Eckhart Tolle:
Safety Partnership Set for Kansas Biosafety Labs
A partnership of Kansas State University and Mercy Regional Health Center will be ready by the time the BSL-4 lab opens in 2018, officials say.
* Jan 22, 2011
Kansas State University and Mercy Regional Health Center have established a partnership that will provide medical care oversight and occupational health response plans for biosafety laboratories to be built in Manhattan, Kan. The partnership is in place for the university's Biosecurity Research Institute, a biosafety level 3 and biosafety level 3 agriculture facility, and will grow when the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), a biosafety level 4 lab, opens in 2018.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security will operate NBAF,a planned 500,000 square foot facility that will be the transplanted Plum Island Animal Disease Center. (PIADC is located in Greenport, N.Y. DHS says only 10 percent of NBAF's space will be used for BSL-4 research.) Research that may lead to vaccines and treatments will be done at both facilities on human and animal infectious diseases that exist naturally in the world, such as Classical Swine Fever and Rift Valley Fever. "This partnership enables K-State to perform essential biosecurity and infectious disease research in a safe environment while ensuring that everyone is prepared in the unlikely event of an accident in the lab," said the university's president, Kirk Schulz. "We appreciate Mercy's willingness to work with our researchers, an essential collaboration as K-State becomes a top research institution."
The two organizations may have released details about their partnership this week to counter a National Research Council report in November 2010 that criticized the DHS risk assessment for NBAF's operation and concluded there is nearly a 70 percent chance of a release of foot and mouth disease outside the lab during the 50-year lifetime of the facility, with an estimated potential economic impact of $9 billion to $50 billion.
Mercy's occupational health services program, led by Theresa Crubel, director and registered nurse, prepares preventative treatment while a planning team at Mercy provides preparedness. The university gives Mercy accurate, current information about pathogens being researched at the BSL-3 facility. "Mercy is very excited about the partnership we currently have with K-State, and we look forward to working with NBAF management and the Department of Homeland Security as the plans for NBAF move forward," said Mercy President/CEO John Broberg. "We will continue to work with K-State to ensure that we have prepared our physicians and staff appropriately to deal with medical and other emergency response events at NBAF."
Among the safeguards being used are these:
* Before any pathogenic research is performed, researchers undergo a fitness test and blood work, then receive appropriate vaccinations.
* Researchers carry wallet cards listing pathogens they are researching, infection symptoms, and what to do if they suspect an infection. They can use a 24-hour hotline to contact medical professionals if symptoms are detected.
* Mercy's emergency services and administrative teams have toured the BSL-3 facility and are able to handle response needs in a biocontainment laboratory. The Mercy emergency staff will receive training for a BSL-4 laboratory before it opens.
CONTINUED:
http://ohsonline.com/articles/2011/01/22/safety-partnership-set-for-kansas-biosafety-labs.aspx?admgarea=news
Safety Partnership Set for Kansas Biosafety Labs
A partnership of Kansas State University and Mercy Regional Health Center will be ready by the time the BSL-4 lab opens in 2018, officials say.
* Jan 22, 2011
Kansas State University and Mercy Regional Health Center have established a partnership that will provide medical care oversight and occupational health response plans for biosafety laboratories to be built in Manhattan, Kan. The partnership is in place for the university's Biosecurity Research Institute, a biosafety level 3 and biosafety level 3 agriculture facility, and will grow when the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), a biosafety level 4 lab, opens in 2018.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security will operate NBAF,a planned 500,000 square foot facility that will be the transplanted Plum Island Animal Disease Center. (PIADC is located in Greenport, N.Y. DHS says only 10 percent of NBAF's space will be used for BSL-4 research.) Research that may lead to vaccines and treatments will be done at both facilities on human and animal infectious diseases that exist naturally in the world, such as Classical Swine Fever and Rift Valley Fever. "This partnership enables K-State to perform essential biosecurity and infectious disease research in a safe environment while ensuring that everyone is prepared in the unlikely event of an accident in the lab," said the university's president, Kirk Schulz. "We appreciate Mercy's willingness to work with our researchers, an essential collaboration as K-State becomes a top research institution."
