Friday, January 25, 2013

ISIS Reports Press Release - Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy


ISIS Reports

Press Release - Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy

January 14, 2013

Press Release

Working Group Urges “De Facto Trade Embargo” to Stop Iran from Reaching “Critical Capability”; Calls for Tough Nonproliferation Standards in Middle East, Increased Support for Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs in Region, Designating China as a “Destination of Diversion Concern”


WASHINGTON, DC. Warning that time is running out as Iran accelerates its nuclear program, the non-partisan Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy called on President Obama to use current U.S. sanctions laws to implement a “de facto international embargo on all investments in, and trade with, Iran (other than provision of humanitarian goods)” before Iran achieves “critical capability” – the point at which it could produce enough weapon-grade uranium (or separated plutonium) for one or more bombs so rapidly that neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor Western intelligence agencies could be able to detect the move before it was too late to respond.
In their 154-page report issued today, the five senior nonproliferation specialists who co-chaired the Project detail how a set of recent U.S. laws, including the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law on January 2, 2013, “vigorously implemented, could provide the U.S. government with all the authority it needs to impose near-maximal” economic pressure on Iran in coming months, while permitting the humanitarian needs of the Iranian people to be met. The report declares that the possibility of a successful outcome in any negotiations with Iran depends on the immediate implementation of these sanctions, along with simultaneously reinforcing the credibility of President Obama’s threat to use military force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The report states that “the United States should offer nuclear sanctions relief to Iran only in response to meaningful concessions by the Iranians that are consistent with the multiple relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and U.S. laws.”
The report urges that Washington reduce the threat of further proliferation in the changing Middle East by taking steps to reduce regional “demand” for weapons of mass destruction. The report also suggest ways to more effectively control the “supply” of sensitive nuclear technologies through enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and by conditioning U.S. commercial nuclear trade on regional recipients’ renouncing development of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing technologies that can be used to produce nuclear weapon material.
The report stresses that the U.S. should actively use the leverage of foreign aid and political support with new governments in Cairo and Damascus to check potential proliferation. Such an assertive policy is critical for Egypt where a Muslim Brotherhood spokesman before the party came to power called for Egyptian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and in Syria, where any new regime must be strongly pressed to eliminate Syria’s chemical arsenal.
The Project co-chairs urge the U.S. to take various specific steps to enhance the capacity and will of regional states to control weapons of mass destruction and key materials to prevent their acquisition by additional state or non-state actors. The co-chairs also encourage Washington and its partners to promote improved detection and response capabilities in the region. In addition, the report calls on the U.S. to “encourage improved implementation of UN sanctions by China, including by designating China as a ‘Destination of Diversion Concern’” pursuant to U.S. law.
The report urges creation of a Middle East Nonproliferation Initiative to coordinate, and more nimbly and creatively advance, such cooperative nonproliferation work in the Middle East. Noting that the Department of Defense was recently granted authority to use its substantial “Cooperative Threat Reduction” funds for projects in the Middle East, the report details a number of key cooperative and collaborative projects that should receive immediate funding. These include projects to build bio-security and bio-safety capacity, track infectious diseases, and organize Track II dialogues with emerging leaders and ascendant groups on such issues as a regional weapon-of-mass-destruction free zone. Another priority project would foster the development of voluntary codes of conduct, for scientists and institutions in the region, on responsible management of legitimate chemical and biological research and materials.
The report contains dozens of specific recommendations arranged in chapters focused on Iran’s nuclear program, proliferation by state actors (other than Iran) in the changing Middle East, proliferation by non-state actors in the region, cooperative nonproliferation programs applicable to the Middle East, and enhanced partnership with Europe on nonproliferation in this volatile region.
The Project Co-Chairs—David Albright (President of the Institute for Science and International Security); Mark Dubowitz (Executive Director, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies); Orde Kittrie (Professor of Law, Arizona State University); Leonard S. Spector (Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies); and Michael Yaffe (Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University)—prepared the report.
The Project convened five not-for-attribution roundtables at which leading experts from the U.S. government, think tanks, and academia discussed how to more effectively address Middle East nonproliferation challenges and opportunities in light of paradigm-shifting regional developments. This report includes the Project co-chairs’ analyses and recommendations, many of which were drawn from or inspired by the roundtable discussions. However, they are attributable only to the Project co-chairs, in their personal capacities. Institutional affiliations are included for identification purposes only.

Read the executive summary here.
Read the full report at: U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East

For further information please contact any of the following Project co-chairs:
David Albright, albright@isis-online.org
Mark Dubowitz, mark@defenddemocracy.org
Orde Kittrie, ofkstrategies@yahoo.com
Leonard “Sandy” Spector, lspector@miis.edu
Michael Yaffe, yaffem@gmail.com

Executive Summary - U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East David Albright,, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector and Michael Yaffe January 14, 2013

Executive Summary - U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East
David Albright,, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector and Michael Yaffe January 14, 2013
 http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/US_Nonproliferation_Strategy_for_the_Middle_East_--_ExecutiveSummary.pdf

U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East David Albright,, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector and Michael Yaffe January 14, 2013

U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East
David Albright,, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector and Michael Yaffe January 14, 2013



