You
folks can say what you want, but legally -- this was Felony Murder.
This video proves that police had no intention of attempting to take
Christopher Dorner alive at any time.
Police can be heard in
this video stating, several times, "Burn that fuc*ing house down!" --
this was the intentional, premeditated execution of a wanted man by the
San Berardino County Sheriff's Department.
While I don't agree
with what he did, the police had no right to burn the house down around
him intentionally. This was murder, plain and simple -- he was given no
opportunity to come out, and the police refused to do their duty to go
in to apprehend him. — in Angelus Oaks, CA.
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=538809799484191
Wednesday, February 13, 2013
You folks can say what you want, but legally -- this was Felony Murder. This video proves that police had no intention of attempting to take Christopher Dorner alive at any time. Police can be heard in this video stating, several times, "Burn that fuc*ing house down!" -- this was the intentional, premeditated execution of a wanted man by the San Berardino County Sheriff's Department. While I don't agree with what he did, the police had no right to burn the house down around him intentionally. This was murder, plain and simple -- he was given no opportunity to come out, and the police refused to do their duty to go in to apprehend him. — in Angelus Oaks, CA. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=538809799484191
The housing market collapse of 2008 was blamed on President Bush, but Bush and other Republicans warned Democrats about a possible housing crisis if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac weren't regulated. Obama and ACORN were the community agitators, I mean organizers, who forced banks to make loans to people who couldn't afford them, including illegals. President Clinton was the one who lifted the regulations that allowed for these loans to happen. Watch and learn:
(TG)
http://www.youtube.com/
Tuesday, February 12, 2013
Europe Declares War on American Ratings Agencies
Europe Declares War on American Ratings Agencies
European leaders hope they can sweep Europe’s
financial problems under the rug by shooting the (American) messengers
of bad news.
July 30, 2011 - 9:05 pm
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European officials struggling to prevent the collapse of what has been described as “a giant Ponzi scheme” are angry — very angry — at American credit ratings agencies for downgrading the creditworthiness of several European countries and thus publicly exposing the true extent of Europe’s debt crisis.
The three leading ratings agencies criticized for being American – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings, which actually is majority owned by a French company — rate the creditworthiness of companies and countries, as well as the quality of funds and stocks. Their assessment determines the conditions under which firms, banks, or countries may borrow money on the capital markets.
The agencies, which collectively hold a global market share of roughly 95 percent, exert considerable influence over Europe because European companies active on U.S. markets are required by securities laws to have ratings that are issued from these firms.
But European politicians are now accusing these companies of outside meddling, as if American ratings agencies are responsible for the bankruptcy of countries like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. In a frantic effort to regain control over the narrative that was carefully crafted over many years that Europe is a global model of socialist utopia, European elites (as always in denial), are, once again, reaching for the tried and true fall-back position of anti-Americanism.
The latest bout of anti-American rhetoric was triggered by the July 5 decision by the New York-based Moody’s to downgrade Portugal’s credit rating to “junk” status. The downgrade was made just as Portugal was to implement austerity measures in return for a €78 billion ($110 billion) EU-IMF bailout, and as the eurozone was struggling to craft yet another rescue package for Greece.
Consider, for example, the reaction of Viviane Reding, the European commissioner for justice. Reding told Germany’s Die Welt newspaper: “Europe cannot let itself be destroyed by three American private companies.” She added: “I see two possible solutions: either the G-20 states agree together to smash the cartel of American rating agencies. Or independent European and Asian rating agencies are established.”
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso accused the agencies of “mistakes,” “exaggerations,” “conflicts of interest,” and of having an anti-European “bias.” Barroso asked: “Is it normal to have only three relevant actors on such sensitive issues where there is a great possibility of conflict of interest? Is it normal that all of them come from the same country?”
Attacking the domination of the ratings sector by the Americans, Barroso continued: “It seems strange that there is not a single rating agency coming from Europe. It shows there may be some bias in the markets when it comes to the evaluation of the specific issues of Europe. It is important that we do not allow others to take away our ability to make judgments.”
The unelected Barroso also said it was time for a European ratings agency to emerge as a counterweight to the U.S.-dominated groups: “We know that when there are oligopolies there are sometimes attempts to abuse the dominant position or market manipulation, so the more competition the better — this is our credo.”
German President Christian Wulff said it was shocking that the rating agencies continue to exercise so much power, and warned of the need for policymakers to “re-conquer the primacy of politics.” German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said he “cannot decipher” the recent ratings downgrades of Portugal. “We need to examine the possibilities of smashing the rating agency oligopoly,” he added.
