"I have not yet begun to fight!"

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Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Breaking: Flight 370 Search Just Got A Lot More Interesting

Insider information leaked from within the search team may have blown open the investigation.

B. Christopher Agee — April 23, 2014

Photo Credit: Facebook/MH370 News Update

As the search for Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 nears the two-month mark, frustrated investigators have yet to find any tangible evidence of the missing fuselage or any of the 239 passengers aboard. A recent report by Malaysian newspaper the New Strait Times, however, suggests that might be because they are looking in the wrong place.
Shortly after the disappearance, investigators began an exhaustive search of the area above which authorities were last able to track the flight. That effort, near the eastern coast of Vietnam, was scrapped when evidence showed the plane might have gone down elsewhere.

Experts have recently targeted their search to an area of the Indian Ocean off of Australia’s western coast. As Western Journalism previously reported, a series of pings believed to be from the plane’s black box were recovered from the area; and a deep-sea explorer was sent down to map the ocean floor for signs of the wreckage.
The Malaysian report, however, indicates at least some within the search team think that area could be another false lead.
“The thought of it landing somewhere else is not impossible,” the newspaper quoted one source, “as we have not found a single debris that could be linked to the MH370.”
Rumors that some nation is hiding the plane, however, “seems absurd,” the source cautioned.
Instead, the article suggests experts are now beginning to embrace the idea that the plane crash landed in a remote area. The search effort was reportedly limited from the beginning by the fact that communications satellites offered little concrete evidence of the plane’s speed, altitude, and direction for much of the flight.
“The reason investigators were forced to adopt a new algorithm to calculate the last known location of MH370 was because there was no global positioning system following the aircraft as the transponder went off 45 minutes into the flight,” a source confirmed.
Finding evidence by using the underwater explorer would rely solely on luck, the report concluded, noting that some on the team are recommending switching search locations.
“We can’t focus on one place too long as the ocean is very big,” a source explained.

Further hindering the search is the fact that some countries have apparently been less than forthcoming in releasing radar and other tracking information regarding the flight. In some cases, releasing all related data would be considered a security risk.
Malaysia, for instance, denied investigators any information after insisting no satellites had made contact with the flight.
“They informed us that not contact was made [and] that was the end of it,” a source concluded. “We can’t be forcing them to show us the data as they had already said there was nothing. However, if these countries do want to come forward, be it old or new data that has yet to be analyzed by our team, they are very welcome to do so.”
The ongoing saga surrounding this missing flight has captured the interest of individuals around the world, including millions of Americans who have paid close attention to the ongoing search efforts. If these latest concerns are valid, the long-awaited resolution might still be far off.
Photo Credit: Facebook/MH370 News Update

HEADS UP!!! Obama Hires Top Criminal Defense Attorney

by Ulsterman on April 23, 2014 with 1 Comments in News

As the president flies off on a trip to Asia, and taking much of the media attention with him, the Obama White House quietly put in place one of the top defense attorneys in the country to be Barack Obama’s new White House Counsel. And if you (rightfully) think that is a rather interesting situation, read on, as there appears to be even more to this story…

While the Mainstream Media has barely noted Mr. Eggleston’s newly elevated position inside of the Obama White House, what little coverage there has been largely ignores the fact that Neil Eggleston has made his living, and his name, from defending those involved in serious political scandal.

I’ll repeat that for emphasis – Neil Eggleston defends those involved in serious political scandal, and now he has been made Barack Obama’s White House Counsel.
Eggleston was part of the Clinton administration defense during the Whitewater scandal, as well as two subsequent executive privilege battles. He also worked with the Bush administration in 2007 during yet another executive privilege dispute.

Libya Objects to Foreign Intervention in Syria

فلسطين

An office building is partially destroyed following a NATO airstrike in the town of Bir al-Ghanam in western Libya, Aug. 8, 2011. (photo by REUTERS/Bob Strong)

Libya Objects to Foreign Intervention in Syria

Libyan Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdulaziz has called upon the Arab League to reject the use of force against Syria outside the framework of international legitimacy. The minister's stance has come as a great surprise to many. Those who enthusiastically back the strike wondered how a state whose new regime was established on the basis of foreign intervention can oppose a similar intervention in other Arab countries.

Summary⎙ Print Though Libya itself received NATO military support to oust its own dictator, it has come out against what looks like certain armed intervention by Western powers in Syria.