 http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/FinalReport.pdf

ISIS Reports Steering Iran Away from Building Nuclear Weapons


ISIS Reports

Steering Iran Away from Building Nuclear Weapons

by David Albright and Andrea Stricker
January 16, 2013
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Without past negotiated outcomes, international pressure, sanctions, and intelligence operations, Iran would likely have nuclear weapons by now. Iran has proven vulnerable to international pressure. It now faces several inhibitions against building nuclear weapons, not least of which is fear of a military strike by Israel and perhaps others if it breaks out by egregiously violating its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and moves to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining Future Nuclear Options,
ISIS Report to the United States Institute of Peace, March 5, 2012
The content of this statement was challenged in a recent report, Weighing the Benefits and Costs of International Sanctions against Iran, 1 released in September 2012 by The Iran Project. In the words of the authors, William Luers, Iris Bieri, and Priscilla Lewis: “Some have even argued that without sanctions and other pressures, Iran would already have a nuclear weapon. We disagree with this judgment, however, since U.S. intelligence officials have stated with a high degree of confidence that the decision to build a nuclear weapon has not yet been taken by Iran’s Supreme Leader.” While ISIS welcomes comments about its findings and analysis, we find that the authors have mischaracterized our statement and publicly available information about U.S. intelligence findings.  The report also appears to downplay a significant international accomplishment in preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons.
ISIS’s assessment summarized in the quote above is not a categorical statement that without international pressure, negotiated outcomes, sanctions, and other measures Iran would definitely have a nuclear weapon, only that it likely would.  In addition, the actions that have deterred Iran from building nuclear weapons in the 2000s involved fear of a military strike in the period up to and after the 2003 Gulf War, a series of highly embarrassing discoveries of secret, undeclared nuclear activities and facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the negotiating skill of the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany in late 2003 to achieve a suspension to Iran’s sensitive nuclear programs. 
In supporting their criticism of the statement in the ISIS report, the authors reference a March 2011 statement by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper before Congress expressing a high level of confidence that the Iranian regime had not decided to build nuclear weapons. This is a widely shared assessment by most Western intelligence agencies. However, this statement provides more support for ISIS’s statement than evidence against it.
One important source of U.S. intelligence assessments is the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The unclassified NIE states: 
We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program2; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. (emphasis added)
The NIE states that “international scrutiny and pressure” were instrumental in Iran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program, which the NIE judges with high confidence existed in the fall of 2003. Although most Western intelligence agencies agree that the Iranian regime has not decided to build nuclear weapons since then, most would recognize that continued pressure, including that resulting from sanctions and the threat of military strikes, plays an important role in constraining the regime from making that decision today. That assessment is consistent with the Obama administration’s stated policy to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Without such actions in 2003 and additional actions prior to and after 2003, there are many reasons to believe that Iran would have built nuclear weapons by now.  Other countries faced with little effective international pressure, such as South Africa in the late 1970s, Pakistan in the early to mid-1980s, and North Korea in the early 2000s, did build nuclear weapons. In 2003, there were strong proponents within Iran for building nuclear weapons.  Moreover, in 2003, Iran’s “structured” nuclear weapons program was making progress on building a warhead deliverable by the Shahab 3 ballistic missile, according to the November 2011 IAEA Iran safeguards report.3 Based on information from European intelligence officials, critical evidence that a determined nuclear weapons program had indeed been halted was intelligence showing the program leader protested the decision to cut back or halt the program. Moreover, in 2002, Iran was building and operating several secret gas centrifuge facilities; even today the full extent of its past and, for that matter, current centrifuge program is not known.  Although Iran maintained that it intended at some point to declare all of its secret enrichment facilities, it also may have in fact intended to keep key facilities secret.  The Western discovery several years later of the secret construction of the deeply buried Fordow gas centrifuge site further supports that view.  Iran was on a trajectory to produce enriched uranium in secret and complete a nuclear warhead. Assessing that Iran would likely have decided to build nuclear weapons absent international discovery and actions in 2003 and afterwards is both logical and defensible.
One could argue that in the absence of all these actions, Iran would not have built nuclear weapons, but this point seems particularly difficult to justify. One could at best argue is that it is not known what Iran may have done if the pressure had not existed.  That would be a fair point.  In reconsidering our assessment, we could agree with the finding that we cannot know with certainty what Iran would have done with regard to building nuclear weapons.  However, ISIS still assesses that absent the long list of actions taken to deter Iran, it would have likely acquired nuclear weapons by today.
Why does this debate matter?  It is important to point out that a collection of actions in the early 2000s, sometimes taken with little international coordination, managed to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons. These actions led to sharp cutbacks in Iran’s declared and undeclared nuclear programs and worked surprisingly well. It took the U.S. intelligence community several years, until the preparation of the 2007 NIE, to realize and acknowledge these methods’ full effect in stopping Iran’s structured nuclear weapons program in 2003.  A key lesson is that the Iranian regime was not fully committed to building nuclear weapons and it was vulnerable to influence about its future decisions with regard to its nuclear program.
Can such efforts work again? So far, they appear to contribute importantly to preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons, although the IAEA and European intelligence agencies have stated that some work on nuclear weaponization may continue.  When several Western intelligence agencies assess that the Iranian regime has not yet made a decision to build nuclear weapons, this assessment likely reflects Iran’s hesitation to do so out of concern of the consequences. 
The future is more difficult to predict, particularly as Iran continues defying the IAEA and seeks to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities.  Today, compared to the early 2000s, there is more emphasis on ramped up and more effective sanctions aimed at pressuring the Iranian regime to change its nuclear positions, sanctions that interfere in Iran’s ability to procure from overseas the equipment it needs to expand and update its centrifuge and other sensitive nuclear programs, intelligence operations that better detect and disrupt Iran’s centrifuge program, and an overt U.S. policy of preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons.  The continuing use of these methods, albeit in a different configuration than in 2003 and 2004, is the best way to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons today and in the future and avoiding war.



1 The report itself appears to be undated.
2 Footnote 1 in the NIE:  For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
3 IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the National Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011.

ISIS Reports Taking Stock and Moving Forward on the Issue of the Parchin High Explosives Test Site


ISIS Reports

Taking Stock and Moving Forward on the Issue of the Parchin High Explosives Test Site

by David Albright and Robert Avagyan
January 25, 2013
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For almost a year, international attention has focused on Iran’s Parchin military complex.  This site is where Iran is suspected to have conducted in the early 2000s high explosive compression tests pertinent to the development and manufacturing of nuclear weapons.  The experiments are alleged to have occurred inside an explosive chamber located in a compound in the north of the sprawling military complex.  As far as can be determined, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor the U.S. government has alleged that the experiments continued after 2004. Iran’s goal of using this chamber would likely have been to hide its activities from overhead observation by foreign intelligence agencies and minimizing the chance that material used in testing would be dispersed off-site, increasing chances of detection. Western intelligence agencies have historically devoted considerable resources via ground and air-based methods to detecting nuclear related facilities, activities, and material at Iranian sites suspected of having been involved in nuclear weaponization and enrichment work.
According to IAEA information, the chamber was constructed in 2000 and designed to contain explosions involving up to 70 kilograms of high explosives. The IAEA has not published a detailed rationale for its request to Iran to visit the Parchin site. However, it reported in its November 2011 safeguards report that Iran used the test chamber to conduct high explosive tests in the early 2000s, possibly related to nuclear weapons development. A senior U.S. official told CNN (and the same official independently stated to ISIS), “We know explosive compression was done at this chamber.” The use of such chambers was pioneered by the Soviet nuclear weapons program; the Soviet, U.S., and British nuclear weapons programs have each used chambers for high explosive compression work related to nuclear weapons development. Based on its information and assessments, the IAEA requested a visit to this building in early 2012 to verify the chamber’s existence and evaluate whether high explosive tests were conducted that are relevant to developing nuclear weapons.  So far, as of the January 2013 high-level negotiations with the IAEA in Tehran, Iran has refused access while at the same time conducting major demolition and construction on the grounds of the site.

Tests Conducted?

The IAEA has not provided complete information on which tests it believes Iran could have conducted inside the Parchin chamber.  It has provided partial information and the media have reported on additional types of possible tests.  As best as can be determined, three types of tests could have been conducted, each with appropriate diagnostic equipment, although the IAEA has never confirmed such a list and still other types of tests are possible.  The three most commonly discussed tests have been: 
  • A test of the initiation components of a nuclear warhead, which could have involved up to 50 kg of high explosives. This test would not contain any uranium.  The November 2011 safeguards report noted that the explosive chamber at Parchin would be suitable for carrying out this type of test.
  • A test to ascertain the symmetry of an imploding hemispherical shell of high explosives, surrounding a uranium metal hemisphere, in a scaled down experiment. A technical advisor to ISIS with decades of involvement in the experimental study of nuclear weapon mock-up explosions evaluated this case.  He assessed that based on the constraints of this chamber and the use of powerful high explosives, the explosive shell would contain about 50 kilograms of high explosives, an amount within the constraints of the chamber.
  • A test of a uranium deuterium neutron initiator used in a nuclear weapon. The initiator is located at the center of a compression system involving a sphere of high explosives and possibly a non-nuclear surrogate material for the weapon-grade uranium core.  The goal of the experiment is to compress the initiator, causing the fusion of the deuterium and a spurt of neutrons.  This test would involve only a few grams of uranium and deuterium with variable amounts of explosives.