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier said something must be done to cut the “power and influence” of the American agencies. In true Eurocrat fashion, Barnier also issued a veiled threat: “I invite the agencies, which are under the control of national supervisors, to be extremely careful to fully respect EU rules. They should learn the lessons from the past.”
Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Lambrinidis criticized the behaviour of the agencies as “the wonderful madness of self-fulfilling prophecy” because it made it harder for insolvent countries like Greece and Portugal to borrow to keep afloat. Never mind the “madness” that European leaders have allowed themselves to believe they can borrow forever without ever having to pay back the debt they have accrued.
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn accused Moody’s of “so-called clairvoyance.” Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou said the ratings agencies were “seeking to shape our destiny and determine the future of our children.” As if the rating agencies accumulated the mountains of Greek debt.
Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said the influence of American credit rating agencies was “disastrous.” The Italian chief economist of the OECD, Pier Carlo Padoan, said of the ratings agencies: “It’s like pushing someone who is on the edge of a cliff. It aggravates the crisis.”
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle called for the creation of a European rival to the three agencies. “It is necessary to establish an independent European rating agency. This must be a goal that we all work on intensively,” he said.
Bring Out Your Dead - UBS Quantifies Costs Of Euro Break Up, Warns Of Collapse Of Banking System And Civil War
Bring Out Your Dead - UBS Quantifies Costs Of Euro Break Up, Warns Of Collapse Of Banking System And Civil War
Any time a major bank releases a report saying a given course of action is too costly, too prohibitive, too blonde, or simply too impossible, it is nearly guaranteed that that is precisely the course of action about to be undertaken. Which is why all non-euro skeptics are advised to shield their eyes and look away from the just released report by UBS (of surging 3 Month USD Libor rate fame) titled "Euro Break Up - The Consequences." UBS conveniently sets up the straw man as follows: "Under the current structure and with the current membership, the Euro does not work. Either the current structure will have to change, or the current membership will have to change." So far so good. Yet where it gets scary is when UBS quantifies the actual opportunity cost to one or more countries leaving the Euro. Notably Germany. "Were a stronger country such as Germany to leave the Euro, the consequences would include corporate default, recapitalisation of the banking system and collapse of international trade. If Germany were to leave, we believe the cost to be around EUR6,000 to EUR8,000 for every German adult and child in the first year, and a range of EUR3,500 to EUR4,500 per person per year thereafter. That is the equivalent of 20% to 25% of GDP in the first year. " It also would mean the end of UBS, but we digress. Where it gets even more scary is when UBS, like many other banks to come, succumbs to the Mutual Assured Destruction trope made so popular by ole' Hank Paulson : "The economic cost is, in many ways, the least of the concerns investors should have about a break-up. Fragmentation of the Euro would incur political costs. Europe’s “soft power” influence internationally would cease (as the concept of “Europe” as an integrated polity becomes meaningless). It is also worth observing that almost no modern fiat currency monetary unions have broken up without some form of authoritarian or military government, or civil war." So you see: save the euro for the children, so we can avoid all out war (and UBS can continue to exist). The scariest thing, however, by far, is that for this report to have been issued, it means that Germany is now actively considering dumping the euro.
Executive summary:
A little more on that particularly troubling last point:Fiscal confederation, not break-up
Our base case with an overwhelming probability is that the Euro moves slowly (and painfully) towards some kind of fiscal integration. The risk case, of break-up, is considerably more costly and close to zero probability. Countries can not be expelled, but sovereign states could choose to secede. However, popular discussion of the break-up option considerably underestimates the consequences of such a move.
The economic cost (part 1)
The cost of a weak country leaving the Euro is significant. Consequences include sovereign default, corporate default, collapse of the banking system and collapse of international trade. There is little prospect of devaluation offering much assistance. We estimate that a weak Euro country leaving the Euro would incur a cost of around EUR9,500 to EUR11,500 per person in the exiting country during the first year. That cost would then probably amount to EUR3,000 to EUR4,000 per person per year over subsequent years. That equates to a range of 40% to 50% of GDP in the first year.
