The End of the New World Order
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphDENVER
– Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing intimidation of Ukraine
appears to mean the end of a 25-year period whose hallmark was an effort
to bring Russia into greater alignment with Euro-Atlantic goals and
traditions. Now the question is: What comes next?
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphAs
the weeks pass, it is increasingly clear that the challenge is not so
much Ukraine – which will continue to lurch from one crisis to the next,
as it has since independence 23 years ago – as it is Russia and its
regression, recidivism, and revanchism.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphExactly
25 years ago, in the spring of 1989, Poland and other countries of what
was then known as the “Eastern Bloc” took the first steps to break free
from their forced alliance with the Soviet Union. Indeed, these
countries’ relationship with the Soviet Union was no true alliance at
all; rather, they were accurately described as “satellites” – states
with limited sovereignty, whose main role was to serve Soviet interests.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphAs
subjugating and ahistorical as those relationships were, much of the
world accepted the binding of “Eastern Europe” to the Soviet Union as a
logical state of affairs, one in keeping with the world order that
emerged at the close of WWII. But what seemed like a permanent division
of the world into competing spheres of interest suddenly ended in 1989,
when the Eastern Bloc left the Soviet orbit, soon followed by the
republics of the Soviet Union itself.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphRussia
emerged not as a renamed Soviet Union, but rather as a state with its
own history and symbols, a member of the international state system that
had been absent for some time, but had suddenly returned. And the
reborn Russia seemed to be dedicated, in its own way, to the same goals
as its post-Soviet neighbors: membership in Western institutions, a
market economy, and a multi-party parliamentary democracy, albeit with a
Russian face.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThis
new world order held for almost 25 years. Except for Russia’s brief war
with Georgia in August 2008 (a conflict generally seen as instigated by
reckless Georgian leadership), Russia’s acquiescence and commitment to
the “new world order,” however problematic, was one of the great
accomplishments of the post-Cold War era. Even Russia’s reluctance to
support concerted Western action, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo in the
1990’s, was based on arguments that could be heard in other European
countries. Russian democracy certainly had its share of flaws, but that
hardly made it unique among post-communist countries.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphRussia’s
historical relationship with Ukraine is far more complex and nuanced
than many Western pundits suggest. It is difficult to talk about Russian
civilization without talking about Ukraine. But, whatever the
complexities, Russia’s recent behavior toward its smaller neighbor is
not rooted in the legacy of their shared history.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIt
is rooted in a different legacy – that of a Russian Empire whose habits
did not die during the Soviet period. Ukraine did not – and perhaps
could not – develop its sovereignty in the way that Poland and others
have succeeded in doing since 1989; nonetheless, it is entitled to chart
its own future. Russia’s challenge to Ukraine’s status as an
independent state is thus a challenge to the entire world, which is why
the crisis has risen to the top of the global agenda.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn
the United States, the media often point out that most Americans would
be hard pressed to find Ukraine on a map. They don’t need to. But
Americans do need to understand the challenge they are facing from a
Russia that no longer seems interested in what the West has been
offering for the last 25 years: special status with NATO, a privileged
relationship with the European Union, and partnership in international
diplomatic endeavors. All of these seem to be off the table for now.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSo
what should the West do? An approach based on sanctions that target the
Russian economy (and therefore its people) is the preferred alternative
of those with the least at stake (US politicians). But sanctions are
unlikely to bring about the internal changes that Russia needs, because
those changes need to be accomplished by the Russian people.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphFor
the West, the real issue should be shoring up security structures and
being prepared for the long haul. NATO has taken an important step in
reassuring its eastern members. This is not to say that Russia, having
annexed Crimea and intimidated Ukraine, will seek to make similar
trouble among former Soviet “allies.” But historical memories die hard.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphPoles
are well aware that, 75 years ago this year, France and Britain were
parties to security agreements that compelled them to declare war on
Germany if it invaded Poland. In September 1939, when Germany invaded,
both countries dutifully declared war, but neither fired a shot or
helped Poland in any tangible way. Poland disappeared from the map of
Europe for five years.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe
Ukraine crisis is really a Russian crisis. Ukraine – whatever is
eventually left of it – will increasingly become a Western country.
Russia is showing no sign that it will follow suit.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphInstead,
Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to be settling in for a long
diplomatic winter. The US needs to prepare for it, especially in shoring
up partners and allies, and ensuring as best it can that Ukraine is
Russia’s last victim, not its first.
Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/christopher-r--hill-calls-on-the-west-to-prepare-for-a-long-struggle-with-a-revanchist-russia#QVSu3mGpXuTO1GIl.99
No comments:
Post a Comment