The two organizations may have released details about their partnership this week to counter a National Research Council report in November 2010 that criticized the DHS risk assessment for NBAF's operation and concluded there is nearly a 70 percent chance of a release of foot and mouth disease outside the lab during the 50-year lifetime of the facility, with an estimated potential economic impact of $9 billion to $50 billion.
Mercy's occupational health services program, led by Theresa Crubel, director and registered nurse, prepares preventative treatment while a planning team at Mercy provides preparedness. The university gives Mercy accurate, current information about pathogens being researched at the BSL-3 facility. "Mercy is very excited about the partnership we currently have with K-State, and we look forward to working with NBAF management and the Department of Homeland Security as the plans for NBAF move forward," said Mercy President/CEO John Broberg. "We will continue to work with K-State to ensure that we have prepared our physicians and staff appropriately to deal with medical and other emergency response events at NBAF."
Among the safeguards being used are these:
* Before any pathogenic research is performed, researchers undergo a fitness test and blood work, then receive appropriate vaccinations.
* Researchers carry wallet cards listing pathogens they are researching, infection symptoms, and what to do if they suspect an infection. They can use a 24-hour hotline to contact medical professionals if symptoms are detected.
* Mercy's emergency services and administrative teams have toured the BSL-3 facility and are able to handle response needs in a biocontainment laboratory. The Mercy emergency staff will receive training for a BSL-4 laboratory before it opens.
CONTINUED:
http://ohsonline.com/articles/2011/01/22/safety-partnership-set-for-kansas-biosafety-labs.aspx?admgarea=news
Eckhart Tolle:
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
On This Page:
* Threats to U.S. Food and Animal Agriculture
* NBAF Mission and Research
* Facility Information
* NBAF Site: Manhattan, Kansas
* Site-Specific Risk Assessment
* NBAF Project Timeline and Transition from Plum Island
* Project Documentation
Threats to U.S. Food and Animal Agriculture
The United States’ food and animal agriculture supply is a highly integrated, open, global, and complex infrastructure. Increased imports of agricultural products and growing numbers of international travelers to and from the United States have had positive effects, but have also opened our food and agricultural supply to possible foreign animal disease outbreaks. The recent global H1N1 outbreak and other regional foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks have demonstrated the vulnerabilities present when there is a lack of available vaccines, countermeasures, and other rapid response capabilities to curb an outbreak. The food and agriculture industry is a significant contributor to U.S. economic prosperity; therefore, the loss of a significant food market would have dire economic and potentially human health consequences.
Current and previous Administrations have affirmed these threats and the need to prepare and respond through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (January 2004) and the National Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (November 2009). In addition, the Congressional report, The Clock Is Ticking, pointed to the likelihood of biological threats and advised the United States to “strengthen our resilience by developing the capability to produce vaccines and therapeutics rapidly and inexpensively.” To supply the needed capabilities, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have the joint responsibility to protect our Nation’s animal agriculture and public health from these threats. The Department is leading these efforts through the construction of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas.
NBAF Mission and Research
NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas, will be a state-of-the-art biocontainment facility for the study of foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten the U.S. animal agriculture and public health. NBAF will provide and strengthen our nation with critical capabilities to conduct research, develop vaccines and other countermeasures, and train veterinarians in preparedness and response against these diseases. For the past 50 years, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has served our nation as the primary facility to conduct this research. However, PIADC is nearing the end of its life-cycle and needs to be replaced in order to meet U.S. research requirements and ensure the timely development of countermeasures in the event of an outbreak. NBAF meets that need and will serve as a replacement for the PIADC facility. Strategically, NBAF will boast of new and expanded capabilities, specifically, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment for the study of high-consequence diseases affecting large livestock.
Specifically, NBAF will meet its mission by:
* Providing enhanced research capabilities to diagnose foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic diseases in large livestock
* Providing expanded vaccine and countermeasure development capabilities for large livestock
* Replacing and expanding research currently done at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in New York, and continuing the partnership between the Department and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (ARS) and (APHIS)
NBAF rests on a strategic partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and USDA. These agencies set research priorities based on threats to animal agriculture, and conduct risk assessments, gap analysis and other necessary evaluations to protect our nation from threats to our animal agriculture and public health. Within the facility, The Department and USDA will continue the work of PIADC at NBAF to conduct research, diagnostics, vaccine development and testing, and training in preparedness and response for veterinary and animal agricultural specialists.
