"I have not yet begun to fight!"

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Monday, September 9, 2013

The Obama-Biden Plan

Barack Obama and Joe Biden will renew America’s security and standing in the world through a new era of American leadership. The Obama-Biden foreign policy will end the war in Iraq responsibly, finish the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, secure nuclear weapons and loose nuclear materials from terrorists, and renew American diplomacy to support strong alliances and to seek a lasting peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Afghanistan: Obama and Biden will refocus American resources on the greatest threat to our security -- the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They will increase our troop levels in Afghanistan, press our allies in NATO to do the same, and dedicate more resources to revitalize Afghanistan’s economic development. Obama and Biden will demand the Afghan government do more, including cracking down on corruption and the illicit opium trade.
Pakistan: Obama and Biden will increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan and hold them accountable for security in the border region with Afghanistan.

Nuclear Weapons

A Record of Results: The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes. Obama has taken bipartisan action to secure nuclear weapons and materials:
- He joined Senator Dick Lugar (R-In) in passing a law to help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world.
- He joined Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Ne) to introduce a bill that seeks to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
Secure Loose Nuclear Materials from Terrorists: Obama and Biden will secure all loose nuclear materials in the world within four years. While working to secure existing stockpiles of nuclear material, Obama and Biden will negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material. This will deny terrorists the ability to steal or buy loose nuclear materials.
Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Obama and Biden will crack down on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that countries like North Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions.
Move Toward a Nuclear Free World: Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.

Iran

Diplomacy: Barack Obama supports tough and direct diplomacy with Iran without preconditions. Now is the time to use the power of American diplomacy to pressure Iran to stop their illicit nuclear program, support for terrorism, and threats toward Israel. Obama and Biden will offer the Iranian regime a choice. If Iran abandons its nuclear program and support for terrorism, we will offer incentives like membership in the World Trade Organization, economic investments, and a move toward normal diplomatic relations. If Iran continues its troubling behavior, we will step up our economic pressure and political isolation. In carrying out this diplomacy, we will coordinate closely with our allies and proceed with careful preparation. Seeking this kind of comprehensive settlement with Iran is our best way to make progress.

Energy Security

Achieving Energy Security: Obama will put America on a path to energy independence by investing $150 billion in renewable and alternative energy over the next ten years -- an investment that will create millions of jobs along the way. He’ll also make the U.S. a leader in the global effort to combat climate change by leading a new international global warming partnership.

Renewing American Diplomacy

Renew our Alliances: Obama and Biden will rebuild our alliances to meet the common challenges of the 21st century. America is strongest when we act alongside strong partners. Now is the time for a new era of international cooperation that strengthens old partnerships and builds new ones to confront the common challenges of the 21st century -- terrorism and nuclear weapons; climate change and poverty; genocide and disease.
Talk to our Foes and Friends: Obama and Biden will pursue tough, direct diplomacy without preconditions with all nations, friend and foe. They will do the careful preparation necessary, but will signal that America is ready to come to the table and is willing to lead. And if America is willing to come to the table, the world will be more willing to rally behind American leadership to deal with challenges like confronting terrorism and Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs.
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Obama and Biden will make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a key diplomatic priority from day one. They will make a sustained push -- working with Israelis and Palestinians -- to achieve the goal of two states, a Jewish state in Israel and a Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security.
Expand our Diplomatic Presence: To make diplomacy a priority, Obama and Biden will stop shuttering consulates and start opening them in difficult corners of the world -- particularly in Africa. They will expand our foreign service, and develop our civilian capacity to work alongside the military.
Fight Global Poverty: Obama and Biden will embrace the Millennium Development Goal of cutting extreme poverty and hunger around the world in half by 2015, and they will double our foreign assistance to achieve that goal. This will help the world's weakest states build healthy and educated communities, reduce poverty, develop markets, and generate wealth.
Seek New Partnerships in Asia: Obama and Biden will forge a more effective framework in Asia that goes beyond bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad hoc arrangements, such as the six-party talks on North Korea. They will maintain strong ties with allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia; work to build an infrastructure with countries in East Asia that can promote stability and prosperity; and work to ensure that China plays by international rules.

