U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance
For more information on the European system, see European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) at a Glance.
Press Contact: Tom Z. Collina, Research Director, 202-463-8270 x104
June 2013
The Obama administration’s missile defense policy presents both elements of change and continuity with the plans set out by the Bush administration. President Obama announced September 17, 2009 that the United States would adopt a “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense in Europe. This approach will primarily use the currently sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system to address the threat posed by short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Iran; a program to counter long-range missiles was cancelled in March 2013. The Aegis system’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) will also eventually be placed on land in Romania and Poland. Obama’s approach is intended to be more flexible than the Bush administration plan to place Ground-Based Midcourse interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic and thus more responsive to emerging threats. Despite these changes, the Obama administration is continuing the deployment and expansion of Ground-Based Midcourse interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, intended to defend the continental United States from future threats from North Korea or Iran. This system will continue to rely on four fixed radar facilities at Shemya, Alaska; Beale Air Force Base, California; Fylingdales in the United Kingdom; and Thule, Greenland. The network also includes mobile X-band radars.
Ballistic missile defense ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration, which withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty so that it could develop and deploy a nationwide defense against a limited number of long-range ballistic missiles. Still, missile defense technology remains largely unproven. Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. For the Ground-Based Midcourse System, for example, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) claims eight successful tests in sixteen attempts since 1999. The most recent test in July 2013 failed. The last successful test was in 2008.
For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The current deployments mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October 1975 because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Safeguard was allowed under the ABM Treaty since it was limited to no more than 100 interceptors protecting an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) base in North Dakota.
The Obama administration inherited six main missile defense programs; it has expanded some and recast or cut others. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program was cancelled due to cost and the Airborne Laser program was mothballed in February 2012. The Aegis SM-3 system has been expanded and is now central to the U.S. BMD system as a whole, although the Block IIB missile was cancelled in 2013. Technical difficulties and setbacks have continued to define the programs with most of them behind schedule and costing much more than originally anticipated.
The Obama administration continues to oversee missile defense programs through the Missile Defense Agency. The system as a whole is organized in terms of boost, mid-course and terminal defense segments and the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. Integrated operation plays a more extensive role in the new plans especially in terms of space, sea and land-based sensors.
The following chart provides a brief look at each of the major missile defense programs inherited by the Obama administration. It contains information on what type of ballistic missile each defense would be intended to counter and at which stage of the enemy missile’s flight an attempted intercept would take place. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational.
Developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration.. In June 2002, Bush withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which had barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The administration also aggressively sought foreign partners for the U.S. program and, during Bush’s last year in office, reached deals to deploy missile interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.
Still, the technology remains unproven .Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. In thirteen tests, the Pentagon has hit a mock warhead eight times. In the most recent test, conducted on December 5, 2008, the interceptor successfully destroyed the mock warhead; however, the incoming missile failed to deploy countermeasures meant to fool the interceptor into missing its target.
Pentagon officials acknowledge that the initial system will be rudimentary. But they argue that some defense is better than none at all. In addition, they assert that the only way to conduct more strenuous and realistic testing of the system is to deploy it..
For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The planned deployment this fall will mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October 1975 because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Under Safeguard, which Washington deployed in a configuration to comply with the ABM Treaty, the United States sought to protect an offensive U.S. missile base located in North Dakota.
The Bush administration inherited seven main missile defense programs, including the ground-based missile interceptor system and two related satellite programs. For the most part, the Bush administration continued work on these same programs, although it recast some, cut others, and added new projects. It canceled one sea-based system—the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System—and significantly down-sized a space-based laser initiative, while commencing new efforts to develop interceptors to attack multiple targets and to strike enemy missiles early in their flights.
During the Clinton administration, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the development of working missile defenses was being hindered by a lack of political will, not scientific or engineering challenges. However, several missile defense programs have fallen further behind schedule and suffered setbacks due to technical difficulties under the Bush administration. An aircraft designed to be armed with a powerful laser—known as the Airborne Laser—is now more than two years behind schedule and may be shelved. One of the two inherited satellite programs has been overhauled and renamed, while the other has far exceeded cost and schedule estimates. In addition, the Pentagon’s ground- and sea-based missile interceptors have experienced schedule and testing delays due to problems with their kill vehicles, which are the components intended to seek out and collide with enemy warheads.
In general, the Bush administration reorganized missile defense programs, placing all of them under one big tent (the Missile Defense Agency) rather than working on each one in isolation. And, whereas previous administrations drew a distinction between theater defenses (those designed to hit short- and medium-range ballistic missiles) and strategic defenses (those intended to intercept long-range missiles/ICBMs), the Bush administration did not, claiming to pursue a general research and development program for a layered missile defense comprised of many different types of systems and capabilities. Nevertheless, the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. In addition, the Pentagon is actively pushing to expand some of the earlier theater missile defense programs to try and tackle the strategic mission. ICBMs travel farther, faster, and are more likely to employ countermeasures intended to fool defenses than shorter-range missiles. The ABM Treaty permitted the development of theater missile defense systems but prohibited work on nationwide strategic defenses.