The economic cost (part 2)
Were a stronger country such as Germany to leave the Euro, the consequences would include corporate default, recapitalisation of the banking system and collapse of international trade. If Germany were to leave, we believe the cost to be around EUR6,000 to EUR8,000 for every German adult and child in the first year, and a range of EUR3,500 to EUR4,500 per person per year thereafter. That is the equivalent of 20% to 25% of GDP in the first year. In comparison, the cost of bailing out Greece, Ireland and Portugal entirely in the wake of the default of those countries would be a little over EUR1,000 per person, in a single hit.
The political cost
The economic cost is, in many ways, the least of the concerns investors should have about a break-up. Fragmentation of the Euro would incur political costs. Europe’s “soft power” influence internationally would cease (as the concept of “Europe” as an integrated polity becomes meaningless). It is also worth observing that almost no modern fiat currency monetary unions have broken up without some form of authoritarian or military government, or civil war.
As for what happens if UBS, and the Euro Unionists lose the fight for the euro:Do monetary unions break up without civil wars?
The break-up of a monetary union is a very rare event. Moreover the break-up of a monetary union with a fiat currency system (ie, paper currency) is extremely unusual. Fixed exchange rate schemes break up all the time. Monetary unions that relied on specie payments did fragment – the Latin Monetary Union of the 19th century fragmented several times – but should be thought of as more of a fixed exchange rate adjustment. Countries went on and off the gold or silver or bimetal standards, and in doing so made or broke ties with other countries’ currencies.
If we consider fiat currency monetary union fragmentation, it is fair to say that the economic circumstances that create a climate for a break-up and the economic consequences that follow from a break-up are very severe indeed. It takes enormous stress for a government to get to the point where it considers abandoning the lex monetae of a country. The disruption that would follow such a move is also going to be extreme. The costs are high – whether it is a strong or a weak country leaving – in purely monetary terms. When the unemployment consequences are factored in, it is virtually impossible to consider a break-up scenario without some serious social consequences.
With this degree of social dislocation, the historical parallels are unappealing. Past instances of monetary union break-ups have tended to produce one of two results. Either there was a more authoritarian government response to contain or repress the social disorder (a scenario that tended to require a change from democratic to authoritarian or military government), or alternatively, the social disorder worked with existing fault lines in society to divide the country, spilling over into civil war. These are not inevitable conclusions, but indicate that monetary union break-up is not something that can be treated as a casual issue of exchange rate policy.
Even with a paucity of case studies, what evidence we have does lend credence to the political cost argument. Clearly, not all parts of a fracturing monetary union necessarily collapse into chaos. The point is not that everyone suffers, but that some part of the former monetary union is highly likely to suffer.
The fracturing of the Czech and Slovak monetary union in 1993 led to an immediate sealing of the border, capital controls and limits on bank withdrawals. This was not so much secession as destruction and substitution (the Czechoslovak currency ceased to exist entirely). Although the Czech Republic that emerged from the crisis was considered to be a free country (using the Freedom House definition), with political rights improving relative to Czechoslovakia (also considered to be a free country), Slovakia saw a deterioration in the assessment of its political rights and civil liberties, and was designated “partially free” (again, using Freedom House criteria).
Similarly the break-up of the Soviet Union saw authoritarian regimes in the resulting states. Of course, this was not a change from the previous status quo, but that is not the point. The question is not how a liberal democracy develops, but whether a liberal democracy could withstand the social turmoil that surrounds a monetary union fracturing. We lack evidence to support the idea that it could.
Even the US monetary union break-up in 1932-33 was accompanied by something close to authoritarianism. Roosevelt’s inauguration was described by a contemporary journalist as being conducted in “a beleaguered capital in wartime”, with machine guns covering the Mall. State militia were called out to deal with the reactions of local populations, unhappy at what had happened to the monetary union (and specifically their access to their banks).
Older examples are less helpful, as they tend to be more akin to fixed exchange rate regimes under a gold standard or some other international monetary arrangement. Nevertheless, the Irish separation from the UK, or the convulsions of the Latin Monetary Union in Europe (particularly around the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and its aftermath) saw monetary unions fragment with varying degrees of violence in some parts of the union.
Writing in 1997, the Harvard economist Martin Feldstein offered a view that seems to be somewhat chillingly precognitive. He said “Uniform monetary policy and inflexible exchange rates will create conflicts whenever cyclical conditions differ among the member countries... Although a sovereign country... could in principle withdraw from the EMU, the potential trade sanctions and other pressures on such a country are likely to make membership in the EMU irreversible unless there is widespread economic dislocation in Europe or, more generally, a collapse of the peaceful coexistence within Europe.” (emphasis added).