Author Rabih Barakat Posted September 5, 2013

Translator(s)Sami-Joe Abboud

Original Article اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية

Besides the differences between the Syrian and Libyan cases — for obvious and recurrent reasons — those who were surprised seemed to forget that countries with bad internal conditions, such as Libya, tend to have regulations that try as much as possible to keep their entities away from chaos.
Two years after the toppling of the Moammar Gadhafi regime, Libya stands on the verge of becoming a “failed state.” And the increased impact of external crises is only further leading to its disintegration, given that this fosters disrespect for the state, at a time in which the state is seeking to contain this phenomenon.
This rationale, however, seems unconvincing at first glance. Libya has devoted itself, or has been devoted at the hands of intervening states over the past two years, as one of the countries that exports fighters to Syria and functions as a major gateway for weapons. Thus, it is only natural to believe that the general inclination as far as the Syrian issue is concerned would be toward further involvement.
This, however, according to available data, is exactly what has fed into the prevailing mentality in Libya that involvement in chaos abroad can only breed chaos at home.
Syria, being the first destination for Libyan jihadists or jihadists crossing from Libya, can easily exacerbate the dynamics of those in a country plagued by the arms trade and recruitment for domestic and foreign causes.
A quick look at the chaos plaguing Libya is enough to demonstrate its impact on the state infrastructure. Libya's oil production fell to 10% of the country’s production capacity and the losses have recently exceeded $2 billion in a record period, as a direct result of the inability of the state to dispute with armed militias the control of export ports in the east and center of the country.
Federalists in eastern Libya confirm that any attempt on the part of the central government to regain control of the ports will be deemed as a “declaration of war.” Meanwhile, the country is plagued by frequent assassinations of security service leaders, who seem unable to protect themselves, as well as by increasing attacks on diplomatic missions in the framework of mutual external messages.
In addition to this, the armed groups have different tribal, ideological and political loyalties, amid increased signs of extremism across most of the country.
Libya's position on the Syrian issue goes beyond internal balances, state concerns and management. The fact is that there is no way to isolate this position from the new approach of the country’s Egyptian neighbor. Egypt’s influence on Libyan decision-making seemed evident in the meetings held on the sidelines of the meetings of Arab foreign ministers at the beginning of September, especially when the Libyans mentioned a “lack of Arab consensus over the strike on Syria” in the context of explaining Tripoli’s position on the issue.
Cairo built its approach based upon a vision through which the new Egyptian regime seeks to maintain the main structures of the state, chief among these being the military.
Egypt adopted this approach to the Syrian situation on the grounds that the Levant constitutes, by natural means, a vital extension of Egypt and a part of its national security.
The position of Cairo, along with Algeria, has constituted a geo-political direction that the Libyan government can by no means ignore. Add to this the impact, albeit limited, of the Gulf states, which call for securing a complete Arab cover for the planned strike on Damascus.
The Libyan position on the Syrian issue shows that the conflict over a still nascent Libyan state and regime is ongoing between countries that do not want to retreat from the post-Gadhafi arena.
This may be pushing the new Libyan authorities to exercise caution about departing from international consensus as far as sensitive issues are concerned, knowing that these include Syria. The mentioned “chaos” is a buzzword that allows any country capable and willing to intervene to make its position important in the equation of the formal decision of the country.
This can be deemed as a general rule which no Arab Spring country has deviated. However, the joint outcome of the chaos in Syria and Libya requires stopping and looking at the US position on both of them.
In this context, it was remarkable how the US Secretary of State John Kerry added Libya to the list of experiments that his country does not want to go through again, and deemed it as one of the models that have not achieved the expected “success” that was promoted prior to the start of military action.
By saying that any military action against Syria will not be a repeat of Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya, Kerry alluded to the fact that the NATO experience in Libya is not an example to follow, compared to the expectations of its administration.
Kerry’s comparison explains a lot about the US hesitation in starting an uncalculated military venture in Syria. His recollection of situations where the US surge ended with a relative retrogression from the area allows one to understand the mechanisms governing work in Washington during the term of the current president, after these were largely disabled under his predecessor.
This comparison is what is exactly missing in the Arab decision that calls for a random strike, instead of inventing formulas to find a solution that will inevitably emerge one day. It should be noted that this comparison does not mean that Washington’s accounts have only changed, or that the circumstances are different, but that no one can afford the luxury of trying to produce total chaos in Syria. The consequences go beyond those of Libya and all the other previous cases.

Libya Losing Control of Oil Fields to Jihadist Groups

The resignation of Libya’s Interior Minister Col. Mohammad al-Sheikh on Aug.18 after less than two months in office revealed the size of the political turmoil in Libya.

Summary⎙ Print Libya's political turmoil has led to jihadist groups laying claim to the nation's eastern region.