At this time, only the ground-based interceptor system has been tested against strategic ballistic missile targets, although the Pentagon has started to investigate whether some radars and sensors used in theater systems might also be capable of tracking a strategic ballistic missile. Preliminary findings are encouraging, according to the Pentagon, which has declined to provide specific test results.
The Obama administration has expressed general support for the idea of national missile defense, but indicated that some Bush-era programs may be up for review. According the to White House website, the administration “will support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.” This sentiment has been echoed by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The following chart provides a brief look at each of the Pentagon’s major missile defense programs. It contains information on what type of ballistic missile each defense would be intended to counter and at which stage of the enemy missile’s flight an attempted intercept would take place. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational.
Press Contact: Tom Z. Collina, Research Director, 202-463-8270 x104
June 2013
The Obama administration’s missile defense policy presents both elements of change and continuity with the plans set out by the Bush administration. President Obama announced September 17, 2009 that the United States would adopt a “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense in Europe. This approach will primarily use the currently sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system to address the threat posed by short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Iran; a program to counter long-range missiles was cancelled in March 2013. The Aegis system’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) will also eventually be placed on land in Romania and Poland. Obama’s approach is intended to be more flexible than the Bush administration plan to place Ground-Based Midcourse interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic and thus more responsive to emerging threats. Despite these changes, the Obama administration is continuing the deployment and expansion of Ground-Based Midcourse interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, intended to defend the continental United States from future threats from North Korea or Iran. This system will continue to rely on four fixed radar facilities at Shemya, Alaska; Beale Air Force Base, California; Fylingdales in the United Kingdom; and Thule, Greenland. The network also includes mobile X-band radars.
Ballistic missile defense ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration, which withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty so that it could develop and deploy a nationwide defense against a limited number of long-range ballistic missiles. Still, missile defense technology remains largely unproven. Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. For the Ground-Based Midcourse System, for example, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) claims eight successful tests in sixteen attempts since 1999. The most recent test in July 2013 failed. The last successful test was in 2008.
For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The current deployments mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October 1975 because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Safeguard was allowed under the ABM Treaty since it was limited to no more than 100 interceptors protecting an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) base in North Dakota.
The Obama administration inherited six main missile defense programs; it has expanded some and recast or cut others. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program was cancelled due to cost and the Airborne Laser program was mothballed in February 2012. The Aegis SM-3 system has been expanded and is now central to the U.S. BMD system as a whole, although the Block IIB missile was cancelled in 2013. Technical difficulties and setbacks have continued to define the programs with most of them behind schedule and costing much more than originally anticipated.
The Obama administration continues to oversee missile defense programs through the Missile Defense Agency. The system as a whole is organized in terms of boost, mid-course and terminal defense segments and the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. Integrated operation plays a more extensive role in the new plans especially in terms of space, sea and land-based sensors.
The following chart provides a brief look at each of the major missile defense programs inherited by the Obama administration. It contains information on what type of ballistic missile each defense would be intended to counter and at which stage of the enemy missile’s flight an attempted intercept would take place. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational.
Ballistic Missile Basics
Ballistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then follow
an unpowered, parabolic trajectory toward the target. They are
classified by the maximum distance that they can travel, which is a
function of how powerful the missile’s engines (rockets) are and the
weight of the missile’s warhead. To add more distance to a missile’s
range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration
referred to as staging. There are four general classifications of
ballistic missiles:
Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:
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Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
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Program & Key Elements
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Designed to Counter
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|
Status
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|
Capability/Schedule
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Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
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|
Program & Key Elements
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|
Designed to Counter
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|
Status
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|
Capability/Schedule
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Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
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|
Program & Key Elements
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|
Designed to Counter
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Status
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|
Capability/Schedule
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Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
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Program & Key Elements
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Designed to Counter
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Status
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|
Capability/Schedule
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Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS)
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(Previously referred to as Space-Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low)) | |
Program & Key Elements
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Designed to Counter
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Status
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|
Capability/Schedule
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Space-Based Infrared System-high (SBIRS-high)
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Program & Key Elements
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Designed to Counter
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Status
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Capability/Schedule
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Airborne Laser (ABL)
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Program & Key Elements
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Designed to Counter
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Status
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Capability/Schedule
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Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
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Program & Key Elements
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Designed to Counter
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Status
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Capability/Schedule
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Category and Description
Missile Defense
Fact Sheet, February 2009
Press Contacts: Wade Boese, Research Director, (202) 463-8270 x104
President George W. Bush announced Dec. 17, 2002 that the United States would begin fielding the initial elements of a limited ballistic missile defense system in 2004. As of February 2009, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reports having deployed 28 ground-based missile interceptors, divided between Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The United States also possesses 18 warships equipped with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, a system intended to counter short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as of January 2009. The U.S. missile defense system relies on four fixed radar facilities at Shemya, Alaska, Beale Air Force Base, California, Fylingdales in the United Kingdom, and Thule, Greenland. The network also includes four mobile X-band radars, and a sea-based X-band radar (SB-X), currently deployed in the Pacific Ocean.Developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration.. In June 2002, Bush withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which had barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The administration also aggressively sought foreign partners for the U.S. program and, during Bush’s last year in office, reached deals to deploy missile interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.
