Thursday, July 11, 2013
I WONDER WERE SAUDI GOT THE WEAPONS OH THATS RIGHT OBAMA
Images analysed by experts at IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review has revealed a hitherto undisclosed surface-to-surface missile base deep in the Saudi desert, with capabilities for hitting both countries.
Analysts who examined the photos spotted two launch pads with
markings pointing north-west towards Tel Aviv and north-east towards
Tehran. They are designed for Saudi Arabia’s arsenal of lorry-launched
DF 3 missiles, which have a range of 1,500-2,500 miles and can carry a
two-ton payload.
The base, believed to have been built within the last five years,
gives an insight into Saudi strategic thinking at a time of heightened
tensions in the Gulf.
While Saudi Arabia does not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, it has long maintained discreet back channel communications as part of attempts to promote stability in the region.
The two countries also have a mutual enemy in Iran,
though, which has long seen Saudi Arabia as a rival power in the Gulf.
Experts fear that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would
seek to follow suit.
The missile base, which is at al-Watah, around 125 miles south-west
of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, was discovered during a project by IHS Jane’sto update their assessment of Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities.
It serves as both a training and launch facility, with the missiles stored in an underground silo built into a rocky hillside. To the north of the facility are two circle-shaped launch pads, both with compass-style markings showing the precise direction that the launchers should fire in.
The Chinese-made missiles, which date back to the 1980s, are not remotely-guided and therefore have to be positioned in the direction of their target before firing.
“One appears to be aligned on a bearing of approximately 301 degrees and suggesting a potential Israeli target, and the other is oriented along an azimuth (bearing) of approximately 10 degrees, ostensibly situated to target Iranian locations,” said the IHS Jane’s article, which is published on Thursday.
While the lorry-launched missiles can theoretically be fired from any location, the idea of having pre-planned directional markers is to ensure that they can be deployed in accurate fashion as quickly as possible, said Allison Puccioni, an image expert at IHS Jane’s.
“There is a marked out spot for the launch truck to park in, which will facilitate an expedited launch,” she said.
Robert Munks, deputy editor of IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, said: “Our assessment suggests that this base is either partly or fully operational, with the launch pads pointing in the directions of Israel and Iran respectively. We cannot be certain that the missiles are pointed specifically at Tel Aviv and Tehran themselves, but if they were to be launched, you would expect them to be targeting major cities.
“We do not want to make too many inferences about the Saudi strategy, but clearly Saudi Arabia does not enjoy good relations with either Iran or Israel.”
Officials at the Saudi Embassy in London did not get back with a response when contacted by The Telegraph. The Israeli Embassy in London said: “We have no comment on this matter.”
David Butter, an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, the London-based foreign affairs think-tank, said there was “little surprise” that the Saudis had the missiles in place.
“It would seem that they are looking towards some sort of deterrent capability, which is an obvious thing for them to be doing, given that Iran too is developing its own ballistic missiles,” he said.
He added, though, that the Saudis would know that the site would come to the attention of foreign intelligence agencies, and that the missile pad pointed in the direction of Israel could be partly just for “for show”.
“It would give the Iranians the impression that they were not being exclusively targeted, and would also allow the Saudis to suggest to the rest of the Arab world that they still consider Israel a threat.”
Oil-rich Saudi Arabia considers itself one of the pre-eminent powers in the Gulf region, but its Sunni Islam leadership has long been at loggerheads with the Shia mullahs of Iran. The ongoing conflict in Syria, which Saudi Arabia has backed the Sunni-dominated rebels and Iran has backed the Shia-dominated regime of President Bashar al-Assad, has heightened fears of a wider sectarian conflict.
A confidential diplomatic cable revealed in the “WikiLeaks” disclosures of 2010 said that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly exhorted the United States to launch military strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme and “cut off the head of the snake”
It serves as both a training and launch facility, with the missiles stored in an underground silo built into a rocky hillside. To the north of the facility are two circle-shaped launch pads, both with compass-style markings showing the precise direction that the launchers should fire in.
The Chinese-made missiles, which date back to the 1980s, are not remotely-guided and therefore have to be positioned in the direction of their target before firing.
“One appears to be aligned on a bearing of approximately 301 degrees and suggesting a potential Israeli target, and the other is oriented along an azimuth (bearing) of approximately 10 degrees, ostensibly situated to target Iranian locations,” said the IHS Jane’s article, which is published on Thursday.
While the lorry-launched missiles can theoretically be fired from any location, the idea of having pre-planned directional markers is to ensure that they can be deployed in accurate fashion as quickly as possible, said Allison Puccioni, an image expert at IHS Jane’s.