Author Posted August 21, 2013

Translator(s)Rani Geha

Original Article اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية

A group calling itself the Barqa Youth Movement has declared the eastern area to be an autonomous federal province within the framework of the Libyan state. The movement’s statement said that Islamic Sharia “is the source of legislation in the province,” declared the appointment of a temporary president for the province, and declared the establishment of a defense force that would protect the province and maintain security.
It is not the first time that the establishment of the Barqa province with its capital Benghazi has been announced since the overthrow of Col. Moammar Gadhafi. Political activist, former detainee and member of the National Transitional Council, Ahmed Zubair al-Sanusi, had already announced the secession of the eastern region. But the move failed when it triggered demonstrations rejecting it.
However, the recent announcement by the Barqa Youth Movement is different because of the figures who stand behind it. Most of those figures are leaders of armed groups that have demonstrated their ability to control the ground. The figures include Al-Saddiq al-Ghaithi, the former proxy assistant secretary to the Libyan defense minister who was in charge of securing the country’s borders and its oil installations.
Al-Saddiq al-Ghaithi … from the Mujahideen Brigades … to protect the oil installations?
Those in Libya who know Ghaithi assert that he used to be an activist in the Islamic jihadist movement years ago and that he was imprisoned by the former regime. He was also a close associate to Abdul Hakim Belhadj, a leader in the Mujahideen Brigades, which belong to the Islamic Fighting Group.
After Gadhafi’s fall, Ghaithi found himself at the top of the country’s military leadership. But Libya’s Islamist current had a quarrel with the country’s new leadership. The Islamists saw that some were attempting to “secularize the state.” These differences resulted in Ghaithi’s dismissal from his post after Defense Minister Mohammad al-Barghouthi accused Ghaithi of trying to assassinate him. Ghaithi denied the charge.
Ghaithi’s announcement about the establishment of the Barqa province with its capital Benghazi came after a meeting of armed groups and political organizations that support Barqa seceding from the central authority in Tripoli. Ghaithi read the meeting’s final statement, which said there was an agreement to form a political office tasked with administering the territory and supervising the institutions. The statement also specified the powers of the president of the province and appointed Ibrahim Saeed Jizran as that president.
Although some Arab tribes in Libya’s eastern region announced that they reject secession and refused to participate in the meeting, observers warn that the conflict between the advocates of federalism and the central government may get worse because of the conflict over oil.
That was embodied on the ground through the establishment of armed groups that support the federal system and that control a number of oil installations as well as the oil export port. Moreover, an armed group contacted international oil companies with the intention to start selling Libyan oil on behalf of the new federation. A foreign oil company has confirmed being contacted by the Barqa federal spokesmen in order to sell oil shipments through the Sidra oil port in Ras Lanuf. The latter is under the control of groups that support Barqa becoming a federal province.
Oil installations’ guards exported a 700,000-barrel shipment
Libyan oil and gas workers union has claimed that elements guarding the oil installations in the al-Hilal region has illegally exported a 700,000-barrel shipment to a certain company.
Although Libyan PM Ali Zaidan threatened to bomb oil tankers and intervene militarily if armed groups decide to sell Libyan oil illegally, news from Libya indicates that groups loyal to Ghaithi have tightened their control over several oil facilities, which may force the Libyan government into an armed confrontation to recover these facilities, especially since Ghaithi has announced the formation of a unified force to defend the federal province. So Libya is threatened with civil war over who will control the oil fields.
That is happening at a time when Libya is in security chaos in light of the country’s inability to form a unified national army that can extend its control on the ground. There are many armed groups, each loyal to a different leader. Libya is politically unstable and two interior ministers have been forced to resign within a short time. Interior Minister Ashour Shuail has submitted his resignation to Zaidan. Before him, Interior Minister Sheikh also resigned after he accused the prime minister of interfering in his affairs. Within all that lawlessness, there were news reports on Aug. 19 that a resigned Libyan judge, Muftah al-Khafifi, was shot dead by an unidentified armed group in Benghazi.

Published Algiers, Algeria Established 1990

Language Arabic Frequency daily

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In Libya, Militias Rule

Men grieve over a grave at the funerals for those killed in clashes at the Libya Shield Brigade headquarters, in Benghazi, June 9, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Esam Al-Fetori)

In Libya, Militias Rule

Piles of rubble and mangled metal litter the corners of two leafy upscale neighborhoods in Tripoli. A car bomb in April destroyed half of the diplomatic offices of the French Embassy, damaging vital infrastructure in a 200-meter [656 feet] radius. The June 11 car bomb at the Italian Embassy has created an atmosphere of diplomatic tension, with many wondering when it will end. On June 9, 31 protesters died outside a military base in Benghazi during a protest. In the last few days, indiscriminate attacks against the Ministry of Defense's special forces and burning of official security offices have killed more in the east of the country. Most worrisome, commander and de facto chief of the armed forces Salim Kenidi spoke to the media, asking the attackers, “Who are you? What do you want? Let us sit and negotiate.”

Summary⎙ Print The collapse of Libya’s intelligence and security sectors requires urgent reform.