Israel

Ensure a Strong U.S.-Israel Partnership: Barack Obama and Joe Biden strongly support the U.S.-Israel relationship, and believe that our first and incontrovertible commitment in the Middle East must be to the security of Israel, America's strongest ally in the region. They support this closeness, and have stated that the United States will never distance itself from Israel.
Support Israel's Right to Self Defense: During the July 2006 Lebanon war, Barack Obama stood up strongly for Israel's right to defend itself from Hezbollah raids and rocket attacks, cosponsoring a Senate resolution against Iran and Syria's involvement in the war, and insisting that Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire that did not deal with the threat of Hezbollah missiles. He and Joe Biden believe strongly in Israel's right to protect its citizens.
Support Foreign Assistance to Israel: Barack Obama and Joe Biden have consistently supported foreign assistance to Israel. They defend and support the annual foreign aid package that involves both military and economic assistance to Israel and have advocated increased foreign aid budgets to ensure that these funding priorities are met. They have called for continuing U.S. cooperation with Israel in the development of missile defense systems.

Bipartisanship and Openness

A Record of Bringing People Together: In the Senate, Obama has worked with Republicans and Democrats to advance important policy initiatives on securing weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, increasing funding for nonproliferation, and countering instability in Congo.
Consultative Group: Obama and Biden will convene a bipartisan Consultative Group of leading members of Congress to foster better executive-legislative relations and bipartisan unity on foreign policy. This group will be comprised of the congressional leadership of both political parties, and the chair and ranking members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations Committees. This group will meet with the president once a month to review foreign policy priorities, and will be consulted in advance of military action.
Getting Politics out of Intelligence: Obama will insulate the Director of National Intelligence from political pressure by giving the DNI a fixed term, like the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Obama and Biden will seek consistency and integrity at the top of our intelligence community -- not just a political ally.
Change the Culture of Secrecy: Obama will institute a National Declassification Center to make declassification secure but routine, efficient, and cost-effective.
Engaging the American People on Foreign Policy: Obama and Biden will bring foreign policy decisions directly to the people by requiring their national security officials to have periodic national broadband town hall meetings to discuss foreign policy. Obama will personally deliver Your Weekly Address via webcast.

Sunday, September 8, 2013

Travel Warning U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Bureau of Consular Affairs

Travel Warning
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Bureau of Consular Affairs

Syria

March 01, 2013

The Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens against travel to Syria and strongly recommends that U.S. citizens remaining in Syria depart immediately. This Travel Warning supersedes the Travel Warning dated August 28, 2012, to remind U.S. citizens that the security situation remains volatile and unpredictable as an armed conflict between government and anti-government armed groups continues throughout the country, with an increased risk of kidnappings, bombings, murder, and terrorism. This revision of the travel warning also serves to update contact information.
No part of Syria should be considered immune from violence, and the potential exists throughout the country for hostile acts, including kidnappings. Indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment, including of densely populated urban areas across the country, have significantly increased the risk of death or serious injury. The destruction of infrastructure, housing, medical facilities, schools, power and water utilities has also exacerbated hardships inside the country.
There is also a threat from terrorism, including groups like al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) affiliated al-Nusrah Front. Since November 2011, al-Nusrah Front has claimed nearly 600 attacks – ranging from more than 40 suicide attacks to small arms and improvised explosive device operations – in major city centers including Damascus, Aleppo, Hamah, Dara, Homs, Idlib, and Dayr al-Zawr. Public places such as government buildings, shopping areas, and open spaces have been targeted.
Communications in Syria are difficult as phone and internet connections have become increasingly unreliable. The Department of State has received reports that U.S. citizens are experiencing difficulty and facing dangers traveling within the country and when trying to leave Syria via land borders, given the diminishing availability of commercial air travel out of Syria as fierce clashes between pro-government and opposition forces continue in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo airports.
The U.S. Embassy in Damascus suspended its operations in February 2012 and therefore cannot provide protection or routine consular services to U.S. citizens in Syria. The Government of the Czech Republic, acting through its Embassy in Damascus, serves as Protecting Power for U.S. interests in Syria. The range of consular services the Czech Republic provides to U.S. citizens is extremely limited, and those services, including for U.S. passports and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad, may require significantly more processing time than at U.S. embassies or consulates outside of Syria. U.S. citizens in Syria who seek consular services should contact the U.S. Interests Section of the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Damascus at USIS_damascus@embassy.mzv.cz.