Still, the technology remains unproven .Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. In thirteen tests, the Pentagon has hit a mock warhead eight times. In the most recent test, conducted on December 5, 2008, the interceptor successfully destroyed the mock warhead; however, the incoming missile failed to deploy countermeasures meant to fool the interceptor into missing its target.
Pentagon officials acknowledge that the initial system will be rudimentary. But they argue that some defense is better than none at all. In addition, they assert that the only way to conduct more strenuous and realistic testing of the system is to deploy it..
For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The planned deployment this fall will mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October 1975 because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Under Safeguard, which Washington deployed in a configuration to comply with the ABM Treaty, the United States sought to protect an offensive U.S. missile base located in North Dakota.
The Bush administration inherited seven main missile defense programs, including the ground-based missile interceptor system and two related satellite programs. For the most part, the Bush administration continued work on these same programs, although it recast some, cut others, and added new projects. It canceled one sea-based system—the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System—and significantly down-sized a space-based laser initiative, while commencing new efforts to develop interceptors to attack multiple targets and to strike enemy missiles early in their flights.
During the Clinton administration, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the development of working missile defenses was being hindered by a lack of political will, not scientific or engineering challenges. However, several missile defense programs have fallen further behind schedule and suffered setbacks due to technical difficulties under the Bush administration. An aircraft designed to be armed with a powerful laser—known as the Airborne Laser—is now more than two years behind schedule and may be shelved. One of the two inherited satellite programs has been overhauled and renamed, while the other has far exceeded cost and schedule estimates. In addition, the Pentagon’s ground- and sea-based missile interceptors have experienced schedule and testing delays due to problems with their kill vehicles, which are the components intended to seek out and collide with enemy warheads.
In general, the Bush administration reorganized missile defense programs, placing all of them under one big tent (the Missile Defense Agency) rather than working on each one in isolation. And, whereas previous administrations drew a distinction between theater defenses (those designed to hit short- and medium-range ballistic missiles) and strategic defenses (those intended to intercept long-range missiles/ICBMs), the Bush administration did not, claiming to pursue a general research and development program for a layered missile defense comprised of many different types of systems and capabilities. Nevertheless, the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. In addition, the Pentagon is actively pushing to expand some of the earlier theater missile defense programs to try and tackle the strategic mission. ICBMs travel farther, faster, and are more likely to employ countermeasures intended to fool defenses than shorter-range missiles. The ABM Treaty permitted the development of theater missile defense systems but prohibited work on nationwide strategic defenses.
At this time, only the ground-based interceptor system has been tested against strategic ballistic missile targets, although the Pentagon has started to investigate whether some radars and sensors used in theater systems might also be capable of tracking a strategic ballistic missile. Preliminary findings are encouraging, according to the Pentagon, which has declined to provide specific test results.
The Obama administration has expressed general support for the idea of national missile defense, but indicated that some Bush-era programs may be up for review. According the to White House website, the administration “will support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.” This sentiment has been echoed by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The following chart provides a brief look at each of the Pentagon’s major missile defense programs. It contains information on what type of ballistic missile each defense would be intended to counter and at which stage of the enemy missile’s flight an attempted intercept would take place. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational.
Ballistic Missile Basics
Ballistic
missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an
unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward the target. They are
classified by the maximum distance that they can travel, which is a
function of how powerful the missile’s engines (rockets) are and the
weight of the missile’s warhead. To add more distance to a missile’s
range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration
referred to as staging. There are four general classifications of
ballistic missiles:
Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:
|
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
|
|
(Referred to as National Missile Defense by the Clinton administration)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
|
|
(Referred to as Navy Theater Wide by the Clinton administration)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Airborne Laser (ABL)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
|
|
(Previously referred to as Space-Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low))
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Space-Based Infrared System-high (SBIRS-high)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
|
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
|
|
Program & Key Elements
|
|
Designed to Counter
|
|
Status
|
|
Capability/Schedule
|
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