Update on Current Activities at Parchin

A reconstruction phase continues at a steady pace at the alleged Parchin high explosives test site, as shown by recent Digital Globe commercial satellite imagery acquired by ISIS. The site underwent a demolition phase from April to August 2012 and entered what appears to be a reconstruction phase in late September or early November. In satellite imagery from January 17, 2013, several activities at the site appear to be almost complete and there is also evidence of new construction work (figure 1).
In a May 30, 2012 report ISIS published satellite imagery showing the demolition of two buildings located near the building suspected to contain the high explosive test chamber (figure 2). ISIS was not able to establish the purpose for why the buildings were demolished. Debris from the larger of the two was completely cleared from the site but some debris from the smaller building was left. As seen in the January 17 satellite imagery, the smaller building has now been reconstructed (figure 1). The new imagery also shows what appears to be the foundation of a new building not far from where the second demolished building was located. The size and layout of the excavation, however, do not suggest that the same building is being reconstructed.
Construction of the new security perimeter also appears to be nearing completion.  The new perimeter resembles the previous layout except its southern section has been visibly extended and it now runs much closer to the buildings on the western side of the site (figure 1). There is also new construction of what appears to be a small building located outside the northern side of the security perimeter. Earth piles initially visible in early November 2012 are still visible in the northern part of the site as are heavy machinery and materials indicating the likelihood of further construction. There is also earth displacement nearby the two support buildings located just south of the suspected chamber building although at this stage it is impossible to determine its origin.

IAEA at a Crossroads

ISIS has consistently called for strong diplomatic measures to be taken in support of IAEA inspectors gaining access to the Parchin site. The legal justification for IAEA access is well established. The IAEA is seeking to fulfill its mandate to determine both the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declaration under its traditional comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA).
However, Iran’s continued refusal to allow access and the degree of alterations made to the site may have severely undermined the possibility of the IAEA reaching a conclusion about allegations that Iran conducted nuclear weapons related research at this site.  The IAEA has also reached this conclusion.
What should the IAEA do now? It could continue asking for a visit or it could call for a special inspection, which it can use in circumstances where there is sufficient suspicion of undeclared nuclear weapons related activities and insufficient cooperation from a member state that would allow for inspections. At this point, neither option is attractive.
The IAEA has asked to visit the Parchin site as opposed to calling for a special inspection.  In the case of a visit, Iran would need to grant it on a voluntary basis.  Iran could impose limitations on inspectors’ access during a visit, which is not the case under a special inspection. During the IAEA’s first visit to Parchin in 2005, Iranian conditions for allowing the visit forced IAEA inspectors to choose between one of several sections of the sizeable complex. As a result, the 2005 visit, while helpful, did not resolve the IAEA’s questions about the activities in other areas of the Parchin military complex.
In the case of an IAEA visit to the building containing the alleged high explosive chamber, Iran could likewise limit inspectors’ access and the quality of sampling they could carry out. 1  It is conceivable that the original tests and considerable earth displacement at the site more recently could have spread incriminating radioactive material beyond the immediate area of the buildings. In the scenario of a visit, Iran could legitimately prevent IAEA access to areas of interest, thus limiting access to only those areas that have been heavily sanitized, such as those inside the newly reconstructed perimeter of the site.  The example of the IAEA’s visit to the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran shows that extensive excavation and removal of dirt can prevent effective sampling.  During this visit, Iran refused the IAEA access to extensive rubble and debris removed from the site. It could also do so in the case of Parchin.
Finding incriminating evidence inside sanitized or reconstructed buildings is challenging and often impossible.  One of the inspectors’ key tools in uncovering undeclared nuclear activities is environmental sampling, but such sampling can be thwarted by the types of actions Iran has taken at the Parchin site.  The Kalaye Electric site in Tehran is often rightly given as a major success story of environmental sampling, despite extensive Iranian efforts in 2003 to hide evidence of secret, undeclared enrichment of uranium in two buildings at the site.  But this case should also be a cautionary tale.  Although required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement to declare the site as enriching uranium, Iran chose to hide its activities in violation of its CSA. In early 2003, when the site was exposed, Iran took major steps to hide its past centrifuge related activities at this site. 2  It refused the IAEA access while it reconstructed the building that had held a small cascade of centrifuges and undertook significant renovations at another building that had conducted single centrifuge testing.  Subsequent IAEA environmental sampling of the building that held the small cascade discovered no enriched uranium particles, although Iran later admitted to significant enrichment in that building.  The reconstruction effort successfully thwarted such sampling.  But Iran had not sanitized the building containing the single centrifuge tests, and inspectors took a sample in the unsanitized ventilation system above where a single machine test stand had been located.  The collected sample showed evidence of enriched uranium particles.  The Kalaye Electric case shows that the reconstruction or sanitization of buildings can prevent environmental sampling from detecting uranium or at least make it difficult to uncover undeclared work.  In the case of Parchin, given Iran’s history of hiding its undeclared activities, the IAEA cannot depend on Iran again making a mistake.
The IAEA could call for a special inspection of Parchin and probably should have done so early last year. However, today, Iran would be expected to defy a call for a special inspection, especially since such an inspection would place the IAEA in charge of establishing the inspection procedures and methods used at the site.  Pursuing a special inspection would likely force a showdown with Iran at the Board of Governors meeting.  Furthermore, such an action taken now would focus the conflict between the IAEA and Iran on this one facility. The controversy over Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts is considerably larger than one facility.
Most of the criticism of the IAEA’s call for a visit to Parchin has offered few recommendations for a constructive way forward.  Many criticisms have focused on undermining the IAEA’s rationale for asking to visit Parchin and have presented faulty, alternative interpretations of the IAEA’s legal authority, satellite imagery of the site, and technical details related to the site.  Some have urged an acceptance of Iran’s denials of any nuclear weapons related work at Parchin; still others claim that Iran has done nothing suspicious at the site but was deliberately modifying it as part of a clever negotiating strategy. Iran has shown little interest in successful negotiations and its actions at the site have significantly increased suspicion throughout the world that it is actually removing evidence.  One critic recently recommended inspections of Parchin, although he recommended they be carried out by a group other than the IAEA.  No formula was offered for how to establish such a group or how to achieve agreement among the many stakeholders involved in that decision. Furthermore, the IAEA is accepted by the vast majority of the world as the legitimate, credible nuclear inspection authority and a non-IAEA inspection would undermine its authority.

Going to the Board

With little hope for a meaningful IAEA visit and recognition of the risks of calling for a special inspection, what should be done next? 
The IAEA cannot close the case on Parchin without a visit.  And as long as the IAEA cannot settle the Parchin issue, it will remain a source of suspicion that undermines any effort to establish confidence or achieve a negotiated outcome. 
The best way forward is likely for the IAEA to take the entire issue of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program to the Board of Governors.  The IAEA has tried for several years to negotiate an umbrella agreement with Iran aimed at resolving the evidence of Iran’s past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons and a past parallel, military fuel cycle program. This effort has likewise reached an impasse.
The Board of Governors should now pass a resolution condemning Iran’s refusal to allow an inspection at Parchin and to answer the IAEA’s questions about possible military dimensions, noting that such actions thwart the IAEA’s ability to answer the fundamental question of whether Iran’s nuclear declaration is complete.  This resolution should then refer the entire set of issues to the U.N. Security Council for further discussion and action.


Figure 1. Satellite imagery from January 17, 2013 showing a new security perimeter, reconstruction of one of the demolished buildings, and the possible foundation of a new building at the Parchin site.

Imagery from May 25, 2012 showing the debris from the demolition of two support buildings located near the building suspected to contain the high explosive test chamber.



1 For example, during the IAEA visit to the Al Kibar (Dair Alzour) reactor site in Syria in 2008, the IAEA was allowed to collect sandy soil at the site but could not include any rubble mixed in with that soil.  In fact, the IAEA sample tubes were checked at least once by a Syrian official, who removed a piece of rubble from one sample.  These soil samples still yielded a significant number of uranium particles. Particles were also found in a changing room in a building associated with the reactor. The IAEA reported that analysis of the samples taken in June 2008 at the Dair Alzour site indicated the presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material.  The IAEA’s assessment was that there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles since the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the particles were all inconsistent with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions. [From IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2009/9, February 19, 2009.] The analysis suggested that the uranium originated in a metal form, which is consistent with the type of fuel used in a North Korean gas-graphite reactor of the type alleged to have been built by Syria.
2 Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010).