U.S. citizens in Syria who are in need of emergency assistance in Syria, and are unable to reach the U.S. Interests Section of the Embassy of the Czech Republic or must make contact outside business hours, should contact the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan:
Telephone: 962 (6) 590-6950 (Daily 2-3:30 local time)
Emergencies: 962 (6) 590-6500
E-mail: Amman-ACS@state.gov
If you seek information about U.S. citizens' services in Syria from the Office of Overseas Citizens' Services in Washington, please e-mail: SyriaEmergencyUSC@state.gov.
The Department of State urges those U.S. citizens who decide to remain in Syria despite this Travel Warning to provide their current contact information and next-of-kin information through the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) at www.travel.state.gov.
For information on "What the Department of State Can and Can't Do in a Crisis," please visit the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Emergencies and Crisis link at www.travel.state.gov. Up-to-date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the United States and Canada or, for callers outside the United States and Canada, on a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).
For further information, U.S. citizens should consult the Department of State's Country Specific Information for Syria. Stay up to date by bookmarking our Bureau of Consular Affairs website, which contains the current Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts as well as the Worldwide Caution. Follow us on Twitter and the Bureau of Consular Affairs page on Facebook as well. You can also download our free Smart Traveler App, available through iTunes and the Android market, to have travel information at your fingertips.

GENEVA: AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING

Passed to the Telegraph by WikiLeaks

9:07PM GMT 04 Feb 2011

Ref ID: 10GENEVA135

Date: 2/26/2010 10:30

Origin: Mission Geneva

Classification: SECRET

Destination:

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Tags:

