that a charging
party can prove unlawful discrimination indirectly by showing, for
example, in a hiring case that: (1) the charging party is a member
of a Title VII protected group; (2) he or she applied and was
qualified for the position sought; (3) the job was not offered to
him or her; and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants with
similar qualifications. If the plaintiff can prove these four
elements, the employer must show a legitimate lawful reason why the
individual was not hired. The employee still may prevail if he or
she discredits the employer's asserted reason for not hiring him or
her.

In
Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court holds that
non-citizens are entitled to Title VII protection and states that a
citizenship requirement may violate Title VII if it has the purpose
or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.

In
Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court rules that an
employee who submits a discrimination claim to arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement is not precluded from suing his or
her employer under Title VII. The court reasons that the right to
be free of unlawful employment discrimination is a statutory right
and cannot be bargained away by the union and employer.

In
Corning Glass Works
v. Brennan, the Supreme Court holds that under the Equal
Pay Act the allocation of proof in a pay discrimination case
requires the plaintiff to prove that an employer pays an employee
of one sex more than an employee of the other sex for substantially
equal work.

In
Albermarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, the Supreme Court decides that after a court
has found an employer guilty of discrimination, the "wronged"
employee is presumed to be entitled to back pay.

In
General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court rules that a health
insurance plan for employees providing sickness and accident
benefits for any disability but those arising as a result of
pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII,
although the court acknowledged that only women can become
pregnant.

In
Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., the Supreme Court holds that Title
VII requires an employer to hire a victim of unlawful
discrimination with seniority starting from the date the individual
was unlawfully denied the position.

In
McDonald v. Santa Fe
Transportation Co., the Supreme Court holds that Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against whites as well as
blacks.

In
International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the Supreme
Court rules that in a pattern or practice discrimination case, once
the plaintiff proves that the defendant systematically
discriminated, all the affected class members are presumed to be
entitled to relief (such as back pay, jobs) unless the defendant
proves that the individuals were not the victims of the defendant's
pattern or practice of discrimination.

In
Hazelwood School
District v. U.S., the Supreme Court rules that a
plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of class hiring
discrimination through the presentation of statistical evidence by
comparing the racial composition of an employer's workforce with
the racial composition of the relevant labor market. The court
explains that absent discrimination, an employer's workforce should
reflect the composition of the employer's applicant pool.

The
Supreme Court in
Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison decides its first Title VII religious
discrimination case. The Court states that under Title VII
employers must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious needs
unless to do so would create an undue hardship for the employer.
The Court defines hardship as anything more than
de
minimis cost.

In
Occidental Life
Insurance Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court addresses many
of the procedural arguments advanced by employers which have
prevented EEOC's lawsuits from going forward. The Court holds that
EEOC lawsuits do not have to be filed in court within 180 days
after the filing of a charge and that EEOC lawsuits are not subject
to state statutes of limitation.

In
Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, the Supreme
Court rules that an employer may not use the fact that women as a
group live longer than men to justify a policy of requiring women
employees to make larger contributions than men to a pension plan
to receive the same monthly pension benefits when they retire.

In
United Steel Workers
of America v. Weber, the Supreme Court holds that
private sector employers and unions may lawfully implement
voluntary affirmative action plans to remedy past discrimination.
The Court holds that an employer and union do not violate a
collectively bargained plan by reserving 50 percent of the slots in
a training program in a traditionally segregated industry for black
employees. The program is lawful because it does not "unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees," does not "create an
absolute bar to the advancement of white employees," and is "a
temporary measure . . . not intended to maintain racial balance,
but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance."

In
General Telephone
Company of the Northwest v. EEOC, the Supreme Court
upholds EEOC's authority to seek class wide relief for victims of
discrimination, without being restricted by the class action rules
applicable to private litigants. The Court emphasizes that when
EEOC files suit, it acts to vindicate the "overriding public
interest in equal employment opportunity."

In
County of Washington
v. Gunther, the Supreme Court holds that the Bennett
Amendment, which incorporates the four affirmative defenses of the
Equal Pay Act (EPA) into Title VII, does not limit Title VII pay
discrimination claims to EPA claims. Title VII wage claims can be
broader than EPA claims because Title VII, unlike the EPA, is
"intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."

In
Connecticut v.
Teal, the Supreme Court holds that an employer is liable
for racial discrimination when any part of its selection process,
such as an unvalidated examination or test, has a disparate impact
even if the final result of the hiring process is racially
balanced. In effect, the Court rejects the "bottom line defense"
and makes clear that the fair employment laws protect the
individual. The
Teal decision means that fair
treatment of a group is not a defense to an individual claim of
discrimination.