Obama Fired Military Officers Because He ‘Fears a Coup’

Obama Fired Military Officers Because He ‘Fears a Coup’

GUILT is trailing Obama like a shadow he can’t shake. Maybe because the military’s VOTES WERE NEVER COUNTED for the 2012 Election? Lots to feel guilty about.
Firings always HELP Barack sleep better at night..

According to (shadowy anonymous blogger) Sorcha Faal the Russian military’s GRU foreign intelligence unit presented a report to Kremlin leadership late last month that said Obama removed one of the United States Navy’s most powerful admirals from his command (in the wake of Benghazi 9/11) specifically because he fears a military coup is being planned against him.
Rear Admiral Charles M. Gaouette
Photo Courtesy of USS Stennis/US Navy via BlackFive
On 9/11/2012, that officer -Rear Admiral Charles M. Gaouette, commander of Carrier Strike Group Three in the Middle East- apparently felt obligated to come to the aid of besieged US defenses at the Benghazi consulate, violating an utterly bewildering White House command he probably had a hard time believing was even being made. Gaouette was said to be attempting to help AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham, also purged by Obama for violating of an obstinate White House insistence to ‘stand down’.
Ham considered himself bound-by-duty to take action, but the story goes that his second-in-command -a likely Obammunist- promptly stepped-right-up and informed him he’d just been ‘relieved of his command’, effective immediately- General Ham was then physically apprehended/arrested.
General Carter Ham
Subsequently -and despite Navy claims that he was NOT ‘replaced’ due to Benghazi- Admiral Gaouette was otherwise inexplicably removed as Carrier Strike Group commander on October 27th…
Faal:
US news reports on Obama’s unprecedented firing of a powerful US Navy Commander during wartime state that Admiral Gaouette’s removal was for ‘allegations of inappropriate leadership judgment’ that arose during the strike group’s deployment to the Middle East.
This GRU report, however, states that Admiral Gaouette’s firing by President Obama was due to this strike force commander disobeying orders when he ordered his forces on 11 September to ‘assist and provide intelligence for’ American military forces ordered into action by US Army General Carter Ham, who was then the commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), against terrorist forces attacking the American Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.
General Ham had been in command of the initial 2011 US-NATO military intervention in Libya who, like Admiral Gaouette, was fired by Obama.
And as we can, in part, read from US military insider accounts of this growing internal conflict between the White House and US Military leaders: ‘The information I heard today was that General [Carter] Ham as head of AFRICOM received the same e-mails the White House received requesting help/support as the attack was taking place. General Ham immediately had a rapid response unit ready and communicated to the Pentagon that he had a unit ready.
General Ham then received the order to stand down.
His response was ‘screw it’, he was going to help anyhow.
Within 30 seconds to a minute after making the move to respond, his second in command apprehended General Ham and told him that he was now relieved of his command…’
READ MORE:
HERE
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TRUCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND GAZA..
LOOKS AS WORTHLESS AS THE PAPER IT’S PRINTED ON-

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BREAKING: Gaza Ceasefire That Took Effect Last Night

( And The Back Story)

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Egyptian equivalent Mohamed Kamel Amr held a joint press conference today announcing a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel with Egypt as a mediating partner.
The deal basically takes effect at 8 PM local time. Both sides are to cease attacks on each other, Israel is to cease targeting Hamas leaders, and to take some undefined steps to ease its sea blockade of Gaza after a 24-hour period.
Now,here’s what actually happened.
According to a couple of my notorious lil’ birdies who are very much in a position to know, the Israelis fully intended to go into Gaza and eradicate Hamas. A country like Israel doesn’t call up that many reserves and affect its economy unless they were serious about the matter.
But then the Obama Administration intervened.
They were perfectly happy for Israel to go in to Gaza and take out Hamas, but insisted that they then turn Gaza over to the Palestinian Authority. This was supposed to strengthen PA President Mahmoud Abbas as ‘Palestine’s savior’ . As as a kicker, President Obama insisted that Israel immediately declare a Palestinian State in Gaza and most of Judea and Samaria, including areas currently under Israeli sovereignty from which the Jewish residents would then be removed. These were also to be turned over to Abbas.
If the Israelis were unwilling to have the IDF do Mahmoud Abbas’ dirty work for him and then give up large areas populated by Jews, then the Obama Administration told the Israelis the U.S. would not back an IDF ground assault in Gaza.
So they Israelis took the ceasefire, essentially meaning that Hamas is going to be left in place to regroup and fight another day. And can claim a victory.
That’s way Israel appeared to be delaying their ground operation for so long..the real back and forth was between the Obama Administration and Israel.
As a sop for being cooperative, President Obama said in a statement that he congratulated PM Netanyahu for accepting the truce and that the US would use the opportunity offered by a ceasefire to intensify efforts to help Israel address its security needs, especially the issue of the smuggling of weapons and explosives into Gaza.
How what is going to happen is, shall we say, problematical? Apparently – wait for it- The White House expects the new Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt to take charge of policing Hamas. After all, that approach worked so well in keeping Hezbollah in Lebanon from rearming after the 2006 war, even with a UN peacekeeping force on the ground.
The President also said that he was committed to seeking additional funding for Iron Dome and other US-Israel missile defense programs.
What’s really behind this, of course, is an effort to strengthen Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government as a regional player and improve ties between the Islamists and the U.S.
It also takes the heat off Morsi, had Israel gone into Gaza, there would have been widespread agitating for Egypt to send ‘volunteers’ to fight the Israelis.
We’ll see if this takes hold. I’d be surprised if it didn’t, since it’s mostly on Hamas’ terms.
http://joshuapundit.blogspot.com/2012/11/breaking-gaza-ceasefire-to-take-effect.html
………………………………………………

Surprise: Obama forced Netanyahu to accept one-sided pro-Hamas ‘cease fire’


Here’s yet another indication that President Obama (without even the consent of  ‘moderate‘ ‘Palestinian‘ President Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen forced Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept a ‘cease fire’ arrangement that is favorable to Hamas (Hat Tip: Ricky G).
Obama “commended [Israel’s] Prime Minister for agreeing to the Egyptian ceasefire proposal – which the President recommended the Prime Minster do,” said the 12.31 a.m. EST statement from the White House.
The cease-fire terms released by Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s office do not mention any measures to penalize Hamas for launching another wave of rocket attacks against Israel.
“A. Israel should stop all hostilities in the Gaza Strip land, sea and air including incursions and targeting of individuals. … All Palestinian factions shall stop all hostilities from the Gaza Strip against Israel including rocket attacks and all attacks along the border,” said the statement.
The announcement also seems to accept Hamas’s demand for an end to Israeli restrictions on the importation of military-related items into the enclave, and its ban on movement of Hamas’ people from Gaza to the nearby West Bank, which is ruled by an unpopular Arab authority that has curbed attacks against Israel.

“Refraining from restricting residents’ free movements and targeting residents in border areas and procedures of implementation shall be dealt with after 24 hours from the start of the ceasefire,” said the announcement.
The announcement does not include mechanisms to enforce Hamas’s compliance. “Each party shall commit itself not to perform any acts that would breach this understanding,” said the statement.