The following diseases would be studied at NBAF which would require BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory capabilities:
* Nipah Virus
* Hendra Virus
* African Swine Fever
* Rift Valley Fever
* Japanese Encephalitis Virus
* Foot and Mouth Disease
* Classical Swine Fever
* Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia
Facility Information
The NBAF is being designed by the NBAF Design Partnership (Perkins & Will, FLAD & Associates, Merrick & Co., AEI Engineering Inc., CCRD Partners, and Affiliated Engineers, Inc.) an award-winning team of architects, engineers and planners. The NBAF will be a state of the art laboratory with critical research adjacencies for the Department of Homeland Security and USDA to carry out their unique and congruent missions. NBAF will contain 500,000 gross square feet of facility space which includes BSL-2, 3, and 4 shared research space for the development of vaccines and other countermeasures. 10% of the space will be for BSL-4 research.
* Why Build a New Facility? No facility currently meets the requirements identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.
* Facility Research & Staffing describes diseases that would potentially be studied at the NBAF and staffing plans.
* Facility Design & Construction describes facility space requirements and contracts awarded for design and construction services
Read more about the laboratory biosafety levels and definition of terms used in the NBAF discussion.
NBAF Site: Manhattan, Kansas
Manhattan, Kansas was selected as the NBAF location after an extensive three-year site selection process that included a thorough risk assessment, environmental impact assessment, and security assessment. The Manhattan location puts the NBAF in proximity to research of NBAF-related missions in veterinary, agriculture, and bio-security research expertise, and resources. This location also puts NBAF in proximity to a major hub of the veterinary pharmaceutical industry. The NBAF will be built on a site on Kansas State University adjacent to the existing Biosecurity Research Institute.
More about the NBAF site location in Manhattan, Kansas
Site-Specific Risk Assessment
The Department of Homeland Security completed a Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment (SSRA) (PDF, 463 pages - 37 MB) in June 2010, and submitted it to the National Academy of Sciences for review. The SSRA was reprinted in October 2010 with Academy updates included. Appendices referenced in the SSRA are available in the SSRA Appendices (PDF, 290 pages - 43 MB) document.
The National Academy of Sciences reviewed the SSRA and found the site-specific risk analysis to be an important "first step in an iterative process aimed at identifying and minimizing risk" and supported the need for the capabilities NBAF provides. With a risk assessment at such an unusually early stage in facility design — currently less than 25 percent complete — Homeland Security is even better equipped to build in risk mitigation and management measures for NBAF. Homeland Security issued a fact sheet (PDF, 2 pages - 132 KB) summarizing the SSRA proccess.
The rigorous construction requirements and operational procedures in place today have successfully protected the local environments around federal high biocontainment facilities on the U.S. mainland for decades, and modern technologies only improve that protective capability for future facilities like the proposed NBAF. Homeland Security will not build or operate the NBAF unless it can be done in a safe manner. The Department will continue to work with USDA and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to ensure all recommendations from the SSRA are properly implemented and all biosafety and biosecurity requirements have been met. No permits will be issued by USDA and/or CDC until all requirements are met.
NBAF Project Timeline and Transition from Plum Island
The timeline for designing, constructing, and operating the NBAF is as follows:
NBAF Timeline
Environmental Impact Study
Determined Suitability of the Kansas Site
Completed
Record of Decision
The Department Stated that NBAF will be Sited in Kansas
Completed
Design
Begin Detailed Design
Underway
Site Preparation
Begin Site Preparation
September 2010
Begin Construction
Begin Construction of Central Utility Plant / Laboratory
March 2011/May 2012
Facility Accreditation
Accreditation and Transition from Plum Island
2016 - 2018
Facility Operational
Begin Research and Vaccine Trials
2018
Once construction of NBAF is completed – an estimated five-year project – the current mission activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) will begin to transition to the new facility. The transition process is expected to take approximately two years.
Project Documentation
The Department of Homeland Security is committed to open communication and providing stakeholders with access to pertinent information and relevant documentation regarding the planning, design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.