S E C R E T GENEVA 000135 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM, KACT, MARR, PREL, RS, US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 09, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-027.
2. (U) Meeting Date: February 09, 2010 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ------- SUMMARY -------
3. (S) A meeting, co-chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin, on proposed agreed statements was conducted at the U.S. Mission on February 9. The proposed agreed statements on converted B-1B heavy bombers, SSGNs, joint basing, Trident I, and rapid reload were discussed in detail. Addressing of agreed statements on the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) was deferred until additional discussion of these matters was completed by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Definitions Working Groups (WG). The Russian side provided copies of agreed statements on the use of telemetric data and on the transfer of Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom. End summary.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs; Joint Basing; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload; and Other Agreed Statements. ---------------------------- Converted B-1B heavy bomberS ----------------------------
5. (S) Mr. Elliott began the meeting with a discussion on the agreed statement for B-1B heavy bombers. The U.S. side accepted the Russian-proposed change to replace the word "all" with "the last" which conveyed the same concept i.e., that the provisions of the agreed statement applied when the last B-1B was converted. Elliott discussed using the term "formerly declared facility" instead of the terms "airbase" or "facility" because the defined term "airbase" only applied to facilities where heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are based and the defined term "facility" only applied to those facilities listed in their definition. Col Ilin commented that care must be taken since the term "bases" was used elsewhere in the document and therefore must be used consistently.
6. In response to the Russian proposal that the procedures for the exhibition of the B-1B be "identical" to the procedures specified in Part III of the Protocol (Conversion or Elimination (CorE)), Section V, Paragraph 5, Elliott explained why procedures for verification of conversion of heavy bombers for use with non-nuclear armaments could not be "identical" to the procedures used during the exhibition to demonstrate that the converted B-1B was incapable of employing nuclear armaments. He said this was because the procedures specified in Part III of the Protocol required the B-1B to remain at the CorE facility following completion of conversion. It was impossible for the United States to comply with this provision since the B-1B that would be exhibited would have already undergone conversion, been inspected, and been flown to its operating base. Ilin agreed that the term "identical" may not be acceptable but that it should be agreed which of the procedures would be used and also that the "distinguishing features" covered during the exhibition must be recorded for future reference. Elliott concurred that the procedures would be similar but physically could not be "identical" as the Russian side had proposed. Elliott asked for clarification of the Russian-proposed changes in paragraph (C). Ilin explained that the Russian side may inspect only one of the two bases each year. After hearing this, Elliott accepted the Russian proposed text.
7. (S) Elliott explained that the U.S. position on proposed paragraph D(i) in the agreed statement was to capture cases of operational exemptions for Type-2 inspections of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB, once they became formerly declared facilities. Dr. Warner reiterated that this concept was well documented in the Inspection Protocol, Part 5, Section VI, paragraph 3, and it would be reasonable to extend this provision to this type of facility. Ilin countered that the Inspection Protocol was not written to apply to formerly declared facilities so the Russian side did not approve of simply adjusting the Inspection Protocol language, and further added that operational exemptions might be needed at a road mobile base in the future. Warner agreed to evaluate changing the wording in the Inspection Protocol to clearly reflect this provision's application to formerly declared facilities which are still being used as operational bases.
--------- U.S. SSGN ---------
8. (S) Elliott stated the same solution discussed earlier in the meeting,regarding the nature of the conversion verification inspections, would need to be applied to the conversion inspections of SSGN launchers. The sides agreed to evaluate the use of coastlines and waters diagrams for recording the location of SSGNs at the submarine base. Warner proposed deferring the discussion to the MOU WG. Elliott proposed a compromise on the number of items to be inspected on both the SSGNs and the converted heavy bombers. He suggested the Russian side be allowed to select two SSGN launchers to verify they have not been reconverted to launch SLBMs if an SSGN was present during a Type-1 inspection at a submarine base. He also suggested that a combination of two heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and two heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments be subject to inspection during a Type-1 inspection at a joint base instead of the Russian proposal of inspecting three of each. Ilin did not accept this proposal and it was agreed that the matter would be discussed at a later meeting.
------------ Joint Basing ------------
