Muslim Brothers’ revenue tactic: ransoming Copts
September 20, 2013
Copying the tactics of jihadists in Pakistan, the Philippines,
and the Sahel, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has increasingly turned
towards kidnap-for-ransom schemes as a fundraising method. As the
Brotherhood will also tell you, the imposition of ransoms is justified by Islamic law. The revenues also help them buy arms or fund terrorists in the Sinai.
One difference, however, in the Egyptian case is that the captors seem to have an inflated sense of how much money the Coptic minority can pay to redeem their loved ones. Many of the ransom demands are simply too high, resulting in no profit for the abductors and the death of the captive.
From the Middle East Forum:
One difference, however, in the Egyptian case is that the captors seem to have an inflated sense of how much money the Coptic minority can pay to redeem their loved ones. Many of the ransom demands are simply too high, resulting in no profit for the abductors and the death of the captive.
From the Middle East Forum:
Egypt: Christians Killed for Ransom
by Raymond Ibrahim
September 2, 2013
Not only are the churches, monasteries, and institutions of Egypt’s Christians under attack by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters—nearly 100 now have been torched, destroyed, ransacked, etc.—but Christians themselves are under attack all throughout Egypt, with practically zero coverage in Western media.
Days ago, for example, Copts held a funeral for Wahid Jacob, a young Christian deacon who used to serve in St. John the Baptist Church, part of the Qusiya diocese in Asyut, Egypt. He was kidnapped on August 21 by “unknown persons” who demanded an exorbitant ransom from his impoverished family—1,200,000 Egyptian pounds (equivalent to $171,000 USD). Because his family could not raise the sum, he was executed—his body dumped in a field where it was later found. The priest who conducted his funeral service said that the youth’s body bore signs of severe torture.
In fact, kidnapping young Christians and holding them for ransom has become increasingly common in Egypt. Last April, 10-year-old Sameh George, another deacon, or altar boy, at St. Abdul Masih (“Servant of Christ”) Church in Minya, Egypt, was also abducted by “unknown persons” while on his way to church to participate in Holy Pascha prayers leading up to Orthodox Easter. His parents said that it was his custom to go to church and worship in the evening, but when he failed to return, and they began to panic, they received an anonymous phone call from the kidnappers, informing them that they had the Christian child in their possession, and would execute him unless they received 250,000 Egyptian pounds in ransom money.
If those in Egypt being kidnapped and sometimes killed for ransom money are not all deacons, they are almost always church-attending Christians. Last April, for example, another Coptic Christian boy, 12-year-old Abanoub Ashraf, was also kidnapped right in front of his church, St. Paul Church in Shubra al-Khayma district. His abductors, four men, put a knife to his throat, dragged him to their car, opened fire on the church, and then sped away. Later they called the boy’s family demanding a large amount of money to ransom child’s life.
The hate for these Christians—who are seen as no better than dogs—is such that sometimes after being paid their ransom, the Muslim abductors still slaughter them anyway. This was the fate of 6-year-old Cyril Joseph, who was kidnapped last May. In the words of the Arabic report, the boy’s “family is in tatters after paying 30,000 pounds to the abductor, who still killed the innocent child and threw his body into the toilet of his home, where the body, swollen and moldy, was exhumed”…
Financial data mining yields no gold nuggets
September 19, 2013
Financial privacy is becoming a fading memory of the past due to
aggressive regulations by Western governments that require bankers to
serve as snitches against their own customers for transactions that may
or may not be criminal in nature. These regulations are costly for the
banks to comply with (costs which are ultimately passed on to
customers), and they carry a price for citizens’ privacy as well.
All that might be forgiven if the invasive policies actually result in stopping terrorists, their financial transactions, or their operations. But according to new research being conducted in the European Union, the results of such programs are “meager and sometimes debatable.” The government holds the data while you’re left holding the bag.
A tip of the hat to Andrew S. Bowen for sending this over:
All that might be forgiven if the invasive policies actually result in stopping terrorists, their financial transactions, or their operations. But according to new research being conducted in the European Union, the results of such programs are “meager and sometimes debatable.” The government holds the data while you’re left holding the bag.