* Sites Evaluated in Environmental Impact Statement
* Environmental Impact Statement and Supporting Documents
* Department Response to May 2009 GAO Report (PDF, 30 pages - 347 KB)
Contact
The Department is fully committed to providing the public access to information about the NBAF and opportunities for involvement. Please send inquiries to the address below
NBAF Program Manager
S&T DOR STOP 0217
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0217
nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov
http://www.dhs.gov/files/labs/editorial_0762.shtm
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
On This Page:
* Threats to U.S. Food and Animal Agriculture
* NBAF Mission and Research
* Facility Information
* NBAF Site: Manhattan, Kansas
* Site-Specific Risk Assessment
* NBAF Project Timeline and Transition from Plum Island
* Project Documentation
Threats to U.S. Food and Animal Agriculture
The United States’ food and animal agriculture supply is a highly integrated, open, global, and complex infrastructure. Increased imports of agricultural products and growing numbers of international travelers to and from the United States have had positive effects, but have also opened our food and agricultural supply to possible foreign animal disease outbreaks. The recent global H1N1 outbreak and other regional foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks have demonstrated the vulnerabilities present when there is a lack of available vaccines, countermeasures, and other rapid response capabilities to curb an outbreak. The food and agriculture industry is a significant contributor to U.S. economic prosperity; therefore, the loss of a significant food market would have dire economic and potentially human health consequences.
Current and previous Administrations have affirmed these threats and the need to prepare and respond through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (January 2004) and the National Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (November 2009). In addition, the Congressional report, The Clock Is Ticking, pointed to the likelihood of biological threats and advised the United States to “strengthen our resilience by developing the capability to produce vaccines and therapeutics rapidly and inexpensively.” To supply the needed capabilities, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have the joint responsibility to protect our Nation’s animal agriculture and public health from these threats. The Department is leading these efforts through the construction of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas.
NBAF Mission and Research
NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas, will be a state-of-the-art biocontainment facility for the study of foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten the U.S. animal agriculture and public health. NBAF will provide and strengthen our nation with critical capabilities to conduct research, develop vaccines and other countermeasures, and train veterinarians in preparedness and response against these diseases. For the past 50 years, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has served our nation as the primary facility to conduct this research. However, PIADC is nearing the end of its life-cycle and needs to be replaced in order to meet U.S. research requirements and ensure the timely development of countermeasures in the event of an outbreak. NBAF meets that need and will serve as a replacement for the PIADC facility. Strategically, NBAF will boast of new and expanded capabilities, specifically, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment for the study of high-consequence diseases affecting large livestock.
Specifically, NBAF will meet its mission by:
* Providing enhanced research capabilities to diagnose foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic diseases in large livestock
* Providing expanded vaccine and countermeasure development capabilities for large livestock
* Replacing and expanding research currently done at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in New York, and continuing the partnership between the Department and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (ARS) and (APHIS)
NBAF rests on a strategic partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and USDA. These agencies set research priorities based on threats to animal agriculture, and conduct risk assessments, gap analysis and other necessary evaluations to protect our nation from threats to our animal agriculture and public health. Within the facility, The Department and USDA will continue the work of PIADC at NBAF to conduct research, diagnostics, vaccine development and testing, and training in preparedness and response for veterinary and animal agricultural specialists.
The following diseases would be studied at NBAF which would require BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory capabilities:
* Nipah Virus
* Hendra Virus
* African Swine Fever
* Rift Valley Fever
* Japanese Encephalitis Virus
* Foot and Mouth Disease
* Classical Swine Fever
* Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia
Facility Information
The NBAF is being designed by the NBAF Design Partnership (Perkins & Will, FLAD & Associates, Merrick & Co., AEI Engineering Inc., CCRD Partners, and Affiliated Engineers, Inc.) an award-winning team of architects, engineers and planners. The NBAF will be a state of the art laboratory with critical research adjacencies for the Department of Homeland Security and USDA to carry out their unique and congruent missions. NBAF will contain 500,000 gross square feet of facility space which includes BSL-2, 3, and 4 shared research space for the development of vaccines and other countermeasures. 10% of the space will be for BSL-4 research.
* Why Build a New Facility? No facility currently meets the requirements identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.