Alas, this will be the final outcome. Unfortunately trillions more in taxpayer capital will be lost before we get there.Our base case for the Euro is that the monetary union will hold together, with some kind of fiscal confederation (providing automatic stabilisers to economies, not transfers to governments). This is how the US monetary union was resurrected in the 1930s. It is how the UK monetary union, and indeed the German monetary union, have held together.
But what if the disaster scenario happens? How can investors invest if they believe in a break-up, however low the probability? The simple answer is that they cannot. Investing for a break-up scenario has not guaranteed winners within the Euro area. The growth consequences are awful in any break-up scenario. The risk of civil disorder questions the rule of law, and as such basic issues such as property rights. Even those countries that avoid internal strife and divisions will likely have to use administrative controls to avoid extreme positions in their markets.
The only way to hedge against a Euro break-up scenario is to own no Euro assets at all.
In the meantime, enjoy as UBS just unwittingly announced the final countdown for the EUR.
xrm45126
https://sphotos-a.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-prn1/19625_4942871301274_1928226098_n.jpg
https://sphotos-a.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-prn1/19625_4942871301274_1928226098_n.jpg
Exclusive: U.S. lets China bypass Wall Street for Treasury orders
Exclusive: U.S. lets China bypass Wall Street for Treasury orders
NEW YORK |
(Reuters) - China
can now bypass Wall Street when buying U.S. government debt and go
straight to the U.S. Treasury, in what is the Treasury's first-ever
direct relationship with a foreign government, according to documents
viewed by Reuters.The relationship means the People's Bank of China buys U.S. debt using a different method than any other central bank in the world.
China, which holds $1.17 trillion in U.S. Treasuries, still buys some Treasuries through primary dealers, but since June 2011, that route hasn't been necessary.
The documents viewed by Reuters show the U.S. Treasury Department has given the People's Bank of China a direct computer link to its auction system, which the Chinese first used to buy two-year notes in late June 2011.
China can now participate in auctions without placing bids through primary dealers. If it wants to sell, however, it still has to go through the market.
The change was not announced publicly or in any message to primary dealers.
"Direct bidding is open to a wide range of investors, but as a matter of general policy we do not comment on individual bidders," said Matt Anderson, a Treasury Department spokesman.
While there is been no prohibition on foreign government entities bidding directly, the Treasury's accommodation of China is unique.
The Treasury's sales of U.S. debt to China have become part of a politically charged public debate about China's role as the largest exporter to the United States and also the country's largest creditor.
The privilege may help China obtain U.S. debt for a better price by keeping Wall Street's knowledge of its orders to a minimum.
Primary dealers are not allowed to charge customers money to bid on their behalf at Treasury auctions, so China isn't saving money by cutting out commission fees.
Instead, China is preserving the value of specific information about its bidding habits. By bidding directly, China prevents Wall Street banks from trying to exploit its huge presence in a given auction by driving up the price.
It is one of several courtesies provided to a buyer in a class by itself in terms of purchasing power. Although the Japanese, for example, own about $1.1 trillion of Treasuries, their purchasing has been less centralized. Buying by Japan is scattered among institutions, including pension funds, large Japanese banks and the Bank of Japan, without a single entity dominating.
Granting China a direct bidding link is not the first time Treasury has gone to great lengths to keep its largest client happy.
In 2009, when Treasury officials found China was using special deals with primary dealers to conceal its U.S. debt purchases, the Treasury changed a rule to outlaw those deals, Reuters reported last June. But at the same time it relaxed a reporting requirement to make the Chinese more comfortable with the amended rule.
Another feature of the U.S.-China business relationship is discretion: The Treasury tried to keep its motivation for the 2009 rule change under wraps, Reuters reported.
Documents dealing with China's new status as a direct bidder again demonstrate the Treasury's desire for secrecy -- in terms of Wall Street and its new direct bidding customer.
To safeguard against hackers, Treasury officials upgraded the system that allows China to access the bidding process.
Then they discussed ways to deflect questions from Wall Street traders that would arise once the auction results began revealing the undeniable presence of a foreign direct bidder.
"Most hold the view that foreign accounts only submit 'indirect bids' through primary dealers. This will likely cause significant chatter on the street and many questions will likely come our way," wrote one government official in an email viewed by Reuters.
In the email, the official suggested providing basic, general answers to questions about who can bid in Treasury actions.
"For questions more extensive or probing in nature, I think it prudent to direct them to the or Treasury public relations area," the official wrote.