The absence of any enforceable terms in an inconclusive cease-fire agreement, which would still prevent Israel’s threatened ground movement into the enclave, will be touted as a victory by Hamas and its allies.
Hamas’ allies wanted to stop an Israeli movement that could have killed many of Hamas’s jihadis and leaders, destroyed more of their hidden weapons and demonstrated their inability to maintain control of their territory.
Also, any cease-fire arrangement without terms is a de facto rejection by the United States and Egypt of Israel’s goals for peace.
Israel’s government had sought new curbs on Hamas’ ability to smuggle rockets and other weapons into the enclave, and for the creation of a kilometer-wide buffer zone between Israel and Gaza. They sought the buffer because local jihadis routinely launch rockets at Israeli border patrols and farmers.
Morsi and Hamas are ideological allies.
Hamas is the Gaza-based affiliate of the international Muslim Brotherhood Islamist movement, which is based in Egypt.
It should be clear that the only way Israel agrees to such a one-sided arrangement (although admittedly, it should also infuriate Abu Mazen – see below) is that President Obama forces the Prime Minister’s hand. In other words, Bibi caved in again. Why?
There’s an election two months from today. Netanyahu does not want to give his opposition more ammunition about how he has spoiled Israel’s relations with the United States – something which is assigned way too high a value here in my humble opinion. Now, suppose Bibi wins. Does he continue to kiss Obama’s butt after the election, at least for some period of time. My guess is yes because (a) he wants Obama to strike Iran or at least not veto an Israeli strike and (b) unlike the US, a Prime Minister of Israel has no limit on the number of terms he can serve (Bibi has already served two) but is subject to his government falling at any time. Bibi may be afraid that Obama can bring him down if he’s not a good boy.
But Bibi is wrong. As much stock as Israelis put in their relations with the US, they also recognize that there are no good relations to be had with this President. Had Bibi defied Obama, the public would have backed him. The proof? A Channel 2 poll taken before the cease fire went into effect on Wednesday night found that 70% of the Israeli public opposes the cease fire, only 24% favors it, and only 7% believe it will last.  And you can bet that most of that 24% was not aware of the provisions I highlighted above. So he caved in to Obama needlessly, at least from a political perspective.
Finally, this agreement has a message for Abu Mazen as well. The provision that allows Hamas terrorists to travel to Judea and Samaria is bound to undermine Abu Mazen’s rule there, and is undoubtedly blowback for Abu Mazen’s continued insistence (including Wednesday in his meeting with Secretary of State Clinton) on pushing ahead with the UN vote. Obama essentially told him that if he won’t play ball, he will be replaced by Hamas. Obama also proved to Abu Mazen that he can bend Netanyahu and force him to make the concessions Abu Mazen wants him to make. Will Abu Mazen get another chance/? Maybe. Or maybe Obama has decided that he is going to try to force Israel to reach an agreement with Hamas.
It’s a long time to 2016….
http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2012/11/surprise-obama-forced-netanyahu-to.html

Bill Gates Says Global Vaccination Program is "God's Work"

Bill Gates Says Global Vaccination Program is "God's Work"

Dees Illustration
Brandon Turbeville
Activist Post

In a recent interview with the London Telegraph, Bill Gates has now claimed that his Foundation’s massive push for vaccination is not just an exercise in philanthropy but that it is, in fact, “God’s work.”

Gates, who, according to the Telegraph, is worth an estimated $65 billion, is now dedicating his life to the “eradication of poliomyelitis,” or, at least he is dedicating himself to the vaccination program allegedly aimed at achieving these ends.

As reported by the Telegraph,
“My wife and I had a long dialogue about how we were going to take the wealth that we’re lucky enough to have and give it back in a way that’s most impactful to the world,” he says. “Both of us worked at Microsoft and saw that if you take innovation and smart people, the ability to measure what’s working, that you can pull together some pretty dramatic things. 
“We’re focused on the help of the poorest in the world, which really drives you into vaccination. You can actually take a disease and get rid of it altogether, like we are doing with polio.”
Yet, eradicating polio through a massive vaccination program may be easier said than done writes Neil Tweedie of the Telegraph. “There is another, sinister obstacle: the propagation by Islamist groups of the belief that polio vaccination is a front for covert sterilisation and other western evils. Health workers in Pakistan have paid with their lives for involvement in the programme.”


To this question, Gates responded with seemingly atypical religious zeal, noted by Tweedie in the published article. “It’s not going to stop us succeeding,” says Gates. “It does force us to sit down with the Pakistan government to renew their commitments, see what they’re going to do in security and make changes to protect the women who are doing God’s work and getting out to these children and delivering the vaccine.”

Indeed, the religious tone of Gates during the course of the interview may seem confusing to Tweedie, but the nature of Gates’ work could very well be described as a religion. Thus, the fact that it finds itself in direct confrontation with another religion – the Islamist groups that Tweedie speaks of – is of no real consequence to Gates as his solution is to dutifully press forward.

Yet, before readers write off the vaccine resisters solely as Muslim fundamentalists, many of the individuals opposing vaccination have a very good reason to be skeptical. Especially those that believe Gates’ vaccine push is geared more toward sterilization and population reduction than about life extension and better health conditions.

After all, it was Bill Gates himself who stated as much publicly when he said, “The world today has 6.8 billion people... that's headed up to about 9 billion. Now if we do a really great job on new vaccines, health care, reproductive health services, we could lower that by perhaps 10 or 15 percent.”



Add this to Gates’ statement is the fact that, time and again, international vaccination programs have ended disastrously for third world nations. Case in point: the recent Meningitis vaccine program that resulted in the paralysis of at least 50 African children and a subsequent cover-up operation by the government of Chad. This large number of adverse events occurred in one small village alone, leaving many to wonder what the rates of side effects might be on an international scale.

Even more concerning is the fact that paralysis rates have flourished in countries where Gates’ polio vaccine, the one he is dedicating his life to, have been administered the most. Indeed, nowhere is this any more apparent than in India. As Aaron Dykes writes,
But the real story is that while polio has statistically disappeared from India, there has been a huge spike in cases of non-polio acute flaccid paralysis (NPAFP)– the very types of crippling problems it was hoped would disappear with polio but which have instead flourished from a new cause. 
There were 47,500 cases of non-polio paralysis reported in 2011, the same year India was declared “polio-free,” according to Dr. Vashisht and Dr. Puliyel. Further, the available data shows that the incidents tracked back to areas were doses of the polio vaccine were frequently administered. The national rate of NPAFP in India is 25-35 times the international average. 
In addition to this data, it appears that the polio vaccines are themselves the leading cause of polio paralysis in India. In relation to the flawed data reported by the Polio Global Eradication Initiative which attempts to minimize the numbers of both vaccine-induced cases of polio paralysis and polio in general, Sayer Ji remarks,
According to the Polio Global Eradication Initiative’s own statistics there were 42 cases of wild-type polio (WPV) reported in India in 2010, indicating that vaccine-induced cases of polio paralysis (100-180 annually) outnumber wild-type cases by a factor of 3-4. Even if we put aside the important question of whether or not the PGEI is accurately differentiating between wild and vaccine-associated polio cases in their statistics, we still must ask ourselves: should not the real-world effects of immunization, both good and bad, be included in PGEI’s measurement of success? For the dozens of Indian children who develop vaccine-induced paralysis every year, the PGEI’s recent declaration of India as nearing “polio free” status, is not only disingenuous, but could be considered an attempt to minimize their obvious liability in having transformed polio from a natural disease vector into a man-made (iatrogenic) one.
Gates’ polio vaccines have likewise been blamed for deaths and disabilities in neighboring Pakistan, with offices of the government in that country even recommending that the vaccines be suspended.