* Facility Research & Staffing describes diseases that would potentially be studied at the NBAF and staffing plans.
* Facility Design & Construction describes facility space requirements and contracts awarded for design and construction services
Read more about the laboratory biosafety levels and definition of terms used in the NBAF discussion.
NBAF Site: Manhattan, Kansas
Manhattan, Kansas was selected as the NBAF location after an extensive three-year site selection process that included a thorough risk assessment, environmental impact assessment, and security assessment. The Manhattan location puts the NBAF in proximity to research of NBAF-related missions in veterinary, agriculture, and bio-security research expertise, and resources. This location also puts NBAF in proximity to a major hub of the veterinary pharmaceutical industry. The NBAF will be built on a site on Kansas State University adjacent to the existing Biosecurity Research Institute.
More about the NBAF site location in Manhattan, Kansas
Site-Specific Risk Assessment
The Department of Homeland Security completed a Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment (SSRA) (PDF, 463 pages - 37 MB) in June 2010, and submitted it to the National Academy of Sciences for review. The SSRA was reprinted in October 2010 with Academy updates included. Appendices referenced in the SSRA are available in the SSRA Appendices (PDF, 290 pages - 43 MB) document.
The National Academy of Sciences reviewed the SSRA and found the site-specific risk analysis to be an important "first step in an iterative process aimed at identifying and minimizing risk" and supported the need for the capabilities NBAF provides. With a risk assessment at such an unusually early stage in facility design — currently less than 25 percent complete — Homeland Security is even better equipped to build in risk mitigation and management measures for NBAF. Homeland Security issued a fact sheet (PDF, 2 pages - 132 KB) summarizing the SSRA proccess.
The rigorous construction requirements and operational procedures in place today have successfully protected the local environments around federal high biocontainment facilities on the U.S. mainland for decades, and modern technologies only improve that protective capability for future facilities like the proposed NBAF. Homeland Security will not build or operate the NBAF unless it can be done in a safe manner. The Department will continue to work with USDA and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to ensure all recommendations from the SSRA are properly implemented and all biosafety and biosecurity requirements have been met. No permits will be issued by USDA and/or CDC until all requirements are met.
NBAF Project Timeline and Transition from Plum Island
The timeline for designing, constructing, and operating the NBAF is as follows:
NBAF Timeline
Environmental Impact Study
Determined Suitability of the Kansas Site
Completed
Record of Decision
The Department Stated that NBAF will be Sited in Kansas
Completed
Design
Begin Detailed Design
Underway
Site Preparation
Begin Site Preparation
September 2010
Begin Construction
Begin Construction of Central Utility Plant / Laboratory
March 2011/May 2012
Facility Accreditation
Accreditation and Transition from Plum Island
2016 - 2018
Facility Operational
Begin Research and Vaccine Trials
2018
Once construction of NBAF is completed – an estimated five-year project – the current mission activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) will begin to transition to the new facility. The transition process is expected to take approximately two years.
Project Documentation
The Department of Homeland Security is committed to open communication and providing stakeholders with access to pertinent information and relevant documentation regarding the planning, design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.
* Sites Evaluated in Environmental Impact Statement
* Environmental Impact Statement and Supporting Documents
* Department Response to May 2009 GAO Report (PDF, 30 pages - 347 KB)
Contact
The Department is fully committed to providing the public access to information about the NBAF and opportunities for involvement. Please send inquiries to the address below
NBAF Program Manager
S&T DOR STOP 0217
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0217
nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov
http://www.dhs.gov/files/labs/editorial_0762.shtm
Eckhart Tolle:
HAHA!
HAHA!
Dig:
DHS is supposed to be a temporary agency for a temporary threat.
Looks like DHS is admitting to a NAZI coup d'etat!
DHS is supposed to be a temporary agency for a temporary threat.
Looks like DHS is admitting to a NAZI coup d'etat!
Eckhart Tolle:
Quote
* Why Build a New Facility? No facility currently meets the requirements identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food
* HSPD 9 Abstract
* HSPD 9 Full Text
HSPD 9 Abstract
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217449547663.shtm
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9 establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. America's agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. U.S. agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. The directive lays out policies, including roles and responsibilities, awareness and warning, and vulnerability assessments, to provide the best protection possible against a successful attack on the U.S. agriculture and food system.
