Is Syrian Conflict an Ethnic Conflict?

Last year, Middle East has witnessed one of the most important history-shaping phase in the last decades through popular uprisings that have erupted simultaneously in many countries, starting in Tunisia then moving to Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings have resulted in the overthrow of the regimes by the mounting pressure that mass demonstrations have applied on them.  These mass demonstrations were carried out mainly by the disproportionate youth segment of the population. Differently, Syrian and Libyan Uprisings have turned into violent conflicts between the recently armed rebels and regime forces, ending up in North Atlantic Treaty Organization  (NATO) military intervention in Libya killing the head of state, Moammar Al-Qaddafi, and a continues civil war in Syria. Most importantly, the Syrian conflict is the most significant among them all. Syria has a strategic position at the center of ethnic, religious and regional conflicts.

            The Economist, amid the horror of the civil war, tries to answer the question of possible military action in its article “The growing horror of the Syrian civil war has put military intervention back on the agenda” on Sep 15th 2012. An important question shall be asked to address possible military and regional impact of Syrian conflict, is: Is Syrian conflict an ethnic conflict?

            First of all, Syrian regime is solely represented by the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party that has been ruling the country since March 1971 by its leader, Hafid al-Asad that came to power through a military coup until his death in June 2010. The presidency of the country has been passed from Hafid to his son, Bashar, after a constitutional amendment that did not take more than 15 minutes. That is, in this aspect, Syria is a similar case to most of the countries that witnessed uprising in the sense that they are ruled autocratically through authoritarian regimes for decades such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. As popular uprisings erupted in the Arab World, it seemed inevitable for such regime to survive the phase without having to deal with a popular uprising.
Economically, Syrian regime struggled with the fact that Syria lacks natural resources that provides the state with necessary liquidity to waive, or delay the political demands of its people, although this can’t be taken for granted since the country is a republic and part of its legitimacy is ensuring transition of power. State has failed to create a strong economy that provides middle class Syrians with a reasonable income mainly because of the strong state-business networks built through rapid privatization programs in late 1990’s and 2000’s  (1). As corruption was epidemic in all levels of governments, Syrians had no way to communicate their grievances, adding more to the lack of freedom in political sphere (2).

Although Syrian regime is secular in terms of public policies and practice, its structure is comprised mainly of members of the minority Alawite sect, which as an offshoot of Shia Islam, as the Assad family is Alawite itself. Alawites have been even more dominant in high-level ranks recently. Alawites compromise only 5% of the population –totals to 13% if all branches of Shia Islam are grouped together-, contrary to 74% Sunnis. Other religious minorities are Christians who compromise 10% of the population and Druze whose percent is 3%. Although some Alawite families are empowered by their ties to the ruling family, the regime deploys a Baathist ideology in determining the ranking of people in societies’ major institutions. That is, Alawites have a better chance of being in the dominant group, which is Baathists in general. Moreover, members of sects in Syria are culturally distinct to a large extent, thus it’s fair to say that Syrian society is a pluralist society.  

However, this sectarian dimension of the regime provided a chance of mobilization for largely-Sunni rebels on religious grounds.  This should not be surprising as it is the case with almost all dictatorships. For instance, Iraqi regime before the United States invasion in 2003 was mainly compromised of Sunnis as the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was Sunni himself, recruiting military and government figures based on kinship not qualifications.  On the other side, minorities such as Shiites and Christians, might be compelled to support the status quo, if they feel that their status might be in danger if the regime falls, especially given the increasing presence of Sunni Islamists and Jihadists among the rebels.

Indeed, the rhetoric of opposition websites is increasingly sectarian and always refers to the pro-regime militias, known as Shabbiha, as Shiites and Alawites. In fact, this rhetoric has been translated to military action on the ground.  For example, Sunni rebels have been laying a siege on two Shiite villages of Zahraa and Nubl in northern Aleppo province for more than 3 months, calming that pro-regime gunmen from the two villages carried out attacks on neighboring Sunni villages 2. In addition, in the Damascus Battle that took place in July 2012, Free Syrian Army has forced largely-Shiite Iraqi refugees to flee their houses in Shiite neighborhood of al-Sayyeda Zainab in the capital (4).

            The conflict is further complicated when taking regional alliances in considerations. Syrian regime is the main ally of Iran, along with Iraq and the resistance movement, Hezbollah  which controls the government in Lebanon with its Christian ally Free Patriotic Movement. Iran, Hizbullah and current Iraqi head of state adhere to Shiite Islam. That is in contrast to the biggest rival of Iran, Saudi Arabia which adheres to the extremist Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam. Saudi has spoken against the Syrian regime vocally and lobbied for the military support of the rebels. After wide media campaigning against the Syrian regime, reporters weapons that belong to the Saudi military at rebels’ possession. It is almost impossible for the Saudi government, given its ideology and history, to arm rebels that might go against the anti-Iran Saudi policy or adheres to a different religious ideology. The empowerment of the sectarian Sunni rebels would worsen the religious divide in Syria and make minorities feel that are they in need for protection from the regime, which is Alawite in structure, or even encourage them to get armed, taking the civil war from rebels against a brutal regime to a more disastrous level where sects engage formally in a war that would sink the whole middle east into a conflict which end is unknowable.  This analysis goes also for NATO-led military intervention as it would empower the dominant Sunni jihadists, whose ideologies are anti-minorities in general.

In general, as the Syrian conflict is an authentic popular uprising, its current violent shape puts ethnic relations in the region in a dangerous position. Sectarian structure of Syrian regime makes it easier for an armed uprising to turn into an ethnic conflict as mobilization of rebels is carried out based on religious ideologies. The escalation of the existing sectarian mobilization and tension developing into an ethnic conflict depends on the degree of empowerment and arming by regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia or western powers, through arming or military intervention, to Sunnis which would help turn the conflict into an endless sectarian conflict instead of a popular uprising against a brutal regime.

References.

1.      Hendawi, Hamza. "In Syria, Sunni Rebels Besiege Shiite Villages." Huffington Post. N.p., 18 Oct. 2012. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.

 2.       Haddad, Bassam. "Ajamindustry." Ajamindustry. N.p., 26 June 2012. Web. 22 Oct. 2012. .


3.      "'Saudi Weapons' Seen at Syria Rebel Base." BBC News. BBC, 10 Aug. 2012. Web. 22 Oct. 2012. .

4.       "Syrian Opposition Accused of Threatening Iraqi Refugees (Arabic)." BBC Arabic News. BBC, 20 July 2012. Web. 22 Oct. 2012. .

تم النشر قبل 14th November 2012 بواسطة Qatif