The Supreme Court in
Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, clarifies the requirements for filing a
private lawsuit under Title VII. The Court explains that the timely
filing of a charge is not a jurisdictional requirement but like a
statute of limitations and therefore is subject to equitable
tolling and waivers.

The Supreme Court in
EEOC v.
Wyoming upholds the constitutionality of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as it applies to state and local
governments. The Court rules that state and local governments --
one of the fastest growing employment sectors -- cannot
discriminate against employees and job applicants on the basis of
their age.

In
EEOC v. Shell Oil
Co., the Supreme Court affirms the authority of EEOC's
Commissioners to initiate charges of discrimination through
"Commissioners Charges."

In
Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, the Supreme Court for the first time
recognizes that sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII. The
Court in formulating its opinion, favorably cites EEOC's policy
guidance on sexual harassment.

In
Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, the Supreme
Court explains the requirements for a lawful voluntary affirmative
action plan. The Court explains that in order for an affirmative
action plan to be valid, an employer must show a conspicuous under
representation of minorities or women in traditionally segregated
job categories and that the plan does not unnecessarily restrict
the rights of male or non-minority employees, or create an absolute
barrier to their advancement.

The Supreme Court in
EEOC v. Commercial
Office Products, clarifies the relationship between EEOC
and state and local Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs). The
Court holds that a FEPA's decision to waive Title VII's 60-day
deferral period pursuant to a worksharing agreement "terminates"
state proceedings and permits EEOC immediately to deem the charge
filed and begin processing. The Court also rules that a charging
party who files a charge that is untimely under state law is
nonetheless entitled to Title VII's longer 300 day federal filing
period rather than the180 day period.

The Supreme Court in
Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, in a unanimous opinion, declares that
the disparate impact analysis can be applied to subjective or
discretionary selection practices. In the past, the Court had
applied disparate impact only to tests and other presumptively
objective practices.

The Supreme Court in
Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins establishes how to analyze an employer's actions
when the employer has mixed motivations for the employment
decision,
i.e., the employer was motivated by a legitimate
reason
and also by an unlawful reason such as unlawful
race or sex bias. The Court holds that if a plaintiff shows that
discrimination played a motivating part in an employment decision,
the employer can attempt to prove, as a complete affirmative
defense, that it would have made the same employment decision even
if discrimination were not a factor.

In
Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, the Supreme Court rules that when a
plaintiff makes a showing of a disparate impact violation of Title
VII, he must do so by demonstrating that specific practices (and
not the cumulative effect of the employer's selection practices)
adversely affected a protected group. Further, the Court holds that
when a showing of disparate impact is made, the employer only has
to produce evidence of a business justification for the practice,
and that the burden of proof always remains with the employee.

In
Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, the Supreme Court
rejects EEOC's position that a benefit plan that denied disability
benefits to employees over the age of 60 at the time of retirement
violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Instead,
the Supreme Court rules that the ADEA does not prohibit
discrimination in employment benefit plans, as long as the benefit
plan is not a means to discriminate in some "non-fringe" benefit
aspect of employment. In short, the Court holds that the ADEA's
prohibition against age discrimination does not apply to employee
fringe benefits in most circumstances.

The Supreme Court in
Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies decides when a charging party must file a
discrimination charge if the charging party is challenging a
seniority system neutral (and non-discriminatory) on its face. The
Court holds that the time in which a facially neutral seniority
system can be challenged runs from the adoption of the alleged
discriminatory system. The Court rejects EEOC's position that the
limitations period begins to run only when the employee is
adversely affected by the seniority system.
Lorrance
is the first EEOC case in which the agency's General Counsel,
Charles Shanor, is permitted to argue in the United States Supreme
Court.

The Supreme Court decides
International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls and addresses the issue of fetal
hazards. In this case, the employer barred women of childbearing
age from certain jobs due to potential harm that could occur to a
fetus. The Court rules that the employer's restriction against
fertile women performing "dangerous jobs" constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII. The Court further rules that the
employer's fetal protection policy could be justified only if being
able to bear children was a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) for the job. The fact that the job posed risk to fertile
women does not justify barring all fertile women from the
position.

The Supreme Court in
Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane rules that an individual who has
signed an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes with his or
her employer cannot proceed with an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) lawsuit in court but must instead submit the
dispute to an arbitrator. This decision differs from the Court's
earlier decision in
Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, where the court held that an employee
could proceed with a Title VII lawsuit even though the union which
he belonged to had agreed in a collective bargaining agreement to
submit discrimination disputes to arbitration.