HSPD 9 Full Text
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9
January 30, 2004
SUBJECT: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food
Purpose
1. This directive establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
Background
2. The United States agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. Americas agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. We should provide the best protection possible against a successful attack on the United States agriculture and food system, which could have catastrophic health and economic effects.
Definitions
3. In this directive:
1. The term critical infrastructure has the meaning given to that term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
2. The term key resources has the meaning given that term in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)).
3. The term Federal departments and agencies means those executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; indepen-dent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
4. The terms State, and local government, when used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
5. The term Sector-Specific Agency means a Federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category.
Policy
4. It is the policy of the United States to protect the agriculture and food system from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by:
1. identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and key resources for establishing protection requirements;
2. developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize threats;
3. mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing nodes;
4. enhancing screening procedures for domestic and imported products; and
5. enhancing response and recovery procedures.
5. In implementing this directive, Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security programs do not diminish the overall economic security of the United States.
Roles and Responsibilities
6. As established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with HSPD-7.
7. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency will perform their responsibilities as Sector-Specific Agencies as delineated in HSPD-7.
Awareness and Warning
8. The Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall build upon and expand current monitoring and surveillance programs to:
1. develop robust, comprehensive, and fully coordinated surveillance and monitoring systems, including international information, for animal disease, plant disease, wildlife disease, food, public health, and water quality that provides early detection and awareness of disease, pest, or poisonous agents;
2. develop systems that, as appropriate, track specific animals and plants, as well as specific commodities and food; and
3. develop nationwide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, plant health, and water quality that integrate existing Federal and State laboratory resources, are interconnected, and utilize standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures.
9. The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop and enhance intelligence operations and analysis capabilities focusing on the agriculture, food, and water sectors. These intelligence capabilities will include collection and analysis of information concerning threats, delivery systems, and methods that could be directed against these sectors.
10. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to create a new biological threat awareness capacity that will enhance detection and characterization of an attack. This new capacity will build upon the improved and upgraded surveillance systems described in paragraph 8 and integrate and analyze domestic and international surveillance and monitoring data collected from human health, animal health, plant health, food, and water quality systems. The Secretary of Homeland Security will submit a report to me through the Homeland Security Council within 90 days of the date of this directive on specific options for establishing this capability, including recommendations for its organizational location and structure.
Vulnerability Assessments
11. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall expand and continue vulnerability assessments of the agriculture and food sectors. These vulnerability assessments should identify requirements of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate, and shall be updated every 2 years.
Mitigation Strategies
12. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, working with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall prioritize, develop, and implement, as appropriate, mitigation strategies to protect vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing from the introduction of diseases, pests, or poisonous agents.
13. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall build on existing efforts to expand development of common screening and inspection procedures for agriculture and food items entering the United States and to maximize effective domestic inspection activities for food items within the United States.
Response Planning and Recovery
14. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, will ensure that the combined Federal, State, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting the national agriculture or food infrastructure. These activities will be integrated with other national homeland security preparedness activities developed under HSPD-8 on National Preparedness.
15. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop a coordinated agriculture and food-specific standardized response plan that will be integrated into the National Response Plan. This plan will ensure a coordinated response to an agriculture or food incident and will delineate the appropriate roles of Federal, State, local, and private sector partners, and will address risk communication for the general public.
16. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall enhance recovery systems that are able to stabilize agriculture production, the food supply, and the economy, rapidly remove and effectively dispose of contaminated agriculture and food products or infected plants and animals, and decontaminate premises.
17. The Secretary of Agriculture shall study and make recommendations to the Homeland Security Council, within 120 days of the date of this directive, for the use of existing, and the creation of new, financial risk management tools encouraging self-protection for agriculture and food enterprises vulnerable to losses due to terrorism.
18. The Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall work with State and local governments and the private sector to develop:
1. A National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the economy and that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak. The NVS shall leverage where appropriate the mechanisms and infrastructure that have been developed for the management, storage, and distribution of the Strategic National Stockpile.