A tip of the hat to Andrew S. Bowen for sending this over:
Terrorism financing barely traceable using data analysis
28 August 2013
Doctoral research by Mara Wesseling has shown that the data analyses being performed as part of the European fight against terrorism financing are of little use for preventing terrorism. Wesseling will receive her doctorate from the University of Amsterdam (UvA) on 3 September.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the European Union created the EU Action Plan for Combating Terrorism, which included action against terrorism financing as a ‘core component’. Politicians, policymakers and legal experts stress the importance of combating terrorism financing, as they see money as a crucial element in the propagation of terrorism. Specific programmes have been set up to address the problem.
‘My research shows that it cannot yet be demonstrated whether these programmes have had much success with regard to tracking down suspected terrorists or preventing terrorist attacks. In light of the meagre and sometimes debatable results of both programmes, the question arises whether the social and political changes instituted as part of the data-analysis-driven fight against terrorism are (still) desirable or justified,’ Wesseling says.
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
In her research, Wesseling analysed the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP – better known as the SWIFT programme in the wake of the ‘SWIFT affair’) and the Third European AML/CFT directive. These two programmes constitute the most significant initiatives in the European fight against the financing of terrorism.
It has been shown that risk analyses carried out by banks as part of the Third European AML/CFT directive have revealed virtually no patterns that point to terrorism financing. Wesseling goes on to say that the preventive power of the TFTP to detect terrorist networks at an early stage is also limited…
$100,000 sent from Gulf to fund 25 assassins
September 18, 2013
Amniyat, the elite intelligence unit of the Somali terrorist
organization al-Shabaab, received 100,000 USD from Somali businessmen
based in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. to carry out a wave of
assassinations in Mogadishu, according to a UN report.
The money was remitted between October to December 2012 with bombings and suicide attacks conducted from January to April of 2013. At least 22 people were assassinated in Mogadishu as a result of the operation.
The following findings come from the July report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, with internal citations omitted:
Amniyat financing from Persian Gulf countries suggests independence from conventional al-Shabaab revenue sources of local taxation and money laundered through Al Hijra (Muslim Youth Center) by the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee in Kenya.
The money was remitted between October to December 2012 with bombings and suicide attacks conducted from January to April of 2013. At least 22 people were assassinated in Mogadishu as a result of the operation.
The following findings come from the July report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, with internal citations omitted:
26. The Monitoring Group was also provided with confidential information regarding the preparation at the end of 2012 and the partial execution of a large-scale assassination operation by an Amniyat cell in Mogadishu. The objective was to mobilize a team of 25 Amniyat operatives to conduct a wave of assassinations of national intelligence officers and members of the Federal parliament. To that end, money was collected amongst supporters of Al-Shabaab within the Somali business community in Qatar and sent via Dahabshil, a money remittance company, to Mogadishu, where it was received by the Amniyat Finance Officer in Mogadishu, Ali Mohammed Ali ‘Abdullahi’, and delivered to the Amniyat commander in charge of the operation.Amniyat answers directly to the chief of al-Shabaab. Amniyat’s clandestine cell structure is designed to avoid detection and survive even if al-Shabaab itself were destroyed.
27. The Monitoring Group had further access to three additional cases in which cash U.S. dollars were collected from the Somali business communities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and transferred by remittance companies to Mogadishu, with the knowledge and aim of financing terrorist activity in Somalia, and specifically to support Amniyat operations in Mogadishu. In the period October to December 2012, the aggregate amount transferred for the four operations was approximately 100,000 USD. In addition to spreading fear amongst the population and government officials, Somali businessmen in the diaspora supporting Amniyat assassinations may serve to achieve ulterior goals, whether clan revenge or elimination of business competitors or political opponents.