Author Anas El Gomati Posted June 18, 2013

Translator(s)Sibel Utku Bila

Vital security questions are being asked of [Prime Minister] Ali Zeidan’s government, which threatened Libya’s long-term diplomatic prospects. How have armed groups across the country been able to assemble lethal explosive devices, transport and execute attacks against sensitive targets? Moreover, how does the most densely armed territory on earth, with one of the most porous borders in the world, lack a functioning intelligence service?
Continued civilian protests across the country have focused on reinstating the army and police, and integrating militias under the Ministries of Defense and Interior. However, with numerous bombings and new actors seeking Libya’s depot of arms from across the region, the security picture is more complex than the domestic picture may indicate. The most feared arm of the ex-regime, the intelligence services, is never spoken of and could be the first step toward controlling the situation.
Intelligence services
As the regime of former President Moammar Gadhafi collapsed many hurried to herald Libya a blank canvas, a country with no real functioning arms or institutions. However, the intelligence agencies were Gadhafi’s strongest arm. They worked in tandem to create an environment of fear and simultaneously extinguish threats to the old regime at home and abroad. This arm was rapidly dismantled. Intelligence offices, files and dossiers were burnt or confiscated and members of the services were imprisoned, were killed or fled. A number of low- and mid-ranking officials have remained outside, but are subject to hostility from revolutionary brigades. With rampant absenteeism across the security forces — estimates ranging from 20 to 40% — and a culture of fear having served in such a brutal, highly sensitive and partisan section of the regime. The former National Transitional Council attempted to reinstate it in June 2012, but the damage was done by this point, stifling any efforts to reignite this needed arm of the state. A military intelligence report given to the General National Congress (GNC) this week was perhaps so weak that it was ignored by the congressmen themselves.
The continued growth and strengthening of militias attempting to fill in this void in the state have arguably worsened the problem. Acting extra-judicially and commonly employing torture, undermining the legitimacy of the government at home and abroad.
While militias look to prevent or apprehend suspected Gadhafists and former regime members — notably from the intelligence services — other threats go under the radar. Terrorists, criminals and paramilitary organizations have been able to attack civilian, state and foreign targets, evading capture or identification. Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar of the Algerian branch of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, according to various sources, visited Libya in 2012 to purchase arms. The alleged perpetrators of the 9/11 attack were photographed by US intelligence in Benghazi, but have still evaded capture or identification by the Libyan authorities.
Benghazi: new problems, old solutions
The threat of and systematic use of violence toward the international community has reached an alarming rate across the country. Attacks aimed at the UN, Red Cross, and Italian, British and US missions (twice) between April and September 2012 literally drove the diplomatic community out of Benghazi. Civilian protests at these occasions reflect the city’s displeasure and a strong demand for order. Though to date, neither individuals nor groups have been charged and these attacks, like others, have passed with little to no official action.
Today, Benghazi is caught in an environment of perpetuating violence. Politically (and revolutionary) motivated assassinations of the police have left the city with a catastrophic security deficit — and almost no arrests. Quasi-official militias such as Dera Libya, led by Wisam Bin Hmaid, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense are largely allocated the task by the government to provide security in the city, at the borders and often in other territories across the country. Protests in the past week outside the militia barracks demanding full disarmament and integration citing insecurity are equally nothing new. In the ensuing chaos, a flurry of shots were fired, killing 31 local men when protesters attempted to enter the barracks.
Bin Hmaid cites similar fears, but that he works alongside the Ministry of Defense, with a security deficit and functioning army as a reason for Dera to remain outside of the integration process. He has a point. Yusuf Mangoush, chief of the armed forces, resigned on June 10 following the death of protesters. Ministers of defense and interior Mohammed Mahmoud al-Bargathi and Ashour Shuwail are both out of jobs due to the recent political isolation law. As bombings continue, citizen protests continue to demand security, militias demand order before they integrate and the security services now in complete disarray, the revolutionary government is facing one of its strongest challenges. If they are to succeed they must look to shift entrenched attitudes and policy and develop a radically new security strategy.
Infrastructure
In order to respond effectively, an emphatic push toward repatriating and reclaiming existing security infrastructure of the Libyan state must be made.
There remain countless intelligence offices, police stations and army barracks that house militias from all over the country. A number of these militias have a particular loyalty to the GNC and affiliation to the Ministries of Interior and Defense. However, a number of rogue militias operate in these and other buildings. Even the official and quasi-official security structures are confusing. More worrisome, in an interview with Al-Monitor, a senior member of a government militia claimed that there were over 30 different control rooms in Tripoli alone, issuing different orders and working independently with different communication systems.
The need to leverage existing security infrastructure and communications to bolster the state’s logistical power and conduct coherent unified operations with solid intelligence is crucial.
Repatriating security infrastructure in Tripoli began under former Minister of Interior Shuwail in the last few months. However, Libya’s other cities and border towns are littered with militias clinging onto vital infrastructure. With weapons trading between Algeria, Mali and a string of recent bombings in Niger, the inability to control this infrastructure confuses any coherent intelligence gathering, or wider national security strategy.
The ease and access to infrastructure to conduct terrorist activities is one of the biggest problems facing the Libyan state, shackling the democratic transition within an atmosphere of uncertainty.
A reformed, doctrinal security service that respects human rights must be a parallel initiative. By reforming and reinstating the most feared of Libya’s security services, Ali Zidan can begin to monitor and gradually improve the security quandary. A unified communication system to instill coherence in the process is only the beginning of a long-term process. International assistance will come in its droves in order to rebuild this feared arm of the state. The question for Zeidan will be where to draw the line between security and sovereignty to begin to navigate the country to safety.
Anas El Gomati is the founder of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, the first Libyan think tank, and a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, where his research focuses on socioeconomics, democratic governance, the security sector and political Islam in Libya. He is also a visiting lecturer at the NATO Defense College in Rome, where his work focuses on political analysis and public policy. On Twitter: @AGomati

NATO Helps Former Mujahid Come to Power in Libya

Mitiga International Airport is located east of Tripoli near the main coastal highway overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. Before the military coup of 1969 [led by Mu'ammar Qaddafi], the airport was known as the Wheelus Air Base and was home to US warplanes. Today, it is the headquarters of the Military Council in Tripoli - the armed forces loyal to the [Libyan] National Transitional Council [NTC] - which seized power in the Libyan capital and overthrew the regime of Mu’ammar Qaddafi.