2. A National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) capable of responding to a high-consequence plant disease with pest control measures and the use of resistant seed varieties within a single growing season to sustain a reasonable level of production for economically important crops. The NPDRS will utilize the genetic resources contained in the U.S. National Plant Germplasm System, as well as the scientific capabilities of the Federal-State-industry agricultural research and extension system. The NPDRS shall include emergency planning for the use of resistant seed varieties and pesticide control measures to prevent, slow, or stop the spread of a high-consequence plant disease, such as wheat smut or soybean rust.
Outreach and Professional Development
19. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall work with appropriate private sector entities to establish an effective information sharing and analysis mechanism for agriculture and food.
20. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Education, shall support the development of and promote higher education programs for the protection of animal, plant, and public health. To the extent permitted by law and subject to availability of funds, the program will provide capacity building grants to colleges and schools of veterinary medicine, public health, and agriculture that design higher education training programs for veterinarians in exotic animal diseases, epidemiology, and public health as well as new programs in plant diagnosis and treatment.
21. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Education, shall support the development of and promote a higher education program to address protection of the food supply. To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of funds, the program will provide capacity-building grants to universities for interdisciplinary degree programs that combine training in food sciences, agriculture sciences, medicine, veterinary medicine, epidemiology, microbiology, chemistry, engineering, and mathematics (statistical modeling) to prepare food defense professionals.
22. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall establish opportunities for professional development and specialized training in agriculture and food protection, such as internships, fellowships, and other post-graduate opportunities that provide for homeland security professional workforce needs.
Research and Development
23. The Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, will accelerate and expand development of current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases. The Secretary of Homeland Security will coordinate these activities. This effort will include countermeasure research and development of new methods for detection, prevention technologies, agent characterization, and dose response relationships for high-consequence agents in the food and the water supply.
24. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.
25. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, shall establish university-based centers of excellence in agriculture and food security.
Budget
26. For all future budgets, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurrent with their budget submissions, an integrated budget plan for defense of the United States food system.
Implementation
27. Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of the Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and Presidential guidance.
28. This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
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* Why Build a New Facility? No facility currently meets the requirements identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food
* HSPD 9 Abstract
* HSPD 9 Full Text
HSPD 9 Abstract
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217449547663.shtm
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9 establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. America's agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. U.S. agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. The directive lays out policies, including roles and responsibilities, awareness and warning, and vulnerability assessments, to provide the best protection possible against a successful attack on the U.S. agriculture and food system.
HSPD 9 Full Text
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9
January 30, 2004
SUBJECT: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food
Purpose
1. This directive establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
Background
2. The United States agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. Americas agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. We should provide the best protection possible against a successful attack on the United States agriculture and food system, which could have catastrophic health and economic effects.
Definitions
3. In this directive:
1. The term critical infrastructure has the meaning given to that term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
2. The term key resources has the meaning given that term in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)).
3. The term Federal departments and agencies means those executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; indepen-dent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
4. The terms State, and local government, when used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
5. The term Sector-Specific Agency means a Federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category.
Policy
4. It is the policy of the United States to protect the agriculture and food system from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by:
1. identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and key resources for establishing protection requirements;
2. developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize threats;
3. mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing nodes;
4. enhancing screening procedures for domestic and imported products; and
5. enhancing response and recovery procedures.
5. In implementing this directive, Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security programs do not diminish the overall economic security of the United States.
Roles and Responsibilities
6. As established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with HSPD-7.
7. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency will perform their responsibilities as Sector-Specific Agencies as delineated in HSPD-7.
Awareness and Warning
8. The Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall build upon and expand current monitoring and surveillance programs to:
1. develop robust, comprehensive, and fully coordinated surveillance and monitoring systems, including international information, for animal disease, plant disease, wildlife disease, food, public health, and water quality that provides early detection and awareness of disease, pest, or poisonous agents;
2. develop systems that, as appropriate, track specific animals and plants, as well as specific commodities and food; and
3. develop nationwide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, plant health, and water quality that integrate existing Federal and State laboratory resources, are interconnected, and utilize standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures.
9. The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop and enhance intelligence operations and analysis capabilities focusing on the agriculture, food, and water sectors. These intelligence capabilities will include collection and analysis of information concerning threats, delivery systems, and methods that could be directed against these sectors.
10. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to create a new biological threat awareness capacity that will enhance detection and characterization of an attack. This new capacity will build upon the improved and upgraded surveillance systems described in paragraph 8 and integrate and analyze domestic and international surveillance and monitoring data collected from human health, animal health, plant health, food, and water quality systems. The Secretary of Homeland Security will submit a report to me through the Homeland Security Council within 90 days of the date of this directive on specific options for establishing this capability, including recommendations for its organizational location and structure.
Vulnerability Assessments
11. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall expand and continue vulnerability assessments of the agriculture and food sectors. These vulnerability assessments should identify requirements of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate, and shall be updated every 2 years.
Mitigation Strategies
12. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, working with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall prioritize, develop, and implement, as appropriate, mitigation strategies to protect vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing from the introduction of diseases, pests, or poisonous agents.
13. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall build on existing efforts to expand development of common screening and inspection procedures for agriculture and food items entering the United States and to maximize effective domestic inspection activities for food items within the United States.
Response Planning and Recovery
14. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, will ensure that the combined Federal, State, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting the national agriculture or food infrastructure. These activities will be integrated with other national homeland security preparedness activities developed under HSPD-8 on National Preparedness.
15. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop a coordinated agriculture and food-specific standardized response plan that will be integrated into the National Response Plan. This plan will ensure a coordinated response to an agriculture or food incident and will delineate the appropriate roles of Federal, State, local, and private sector partners, and will address risk communication for the general public.
16. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall enhance recovery systems that are able to stabilize agriculture production, the food supply, and the economy, rapidly remove and effectively dispose of contaminated agriculture and food products or infected plants and animals, and decontaminate premises.
17. The Secretary of Agriculture shall study and make recommendations to the Homeland Security Council, within 120 days of the date of this directive, for the use of existing, and the creation of new, financial risk management tools encouraging self-protection for agriculture and food enterprises vulnerable to losses due to terrorism.
18. The Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall work with State and local governments and the private sector to develop:
1. A National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the economy and that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak. The NVS shall leverage where appropriate the mechanisms and infrastructure that have been developed for the management, storage, and distribution of the Strategic National Stockpile.
2. A National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) capable of responding to a high-consequence plant disease with pest control measures and the use of resistant seed varieties within a single growing season to sustain a reasonable level of production for economically important crops. The NPDRS will utilize the genetic resources contained in the U.S. National Plant Germplasm System, as well as the scientific capabilities of the Federal-State-industry agricultural research and extension system. The NPDRS shall include emergency planning for the use of resistant seed varieties and pesticide control measures to prevent, slow, or stop the spread of a high-consequence plant disease, such as wheat smut or soybean rust.
Outreach and Professional Development
19. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall work with appropriate private sector entities to establish an effective information sharing and analysis mechanism for agriculture and food.
20. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Education, shall support the development of and promote higher education programs for the protection of animal, plant, and public health. To the extent permitted by law and subject to availability of funds, the program will provide capacity building grants to colleges and schools of veterinary medicine, public health, and agriculture that design higher education training programs for veterinarians in exotic animal diseases, epidemiology, and public health as well as new programs in plant diagnosis and treatment.
21. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Education, shall support the development of and promote a higher education program to address protection of the food supply. To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of funds, the program will provide capacity-building grants to universities for interdisciplinary degree programs that combine training in food sciences, agriculture sciences, medicine, veterinary medicine, epidemiology, microbiology, chemistry, engineering, and mathematics (statistical modeling) to prepare food defense professionals.
22. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall establish opportunities for professional development and specialized training in agriculture and food protection, such as internships, fellowships, and other post-graduate opportunities that provide for homeland security professional workforce needs.
Research and Development
23. The Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, will accelerate and expand development of current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases. The Secretary of Homeland Security will coordinate these activities. This effort will include countermeasure research and development of new methods for detection, prevention technologies, agent characterization, and dose response relationships for high-consequence agents in the food and the water supply.
24. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.
25. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, shall establish university-based centers of excellence in agriculture and food security.
Budget
26. For all future budgets, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurrent with their budget submissions, an integrated budget plan for defense of the United States food system.
Implementation
27. Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of the Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and Presidential guidance.
28. This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
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