28. In a press communiqué dated 18 April 2013, the so-called Press Office of Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the killing of “127 Somali intelligence agents, officials and spies in Mogadishu”, and for the subsequent resignation of the head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) of Somalia, Ahmad Mo’alim Fiqi. It further stated that the assassination campaign was conducted by the “Mujahideen counter-intelligence teams” in Mogadishu, and led by the “Muhammad Ibn Maslamah Brigade”. The phrase “counter-intelligence teams” is in reference to Amniyat. However, the high casualty figure appears to be propaganda, since, according to UN statistics, only 22 individuals were assassinated by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu between January and March 2013.
Amniyat financing from Persian Gulf countries suggests independence from conventional al-Shabaab revenue sources of local taxation and money laundered through Al Hijra (Muslim Youth Center) by the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee in Kenya.
Al-Shabaab’s charcoal business booms despite loss of Kismayo
September 17, 2013UN says terror group’s annual revenues likely exceed 25 million USD
In what seemed like a major military and financial setback for al-Shabaab, the capture of the important port of Kismayo by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops, and the Ras Kamboni clan militia in September 2012 has turned out to be mere window dressing for a profit sharing arrangement between militiamen, the Kismayo business establishment, and al-Shabaab itself.The pre-existing agreements for taxes and royalties to be paid to al-Shabaab at each stage of the lucrative Somali charcoal production and supply chain appear to be intact despite the change in management of the port. Add that to checkpoint taxes imposed on truckloads of Somali coal and expanded charcoal export operations at the beach port of al-Shabaab controlled Barawe, and you have a recipe al-Shabaab success.
In its exhaustive 400+ page report in July, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea lays out al-Shabaab’s unexpected ability to snatch victory from the jaws of seeming defeat:
…Overall, despite the fact that the KDF/AMISOM and Ras Kamboni forces replaced Al-Shabaab’s control of Kismayo, the charcoal business architecture remained intact. While the production and trade in charcoal has always existed in Somalia on a smaller scale, during Al-Shabaab’s control of Kismayo it became a large-scale international enterprise combining local clan and Al-Shabaab financial interests, as previously documented by the Monitoring Group (S/2011/433 and S/2012/544). The nature of the business enterprise forged by Al-Shabaab continues with Al-Shabaab, its commercial partners and networks still central to the trade. Essentially, with the changeover of power in Kismayo, the shareholding of the charcoal trade at the port was divided into three between Al-Shabaab, Ras Kamboni and Somali Kenyan businessmen cooperating with the KDF.Meanwhile, Persian Gulf countries flagrantly violate the UN’s ban on the Somali charcoal trade by continued importation. If there is any saving grace to the charcoal fiasco, it is that the Monitoring Group believes al-Shabaab cells outside of southern Somalia may not be receiving increased revenue.
In addition to Al-Shabaab’s shareholding at Kismayo represented by individual charcoal traders in the local business community, there is seamless movement of charcoal trucks between Kismayo and Barawe and regular coordination between the two ports, not least because of the personal and commercial relations between charcoal traders, individuals in Ras Kamboni and members of Al-Shabaab.
This dramatic increase in scale of the charcoal trade since the time when Al-Shabaab exclusively controlled it, actually benefits Al-Shabaab as it draws considerable revenue from its partial shareholding in the expanded business. In fact, its shareholding in Kismayo charcoal, in combination with its export revenues at Barawe and its taxation of trucks transporting charcoal from production areas under its control are likely exceeding the revenue it generated when it controlled Kismayo, previously estimated by the Monitoring Group to be 25 million USD per year (see annex 9.2). As such, Al-Shabaab has managed to exploit and profit from the diversification of interests in the charcoal trade (see annex 9.2)…
See prior Money Jihad coverage of how the Somali charcoal trade benefits al-Shabaab here, here, and here.
Pakistan scrambles to get off FATF’s gray list
September 16, 2013
The world’s leading financial standards body, FATF, alerted
the international community earlier this summer that Pakistan and 11
other countries have failed to make sufficient progress in preventing
money laundering and terrorist financing.
The newspaper Pakistan Today notes that if Pakistan fails in “coming up with proper and combating the financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering legislations the country may face severe financial sanctions that may affect its financial deals with the World bank, the Asian Development Bank and other top financial institutions” (h/t Zia Ur Rehman). Pakistan should make reforms prior to FATF’s next meeting in October to avoid such sanctions.