“There is a marked out spot for the launch truck to park in, which will facilitate an expedited launch,” she said.
Robert Munks, deputy editor of IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, said: “Our assessment suggests that this base is either partly or fully operational, with the launch pads pointing in the directions of Israel and Iran respectively. We cannot be certain that the missiles are pointed specifically at Tel Aviv and Tehran themselves, but if they were to be launched, you would expect them to be targeting major cities.
“We do not want to make too many inferences about the Saudi strategy, but clearly Saudi Arabia does not enjoy good relations with either Iran or Israel.”
Officials at the Saudi Embassy in London did not get back with a response when contacted by The Telegraph. The Israeli Embassy in London said: “We have no comment on this matter.”
David Butter, an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, the London-based foreign affairs think-tank, said there was “little surprise” that the Saudis had the missiles in place.
“It would seem that they are looking towards some sort of deterrent capability, which is an obvious thing for them to be doing, given that Iran too is developing its own ballistic missiles,” he said.
He added, though, that the Saudis would know that the site would come to the attention of foreign intelligence agencies, and that the missile pad pointed in the direction of Israel could be partly just for “for show”.
“It would give the Iranians the impression that they were not being exclusively targeted, and would also allow the Saudis to suggest to the rest of the Arab world that they still consider Israel a threat.”
Oil-rich Saudi Arabia considers itself one of the pre-eminent powers in the Gulf region, but its Sunni Islam leadership has long been at loggerheads with the Shia mullahs of Iran. The ongoing conflict in Syria, which Saudi Arabia has backed the Sunni-dominated rebels and Iran has backed the Shia-dominated regime of President Bashar al-Assad, has heightened fears of a wider sectarian conflict.
A confidential diplomatic cable revealed in the “WikiLeaks” disclosures of 2010 said that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly exhorted the United States to launch military strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme and “cut off the head of the snake”
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
U.S. Fails to Designate Nigerian Jihadists (Boko Haram) as Foreign Terror Group
U.S. Fails to Designate Nigerian Jihadists (Boko Haram) as Foreign Terror Group
The Clarion Project - The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Boko Haram group in Nigeria is, by any definition, a foreign terrorist organization. The Obama Administration is refusing to designate it as such, arguing that it is not a direct threat to the U.S. In other words, it is choosing appeasement over moral clarity.
Boko Haram is roughly translated to mean that Western education is sacrilegious. The Islamist group is openly committed to “war” against the Federal Republic of Nigeria in order to create a “pure” Islamic country governed by Sharia law. Members often cite the Koranic verse, “anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among transgressors.”
The terrorist group was created in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim Borno State, located in northeastern Nigeria by an Islamist cleric named Muhammad Yusuf, who established a religious complex that consisted of a mosque and an Islamic school. It attracted poor Muslim families throughout Nigeria and in neighboring countries as well. His school quickly pushed a political agenda to “create an Islamic state” in Nigeria, and his complex became a recruiting ground for jihadists against the Nigerian government. More
White House Rolls Out Red Carpet For Terror-Supporting Cleric
White House Rolls Out Red Carpet For Terror-Supporting Cleric
Posted 06/26/2013 06:47 PM ET
Betrayal: In
a new low for an administration that courts U.S. enemies, the White
House has met secretly with the deputy of a Muslim cleric who has called
for the killing of U.S. troops.
On June 13, of all things the National Security Council hosted Sheik Abdullah bin Bayyah for a West Wing chat, where the radical Islamist asked for more support for Hamas and Syrian "rebels," i.e. al-Qaida terrorists.
President Obama's envoy to the Muslim world, Rashad Hussain, and senior NSC aide Gayle Smith reportedly asked for the meeting as a learning session.
Well, here's what the administration apparently didn't learn — or did find out and still didn't care — when it vetted the sheik:
• Bin Bayyah works for Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who supports suicide bombings and issued a fatwa calling for attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Al-Qaradawi, who happens to be the spiritual leader of the radical Muslim Brotherhood, also once vowed to "conquer" America.
• His boss is considered so dangerous the State Department has banned him from entering the U.S. every year since 1999. Yet it apparently had no reservations granting a visa to his right-hand man. Why?
• In 2004, bin Bayyah joined a radical pro-jihad group — the International Union of Muslim Scholars — which has supported Palestinian terrorists and called for the destruction of the state of Israel.
• Last year, the sheik participated in a conference in Mauritania sponsored by the Islamic Society of North America, which the Justice Department has blacklisted as a Hamas front group and named an unindicted terrorist co-conspirator.