In India, doctors heavily criticized the program not only for the heavy cost to human health and quality of life but also the massive financial burden hoisted upon the state. This is because the program was only partially funded by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, which is itself partnered with the World Health Organization, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, World Bank, and United Nations.

The doctors criticized the GAVI-alliance by stating,
The Indian government finally had to fund this hugely expensive programme, which cost the country 100 times more than the value of the initial grant,” their report stated.
From India’s perspective the exercise has been an extremely costly both in terms of human suffering and in monetary terms. It is tempting to speculate what could have been achieved if the $2.5 billion spent on attempting to eradicate polio, were spent on water and sanitation and routine immunization. 
. . . . . the polio eradication programme epitomizes nearly everything that is wrong with donor funded ‘disease specific’ vertical projects at the cost of investments in community-oriented primary health care (horizontal programmes) . . . . . 
. . . . .This is a startling reminder of how initial funding and grants from abroad distort local priorities.
Indeed, as the doctors assert, one cannot vaccinate away disease like polio. Apart from the fact that there has never been a study conducted which proves a vaccine either safe or effective that was not connected to a drug company or a vaccine maker,[1] the so-called cure, if it comes under the guise of a vaccine, may well be as bad if not worse than the disease itself.

Again, Sayer Ji writes,

Polio underscores the need for a change in the way we look at so-called "vaccine preventable" diseases as a whole. In most people with a healthy immune system, a poliovirus infection does not even generate symptoms. Only rarely does the infection produce minor symptoms, e.g. sore throat, fever, gastrointestinal disturbances, and influenza-like illness. In only 3% of infections does virus gain entry to the central nervous system, and then, in only 1-5 in 1000 cases does the infection progress to paralytic disease. 
Due to the fact that polio spreads through the fecal-oral route (i.e. the virus is transmitted from the stool of an infected person to the mouth of another person through a contaminated object, e.g. utensil) focusing on hygiene, sanitation and proper nutrition (to support innate immunity) is a logical way to prevent transmission in the first place, as well as reducing morbidity associated with an infection when it does occur. 
Instead, a large portion of the world's vaccines are given to the Third World as "charity," when the underlying conditions of economic impoverishment, poor nutrition, chemical exposures, and socio-political unrest are never addressed.
The fact is that the root cause of diseases like polio are not a lack of vaccination but poor sanitation standards, poverty, lower living standards, chemical pollution, and lack of proper nutrition. If money were spent correcting these ills, as opposed to providing ineffective (in their stated purposes) and dangerous vaccinations, then polio and many other such diseases could indeed be eradicated.

In the end, the answer is about raising living standards, reducing pollution, increasing knowledge and access to proper nutrition and clean drinking water – not chemical and virus-laden needles. Perhaps this method could be more accurately described as "God's work."

[1] Flu and Flu Vaccines: What’s Coming Through That Needle. Dr. Sherri Tenpenny.

Read other articles by Brandon Turbeville here.

Brandon Turbeville is an author out of Florence, South Carolina. He has a Bachelor's Degree from Francis Marion University and is the author of three books, Codex Alimentarius -- The End of Health Freedom, 7 Real Conspiracies, and Five Sense Solutions and Dispatches From a Dissident. Turbeville has published over 190 articles dealing on a wide variety of subjects including health, economics, government corruption, and civil liberties. Brandon Turbeville's podcast Truth on The Tracks can be found every Monday night 9 pm EST at UCYTV. He is available for radio and TV interviews. Please contact activistpost (at) gmail.com.

Sheriff Joe Arpaio: I'm not confiscating guns 'I don't care what they say from Washington'

Sheriff Joe Arpaio: I'm not confiscating guns

'I don't care what they say from Washington'


Maricopa County Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio told a local radio host that the federal government is “going to have problem” if they expect him to confiscate guns from private citizens.
“I took [multiple] oaths of office, and they all say I will defend the Constitution of the United States,” Arpaio told Mike Broomhead of KFYI Radio in Phoenix, Ariz. “Now if they’re going to tell the sheriff that he’s going to go around picking up guns from everybody, they’re going to have a problem. I may not enforce that federal law.”
Broomhead pushed the man sometimes called “America’s toughest sheriff” even further, asking Arpaio if the feds passed a law banning ammunition magazines that hold more than 10 rounds, would his deputies confiscate such magazines?
“No,” Arpaio said. “My deputies, I said before, I’m going to arm all my deputies – a month ago I said before this – with automatic weapons and semi-automatic weapons. We’re going to be able to fight back. … I don’t care what they say from Washington.”
Arpaio expressed a certain camaraderie with many other sheriffs around the country who have similarly warned they will not enforce what they believe to be infringements on the citizens’ 2nd Amendment right to bear arms.
Some of the strongest language to that effect has come from Utah, where 28 of the state’s 29 elected sheriffs signed a letter to President Obama warning him not to send federal agents to start confiscating guns.
“[M]ake no mistake,” the sheriffs wrote, “as the duly-elected sheriffs of our respective counties, we will enforce the rights guaranteed to our citizens by the Constitution. No federal official will be permitted to descend upon our constituents and take from them what the Bill of Rights – in particular Amendment II – has given them.
“We, like you swore a solemn oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” the sheriffs concluded, “and we are prepared to trade our lives for the preservation of its traditional interpretation.”
Similarly, in New Mexico last week, 30 of the state’s 33 county sheriffs paid a visit to the state house, reminding the governor and state congressmen that a sheriff’s job is to defend the Constitution, including the 2nd Amendment.
And in Oregon, Grant County Sheriff Glenn Palmer penned a letter to Vice President Joe Biden warning, “I will not tolerate nor will I permit any federal incursion within the exterior boundaries of Grant County, Ore., where any type of gun-control legislation aimed at disarming law-abiding citizens is the goal or objective.
“We live in a free society,” Palmer continued, “and firearms ownership [is] the right to defend oneself from becoming a victim of a criminal act or from a far-reaching government attempting to enact laws that are unconstitutional.
“I will refuse to participate or stand idly by,” he concluded in the letter to Biden, “while the people are made into criminals due to your unconstitutional actions.”
Similar sentiments have been expressed by sheriffs in Missouri, California, Kansas, Montana and in dozens of counties in several states across the country. A growing list of now more than 90 sheriffs who have reportedly vowed to uphold the Constitution against gun-control measures is being accumulated by the Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association and can be seen here.
Read more at http://www.wnd.com/2013/01/sheriff-joe-arpaio-im-not-confiscating-guns/#Rg1HW6GfDs5UebFh.99

The Qatar Leaks: The Secret Business of Foreign Affairs Leaked minutes from Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Conversations with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi, from Russia’s involvement in Syria to Gaddafi’s fall

The Qatar Leaks: The Secret Business of Foreign Affairs

Leaked minutes from Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Conversations with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi, from Russia’s involvement in Syria to Gaddafi’s fall

persiangulf
By Radwan Mortada
Al-Akhbar publishes leaked minutes from the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs that have Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi discussing regional affairs – from Russia’s involvement in Syria to Gaddafi’s fall – with Qatari officials.
An important dimension of the Syrian crisis is the electronic war being waged by both sides. One of the groups active in this area calls itself the Syrian Electronic Army and it has recently succeeded in hacking into several official Qatari, Saudi, and Turkish websites and downloading thousands of secret documents from them.
Al-Akhbar gained access to some of these through an intermediary and, after confirming their authenticity, agreed to publish them in coordination with the Syrian Ajel website.
Today, Al-Akhbar begins publishing these documents, starting with three correspondences from the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The first one is the minutes of a meeting between Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani and Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi that took place in September 2012, in which they discussed the situation in Syria.
In it, the Qatari prime minister talks of contacting Russia to convince it of abandoning Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, offering guarantees from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that Moscow’s naval base can remain in Syria.
The document also reveals that what Qatar offered Egypt in terms of financial assistance after the revolution is little more than loans with interest in return for giving the Qataris incentives such as investing in Egypt’s steel industry.
The second document is the minutes of a meeting between Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The meeting took place in mid-March 2011 during the early stages of battle in Libya and the discussion revolves mainly about the situation on the ground there.
As for the third document, it also contains minutes of a meeting, this time between the Qatari Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani and foreign minister Davutoğlu.
In it, the foreign minister stresses the importance of not allowing Assad to complete his term in office, which ends in 2014, because he will use it to defeat the opposition.

