Shades of Vietnam: Spike in U.S. troop deaths tied to stricter rules of engagement
**FULL FRAME VERSION OF AFDG102,
WEDNESDAY AUG. 19, 2009 PHOTO** In this full frame version of AFDG102,
Wednesday Aug. 19, 2009 photo, Spc. Paul Pickett, 22, of Minden, La.,
centers, covers Pfc. James Gordon, 20, of Texas, both of the U.S. Army’s
Apache Company, 2nd Battalion 87th Infantry Regiment, part of the 3rd
Combat Brigade 10th Mountain Division based out of Fort Drum, N.Y.,
from the rotar wash of a landing medivac helicopter after Gordon
sustained leg injuries when the armored vehicle he and six others were
riding in hit an improvised explosive device in the Tangi Valley of
Afghanistan’s Wardak Province. It was Apache company’s 48th IED in a
month, 7 that were attacks, 41 diffused or destroyed, resulting in 22
soldiers injured and one soldier killed in that timeframe. (AP
Photo/David Goldman)
The number of U.S. battlefield fatalities exceeded the rate at
which troop strength surged in 2009 and 2010, prompting national
security analysts to assert that coinciding stricter rules of engagement
led to more deaths.A connection between the sharp increase in American deaths and restrictive rules of engagement is difficult to confirm. More deaths surely stemmed from ramped-up counterterrorism raids and the Taliban’s response with more homemade bombs, the No. 1 killer of NATO forces in Afghanistan.
But it is clear that the rules of engagement, which restrain troops from firing in order to spare civilian casualties, cut back on airstrikes and artillery strikes — the types of support that protect troops during raids and ambushes.
“In Afghanistan, the [rules of engagement] that were put in place in 2009 and 2010 have created hesitation and confusion for our war fighters,” said Wayne Simmons, a retired U.S. intelligence officer who worked in NATO headquarters in Kabul as the rules took effect, first under Army Gen. Stanley M. McChrystal, then Army Gen. David H. Petraeus.
“It is no accident nor a coincidence that from January 2009 to August of 2010, coinciding with the Obama/McChrystal radical change of the [rules of engagement], casualties more than doubled,” Mr. Simmons said. “The carnage will certainly continue as the already fragile and ineffective [rules] have been further weakened by the Obama administration as if they were playground rules.”
Mr. Karzai now is refusing to sign a status of forces agreement for U.S. troops to remain in his country after 2014, even though Mr. Obama personally pledged to him in a letter that Afghan homes would be mostly off-limits to ground forces.
Even before the president’s edict, commanders since 2009 had to insure that a Taliban fighter was carrying a weapon before they could authorize direct fire. A unit engaged in combat on the ground and requesting airstrikes must convince commanders — and lawyers — back at headquarters that no civilians would be harmed.
Warriors say this chain-of-command bureaucracy has cost lives: Each Taliban fighter allowed to escape is one more terrorist free to attack Americans by fighting battles or planting homemade bombs.
“We handcuffed our troops in combat needlessly,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, a fighter pilot in Vietnam. “This was very harmful to our men and has never been done in U.S. combat operations that I know of.”
In 2010, the first full year of the troop surge, 499 Americans were killed, according to the research website icasualties.org. That is about five times the annual death toll compared with 2006-2007 and three times the number in 2008 — yet U.S. troop strength roughly doubled, from 40,000 to 85,000.
In 2011, as U.S. troops peaked at 100,000, 419 Americans were killed. In 2012, as the troop count began to decrease, the death toll fell to 319, three times what it was in 2006-2007.
The battle of Ganjgal in Afghanistan’s Kunar province proved to be historic. An Army captain and a Marine earned Medals of Honor for their efforts in the 10-hour firefight.
The September 2009 battle also stands as a stark example of the effects the restrictive rules of engagement had on troops under fire, fighting for their lives.
Former Army Capt. William Swenson, who last month pinned on the Medal of Honor, repeatedly called headquarters to request airstrikes but was denied for hours, as more than 150 Taliban fighters surrounded and attacked his position.
Mr. Swenson vented his frustration in an after-action investigation.
“It’s not JAG [military attorney] responsibility to interject to say, ‘Hey, we are concerned that you’re going to hit a building,’” he said. “I can tell you that I am concerned with saving as many lives as I can, not necessarily one. Unfortunately, this is combat. I can’t be perfect, but I can do what I feel what’s right at the time.”
He added: “I am not a politician. I am just the guy on the ground asking for that ammunition to be dropped because it’s going to save lives.”
Mr. Swenson recalled other instances in which the brigade command would not authorize airstrikes on targets he identified.
“I just get the craziest thing across the radio sometimes,” he said. “Just people second-guessing.”
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