Not so coincidentally, Pakistan’s central bank has rolled out a new requirement for Pakistani financial institutions to adopt nationwide software by Sept. 30 that will facilitate the filing of suspicious activity reports by bank employees. When a certain customer or transaction is regarded as suspicious, the financial institutions would use this software to report their observations back to the central bank.
Anybody familiar with new software deployments, even under the best circumstances in well-developed high-tech nations, will recognize that this is an overly ambitious timetable to for implementation. Widespread training and adoption of the software is unlikely to be complete by FATF’s deadline, but the stated goal may be enough to persuade FATF that Pakistan is moving in the right direction.
Pakistan has been cited before by the Financial Action Task Force for its financial regulatory deficiencies. Despite the history of shortcomings, Western nations have continued to saturate Pakistan with foreign aid. Without adequate money laundering an CFT controls in place, there is a high risk of any such military and development aid being abused by malicious actors without fear of detection or prosecution.
The newspaper Pakistan Today notes that if Pakistan fails in “coming up with proper and combating the financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering legislations the country may face severe financial sanctions that may affect its financial deals with the World bank, the Asian Development Bank and other top financial institutions” (h/t Zia Ur Rehman). Pakistan should make reforms prior to FATF’s next meeting in October to avoid such sanctions.
Not so coincidentally, Pakistan’s central bank has rolled out a new requirement for Pakistani financial institutions to adopt nationwide software by Sept. 30 that will facilitate the filing of suspicious activity reports by bank employees. When a certain customer or transaction is regarded as suspicious, the financial institutions would use this software to report their observations back to the central bank.
Anybody familiar with new software deployments, even under the best circumstances in well-developed high-tech nations, will recognize that this is an overly ambitious timetable to for implementation. Widespread training and adoption of the software is unlikely to be complete by FATF’s deadline, but the stated goal may be enough to persuade FATF that Pakistan is moving in the right direction.
Pakistan has been cited before by the Financial Action Task Force for its financial regulatory deficiencies. Despite the history of shortcomings, Western nations have continued to saturate Pakistan with foreign aid. Without adequate money laundering an CFT controls in place, there is a high risk of any such military and development aid being abused by malicious actors without fear of detection or prosecution.
Egypt: Islamists levy jizya against Copts
September 15, 2013
And what do they do with the proceeds? Buy weapons to wage
further assaults against non-Muslims, the military, and moderate
Muslims. Excerpts from a recent article in The Times of London follow:
- “Some Coptic Christian communities are being made to pay bribes as local Islamists exploit the turmoil by seeking to revive a seventh-century tax, called jizya, levied on non-Muslims.”
- “In Minya, home to one of the largest communities of Coptic Christians, families said that they had had to pay protection money to their Muslim attackers.”
- “‘…A local thug [in Deir Mawas], together with representatives of the two most important Muslim families in the city, came around to the Christian families demanding money or they will burn their buildings,’ he said. ‘The starting price was 2,000LE (£190), but because I own quite a large shop, I had to pay 5,000LE.’ For many this is several months’ earnings.”
- “…the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters are forcing the roughly 15,000 Christian Copts of Dalga village in south Minya province to pay jizya…”
- “‘…Some are being expected to pay 200 Egyptian pounds per day, others 500 Egyptian pounds per day’.”
- “…some 40 Christian families have now fled Dalga…”
Sinai Peninsula flooded with one-quarter billion dollars for jihad
September 13, 2013
First, let’s put in perspective exactly how much $250 million
is. It’s a lot. Especially for jihadist groups, most of which—even the
world’s biggest ones—barely take in that much money in a year.
The possibility that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood could have diverted that much money to Islamic terrorists in the Sinai suggests that groups like relatively low-profile groups al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and the Salah al-Dine Brigades could potentially carry out attacks equal to or great than operations by the Taliban, al-Shabaab, or Al Qaeda, while still having money left over in the bank.
