Russian Realpolitik: Inside the Arms Trade with Syria
Russian Realpolitik: Inside the Arms Trade with Syria
Russian Realpolitik: Inside the Arms Trade with Syria
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The head of the Syrian delegation to the semiannual Russian arms bazaar
tries out a new silencer-equipped Kalashnikov assault rifle, the
AK-104, at an airfield outside Moscow
“This weapon is perfect for close-quarters combat, house to house,” the
Russian arms dealer explains, gently passing a silencer-equipped
assault rifle, the AK-104, to the official from Syria, who brings the
gun’s sight level with his eye and aims it across pavilion C3 of
Russia’s semiannual arms bazaar. Serving as their translator is Colonel
Isam Ibrahim As’saadi, the military attaché at the Syrian embassy in
Moscow, who chaperones the three officials in town from Damascus for a
bit of military shopping. It is a rare opportunity for them. With their
country sinking into a civil war, most of the world’s top arms-dealing
nations have banned sales to the Syrian government. So the delegates
enjoy themselves in Moscow. They spend more than an hour talking to the
Kalashnikov salesman, Andrei Vishnyakov, head of marketing for Izhmash,
the company that created the AK-47. Then they stroll over to other
displays spread out across the giant Zhukovsky airfield near Moscow.
They peruse tanks, touch rocket launchers, study cruise missiles and
other heavy artillery, all of which stand gleaming in the summer sun
like so many sports cars at a dealership. All of it is for sale.
Welcome to Russia’s premier weapons expo, the deceptively titled Forum
of Technologies in Machine Building, a military smorgasbord for the
dictators of the world that Russian President Vladimir Putin opened in
2010. Delegations from Iran, Zimbabwe, Bahrain, Pakistan and Uganda,
among many others, came to the fair last week, but the Syrian presence
was the most controversial. Since the 1950s, when it first became a
client state of the Soviet Union, Syria has purchased almost all its
weapons from Russia, making it a cherished customer. Over the past 16
months, Syrian forces loyal to President Bashar Assad have used these
weapons to brutally crush a homegrown rebellion, with the death toll now
estimated at 14,000, including thousands of women and children. The
rest of the Arab world has joined with the West in condemning these
massacres, but that has not stopped the flow of Russian arms. Indeed,
the Kremlin seems willing to jeopardize its relations with Europe and
the U.S. in order to defend Assad and continue to sell him weapons.
In diplomatic terms, there is nothing frustrated Western officials can
do to stop it. Russia has a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council,
and it has repeatedly used its veto power to block any discussion of an
international arms embargo against Syria. Susan Rice, the U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., said in May that the Russian arms sales to Syria
are “reprehensible,” but are not illegal. Diplomatic and moral pressure
from the West, like the claim that Russia is aiding the murder of
civilians, has not changed many minds in Moscow. “These are the guys we
are rooting for,” an official with Russia’s state arms dealer,
Rosoboronexport, told TIME on Thursday while showing the Syrian
delegates a set of truck-mounted rocket launchers.
(PHOTOS: Inside Syria’s Slow-Motion Civil War)
The Syrians seemed impressed, even climbing into the truck to look
around before warmly shaking hands with the Russians and moving on to
the other exhibits. Apart from Colonel As’saadi, the military attaché,
the Syrian delegates refused to give their names or answer TIME’s
questions. The man whom As’saadi identified as the head of the
delegation would only say he had flown in from Damascas specifically to
attend the fair. “That shows a serious intention to buy,” says Hugh
Griffiths, an arms-trafficking expert at the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which tracks the global weapons
market. It was, however, impossible to tell what, if anything, the
Syrians purchased. Those deals are struck behind closed doors. But if
they did end up buying the assault rifles or armored vehicles that they
spent hours studying on Thursday, it would cast serious doubt on the
official line from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which has said that
only defensive weapons, like antiaircraft missiles, are being sold to
Syria, none of which could be used against civilians. The
“house-to-house” capabilities that Vishnyakov touted at the Kalashnikov
exhibit undermined the ministry’s claim.
The organizer of the
arms expo, which included a “tank ballet” choreographed by the Bolshoi
Theatre, is the Russian weapons and engineering conglomerate Russian
Technologies. The company is headed by Sergei Chemezov, an old friend of
Putin’s from the KGB. In the 1980s, both men worked as KGB spies in the
East German city of Dresden, and after Putin became President in 2000,
he gradually transferred Russia’s largest state-owned, machine-building
and weapons firms to Chemezov’s corporation. Russian Technologies now
controls around 600 companies and thousands of factories, producing
everything from cars and planes to military hardware. But the jewel in
its crown is Rosoboronexport, the only company in Russia that can
legally sell arms abroad. Last year, the company sold more than $11
billion in arms worldwide, making Russia the world’s second largest
weapons dealer after the U.S. As of 2011, Russia had about $4 billion in
outstanding weapons contracts with Syria, including sales of Buk-M2E
surface-to-air missiles, Pansir-S1 rocket complexes and MiG-29 fighter
jets.