Summary⎙ Print Abdelhakim Belhadj is the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an insurgency which fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan alongside Al-Qaeda operatives before helping to bring down the Qadaffi regime in Libya. In this interview with Vicken Shetarian of Al-Hayat, Belhadj talks about his role during the Libyan Civil War and his views on Shari’a law in Libya.

Author Vicken Cheterian Posted January 25, 2012

Translator(s)Naria Tanoukhi

Original Article اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية

Armed bearded men surround the offices of the airport and guard its facilities. Many people wait to enter and meet with the leader of the Tripoli rebels Abdelhakim Belhadj - dubbed “the Sheikh” by the insurgents. A mother accompanied by her daughter came to discuss the suffering of her wounded son and was met by two men in suits standing in front of the office’s entrance. Inside the office, three men dressed in military uniform are in the midst of a discussion. They give off the impression that they are rebel leaders.
Ever since the Libyan rebels entered Tripoli, there has been much speculation about Belhadj, his history and what he represents. Westerners who oppose the NATO intervention in Libya see [his leadership] as evidence that supporting the revolution was wrong. The Qaddafi regime had previously announced that it was fighting Al-Qaeda, and some feel that Belhadj’s presence at the entrance of Bab al-Azizia proves [that this was indeed the case].
But who is Abdelhakim Belhadj? And should the world fear him?
Belhadj is no one less than the Emir (leader) of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group [LIFG], a Libyan jihadist organization founded by Libyan volunteers who fought against the Soviet army in Afghanistan [during the 1980’s]. Belhadj and other Libyan-Afghanis returned to their country in 1992 after the Afghan Mujahideen entered Kabul. [Upon their return to Libya], they worked on establishing the LIFG, whose purpose was to overthrow the Qaddafi regime by [force of] arms. The group established bases in the Jabal al-Akhdar area in Eastern Libya, where Omar al-Mukhtar [a Libyan resistance leader] once fought against Italian [colonial] forces. Soon after [their establishment], the bases were discovered [by Qaddafi forces], bombed by warplanes and struck with Napalm missiles. After three failed attempts to assassinate Qaddafi, the fighters who survived [the attacks] fled back to Afghanistan.
US Intelligence Handed Belhadj Over to Qaddafi
The US forces occupying Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks attempted to disperse the LIFG [operatives present in the country]. CIA agents arrested Belhadj in Malaysia [in 2003]. He was [transferred to Bangkok] and tortured before being handed over to the Libyan authorities, who then detained him in the notorious Abu Salim prison for seven years.
Belhadj’s previous role [as a Mujahid] and the time he spent in Afghanistan explain his relationship with Al-Qaeda. During his war against [Osama] Bin Laden, Bush demanded that the LIFG and a large number of jihadist groups [declare that they were] “either with us or against us.” Part of the LIFG refused to take part in a war against a “faraway enemy,” reckoning that their [organization] should be limited to fighting tyranny in [its] country of origin [Libya]. Nu’man Bin-Othman, who lived in London at the time, was one of the principal figures who adopted this point of view. However, other [LIFG fighters] remained in the area between Afghanistan and Pakistan and were integrated into Al-Qaeda. [The LIFG] gave the organization some of its key leaders: Abu-Yahya al-Libi escaped from the Bagram prison in Afghanistan in 2005, causing a sensation. [However], the relationship remained far from clear, a fact evidenced when [Ayman] al-Zawahiri [the current leader of Al-Qaeda] claimed in 2007 that the LIFG had joined forces with his organization.
Within Libya, Belhadj's reputation faces another challenge beyond [his alleged close ties to Al-Qaeda]. A large number of critics have called him “the commander of Al-Jazeera” due to his sudden appearance on the Qatari TV news station during the battle for Tripoli. He has also been criticized for his relations with the Qatari Emirate.
Despite his busy schedule, the former Emir [Belhadj] agreed to be interviewed [by Al-Hayat] and also expressed a willingness to keep in touch [with the paper]. He came across as a modest and soft-spoken individual, presenting official documents to back up the claims he made. First, he defended [his reputation] by asserting that his role was not limited to the liberation of Tripoli. On February 18, he went to Misrata to meet with local youths, and headed downtown the next day to meet with the rebels. Afterwards, Belhadj added that he hid underground out of fear that the security forces were looking for him. This did indeed happen - [the security forces] arrested his father and brother. Belhadj said that he remained in hiding for a month and a half in different parts of Tripoli, during which time he worked to raise money and prepare safe houses. He was especially interested in speaking with young people who had military experience in order to find a way out of Tripoli.
Belhadj explained that he left Tripoli aboard a ship. At the end of April, he headed to Tunisia where he met with the [Libyan] rebels. He then moved to Benghazi to help organize the “February 17 Battalion,” headed by Fawzi Bu-Katif from Benghazi. On July 14, he received an order from the Transitional National Council’s Minister of Defense to move arms and ammunition to the Western regions [of Libya]. [In the West], he participated in the liberation of Tripoli after having fought in various battles. Belhadj says that the Libyans know [everything about] his history, adding that he did not “fall from the sky,” because his struggle dates back to the eighties.
Belhadj in Turkey
