Iran Strongly Rejects Text of Geneva Agreement Released by White House
TEHRAN
(FNA)- The Iranian Foreign Ministry on Tuesday called invalid a press
release by the White House alleged to be the text of the nuclear
agreement struck by Iran and the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China,
Britain and France plus Germany) in Geneva on Sunday.
“What has been released by the website of the White House as a fact
sheet is a one-sided interpretation of the agreed text in Geneva and
some of the explanations and words in the sheet contradict the text of
the Joint Plan of Action (the title of the Iran-powers deal), and this
fact sheet has unfortunately been translated and released in the name of
the Geneva agreement by certain media, which is not true,” Foreign
Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham said on Tuesday.
She said that the four-page text under the name of the Joint Plan of
Action (which has been released by the Iranian foreign ministry) was the
result of the agreement reached during the Geneva talks and all of its
sentences and words were chosen based on the considerations of all
parties to the talks. In fact one of the reasons why negotiations
between Iran and the G5+1 took so long pertained to the accuracy which
was needed for choosing the words for the text of the agreement, Afkham
said, explaining that the Iranian delegation was much rigid and laid
much emphasis on the need for this accuracy.
Afkham said that the text of the Joint Plan of Action was provided to the media a few hours after the two sides agreed on it.
After the White House released a modified version of the deal struck
by Iran and the six world powers in Geneva early Sunday morning, the
Iranian Foreign Ministry released the text of the agreement.
The full text of the deal is as follows:
Geneva, 24 November 2013
Joint Plan of Action
Preamble
The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed
long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear
programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no
circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This
comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result
in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of
concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy
its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant
articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This
comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment
programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the
peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would
constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal,
step-bystep process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all
UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national
sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme.
There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and
the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN
Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a
satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council's consideration of this
matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and
implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive
solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be
established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and
address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for
verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work
with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of
concern.
Elements of a first step The first step would be time-bound, with a
duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all
parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations
in good faith. Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:
• From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working
stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the
remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.
• Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.
• Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its
activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant1, Fordow2, or the Arak
reactor3, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.
• Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to
UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up
to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational
schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.
• No new locations for the enrichment.
• Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its
current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for
accumulation of the enriched uranium.
• No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
• Enhanced monitoring:
o Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including
information on Iran's plans for nuclear facilities, a description of
each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of
operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities,
information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source
material. This information would be provided within three months of the
adoption of these measures.
o Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA.
o Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards
Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
o Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the
purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory
Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced
inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records,
at Fordow and Natanz.
o IAEA inspector managed access to:
centrifuge assembly workshops4;
centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and, uranium mines and mills.
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Footnotes:
1 Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the
centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional
centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will
replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
2 At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not
feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades.
Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
3 Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the
reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or
transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test
additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install
remaining components.
4 Consistent with its plans, Iran's centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.
In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:
• Pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales, enabling
Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of
crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held
abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on
associated insurance and transportation services.
• Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:
o Iran's petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated
services.5 o Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on
associated services.
• Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran's auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.
• License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for
safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services.
License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as
associated services.6
• No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.
• No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.
• The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the
Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.
• Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for
Iran's domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad.
Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and
agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses
incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and
non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the
channel.
o This channel could also enable:
transactions required to pay Iran's UN obligations; and, direct
tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students
studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.
• Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.
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Footnotes
5 "Sanctions on associated services" means any service, such as
insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S.
or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the
underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions.
These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.
6 Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.
Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*
The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to
conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year
after the adoption of this document, would:
• Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.
• Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.
• Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national
nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade,
technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.
• Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed
parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope
and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out,
and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.
• Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
• Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced
monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent
with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian
parliament).
• Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among
others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and
associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as
agreed R&D practices.
Following successful implementation of the final step of the
comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear
programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear
weapon state party to the NPT.
* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the
standard principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"
applies.
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