9. (S) Elliott asked for clarification of the Russian-proposed change to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of the joint basing agreed statement. Ilin explained that the proposed change was an attempt to standardize this agreed statement with procedures established in the Inspection Protocol. Elliott agreed to review the proposal and provide alternative text that more completely captured the procedures necessary to conduct this inspection. Elliott stated that the proposed text in paragraphs 1(a)(iv) and 2 were redundant and Ilin responded that they were inserted to provide clarity. The sides agreed to discuss these changes at a future meeting.
--------------- Trident i SLBMs ---------------
10. (S) With regard to the agreed statement on Trident I SLBMs, Elliott said there was no need to insert the proposed Russian text, "these SLBMs will be launched from land-based launchers" since the previous sentence already stated that the remaining Trident I SLBMs shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. Ilin agreed to review the text and discuss the issue during the next meeting. Elliott said the Trident I launchers were used for purposes other than to launch sea-based cruise missiles, including special operations uses, so the Russian proposal to specify their use for only launching sea-based cruise missiles was incorrect. Ilin stated the uses of the launchers must be clearly defined. Elliott proposed altering the agree
ment to state that the launchers would not be used for launching SLBMs. ------------ Rapid Reload ------------
11. (S) Elliott read the U.S. proposal on rapid reload. Ilin responded that the Russian side felt the rapid reload agreed statement reflected sentiments present during the Cold War. Ilin read a new Russian version of the agreed statement which included the concept to "not keep ICBMs and SLBMs with RVs installed in loading tubes at storage facilities" and provided a copy of this proposal. Begin text of Russian-proposed statement: Document of the Russian side February 9, 2010 Agreed Statement On the prohibition of the production, testing and deployment of systems for rapid reload of ICBM and SLBM launchers The Parties agree that the production, testing and deployment of systems for the rapid reload of ICBM and SLBM launchers is unwarranted and should not be pursued by either Party. The Parties commit not to maintain ICBMs and SLBMs with warheads located on them, including those in launching tubes (containers), in storage facilities. End text.
----------------------- other Agreed statements -----------------------
12. (S) Ilin provided copies of two additional proposed agreed statements. The first was an agreed statement on the use of telemetric data. Begin text: Document of the Russian side February 9, 2010 Agreed Statement On the Use of Telemetric Information Considering that the exchange of telemetric information on missile launches of the Parties is a sensitive transparency measure, which, under specific circumstances, is capable of inflicting harm on the national security of a Party, the United States of America and the Russian Federation agree that telemetric information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party, received independently or within the framework of a bilateral exchange, shall not be used for purposes related to the development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile defense systems. End text.
13. (S) The second was an agreed statement on the transfer of Tridents II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. Begin text: Document of the Russian side February 9, 2010 Agreed Statement On the movement of SLBM "Trident-II" missiles, transferred by the US to equip the Navy of Great Britain The Parties agree that, in order to increase transparency in relation to the use of "Trident-II" SLBMs, transferred by the United States of America to equip the Navy of Great Britain, the United States of America shall provide notification to the Russian Federation about the time of such transfer, as well as the unique identifier and the location of each of the transferred missiles. The Parties agree that, upon conclusion of the life cycle of "Trident-II" SLBMs transferred by the United States of America to equip the Navy of Great Britain, the United States of America will send notification to the Russian Federation about the time and method of elimination, as well as the unique identifier for each of the transferred missiles. End text.
14. (S) Ilin questioned why the sides had not discussed the proposed agreed statements concerning the Leninsk Test Range or the CorE facility at Davis-Monthan AFB and Elliott responded that the MOU WG was addressing the Leninsk issue and the agreed statement on heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB may not be necessary pending resolution of the definition of "deployed" and "non-deployed" heavy bombers. He recommended the sides defer discussion on those two agreed statements for the time being.
15. (U) Documents exchanged: - Russia: -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement on the Movement of SLBM "Trident-II" Missiles, Transferred by the US to Equip the Navy of Great Britain, dated February 9, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement on the Prohibition of the Production, Testing and Deployment of Systems for Rapid Reload of ICBM and SLBM Launchers, dated February 9, 2010; and -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement on the Use of Telemetric Information, dated February 5, 2010
16. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Mr. Ahlm (RO) Mr. Albertson Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Lt Col Goodman LTC Litterini Amb Ries Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. C. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Luchaninov Gen Orlov Gen Poznikhir Gen Venevtsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING

WikiLeaks cables: US agrees to tell Russia Britain's nuclear secrets

The US secretly agreed to give the Russians sensitive information on Britain’s nuclear deterrent to persuade them to sign a key treaty, The Daily Telegraph can disclose.

HMS Vanguard is Britain's lead Trident-armed submarine. The US, under a nuclear deal, has agreed to give the Kremlin the serial numbers of the missiles it gives Britain Photo: TAM MACDONALD

By Matthew Moore, Gordon Rayner and Christopher Hope

9:25PM GMT 04 Feb 2011

2993 Comments

Information about every Trident missile the US supplies to Britain will be given to Russia as part of an arms control deal signed by President Barack Obama next week.

Defence analysts claim the agreement risks undermining Britain’s policy of refusing to confirm the exact size of its nuclear arsenal.

The fact that the Americans used British nuclear secrets as a bargaining chip also sheds new light on the so-called “special relationship”, which is shown often to be a one-sided affair by US diplomatic communications obtained by the WikiLeaks website.

Details of the behind-the-scenes talks are contained in more than 1,400 US embassy cables published to date by the Telegraph, including almost 800 sent from the London Embassy, which are published online today. The documents also show that:

• America spied on Foreign Office ministers by gathering gossip on their private lives and professional relationships.

• Intelligence-sharing arrangements with the US became strained after the controversy over Binyam Mohamed, the former Guantánamo Bay detainee who sued the Government over his alleged torture.
• David Miliband disowned the Duchess of York by saying she could not “be controlled” after she made an undercover TV documentary.
• Tens of millions of pounds of overseas aid was stolen and spent on plasma televisions and luxury goods by corrupt regimes.
A series of classified messages sent to Washington by US negotiators show how information on Britain’s nuclear capability was crucial to securing Russia’s support for the “New START” deal.
Although the treaty was not supposed to have any impact on Britain, the leaked cables show that Russia used the talks to demand more information about the UK’s Trident missiles, which are manufactured and maintained in the US.
Washington lobbied London in 2009 for permission to supply Moscow with detailed data about the performance of UK missiles. The UK refused, but the US agreed to hand over the serial numbers of Trident missiles it transfers to Britain.
Professor Malcolm Chalmers said: “This appears to be significant because while the UK has announced how many missiles it possesses, there has been no way for the Russians to verify this. Over time, the unique identifiers will provide them with another data point to gauge the size of the British arsenal.”
Duncan Lennox, editor of Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, said: “They want to find out whether Britain has more missiles than we say we have, and having the unique identifiers might help them.”
While the US and Russia have long permitted inspections of each other’s nuclear weapons, Britain has sought to maintain some secrecy to compensate for the relatively small size of its arsenal.
William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, last year disclosed that “up to 160” warheads are operational at any one time, but did not confirm the number of missiles.

The administrations naive hopes of persuading Iran to abandon Syria

Washington Examiner:

Iran is enduring economic sanctions designed to slow the country's nuclear weapons program, but President Obama's team thought the regime might abandon dictator Bashar Assad over his use of chemical weapons in Syria's civil war.

Samantha Power, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, hoped that a team of UN investigators — many of whom, presumably, have a longstanding relationship with Iranian leaders -- could write a report that would convince Iran to abandon its ally at the behest of the United States.

"We worked with the UN to create a group of inspectors and then worked for more than six months to get them access to the country on the logic that perhaps the presence of an investigative team in the country might deter future attacks," Power said at the Center for American Progress as she made the case for intervening in Syria.
...

Iran and Russia care more about the survival of their ally than the fate of the Syrian people. Iran is fundamentally a country run by religious bigots and that rather than logic forms the basis for their decision making. Russia wants its warm water port and is not going to let humanitarian considerations get in the way of keeping it.

It is really hard to imagine that this administration could be so lacking in intellectual talent that it would even consider such a bad idea.

Posted Yesterday by Merv Benson

Labels: Syria Iran UN Russia WMD

The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why it Matters

July 17, 2013

Why is Iran's nuclear weapons program a threat to America and American interests?
Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian regime will have severe repercussions for American security and the security of our allies.

A nuclear-armed Iran would embolden Iran's aggressive foreign policy, resulting in greater confrontations with the international community. Iran already has a conventional weapons capability to hit U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East and parts of Europe. If Tehran were allowed to develop nuclear weapons, this threat would increase dramatically.
Iran is one of the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism through its financial and operational support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. Iran could potentially share its nuclear technology and know-how with extremist groups hostile to the United States and the West.
While Iranian missiles can't yet reach America, Iran having a nuclear weapons capability can potentially directly threaten the United States and its inhabitants. The U.S. Department of Defense reported in April 2012: "With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran may be technically capable of flight-testing an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015.” Many analysts are also concerned about the possibility of a nuclear weapon arriving in a cargo container at a major US port. Furthermore, a federally mandated commission to study electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks noted the vast damage that could be wrought by a single missile with a nuclear warhead, launched from a ship off the US coast, and detonated a couple of hundred miles in the air, high above America.
A nuclear-armed Iran poses a threat to America's closest allies in the Middle East. Israel is most at risk as Iran's leaders have repeatedly declared that Israel should "be wiped from the map." America's moderate Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and others are already alarmed at Iran's aggressive regional policy and would feel increasingly threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.
The Middle East remains an essential source of energy for the United States and the world. Iran's military posture has led to increases in arms purchases by its neighbors. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would further destabilize this volatile and vital region.

