Friday, March 8, 2013

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

30 November Interagency Review of Middle East Photo Reconnaissance Planning

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394487

A Difficult Relationship: Intelligence Support for Richard M. Nixon by John Helgerson

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839445b

Arab Oil Cutback and Higher Prices: Implications and Reactions

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394561

Arab-Israeli Hostilities: Two Scenarios

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d839452a

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394440

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839441d

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943ff

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394400

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394441

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394421
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d8394421



President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394442

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394402

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394423

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394444

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394424

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394405

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394426

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394447

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394407

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394448
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d8394448


resident Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394408

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394428

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394429

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839444a

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442a

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440b

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442b

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440c

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442c

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440d
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d839440d 
 
 
 

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442d

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839444e

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440e

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442e

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440f

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f1

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394451

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394411

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f2

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394452
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d8394452 
 

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394412

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394432

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f3

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394453

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f4

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394415

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394435

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394456

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f7

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394417
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d8394417 
 

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394418

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f9

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394439

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943fa

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839441a

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839443a

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839443b

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839441b

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839443c

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839441c
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d839441c


President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel-USSR

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943ef

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Middle East

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394438

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab Summit

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394446

Central Intelligence Bulletin: EC-Middle East

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440a

Central Intelligence Bulletin: EC-Oil Policy

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394413

Central Intelligence Bulletin: EC-US

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394445

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Egypt, Libya, USSR-Syria

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f5

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Egypt-USSR

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839444b

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Egypt-USSR

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442f

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Egypt-USSR

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f0
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d83943f0

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Egypt-USSR

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394434

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Egypt-USSR

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f8

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Fedayeen

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394430

Central Intelligence Bulletin: International Oil

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394455

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Israel-Egypt-Syria

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394437

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Israel-Syria

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839443f

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Lebanon

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394449

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Lebanon-Fedayeen

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394425

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Lebanon-Fedayeen

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f6

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Libya

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394422
Download PDF for 51112a4a993247d4d8394422


President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Syria-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394410

Central Intelligence Bulletin: USSR, Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839441e

Central Intelligence Bulletin: USSR-Syria

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839443d

CIA - Office of National Estimates: The Expulsion from Egypt - Some Consequences for the Soviets

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394533

CIA - Office of National Estimates: The Russian Ouster--Causes and Consequences

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394546

CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence: Intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394488

CIA Historical Collections Division: CIA's Middle East Task Force and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394482

CIA Memo: Brezhnevs Political Position in the Wake of the Middle East War; Excerpts from 5 December European Brief in Reference to Brezhnev

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394529

CIA Memo: Post Mortem Phase II

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394512

CIA Memo: The USSR and the Arab Oil Weapon

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d839453a
Download PDF for 51112a4b993247d4d839453a


President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

Documents in this Collection

Documents in PDF format require the Adobe Acrobat Reader®

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 10:21-11:11 am

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394574

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 10:27-11:35 am

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394571

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 2:01-2:54 pm

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394575

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 2:39 - 3:20 pm

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394583

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 3:02-4:10 pm

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d839458a

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 6:06-7:06 pm

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394580

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 7:22-8:27 pm

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394576

WSAG Summary of Conclusions, 9:01-10:06 am

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394582
Download PDF for 51112a4b993247d4d8394582

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