From Elder of Ziyon (hat tip to Genug):
The possibility that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood could have diverted that much money to Islamic terrorists in the Sinai suggests that groups like relatively low-profile groups al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and the Salah al-Dine Brigades could potentially carry out attacks equal to or great than operations by the Taliban, al-Shabaab, or Al Qaeda, while still having money left over in the bank.
From Elder of Ziyon (hat tip to Genug):
Report: Muslim Brotherhood gave $250M to Sinai jihadists to attack police and army
Al Monitor translates an interview in Iraqi newspaper Azzaman with Hussein Abdel Rahman, spokesman of the Brothers Without Violence group, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that adheres to the same principles as the MB but eschews violence.
At the very end of the interview Rahman – who apparently knows quite a bit about what is going on in the Ikhwan – reveals a bombshell:
Azzaman: Amid persisting violence in the Sinai against the army and the police, some people are accusing Muslim Brotherhood leaders, mainly Mohamed Beltagy and Ezzat, of being involved in those incidents. Are these claims valid?While he denies direct involvement of the MB with the jihadist attacks in the Sinai, he admits freely that the jihadists are funded by the MB.
Abdel Rahman: The international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood earmarked a sum of $250 million to fund some jihadist movements in the Sinai, like al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and the Salah al-Dine Brigades, and supply them with arms sometimes to conduct acts of violence against the army and the police. Unfortunately, some are accusing Muslim Brotherhood youth of committing these acts, but it is not true. They are innocent of such acts that are caused by some leaders who have adopted the approach of Sayyid Qutb, such as Essam al-Aryan, Safwat Hegazi and Tarek al-Zomor. As for Badie, he did not manage any recent acts; Ezzat is actually the current mastermind of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In this light, the Egyptian arrests of the Brotherhood leaders seems much more grounded in reality and less in harassment, as it sometimes appears. The implication is also that if the MB has given $250M to the Sinai jihadists, then certainly they must have bankrolled their fellow Hamas movement – and the idea that Hamas was involved in the Sinai attacks in some form becomes far more plausible as well.
(h/t Max S)
Helping Hand honored despite close ties to a Hamas-funding Pakistani charity
September 12, 2013
Charity Navigator, a leading evaluator of nonprofit groups in the U.S., has published 15 different “top 10” lists to help donors assess charities. Among those lists is a list
of 10 charities with low overhead costs that rely on private
donations. Helping Hand for Relief and Development, a Michigan-based
Islamic charity, ranks seventh on that list.
Charity Navigator does not appear to have factored in Helping Hand’s ongoing cooperation (see here and here) with the Al-Khidmat Foundation, a Pakistani charity which gave a 6 million rupee check to Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in 2006.
The Pakistani tie-in is even more alarming considering that the auditing firm that prepared Helping Hand’s financial statement for 2011, the most recent year available, divulged that “We did not audit the financial statements of the Organization’s operations in Pakistan which reflect total assets and revenues constituting 55 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the related consolidated totals.”
It is also worth noting that Helping Hand reported having $7 million in medical supply and drug assets in their last tax return. The fair market valuation of drugs donated to and distributed by charities, especially deworming medication, has been an area of increased scrutiny. Helping Hand states that it uses current accounting standards to comply with IRS mandates in this area, but some analysts still believe that in-kind donations to charities are being overstated. This has the effect of exaggerating the net worth of some charities, and it makes administrative costs appear to be a small share relative to their size. Charity Navigator is well aware of this ongoing controversy, but how closely it examined drug valuations by charities on their top 10 lists is unclear.
The Charity Navigator rating is already being exploited by Helping Hand, which is running a banner across its homepage in large font and all capital letters with misleading phrases “TOP 10 HIGHLY RATED CHARITY” and “DONATE WITH CONFIDENCE” along with Helping Hand and Charity Navigator logos. Muslim news websites such as ABNA (hat tip to Creeping Sharia and Islamist Watch) have touted the rating as well.
The Muslim advocacy group ICNA has also congratulated Helping Hand for the rating in a press release. But the ICNA statement should be taken with a grain of salt because 1) ICNA is a partner organization with Helping Hand, and 2) ICNA has received a loan from Helping Hand with favorable financing terms. ICNA’s indebtedness to Helping Hand was not disclosed in the press release.