In
St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court rules that the
plaintiff in an employment discrimination case is not entitled to
automatically win even if he establishes a
prima facie
case of discrimination and demonstrates that all of the reasons
advanced by the employer for the "challenged action" are false. The
Supreme Court's decision means that even if the plaintiff can prove
the employer's asserted defense is pretextual, than a finding of
unlawful discrimination is not mandatory. A fact finder may still
conclude that the employer's action is not discriminatory. The
Commission had filed a brief as
amicus curiae arguing,
unsuccessfully, that prior Supreme Court cases established that
once the plaintiff had shown that all of the employers reasons for
the adverse employment actions are pretextual, then the plaintiff
should automatically win.

In
Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court rules that in
a sexual harassment case, the plaintiff does not have to prove
concrete psychological harm to establish a Title VII violation.

A unanimous Supreme Court in
McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., rejects the so called
"after acquired evidence" doctrine applied by lower courts to bar a
plaintiff from proving unlawful discrimination. Under the doctrine,
employers after firing an employee or taking other adverse action,
justify their actions by relying on evidence uncovered after the
employee's termination which would have justified the termination.
The Supreme Court rules that in such cases, the employer is still
liable for having violated an anti-discrimination law but that the
employee is not entitled to reinstatement or to back pay for the
period after the employer learns of the misconduct.

The Supreme Court in
O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. rules that to show
unlawful discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, a discharged plaintiff does not have to show that he or she
was replaced by someone outside the protected age group (that is
under age 40).

A unanimous Supreme Court in
Robinson v.
Shell Oil, adopts EEOC's position (advanced as
amicus curiae) that the Title VII prohibition against
retaliation protects former as well as current employees.

The Supreme Court in
Walters and
EEOC v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises approves
EEOC's "payroll method" of counting employees to determine if an
employer has the requisite number of employees to be subject to
Title VII coverage.

The Supreme Court decides
Bragdon v. Abbott, a Title III (public accommodations)
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) case. The Court holds that an
individual with asymptomatic HIV is an individual with a disability
and therefore is protected by the ADA. Significantly, the Court
finds that reproduction is a major life activity under the
statute.

The Supreme Court, in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, spells out the
circumstances in which employers will be held liable for acts of
sexual harassment carried out by their supervisory personnel. The
Court rules that employers are liable when the sexual harassment
has culminated in a tangible employment action directed against the
harassed employee (
i.e., employee is terminated or demoted
after rejecting a supervisor's sexual advance). The Court further
rules that employers are permitted to establish an affirmative
defense to the claim, if it can show no tangible action was taken
against the harassed employee and two additional elements: (1) the
employer had communicated and established an effective procedure
for employees to seek redress from sexual harassment; and (2) the
harassed employee failed to take advantage of this procedure. If an
employer can show all of these elements, then it will not be held
responsible for the sexual harassment by its supervisory
personnel.

A unanimous Supreme Court rules in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services that sex
discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII. The Court reiterates that the plaintiff
must prove that there was discrimination because of sex and that
the harassment was severe.

In
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., the Supreme
Court revisits the issue of whether a collective bargaining
agreement providing for the mandatory arbitration of discrimination
claims can bar individual charging parties from pursuing their EEO
claims in federal court. The Supreme Court decides that the
collective bargaining agreement at issue did not contain a clear
and unmistakable waiver and therefore the charging party could
pursue his employment discrimination claim in court.

In the cases of
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. and
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, the Supreme Court holds
that the question of an individual's disability requires evaluation
of his or her impairment in its "mitigated" or corrected state. To
be protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
individual must show that he or she is substantially limited in
performing a major life activity even with the use of medications
or assistive devices. As a practical matter, this means that
individuals taking medications to offset the effects of a condition
like diabetes or epilepsy may not be able to secure ADA protection
if they cannot show that they were substantially impaired while in
a mitigated state.

In
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the
Supreme Court agrees with EEOC's position that a plaintiff can go
forward with his or her Americans with Disabilities Act case
despite having filed an earlier claim for disability under the
Social Security Act alleging he or she is unable to work.

In
Gibson v. West, the Supreme Court endorses EEOC's
position that it has the legal authority to require that federal
agencies pay compensatory damages when EEOC has ruled during the
administrative process that the federal agency has unlawfully
discriminated in violation of Title VII.
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