When asked about his visit to Turkey in November 2011 and the implications [of Turkish involvement] in the ongoing conflict in Syria, Belhadj insisted that he only visited Istanbul to check up on those being treated in Turkish hospitals for wounds suffered during the Libyan war. He says that he did not take any money or weapons with him [to Turkey], and that he did not hold any meetings with Syrians during his 48-hour stay.
When asked about his views on his previous experiences, Belhadj answered, “a man deals with things according to reality.” He says that [the NTC] did not turn its arms on the Libyan people, and that [the NTC] constituted an integral part and extension of the people in the country. [He adds that the NTC] carried the banner of jihad to persuade the people join it in overthrowing the Qaddafi regime. [According to Belhadj, the NTC] did not propose an integrated policy. He also claimed that armed conflict was [an efficient] way to effect change.
[Al-Hayat also spoke to] Anis al-Sharif, a member of the LIFG who spent many years as a refugee in England specializing in media affairs for this group.
Drawing on his previous experience in this jihadi group, [Sharif] pointed out that the LIFG’s problem was that it tried to change the regime by force. [He says] it failed to do so because it was [leading] a “factional project,” and that some people were concerned that change would only constitute [swapping out] the rule of one minority for the benefit of another. The Arab Spring proved that it was the people themselves who brought about this change, and that they therefore have the [primary] right to rule. Sharif also acknowledged that the LIFG had not been entirely wrong, and that peaceful means would not have been enough to bring about change in Libya. He contended that the tyrant [Qaddafi] had started the war, validating the route of armed conflict.
Arab Popular Revolutions
On the topic of the ongoing Arab revolutions, Belhadj reiterated the idea that what distinguishes [these revolutions] is their popular nature. When his organization used to amass in small groups, it failed. What [the NTC] now wants is to successfully complete the objectives of the Arab revolutions: Democracy, elections, the rule of law, institution-building and equality protected by a judicial system.
Hundreds of individuals associated with the LIFG were released from Libyan prisons in three waves between 2009 and 2011. Interestingly enough, the last group of 110 prisoners was released on February 16, 2011, the same day the revolution broke out in Benghazi. Among these prisoners was Abd’ al-Wahhab Qayid, the brother of Abu-Yahya al-Libi [who escaped from an American prison in Afghanistan in 2005]. While in prison [in Libya], the LIFG leadership reached the conclusion that its attempt to overthrow the Qaddafi regime through armed revolt had failed. [In their discussions, they] made reference to developments in the jihadi revolutions in neighboring Algeria or Egypt, always reaching the same conclusion: Arab regimes which are supported by world powers are too strong to be overthrown by guerrilla warfare or terrorism.
Two figures played a key role in the release of LIFG prisoners. The first is Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, who was presented as the Qaddafi regime’s face of reform. The other is Sheikh Ali al-Salabi, commander of the “Libyan Brothers.” Shortly after their release, former LIFG prisoners created the “Islamic Movement for Change,” whose aim was to transform the Libyan political landscape through peaceful means. Today, the former LIFG combatants are cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood to form a new national political entity. Such cooperation has not been easy to accomplish due to the hostile relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist-Jihadist groups elsewhere.
I asked Anis al-Sharif whether he considered the foundations of the new movement to be “Islamo-democratic.” I expected him to reject the word “democracy,” as in the past, Salafist groups have considered it a heresy that was injected into Islam to divide [the Islamic community]. On the contrary, Sharif said that [the NTC] did not want to use the word “Islam” because it stirred fears in the hearts of various groups. [He says the NTC] preferred to launch a broad political front for national political activity, where Islam would remain a point of reference.
Almost all Libyans are Sunni Muslim, and 95% of them follow the Maliki doctrine [one of four schools of religious law within Sunni Islam]. Unlike the former [Libyan] commander’s exaggerated behavior and female body guards, [Libyan] society is largely conservative. There is [currently] no debate about the role of women in the public sector. Consumption of alcohol remains illegal. Unlike neighboring Egypt and Tunisia, there is no significant tourism sector that could [expose Libyans to the outside world]. Moreover, there is no split between the Islamists and secularists - as in Tunisia - and there is consensus on the fact that Sharia law should be used as a reference for the constitution.
Not everyone in Libya believes the new discourse of the former Islamic activists. One Libyan political observer - who asked to remain anonymous - asked, could [the revised discourse] be the result of changes within LIFG circles, or does it represent a genuine shift in religious sentiments? [The observer] said that the [LIFG] are not disclosing their actual views because they know that the people would object to them. He added that he has information on extensive contact between the Syrian opposition and certain groups within Libya. He asked who gave [these Libyan groups] the right to intervene in a foreign conflict.
Should Libya and the world fear Belhadj? The rules of the political game in Libya and the region changed in 2011. Today, the Islamists do not need to take up arms to demand their share of political [power], but this is exactly what Belhadj and his friends have done. They managed to “seize power within the context of a popular revolution, and with the help of NATO.”