Institutional donors who may be considering donations to Helping Hand and private donors who intend to give zakat to Helping Hand should consider the serious questions about Helping Hand’s operations in Pakistan and donate elsewhere. Banks with relationships with Helping Hand should also review the risk of maintaining those accounts.
Charity Navigator does not appear to have factored in Helping Hand’s ongoing cooperation (see here and here) with the Al-Khidmat Foundation, a Pakistani charity which gave a 6 million rupee check to Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in 2006.
The Pakistani tie-in is even more alarming considering that the auditing firm that prepared Helping Hand’s financial statement for 2011, the most recent year available, divulged that “We did not audit the financial statements of the Organization’s operations in Pakistan which reflect total assets and revenues constituting 55 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the related consolidated totals.”
It is also worth noting that Helping Hand reported having $7 million in medical supply and drug assets in their last tax return. The fair market valuation of drugs donated to and distributed by charities, especially deworming medication, has been an area of increased scrutiny. Helping Hand states that it uses current accounting standards to comply with IRS mandates in this area, but some analysts still believe that in-kind donations to charities are being overstated. This has the effect of exaggerating the net worth of some charities, and it makes administrative costs appear to be a small share relative to their size. Charity Navigator is well aware of this ongoing controversy, but how closely it examined drug valuations by charities on their top 10 lists is unclear.
The Charity Navigator rating is already being exploited by Helping Hand, which is running a banner across its homepage in large font and all capital letters with misleading phrases “TOP 10 HIGHLY RATED CHARITY” and “DONATE WITH CONFIDENCE” along with Helping Hand and Charity Navigator logos. Muslim news websites such as ABNA (hat tip to Creeping Sharia and Islamist Watch) have touted the rating as well.
The Muslim advocacy group ICNA has also congratulated Helping Hand for the rating in a press release. But the ICNA statement should be taken with a grain of salt because 1) ICNA is a partner organization with Helping Hand, and 2) ICNA has received a loan from Helping Hand with favorable financing terms. ICNA’s indebtedness to Helping Hand was not disclosed in the press release.
Institutional donors who may be considering donations to Helping Hand and private donors who intend to give zakat to Helping Hand should consider the serious questions about Helping Hand’s operations in Pakistan and donate elsewhere. Banks with relationships with Helping Hand should also review the risk of maintaining those accounts.
Benghazi culprits funded by Libyan subcontracts
September 11, 2013
Ansar al-Sharia, the terrorist group that played a leading role
in the attack that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other
Americans, is profiting from security subcontracts awarded to it by the
February 17 Martyrs Brigade, a larger militia that receives direct
contracts from the Libyan defense ministry.
This disgrace resembles the ongoing public contract scandals in Afghanistan through which specific UN, U.S., and Afghan security operations have been subcontracted out to Taliban affiliated-fighters over the past several years.
The Weekly Standard reports:
The Associated Press reported in March that “The state pays many militias, relying on them to serve as security forces since the police and military remain a shambles.”
More recently, the Global Post reports:
This disgrace resembles the ongoing public contract scandals in Afghanistan through which specific UN, U.S., and Afghan security operations have been subcontracted out to Taliban affiliated-fighters over the past several years.
The Weekly Standard reports:
… Ansar al Sharia is far from being on the run. The organization is expanding and is even tasked with providing security inside Benghazi.The Weekly Standard cites a Daily Beast article from February which elaborates on the payments to Ansar al-Sharia:
On Sunday, Ansar al Sharia Libya posted images and a video of its armed members manning a checkpoint in Benghazi. Incredibly, according to previous reports, the group is providing security at the behest of the Libyan government…
… Since the consulate attack that led to the death of U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens, Ansar al-Sharia has kept a low profile but recently—and noticeably at celebrations to mark the second anniversary of the revolution earlier this month—the militia was back manning checkpoints and guarding hospitals and other public buildings. Government payments to Ansar al-Sharia militiamen also have been resumed and are made through other Benghazi brigades, including the 17th of February brigade, according to sources in the General National Congress, Libya’s new Parliament.As for the militia that serves as Ansar al-Sharia’s paymaster, the BBC says, “The Martyrs of 17 February Brigade are considered to be the biggest and best armed militia in eastern Libya. The brigade is financed by the Libyan defence ministry. The brigade consists of at least 12 battalions and possesses a large collection of light and heavy weapons in addition to training facilities.”