How do we know Iran is developing nuclear weapons?
Iran's nuclear program is clearly intended to develop a nuclear weapons capability. For eighteen years, it was kept secret, even though international assistance would have been available to a civilian program. In 2002, Iran's covert program was exposed. Since then, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly said that it cannot consider Iran's nuclear program as entirely civilian. On November 8, 2011 it released a report stating there is "credible" evidence that "Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device." Each report since then has underscored Iran’s continuing refusal to address the IAEA’s evidence and its refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into the Parchin complex, where evidence shows “strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development.”
In 2009, Western intelligence agencies discovered, and Iran admitted to, another secret facility that is designed for approximately 3,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium. President Obama commented that the "configuration" of the Fordow facility is "not consistent with a peaceful nuclear program." Three thousand centrifuges are sufficient for producing quantities of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, but not for fuel for nuclear power plants.
What evidence does the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have?
On November 8, 2011, the IAEA released a comprehensive and damning report on Iran's nuclear program. The report is based on intelligence received from more than 10 different countries, interviews with foreign scientists who helped Iran develop their program, and the IAEA's own investigations and analyses.

In unambiguous terms, the report stated that Iran is engaged in "activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device." These activities include:

Research on uranium cores and detonators for nuclear weapons
Acquiring nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine supply network
Developing an indigenous nuclear weapons design and testing of the components
Computer modeling of nuclear explosions and logistics for nuclear testing
Engineering studies to adapt missiles for nuclear warheads

The IAEA's May 2013 report noted that Iran had a 182kg stockpile of 20% enriched uranium and 6,357kg of 5% enriched uranium, enough to produce weapons-grade uranium for seven nuclear bombs using the same enrichment technology. Iran continues to install centrifuges at the deep underground, heavily defended Fordow installation, increasing its capability to quickly enrich to weapons-grade.
Didn't the CIA report that Iran had stopped developing nuclear weapons?
U.S. officials have been quoted as confirming that the 2010 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran makes clear that Iran has never stopped its nuclear weapons development program. This NIE has not been made public.
The November 2007 NIE was widely misinterpreted as claiming that Iran ended its nuclear weapons program, when in fact it had confirmed the existence of a covert Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. Only one element – nuclear warhead design – was estimated to have been put on hold in 2003. As then CIA director Michael Hayden has said of the 2007 NIE, "What came out in a lot of coverage was 'Iran stops nuclear program.' The only thing we claimed had been halted in '03 was the weaponization. The development of fissile material and the development of delivery systems continued. And one can make the case the development of delivery systems makes no sense with just conventional warheads on top of them."
How is the international community dealing with the Iranian nuclear program?
The major world powers have been following a two-track policy: encouraging Iran to engage in diplomatic negotiations, while imposing increasingly comprehensive sanctions against Iran’s energy and financial sectors. Both the United States and Israel have promoted the imposition of sanctions as well as the search for a diplomatic resolution, while warning that there will be a time limit for these policies, and that “all options” – including military action - remain on the table.
Diplomatic Efforts: For several years, the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom (the "P5+1") have offered to negotiate with Iran and at the same time have been incrementally increasing pressure on Iran through sanctions. Iran has met with P5+1 negotiators on several occasions in past years, but the Iranians have never engaged in serious discussions.
Sanctions: The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted four resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear proliferation activities.
The U.S. has had sanctions in place for many years against companies that invest in Iran's energy sector. Recently, more stringent U.S. sanctions have been included in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2012 and 2013, which placed sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and foreign institutions doing business with the Central Bank of Iran. Those sanctions targeted major buyers of Iranian oil, forcing them to significantly reduce the amounts of oil they buy from Iran and to start paying for oil with goods instead of cash. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010, which sanctions companies that provide refined petroleum or energy-sector technology to Iran. The U.S. Treasury has also "blacklisted" Iranian companies involved in proliferation or terrorism to make banking transactions more difficult for them globally.
Since July 2012, the European Union has banned all imports of Iranian oil. Previous sanctions from October 2010 had prevented EU-based companies from investing in Iran's energy sector or providing energy-sector technology to Iran. Major European leaders have also expressed support for additional European Union sanctions on Iran should Iran continue to demonstrate recalcitrance in meetings to discuss its nuclear program.
Though no claims of responsibility have been made, there have been reports of highly sophisticated, covert cyber-attacks against Iran's nuclear program and defense networks.
What kind of regime governs Iran?
Since the revolution which overthrew the monarchy in 1979, Iran has been run by a Shia Islamist regime which has violently suppressed internal dissent. Both Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's powerful Supreme Leader, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has been in office since 2005, are uncompromising hardliners. In June 2013, Hassan Rowhani, a cleric with views considered by some to be more moderate than those of Ahmadinejad, was elected to serve as the country’s next president. It remains unclear what approach he will take towards the country’s nuclear program, the direction of which is largely set by the Supreme Leader.
There have been periods when it appeared that the Iranian leadership was opting for greater moderation and reform. This occurred with the election of Mohamed Khatami, considered the "reformist candidate" to the presidency in 1997. While the Khatami reign (through 2005) was marked by some moderation in Iran's public stance towards the West, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei tightly controlled most of the state apparatus. Iran's nuclear weapons program also intensified during this period.
Violent repression: The Iran regime violently represses public manifestations of political opposition. In February 2011, regime security forces quashed demonstrations organized by opposition forces to express solidarity with political uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. Following the dubious outcome of presidential elections in June 2009, the regime's security forces and allied militia harshly clamped down on pro-opposition protests in Tehran and elsewhere across the country. A number of people protesting the election results were killed -- some killed at rallies by gunfire, and some in prisons following their arrest.
Terrorism and extremism: Iran's regime is a source of extremism and destabilization in the region and around the globe. Iran is generally considered to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing financial support and training for organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and others, and is believed to be behind many Shiite insurgents in Iraq. Iran is responsible for the bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Jewish community center (1994) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed over 200 people and wounded hundreds more. Its leaders have repeatedly called for Israel's demise and have propagated base anti-Semitism, including the denial of the Holocaust. The Iranian government is also backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his government’s brutal campaign against rebel forces and Syrian citizens. Iran supplies the Assad regime with financial and military support, and its proxy Hezbollah recently began fighting alongside the Syrian government.
Human rights violations: The Iranian regime denies basic freedoms to Iran's citizens, including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press. The rights of women, workers, homosexuals, juveniles, religious and ethnic minorities, and political opposition are brutally suppressed. The United States and Sweden have proposed that the UN Human Rights Council appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate and report on human rights violations in Iran.