Published London, Pan Arab Established 1946

Language Arabic Frequency daily

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MCCAIN'S TRIP TO LIBYA TRIPOLI funding terrorist

SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MCCAIN'S TRIP TO LIBYA TRIPOLI 00000648 001.2 OF 003 1.(SBU/NF)

Passed to the Telegraph by WikiLeaks

9:31PM GMT 31 Jan 2011

Ref ID: 09TRIPOLI648

Date: 8/10/2009 17:39

Origin: Embassy Tripoli

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Destination:

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Tags: PREL,PGOV,OREP,PHUM,LY

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000648 SENSITIVE NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG; H (H PLEASE PASS TO CODEL MCCAIN) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OREP, PHUM, LY SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MCCAIN'S TRIP TO LIBYA TRIPOLI 00000648 001.2 OF 003
1.(SBU/NF) Summary: Embassy Tripoli warmly welcomes your visit and believes it will be an important occasion to advance the bilateral relationship in several key areas. Following the signature of the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement in October 2008, the United States and Libya established full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of Ambassadors in January 2009 for the first time in 37 years. The normalization of relations has provided the United States and Libya with increasing opportunities to push for progress in areas of mutual concern, such as counterterrorism efforts, military-to-military cooperation, regional stability in greater Africa, and trade and investment. However, significant challenges remain, particularly in ensuring Libya meets its disarmament commitments and in encouraging the government to expand political space through a human rights dialogue. We believe it would be very helpful if you emphasized to your Libyan interlocutors the importance the U.S. places on progress in these key areas, and share your vision of how the relationship could develop once outstanding issues are resolved. End summary.
2.(SBU/NF) Your visit represents the highest-level visit by a U.S. Government delegation since former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's historic and well-received visit in September 2008. The Libyan Government is taking great pains to ensure that you have a positive experience as well, and will be listening for cues on the future direction of the relationship. Your visit comes just three weeks before the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup on September 1, and falls within a year of unprecedented international prominence for Libya and for Muammar al-Qadhafi. Qadhafi, who sees himself as a man of particular historical importance, currently holds the chairmanship of the African Union (AU), and is expected to lead his country's delegation to New York this fall, as his country takes on the presidency of the 64th UN General Assembly. Qadhafi has leveraged his position as AU Chair to improve Libya's relations with European nations, paying recent state visits to France, Russia, and Italy, among other nations. As a sign that he has normalized relations with Libya's former colonial ruler, Qadhafi will host Silvio Berlusconi for a Libyan-Italian "Friendship Day" at the end of the month. A meeting with POTUS on the margins of UNGA would be the capstone of Qadhafi's historic year, but Embassy and high-level State Department officials have emphasized that Libya must take specific actions to move forward the bilateral relationship prior to a potential meeting.
SECURITY
3.(SBU/NF) Libya's decision to give up its WMD programs and to renounce its support for terrorism opened the door for a wide range of cooperation in areas of mutual concern. Libya has acted as a critical ally in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and Libya is considered one of our primary partners in combating the flow of foreign fighters. Our strategic partnership in this field has been highly productive and beneficial to both nations. We have begun some successful training programs to assist Libya in improving its security capabilities, under the rubrics of anti-terrorism assistance and border security. However, the government has not wanted to commit to participate in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) due to an incorrect perception that TSCTP is a regional organization, designed to provide U.S. foreign assistance to countries in need. Libya is very sensitive to receiving foreign aid, insisting that it is not a needy country but rather a patron nation of others. We believe it would be helpful if you could clarify the importance of TSCTP for obtaining congressional funding for bilateral security programs in Libya.
4.(SBU/NF) Libya has stated its number one priority, in return for relinquishing WMD, is a security guarantee by the U.S. against foreign aggression. To that end, Libya has expressed an interest in purchasing lethal weapons from U.S. firms. It would be helpful if you could provide congressional perspectives on lethal sales to Libya and the security commitments that must be fulfilled prior to any U.S. consideration of lethal sales. The GOL has also expressed a desire to receive in operational order the eight C-130 planes that Libya purchased in the 1970's, which were never delivered to Libya. Although the USG views the case as a strictly commercial matter between Libya and Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the C-130s, the aircraft are stored at a U.S. airbase, and the U.S. Air Force is encouraging Lockheed Martin to propose a compromise. Notably, the GOL has not yet agreed to end-use monitoring or security of U.S. technology agreements - two necessary steps for expanded TRIPOLI 00000648 002.2 OF 003 military-to-military cooperation, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs.
WMD COMMITMENTS