Document 1: Hamad bin Jassim and Mohamed Mursi
(Confidential)
Minutes of Meeting Between His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, with His Excellency President Mohamed Mursi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Thursday, 6/11/2012
Sheikh Hamad: [...]
Hamad: His Highness the Prince [Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani] appreciates your role. Today we discussed with Mr. Hicham Qandil the [Egyptian] Prime Minister and agreed on some issues. One of them is the remainder of the agreed upon one and a half billion US Dollars. We reduced the rate of interest to 1.5 [percent] and increased the [loan] period. This is in addition to the additional amount that we will work. Together, we are “family” and each day one of us has a demand. As well as the electricity, where we suggested a study and the agreement will be done in a month’s time.
Egyptian Prime Minister: I am sure that your hearts are with us.
Hamad: We also agreed on the steel. We have partnerships with several countries in this area.
Mursi: I have a suggestion to reinvigorate and reactivate the Iron and Steel Company in Helwan, which is the largest steel factory in the Middle East, built by the Russians with Russian technology [...] It consists of four furnaces. The first is old, but it can be rehabilitated and rebuilt. The fourth is advanced and a port was constructed for it in Dakahlia to provide coal, in addition to the rail from the port to Helwan and the raw materials rail from the oases region. We have large quantities of raw materials. But [the furnace] is built based on the end product. The complex is beginning to lose money, because it used to produce 2 million tons, which is the break-even for the project. It used to be an industrial fortress with 25,000 workers, but the Ahmed Ezz company [Ezz Steel] appeared and started seducing away the engineers.
Hamad: We are with you and we can announce the project from now. We will include it to be studied by the team that will come to study the projects.
Finance Minister Yusuf Kamal: We have all he studies and it fits with a similar idea we have in Algeria, which is a partnership with the Extra Trade company. They can organize with us.
Hamad: Your Excellency, we assure you that we are under orders from His Highness the Prince. You know his feelings towards you. We are ready and we have amounts [of money] that were not included in the minutes. We will look into steel and electricity, there’s a deal, also the outstanding issues related to Barwa and Diar, which is a positive indicator. We also agreed on the issue of aviation and invited the Minister of Civil Aviation. But your Excellency, we have a problem in terms of the surplus. It is that we don’t want it to be deposited anywhere, while you lend 14 percent. If agreed, we are ready to deposit between 10 and 20 billion Egyptian Pounds [$1.5 to 3 billion]. We hope you consider this and we can keep it for one year and then renew. We are ready to do this.
Mursi: Why should it be in Egyptian Pounds, because the Chinese are saying the same thing.
Hamad: Because interest on Egyptian Pounds is high and we are ready for it to be for one year and then it can be renewed. We agreed on the minutes of an agreement between the two sides and on the specific times and dates of each operation, so we can begin. This will include the deposit of $1.5 billion, according to the agreement between His Highness the Prince and Your Excellency. We are sincere to begin work and our trust increased following your speech in Tehran. Everyone praised it and, yesterday, in the Arab League meeting, positions changed.
Mursi: There is no room for the word reform. He must leave.
Hamad: We suggested to him that he leaves. Really, it was a powerful speech.
Mursi: How could the Saudi King surprise us with the initiative of dialogue between confessions, while we had agreed about the Syrian issue.
Hamad: Us too. We had met him a day earlier and nobody mentioned it.
Mursi: We want to take a serious position.
Hamad: I think everything will change after the US and German elections. If Obama returns, and it does not matter if he waits till January for his new term. He can do it automatically and he has made commitments.
Mursi: If the Iranians get involved in solving the issue in Syria, they will win and become closer to Turkey and the Gulf.
Hamad: They are starting to think of names. In the past, they had good relations with us and we have common [oil] wells. But on the Syrian issue, unfortunately it’s the Russians. If they say the word, the Syrian regime will be finished. But Russia is still insisting on the issue. I spoke to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin on the phone for 40 minutes. It was a bad conversation, although my relationship with him used to excellent, but the call was a failure. Now, they are starting to lose balance and want a solution.Mursi: Why do they want it?
Hamad: They have a marine base in Syria. We told them we will work on an agreement between you and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), but they did not accept.
Mursi: They are part of the problem and he will leave.
Hamad: As for the visas, we agreed, and the Egyptian side can begin taking visas.
Egyptian Prime Minister: There is also a positive indication in the issue of partnership with Sudan.
Hamad: Yes. We will send our delegation for this matter and create a partnership in Africa. It will strengthen relations and we are ready. There is a project for the Diyar company for $120 million. Things will move. We are honest and we want to inform the public of the issue.
Mursi: We do not have any conflicts. You are our brothers and your hands are clean.
Hamad: We thought it would be better to do it through Egypt. You are in Africa and you have the people and experience. Rest assured, Your Excellency, we will be with you.

Document 2: Hamad bin Jassim and Davutoğlu
(Confidential)
Minutes of Official Negotiations Between His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and
His Eminence Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey
Doha – Sunday 13/3/2011
(Following greetings)
Sheikh Hamad: Your meeting with His Excellency the Prince was good.
Davutoğlu: The situation in the region is moving fast. We should be coordinating.
Hamad: We are trying to push the [UN] Security Council to do something.
Davutoğlu: Gaddafi must leave and he will leave. Now he is winning the battle and we are worried. We tried to pressure him to leave Syria, but he began recruiting mercenaries from Sudan and Egypt. The West has different positions. France is of one opinion, but Europe has another, also the Americans.
Hamad: The US secretary of state called me three times and might call back today. We asked the Arab League to issue a decision for a no-fly zone over Libya. Syria is against and Yemen is not decided.
Davutoğlu: Why does Syria oppose?
Hamad: I don’t know.
Davutoğlu: I was surprised when the Syrians said they did not receive a message from you [concerning Lebanon].
Hamad: This is not true. We sent three copies.
Davutoğlu: I told the Syrians, why do you ask us to travel to Lebanon, while you had already made up your minds.
Hamad: I think they will lose if they continue to lie to their friends. What is happening now in Libya cannot be accepted. The Security Council must be pressured to impose a no-fly zone.
Davutoğlu: We are not members in the Security Council, but we are a member of NATO and we can do something. They told us that the decision has to come from the Security Council and the Arab countries. If NATO attacks Libya, Gaddafi will claim he is defending the Arabs.
Hamad: Some Arab countries can participate and Turkey has to play a role.
Davutoğlu: We say that Gaddafi must go. [Turkish] Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, but the security council decision concerning the international tribunal shut the door on Gaddafi. He is now either regaining control of Libya or dying a hero.
Hamad: Even if he controls Libya, he is finished. I think it is important to push for a decision on a no-fly zone over Libya. He is gaining in his war, but he is finished because he killed his own people and said terrible things about Arabs.
Davutoğlu: What’s important is how to save the Libyans.
Hamad: No-fly zone and attacking the radars.
Davutoğlu: As far as NATO is concerned, it was Germany that blocked the no-fly zone decision.
Hamad: Don’t oppose the decision. You are not required to send forces.
Davutoğlu: We are now charged with Portugese interests. Are you in contact with the tribes?
Hamad: Some of them.
Davutoğlu: Gaddafi might take control of Benghazi and this affects the situation in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen. He could bring back the two former leaders into power. We are trying to find an exit for him, but I think it’s too late.
Hamad: [Former Libyan security chief] Abdullah Senoussi called me and started making threats. I don’t care. This is our policy and we will keep it up. I told [Saudi Foreign Minister] Saud al-Faisal and [UAE Foreign Minister] Abdullah Bin Zayed that we need to be clear. And actually Saud al-Faisal’s statement was clear and direct and I am happy with that.
Davutoğlu: I spoke to His Highness the Prince today about the economic situation in Tunisia and Egypt. We must support them.
Hamad: We can make announcements about investments in Egypt, but the situation in Tunisia is still not clear.
Davutoğlu: We used to have Turkish companies working in Egypt, but they left after the revolution. It is important to invest in garment manufacturing and tourism, because they can employ many people.
Hamad: We have an industrial zone in Port Said. We can do that.
Davutoğlu: We can form a joint Qatari-Turkish committee to work on this.
Hamad: Send us the proposal and we will study it. I am thinking of visiting Turkey, but this time Istanbul not Ankara. And I am still waiting for an answer about Qatar Airlines.
Davutoğlu: The transportation minister resigned and we will have elections on 12 June 2011. The military cooperation agreement has not been activated. What is happening?
Hamad: We will follow it up.
(Fin)
Minutes prepared by:
Ambassador Zayed Bin Rashed al-Nuaimi
Director of the Department of Asian and African Affairs