The granting to China of direct bidder status may be controversial because some government officials are concerned that China has gained too much leverage over the United States through its large Treasury holdings.
For example, economist Brad Setser, who is a member of the National Economic Council and has also served on the National Security Council, has argued China's large Treasury holdings pose a national security threat.
Writing for the Council on Foreign Relations in 2009, Setser posited that China's massive U.S. debt holdings gave it power over U.S. policy via the threat of a swift, large sale of U.S. debt that could send the market into turmoil and drive up interest rates.
But Treasury officials have long maintained that U.S. debt sales to China are kept separate from politics in a business relationship that benefits both countries. The Chinese use Treasuries to house the dollars they receive from selling goods to the United States, while the U.S. government is happy to see such strong demand for its debt because it keeps interest rates low.
A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington did not respond to calls and emails seeking comment.
The United States has, however, displayed increasing anxiety about China as a cybersecurity threat. The change Treasury officials made to their direct bidding system before allowing access to China was to limit access to the system to a specially designed private network connection controlled by the Treasury.
China is among the most sensitive topics for bankers and government officials who court the country as a financial client because of its size and importance, and none would agree to comment on the record for this story.
A former debt management official at the Treasury who did not want to be identified said that as China's experience in the U.S. Treasury market has deepened over time, Chinese officials may have felt more comfortable taking the reins in the management of their holdings.
Their request to bid directly, in his view, came from a confidence that their money managers could buy U.S. debt more efficiently on their own than through Wall Street banks, which can often drive up the price of Treasuries at an auction if they know how much large clients are willing to pay. Such a practice that is not specifically illegal, though most traders would deem it unethical.
Evidence of China's growing sophistication as a money manager in the U.S. markets is clear in its expansion of operations in New York. Its money management arm, the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (commonly called SAFE), has an office in Midtown Manhattan and a seasoned chief investment officer -- former Pacific Investment Management Co derivatives head Changhong Zhu -- in Beijing.
A woman who answered the phone at SAFE's New York office said no one in the office was authorized to talk to the media.
(Editing by Martin Howell and Steve Orlofsky)
OH OBAMA SAYS MADE IN USA TO MEAN SOME THING THEN WHAT DO YOU CALL THIS China firm buys AMC to form world's largest cinema chain
China firm buys AMC to form world's largest cinema chain
updated 12:25 AM EDT, Mon May 21, 2012
Under the new U.S.-China deal, more IMAX or 3D films are being allowed into China.
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
- Dalian Wanda Group buys AMC in a $2.6 billion deal for the U.S. theater group
- Creates the world's largest theater chain, according to the companies
- Comes after a raft of cross-Pacific deals between Hollywood and Chinese firms
The move is the latest in
a raft of deals between U.S. entertainment companies and Chinese firms,
linking the world's largest theater market with the world's fastest
growing.
"This acquisition will
help make Wanda a truly global cinema owner, with theatres and
technology that enhance the movie-going experience for audiences in the
world's two largest movie markets," said Wang Jianlin, chairman and
president of Wanda.
Wanda, a private company
that previously operated solely in China, generates $16.7 billion in
annual revenue from its commercial development and entertainment
businesses, the company said. The group owns 86 theaters with 730
screens in China.
"As the film and
exhibition business continues its global expansion, the time has never
been more opportune to welcome the enthusiastic support of our new
owners," said Gerry Lopez, chief executive officer and president of AMC.
AMC operates 346
multiplex theaters, largely in North America, with a total of 5,034
screens. Headquarters of AMC, a privately held company, will remain in
the Kansas City area and day-to-day operations, including the process
for film programming, will remain unchanged, the release said.
In a deal last February,
China agreed to increase the quota of 20 foreign films per year -- most
of them from the U.S. -- to add an additional 14 IMAX or 3D films each
year, and nearly doubled the cut foreign film companies can take from
Chinese box office to 25%.
In April, The Walt Disney
Company China, Marvel Studios and DMG Entertainment of Beijing
announced a production deal in which "Iron Man 3" will be co-produced in
China. That follows the February announced that a $330 million joint
venture between DreamWorks Animation, China Media Capital (CMC) and two
other Chinese companies to establish a China-focused family
entertainment company, Oriental DreamWorks.
Last month came
revelations, first reported by Reuters, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission sent inquiries to 20th Century Fox, Disney and DreamWorks
about whether Hollywood studios were paying bribes to get a foothold in
the China theater market.
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