“This is one of our traditional markets,” says Anatoly
Isaykin, the general director of Rosoboronexport, who spoke to TIME at
the arms expo. Isaykin, who was also a career KGB officer before
becoming Russia’s top arms dealer, says the Syria issue is being blown
out of proportion, perhaps as part of a Western conspiracy to blacken
his company’s name. “Around these hot spots, efforts are made to present
our organization, Rosoboronexport, as some kind of evil genius who is
trying to pour kerosene on the fire,” Isaykin says. “I think this is
part of the political game.” All of the West’s efforts to stop Russia
from selling weapons to Syria, he says, amounts to nothing more than
unfair competition. “Of course I mean competition in the broadest
sense,” Isaykin says. “It always existed and it will continue to exist.
So if Russia loses a market, its competitors have a chance to gain.”
(MORE: Can the U.S. and Russia Agree on How to End Syria’s War?)
Alexander Golts, a military expert in Moscow, says this Manichaean view
of the world is what drives Russia to arm Assad. “The root motivation
here is ideology, not finances,” Golts says. “It is the ideology of Cold
War realpolitik, where you had two sides sitting at the chessboard and
moving pieces around. That is how Putin still sees the world.” As for
the Syrians, they have lots of reasons to keep buying Russian arms even
if they don’t really need them. “They’re desperately trying to keep
Russia on board as a partner by channeling more cash to the Russians and
building on that relationship,” says Griffiths.
Russia seems
eager to play along, as much for the cash as the geopolitical dividends.
Throughout the Arab Spring revolts, which many in Moscow saw as a
U.S.-led conspiracy to carve up the Middle East, Putin grew increasingly
angry over Western meddling in the region. In 2010, when Putin opened
the first-ever arms bazaar at the Zhukovsky airfield, Yemeni President
Ali Abdullah Saleh flew in to attend, and Putin personally showed him
around. As they passed the display of a T-90 tank with reporters in tow,
Putin turned to Saleh and said, “That’s what you’ve got to buy.” He did
not do this with the aim of making a profit, Golts suggests, but to
cement Russia’s influence in Yemen. A weapons deal is not a simple
cash-and-carry arrangement. It requires the buyer and seller to maintain
stable relations, so that the weapons can be installed, serviced and
repaired. The seller will often provide ammunition and training for
years. “This is a serious bond,” Golts says.
The bond between
Russia and Yemen was put at risk by the Arab Spring revolts, which
erupted in Yemen a year after Putin’s stroll with Saleh through the arms
bazaar in 2010. That revolution quickly turned violent, and Saleh ceded
power soon after he was wounded in a rebel rocket attack in June 2011,
costing Putin one of his allies — albeit a country that played on U.S.
ties and anxieties in the Arabian Peninsula as well. Months later, the
Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, another client of Russian arms dealers,
was killed by rebels who had support from NATO bombing raids. Putin was
outraged, especially after images of Gaddafi’s bloody corpse appeared
in the media. “Who gave them the right to do this?” he snapped at a
press conference in Denmark, referring to NATO’s role in the Libyan
revolution. “Why did they have to get involved in this armed conflict?
What, is there a shortage of crooked regimes in the world? Are we going
to interfere in every domestic conflict? … You have to let people
resolve their own problems.”
After the war in Libya, Russia
drew a line. It began blocking all U.N. efforts to force Assad down the
same road as Gaddafi and Saleh, and as foreign countries began arming
rebels in Syria, Russia continued supplying Assad. “None of these events
will influence our relationships with our traditional markets in any
way,” says Rosoboronexport’s Isaykin. Judging by the crowd at the arms
bazaar — packed with military men from Asia, Africa and the Middle East —
Russia still has plenty of loyal customers around the world. As
Russia’s tanks performed their ballet in a mock battlefield on Thursday,
the foreign delegates looked on, happy patrons of the art of war. That
evening, after two long days of shopping, the Syrian delegates walked
toward the parking lot with bags full of pamphlets and promotional
videos for Russian military hardware. No doubt they were imagining how
useful it could be back home.
Read more: http://world.time.com/2012/07/01/russian-realpolitik-inside-the-arms-trade-with-syria/#ixzz2DfnQKegR
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