5.(SBU/NF) Progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship will depend on Libya's continued progress toward fulfillment of its WMD-related commitments. The U.S. is ready to launch a civil-nuclear dialogue as a framework for discussing ways in which we can expand our nuclear cooperation in areas such as the establishment of a Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, cooperative threat reduction, scientist engagement and redirection programs, and civil-nuclear engagement. However, we are unable to consider expanded cooperation until Libya makes good-faith efforts to meet the following critical deadlines for destruction and/or disposal of its WMD and related materials: -September 2009: Transfer of highly enriched uranium fuel to Russia, and beginning destruction of SCUD Bs; -2010: Conversion of Rabta chemical site to a pharmaceutical plant, and destruction of precursor chemicals; -2011: Destruction of mustard agent.
6.(SBU/NF) The most pressing issue remains Libya's signing of the agreement to transfer its highly enriched uranium to Russia for treatment and disposal, an action that must be taken prior to August 15, 2009, if Libya is going to meet the September deadline for disposal. The GOL is keenly interested in the establishment of the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center as an example of the success of the bilateral relationship. Your interlocutors may raise the issue of U.S. funding for the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, which is a request that the Department of Energy is currently preparing for submission to Congress.
REGIONAL COOPERATION
7.(SBU/NF) Libya's strategic geographical position and current role as chair of the African Union make it a significant player on the continent. Libya has thus far cooperated with U.S. efforts to foster peace in Darfur and a foundational effort to forge a ceasefire between Sudan and Chad. The USG continues to support Libya's efforts within the AU Peace and Security Commission to promote good governance and rule of law. Qadhafi has used his role as Chair of the African Union to attempt to mediate conflicts in the sub-Saharan region, to include Sudan-Chad, Somalia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia. Libya hosted an African Union Summit in July, during which it advocated to strengthen the AU, and it is preparing to host another summit on regional peace and security on August 31.
8.(SBU/NF) As Qadhafi has broadened his engagement as an African leader, he has notably minimized his efforts to affect policy in the Arab world. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a one-state solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians: "Isratine." The Libyans will appreciate any information you would like to share regarding how Congress views Africa, the Arab world in general and the Middle East peace process in particular.
HUMAN RIGHTS, MEGRAHI
9.(SBU/NF) Human rights remains a sensitive topic in the bilateral relationship, particularly in the wake of Fathi el-Jahmi's death in May. The Libyan Government has agreed to host an interagency team of USG officials August 17-19 to launch a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. This first meeting will set the agenda for the dialogue, which will include general discussion on a broad range of issues, such as international conventions to which both the U.S. and Libya are party; refugees and migration; prisons and detention facilities; international bodies and international NGOs; as well as specific cases of concern from both sides. The USG delegation will be led by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and will include representatives from the NSC, OVP, and State Department. The Embassy views this dialogue as an important step forward in our relationship. It would be very helpful if you could share your views on the importance of human rights to bilateral engagement.
10.(SBU/NF) The Government of Libya has not officially raised the case of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi with the Embassy at any level. We do not expect the issue to be raised during your visit, but if it is, we believe the most TRIPOLI 00000648 003.2 OF 003 helpful response would be to note that this is an issue for the Scottish Executive and that it would not be constructive to discuss the case as a bilateral issue. Libya requested compassionate release for Megrahi on July 24, but the Scottish courts have not yet issued a decision on granting his release.
HOMELAND SECURITY: VISAS AND PORT-OF-ENTRY PROCEDURES
11.(SBU/NF) As part of our effort to expand relations and facilitate greater people-to-people exchanges, Embassy Tripoli began full non-immigrant visa services in April 2009. Unfortunately, we have not seen reciprocal movement on the Libyan side. The Embassy is coordinating a bilateral working group with GOL counterparts to discuss visa issues, including non-issuance of visas to U.S. diplomats and official visitors, business travelers, and tourists. It would be helpful if you could underscore with Libyan officials the importance of a fully normalized visa regime to the implementation of fully normalized relations with the United States.
12.(SBU/NF) Libyan officials may complain about Department of Homeland Security regulations and practices governing the way that they are received at U.S. ports-of-entry. Libyan travelers - including senior Government officials, in contravention of DHS procedures - are routinely pulled into secondary questioning due to Libya's status as an NSEERS country. DHS regulations dating back to 1983 also prohibit the travel to the U.S. of Libyan nuclear scientists and aircraft pilots and mechanics. Libyan officials may not be aware of these latter regulations, but they must be changed in order to move forward on the full range of civil-nuclear and security cooperation that we envision.
COMMENT
13.(SBU/NF) The Embassy has received positive signs from the Libyan Government regarding your requested meeting with Qadhafi. Your visit will be seen as an important opportunity for Libya to prove that it is worthy of respect as a bilateral partner. Qadhafi will be looking to you for insight into how Congress views Libya and the future of the bilateral relationship. Thank you in advance for any assistance you can provide in pushing forward our strategic agenda. We look forward to welcoming you in the Libyan Jamahiriya. POLASCHIK