• During his trip to Washington, bin Bayyah also visited the ADAMS Center, a northern Virginia mosque whose leaders' homes and businesses were raided by federal agents after 9/11 for terrorist connections.
It strains credulity that the White House was in the dark about this creep. His statements and videos and associations are readily available on the Internet.
Yet it rolled out the red carpet, legitimizing him and his group — "basically the equivalent of inviting al-Qaida to the White House," said Steve Emerson of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, which exposed the secret White House meeting.
We join Emerson in calling for Congress to investigate not only why the Secret Service OK'd a known jihadist's White House visit, but also why Homeland Security signed off on his visa.
On June 13, of all things the National Security Council hosted Sheik Abdullah bin Bayyah for a West Wing chat, where the radical Islamist asked for more support for Hamas and Syrian "rebels," i.e. al-Qaida terrorists.
President Obama's envoy to the Muslim world, Rashad Hussain, and senior NSC aide Gayle Smith reportedly asked for the meeting as a learning session.
Well, here's what the administration apparently didn't learn — or did find out and still didn't care — when it vetted the sheik:
• Bin Bayyah works for Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who supports suicide bombings and issued a fatwa calling for attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Al-Qaradawi, who happens to be the spiritual leader of the radical Muslim Brotherhood, also once vowed to "conquer" America.
• His boss is considered so dangerous the State Department has banned him from entering the U.S. every year since 1999. Yet it apparently had no reservations granting a visa to his right-hand man. Why?
• In 2004, bin Bayyah joined a radical pro-jihad group — the International Union of Muslim Scholars — which has supported Palestinian terrorists and called for the destruction of the state of Israel.
• Last year, the sheik participated in a conference in Mauritania sponsored by the Islamic Society of North America, which the Justice Department has blacklisted as a Hamas front group and named an unindicted terrorist co-conspirator.
• During his trip to Washington, bin Bayyah also visited the ADAMS Center, a northern Virginia mosque whose leaders' homes and businesses were raided by federal agents after 9/11 for terrorist connections.
It strains credulity that the White House was in the dark about this creep. His statements and videos and associations are readily available on the Internet.
Yet it rolled out the red carpet, legitimizing him and his group — "basically the equivalent of inviting al-Qaida to the White House," said Steve Emerson of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, which exposed the secret White House meeting.
We join Emerson in calling for Congress to investigate not only why the Secret Service OK'd a known jihadist's White House visit, but also why Homeland Security signed off on his visa.
Read More At Investor's Business Daily: http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/062613-661589-white-house-invites-jihadist-sheik-to-tea.htm#ixzz2Ygz9Fcqn
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Documents Show Obama Officials in Tension Over British Banks
Documents Show Obama Officials in Tension Over British Banks
By BEN PROTESS
Doug Mills/The New York TimesBart Naylor of Public Citizen was critical of the Treasury Department.In the case of the banks suspected of funneling billions of dollars in tainted money through the American financial system — HSBC and Standard Chartered — authorities decided last year to level hefty fines rather than seek criminal charges. Those decisions raised concerns in Washington that some banks, having grown so large and interconnected, are too big to indict.
The internal government documents, which revealed some tension among authorities about how aggressively to pursue the cases, suggest that at least one agency, the Treasury Department, was alert to such concerns. When authorities were being blamed for letting HSBC off the hook, Treasury officials assured top aides to Timothy F. Geithner, then the Treasury secretary, that monetary penalties were coming as “quickly as possible,” according to the documents reviewed by The New York Times.
Internal Treasury Documents (PDF)The agency also contacted and persuaded a news organization to withdraw a report that wrongly blamed Treasury for not indicting HSBC, the documents indicate. (It’s the job of the Justice Department to decide criminal charges, Treasury explained.)
Ultimately, Treasury assessed a record $875 million fine against HSBC, accusing it of allowing Mexican drug cartels to direct money through accounts in the United States. But some critics wanted more, noting that Treasury’s own internal documents cite the bank’s “egregious violations” of money laundering laws as “qualitatively worse” than other banks.
“I would like to see Treasury support zealous prosecution, and instead I see them managing their image,” said Bart Naylor, a policy advocate at Public Citizen, a nonprofit group critical of the government for not taking a harder line with HSBC.
Treasury released the internal documents to Public Citizen through a Freedom of Information Act request. The group then shared the information with The Times. A spokesman for Treasury declined to comment.
Jim Lo Scalzo/European Pressphoto AgencyTimothy F. Geithner, the former Treasury secretary, had a more staid philosophy in money laundering cases than other regulators.The memo, internal e-mails show, was prepared for Mr. Geithner as “talking points” ahead of an October meeting with George Osborne, Britain’s chancellor of the Exchequer. In a September letter to Mr. Geithner, Mr. Osborne had expressed significant “concerns” about New York’s action, given that the United States and Britain typically collaborate closely on such cases.