Document 3: Tamim bin Hamad and Davutoğlu
(Confidential)
Minutes of the meeting between His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Crown Prince (God Keep Him) with His Excellency Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
Beach Palace – Tuesday, 25/10/2011
(Following greetings)
His Highness the Crown Prince: We’re happy to see you. We were hoping to offer aid to Turkey to deal with the earthquake. We have a specialized rescue team. How is the situation in Turkey now?
We want to offer support in light of the warm relations between us, for we are brothers and Muslims. We respect your policies and the step you are taking. What is happening in Syria?
The Guest: Sound policies have kept the region in a positive situation for the past one hundred years. At first, we worked separately, but now we are intertwined and we must work together in order to achieve prosperity.
Qatar and the Emirates are able to think in a positive manner and that is because they are healthy countries. When we look around us to speak to others, who can we talk to in the region? In Iraq, there is Talabani, Alawi, Barzani, and Maliki, and Syria is that way too. Egypt is the biggest Arab and Muslim country, but it has its internal problems. I met with the general secretary of the Arab League and I spoke with him about Arab matters.
His Highness the Crown Prince: You will find us everywhere. We headed the Arab League delegation because no one wanted it.
There was a dispute between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegations during the Islamic Summit which was held in Doha. Izzat al-Douri was there; this was the Baath’s problem – they have problems with minorities.
In Syria, there are problems between the Alawis and Sunnis. You cannot blame the minority for thinking about what might happen to them in the future. This problem has to be resolved in the future.
The Guest: I met Nabil al-Arabi, I think he is here.
His Highness the Crown Prince: He will be at the meeting tomorrow.
The Guest: We thank you for the condolences. We want to coordinate with you. We have a general debate in parliament, but I decided to go to Qatar because it is important to us. What is your message tomorrow?
His Highness the Crown Prince: We will be sending a message to Bashar. He had said that he was going to talk to opposition. I believe that we have to send him a message that if he doesn’t continue down that road, the matter will take its course all the way to the Security Council.
His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs: The killing must stop and the army must be pulled out of the cities, in addition to amending Article 8 and conducting elections after negotiating with the opposition.
His Highness the Crown Prince: He is not taking the matter seriously; he wants to destroy the whole region. Iran has changed its tone. I spoke to Burhan Ghalioun and he values Turkey’s role. I told him that our relations with Turkey are good and whatever Turkey decides, we are with them. We will let you know what happens.
The Guest: Coordination between us is important. Bashar is relying on two things and he has a lot of problems. He thinks that Russia and China are with him, and he thinks he can play the Russian and Chinese card with the West.
We helped him break his isolation in 2006, when he was isolated by the West. We offered him a 14-point plan and we discussed everything with him. We know him and his regime very well. Our ambassador in Syria was with me, and Bouthaina Shaaban was present. He agreed to pull the army out of Hama, Homs, Daraa, and the rest of the cities, issue a new media law, allow the foreign press to enter the country, amend Article 8 of the constitution, hold elections, [...] and sit down with the opposition – he agreed to all this.And after two days he attacked the mosques, launched an offensive on Latakia, killing people [...] Our plan was to back him if he implemented the plan. He pulled out of Hama as our ambassador watched on, only to return and attack it. Our ambassador notified us in a secret letter that they are in the process of destroying Hama. He was deceiving us.
When he attacked Latakia, I called him and asked him how is it that you are destroying the mosques, we will not remain quiet over it. I told him that the president must make his speech according to the agreement. But Muallem asked us to wait. I told him that his integrity was at risk. Muallem called me and told me that the president will give a speech in a week. And I said no and we clarified our position. We have not had contact with them since last August 14.
In Libya the situation was different. There, the Arab League gave Western intervention legitimacy. We in Turkey do not want Western or NATO intervention, despite the fact that we are a member of NATO. Foreign intervention in Syria will cause problems in Lebanon and Iran, and Hamas is able to act individually against him – we support the opposition and he is afraid of it. In 2006, we held joint military exercises and we supported him economically, but now he has to be isolated economically and he is bankrupt. We spoke to Iran and they told us to give him a few months time. We told them: try if you can. Salehi is a good man.
His Highness the Crown Prince: We should use that.
The Guest: We want to send a message to the Russians and the Chinese, and the Arabs must talk to the two countries to confirm to them that we do not want another Libya situation and we must convince them not to support Bashar – he cannot be given the opportunity to rule until 2014, so that he can get rid of the opposition.
His Highness the Crown Prince: He must stop the violence today before tomorrow. You have done all you can but there has to be Arab support and this has to be the Arab message to him.
The Guest: Yes, this is the right message and he cannot be given any more time. We must act now. What is the position of Algeria, are they against the revolution?
His Highness the Crown Prince: It will change its position and they will back the revolution.
The Guest: We are a member of NATO and we do not want foreign intervention. As Muslims, Arabs and Turks, we do not want Western intervention in Syria. What is the decision that will be taken if the Syrian president does not abide by the Arab initiative?
His Highness the Crown Prince: I cannot say now.
The Guest: It is easy to win the war on the ground, but the rebuilding will be difficult, so will the situation in Syria.
His Highness the Crown Prince: The Turkish vice defense minister is here.
The Guest: I will be visiting Jordan and will meet with the King tomorrow. Is Khaled Meshal in Damascus? Can he come to Doha? If such a step is sensitive for him, there is no need. There is a matter I wanted to speak to your highness about. Al-Jazeera is directing criticism against our position and this is not good.
His Highness the Crown Prince: Our relation with you is bigger than al-Jazeera and you can speak to Hamad bin Jassem, and we will talk to him about the issue.
The Guest: Thank you your highness.
His Highness the Crown Prince: You are welcome and we hope you have a pleasant stay in Doha.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.