The sources say the chief of the defense staff, Yousef Mangoush, has been diverting operational funds from the fledgling armed forces to the militia. They worry the move is “playing with fire”…
The Associated Press reported in March that “The state pays many militias, relying on them to serve as security forces since the police and military remain a shambles.”
More recently, the Global Post reports:
… Frederic Wehrey, the former US military attaché in Tripoli, called the [Libyan] army “a shell of an institution.“ Contracting with the revolutionaries did bring them somewhat under the authority of the state. But it was also a “Faustian bargain” that gave brigade commanders and their political patrons leverage over the government.
This quickly gave rise to the growth of parallel forces that now overshadow the regular army and police…
UK lifts sanctions on Al Qaeda henchman
September 10, 2013
The British have removed Mohammed Daki—who is the former
roommate of a 9/11 planner, a convicted forgery expert, and a recruiter
for the Iraq insurgency—from their list of sanctioned terrorists. Mr. Watchlist notes that the decision follows similar de-listings of Daki in August by the United Nations, Australia, and Canada.
As is usual in such cases, no explanation for the removal has been provided, but the move is clearly the result of yet another cryptic recommendation made by a UN ombudsman. Like instances covered by Money Jihad here, here, here, and here, the ombudsman makes confidential reports for removal with no opportunity for public hearings, public comment, or testimony from Al Qaeda’s victims or their families. The decisions are made in closed-door meetings between the ombudsman and undisclosed parties. There are no apparent disclosure requirements on who may be lobbying the ombudsman, such as wealthy Saudis and their lawyers.
The confidential recommendations made are then rubber-stamped by the UN’s Al Qaeda sanctions committee, many Western governments follow suit, and the public is the last to know.
And who is Daki? The Washington Post once reported that, “To Italian law enforcement officials, Mohammed Daki, a Moroccan expatriate, former engineering student and mosque preacher, was a dangerous terrorist who mingled with 9/11 plotters in Germany and, from a base in Italy, recruited suicide bombers for attacks in Iraq.”
History Commons notes that Daki lived at the same address at the same time as 9/11 facilitator Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Global Jihad notes that, in 2005, Daki was sentenced to 22 months for forging documents.
But none of the rap sheet matters, and neither do our opinions. All that matters is the recommendation of an unelected ombudsman whose reports none of us are allowed to read.
As is usual in such cases, no explanation for the removal has been provided, but the move is clearly the result of yet another cryptic recommendation made by a UN ombudsman. Like instances covered by Money Jihad here, here, here, and here, the ombudsman makes confidential reports for removal with no opportunity for public hearings, public comment, or testimony from Al Qaeda’s victims or their families. The decisions are made in closed-door meetings between the ombudsman and undisclosed parties. There are no apparent disclosure requirements on who may be lobbying the ombudsman, such as wealthy Saudis and their lawyers.
The confidential recommendations made are then rubber-stamped by the UN’s Al Qaeda sanctions committee, many Western governments follow suit, and the public is the last to know.
And who is Daki? The Washington Post once reported that, “To Italian law enforcement officials, Mohammed Daki, a Moroccan expatriate, former engineering student and mosque preacher, was a dangerous terrorist who mingled with 9/11 plotters in Germany and, from a base in Italy, recruited suicide bombers for attacks in Iraq.”
History Commons notes that Daki lived at the same address at the same time as 9/11 facilitator Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Global Jihad notes that, in 2005, Daki was sentenced to 22 months for forging documents.
But none of the rap sheet matters, and neither do our opinions. All that matters is the recommendation of an unelected ombudsman whose reports none of us are allowed to read.
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