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Thursday, September 05, 2013

The DNI submits this summary consistent with direction in the FY2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307...
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Federal Agency Data Mining Report 2012

Friday, April 12, 2013

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) provides this report pursuant to Section 804 of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, entitled The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007 (Act).
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2012 Report on Security Clearance Determinations

Friday, April 12, 2013

The Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2010 established a requirement for the President to submit an annual report to Congress on the security clearance process, to include the total number of security clearances across government and in-depth metrics on the timeliness of security clearance determinations in the Intelligence Community (IC). In response to this requirement, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has prepared this 2012 Report on Security Clearance Determinations...
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U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2013 - Sponsored by the Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive

Tuesday, April 09, 2013

This overview, sponsored by the Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive, is designed to help people across the Government better understand and navigate the IC, leading to improved collaboration and coordination between and with the IC and with the rest of the Federal Government.
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Data Mining Report

Tuesday, April 09, 2013

2012 Data Mining Report
For the period Jan. 1, 2012 through Dec. 31, 2012

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Monday, March 04, 2013

The DNI submits this summary consistent with direction in the FY2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307...

Click to Download the PDF Report

ODNI overview brochure

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence - An Overview

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Wednesday, September 05, 2012

The DNI submits this summary consistent with direction in the FY2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307...
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Data Mining Report

Friday, August 10, 2012

2011 Data Mining Report
For the period Jan. 1, 2011 through Dec. 31, 2011

2012 ISE Annual Report to the Congress

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

The PM-ISE proudly releases its ISE Annual Report to the Congress, which is a report required by law to provide “a progress report on the extent to which the ISE has been implemented.” Read more...

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