While the talking points highlighted “Treasury’s coordination” with British regulators, it also distanced Mr. Geithner from the New York regulator, Benjamin M. Lawsky.
“Unfortunately,” the memo said, Mr. Lawsky’s office notified federal authorities “only hours before its public announcement.”
But people close to the case argue that federal authorities were aware that Mr. Lawsky was poised to act. Three months before filing the case, Mr. Lawsky’s office informed Treasury and other federal officials that it planned to soon take action against Standard Chartered for illegally funneling money for Iranian banks and corporations, the people close to the case said.
The tension reflected a culture clash between Mr. Lawsky’s aggressive approach and the more staid philosophy common at the Treasury Department. A former terrorism prosecutor, Mr. Lawsky adopted a broader view of Standard Chartered’s wrongdoing than federal authorities, and even threatened to revoke its state banking license. At the time, Treasury and the Justice Department were not ready to act.
Matt Anderson, a spokesman for Mr. Lawsky, declined to comment. In a speech this April, however, Mr. Lawsky played down the tensions, saying “a dose of healthy competition among regulators is helpful and necessary to safeguarding the stability of our nation’s financial system.”
But in Washington, some discussions have taken a more hostile tone as the Justice Department faces scrutiny for not indicting HSBC.
The Justice Department has explained that it follows guidelines requiring prosecutors to weigh indictments of businesses with “collateral consequences” like job losses and, in the case of big banks, a threat to the economy. And in a recent letter to Congress, the department explained that it has “contacted relevant government agencies to discuss such issues,” including federal regulators.
But in Congressional testimony in March, David S. Cohen, Treasury’s under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said “The decision whether to bring criminal charges is the exclusive prerogative of criminal prosecutors.” He added that “we were not in a position to offer any meaningful guidance” in the HSBC criminal case.
But inside the Treasury Department in late 2012, shortly after Congress scolded authorities for not yet punishing HSBC, officials appeared to make the civil case a significant priority.
Over several weeks, Treasury officials consulted two of Mr. Geithner’s top lawyers, Christopher Meade and Christian Weideman. The involvement of the lawyers, who were known at Treasury as Mr. Geithner’s top problem solvers, reflected the seriousness of the approach.
Treasury officials sent the lawyers “new developments” in the HSBC case. At one point, an official assured them that Treasury was moving “as quickly as possible to put together administrative penalty actions.”
When Treasury joined the Justice Department in announcing the case in December, a media outlet ran an overnight article in which a professor speculated that Mr. Geithner had not criminally prosecuted HSBC to avoid putting it out of business.
By dawn that day, Treasury officials e-mailed one another about the article. Shortly after, National Public Radio retracted the quote and issued a statement saying that Treasury had not been involved in the decision not to indict HSBC.
Disarmament
Freedom From War
The United States Program
for General and Complete
Disarmament in a Peaceful
World
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7277
Disarmament Series 5
Released September 1961
Disarmament Series 5
Released September 1961
Office of Public Services
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. - Price 15 cents
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. - Price 15 cents
INTRODUCTION
The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting mankind, the United States has introduced at the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations a Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the disarmament field:First, there must be immediate disarmament action:
A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls:
The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process.Third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established:
There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.
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There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The full text of the program is contained in an appendix to this pamphlet.
FREEDOM FROM WAR
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD
SUMMARY
DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES
The over-all goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:
- The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
- The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;
- The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;
- The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.
TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES
The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:
- As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;
- Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;
- Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and
- Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.
DISARMAMENT STAGES
The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions.
FIRST STAGE
The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:
- The nuclear threat would be reduced:
All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.
The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such materials from past production would be converted to non-weapons uses.
States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.
States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.
A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. - Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced:
Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted. - Arms and armed forces would be reduced:
The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.
An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons. - Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted:
The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction would be prohibited.
States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launchings. - U.N. peace-keeping powers would be strengthened:
Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force. - An International Disarmament Organization would be established for effective verification of the disarmament program:
Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.
It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.
It would determine the transition from one stage to the next. - States would be committed to other measures to reduce
international tension and to protect against the chance of war by
accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack:
States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.
A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.
SECOND STAGE
The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:
- Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;
- Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;
- Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;
- Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;
- On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;
- The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and
- The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.
THIRD STAGE
During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:
- States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.
- The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
- The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
- The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
Appendix
DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD
The Nations of the world,
Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;
Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;
Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;
Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:
(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;
(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;
(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
Call on the negotiating states:
(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;
(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;
(c) Also to seek --- without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program --- agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.
Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:
(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.
(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.
(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.
(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.
(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.
Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:
STAGE I
A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:
(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.
(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.
(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.
B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:
(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.
(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.
(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.
C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:
(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.
(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.
(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.
(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.
(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.
(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:
(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.
(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.
E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:
(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable c,f producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.
(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.
F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:
(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.
(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.
(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.
(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.
G. To Keep the Peace:
(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force--including nuclear, conventional, or CBR--contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.
(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.
(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.
(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.
(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
STAGE II
A. International Disarmament Organization:
The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.
B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:
(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.
(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.
(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.
(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:
Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.
D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:
Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.
E. To Keep the Peace:
During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:
(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.
(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.
(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.
STAGE III
By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O 609147 [end of document]
The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:
(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N Peace Force.
(b) The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
ayments Payment thresholds
Payments
Payment thresholds
There
are several earnings thresholds that impact whether you're eligible to
be paid for your AdSense earnings. These thresholds vary depending on
the reporting currency in your account.
To learn whether you need to provide tax information and, if necessary, how to submit it:
For more information, please visit the payments guide.
You may opt to increase your payment threshold to a value greater than the default payment threshold if you would like to receive your payments in larger increments.
| Thresholds | Tax Information Entry | Address Verification | Form of Payment Entry | Payment | Cancellation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. Dollar (USD) | $0 | $10 | $0 | $100 | $10 |
| Euro (EUR) | N/A | €10 | €0 | €70 | €10 |
| Great British Pound (GBP) | N/A | £10 | £0 | £60 | £10 |
| Australian Dollar (AUD) | N/A | A$15 | A$0 | A$150 | A$15 |
| Canadian Dollar (CAD) | C$0 | C$10 | C$0 | C$100 | C$10 |
| Chinese Renminbi (RMB) | N/A | ¥80 | ¥0 | ¥400 | ¥80 |
| Czech Koruna (CZK) | N/A | Kč200 | Kč0 | Kč2000 | Kč200 |
| Danish Krone (DKK) | N/A | kr60 | kr0 | kr600 | kr60 |
| Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) | N/A | HK$100 | HK$0 | HK$1,000 | HK$100 |
| Hungarian Forint (HUF) | N/A | Ft2,000 | Ft0 | Ft20,000 | Ft2,000 |
| Israeli Shekel (ILS) | N/A | ₪40 | ₪0 | ₪400 | ₪40 |
| Japanese Yen (JPY) | N/A | ¥1000 | ¥0 | ¥10000 | ¥1000 |
| Mexican Peso (MXN) | Mex$0 | Mex$100 | Mex$0 | Mex$1,000 | Mex$100 |
| New Zealand Dollar (NZD) | N/A | $100 | $0 | $1,000 | $100 |
| Norwegian Krone (NOK) | N/A | kr60 | kr0 | kr600 | kr60 |
| Polish Zloty (PLN) | N/A | zł30 | zł0 | zł300 | zł30 |
| South African Rand (ZAR) | N/A | R100 | R0 | R1000 | R100 |
| Swedish Krona (SEK) | N/A | kr70 | kr0 | kr700 | kr70 |
| Swiss Franc (CHF) | N/A | CHF10 | CHF0 | CHF100 | CHF10 |
| Turkish Lira (TRY) | N/A | TL10 | TL0 | TL100 | TL10 |
Tax Information Entry Threshold
Depending on your location, you may be required to provide certain information for tax purposes. If you are required to submit tax information, you will be able to do so when you first log in to your account.To learn whether you need to provide tax information and, if necessary, how to submit it:
- Sign in to your account.
- Visit the Payee profile page.
- In the 'tax information' section, click 'update tax information'.
- If you're required to enter tax information, you'll see a tax wizard prompting you to enter your information.
Address Verification Threshold
To verify the accuracy of your account information, we will mail a personal identification number (PIN) to your payment address when your earnings reach the verification threshold. You'll then be required to enter this PIN in your account. Learn more about address verification.For more information, please visit the payments guide.
Payment Threshold
You will be paid out when your unpaid earnings reach the payments threshold and you've completed the necessary steps to get paid. Payment thresholds are based on the reporting currency that your AdSense Payments page is displayed in.You may opt to increase your payment threshold to a value greater than the default payment threshold if you would like to receive your payments in larger increments.
Cancellation Threshold
If you decide to cancel your account and your account balance is greater than the cancellation threshold, you'll receive your final payment within approximately 90 days of the end of the month, provided that you've completed the necessary steps to get paid.
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