GENEVA: AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING

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9:07PM GMT 04 Feb 2011

Ref ID: 10GENEVA135

Date: 2/26/2010 10:30

Origin: Mission Geneva

Classification: SECRET

Destination:

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S E C R E T GENEVA 000135 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM, KACT, MARR, PREL, RS, US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 09, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-027.
2. (U) Meeting Date: February 09, 2010 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ------- SUMMARY -------
3. (S) A meeting, co-chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin, on proposed agreed statements was conducted at the U.S. Mission on February 9. The proposed agreed statements on converted B-1B heavy bombers, SSGNs, joint basing, Trident I, and rapid reload were discussed in detail. Addressing of agreed statements on the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) was deferred until additional discussion of these matters was completed by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Definitions Working Groups (WG). The Russian side provided copies of agreed statements on the use of telemetric data and on the transfer of Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom. End summary.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs; Joint Basing; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload; and Other Agreed Statements. ---------------------------- Converted B-1B heavy bomberS ----------------------------
5. (S) Mr. Elliott began the meeting with a discussion on the agreed statement for B-1B heavy bombers. The U.S. side accepted the Russian-proposed change to replace the word "all" with "the last" which conveyed the same concept i.e., that the provisions of the agreed statement applied when the last B-1B was converted. Elliott discussed using the term "formerly declared facility" instead of the terms "airbase" or "facility" because the defined term "airbase" only applied to facilities where heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are based and the defined term "facility" only applied to those facilities listed in their definition. Col Ilin commented that care must be taken since the term "bases" was used elsewhere in the document and therefore must be used consistently.
6. In response to the Russian proposal that the procedures for the exhibition of the B-1B be "identical" to the procedures specified in Part III of the Protocol (Conversion or Elimination (CorE)), Section V, Paragraph 5, Elliott explained why procedures for verification of conversion of heavy bombers for use with non-nuclear armaments could not be "identical" to the procedures used during the exhibition to demonstrate that the converted B-1B was incapable of employing nuclear armaments. He said this was because the procedures specified in Part III of the Protocol required the B-1B to remain at the CorE facility following completion of conversion. It was impossible for the United States to comply with this provision since the B-1B that would be exhibited would have already undergone conversion, been inspected, and been flown to its operating base. Ilin agreed that the term "identical" may not be acceptable but that it should be agreed which of the procedures would be used and also that the "distinguishing features" covered during the exhibition must be recorded for future reference. Elliott concurred that the procedures would be similar but physically could not be "identical" as the Russian side had proposed. Elliott asked for clarification of the Russian-proposed changes in paragraph (C). Ilin explained that the Russian side may inspect only one of the two bases each year. After hearing this, Elliott accepted the Russian proposed text.
7. (S) Elliott explained that the U.S. position on proposed paragraph D(i) in the agreed statement was to capture cases of operational exemptions for Type-2 inspections of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB, once they became formerly declared facilities. Dr. Warner reiterated that this concept was well documented in the Inspection Protocol, Part 5, Section VI, paragraph 3, and it would be reasonable to extend this provision to this type of facility. Ilin countered that the Inspection Protocol was not written to apply to formerly declared facilities so the Russian side did not approve of simply adjusting the Inspection Protocol language, and further added that operational exemptions might be needed at a road mobile base in the future. Warner agreed to evaluate changing the wording in the Inspection Protocol to clearly reflect this provision's application to formerly declared facilities which are still being used as operational bases.
--------- U.S. SSGN ---------
8. (S) Elliott stated the same solution discussed earlier in the meeting,regarding the nature of the conversion verification inspections, would need to be applied to the conversion inspections of SSGN launchers. The sides agreed to evaluate the use of coastlines and waters diagrams for recording the location of SSGNs at the submarine base. Warner proposed deferring the discussion to the MOU WG. Elliott proposed a compromise on the number of items to be inspected on both the SSGNs and the converted heavy bombers. He suggested the Russian side be allowed to select two SSGN launchers to verify they have not been reconverted to launch SLBMs if an SSGN was present during a Type-1 inspection at a submarine base. He also suggested that a combination of two heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and two heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments be subject to inspection during a Type-1 inspection at a joint base instead of the Russian proposal of inspecting three of each. Ilin did not accept this proposal and it was agreed that the matter would be discussed at a later meeting.
------------ Joint Basing ------------
9. (S) Elliott asked for clarification of the Russian-proposed change to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of the joint basing agreed statement. Ilin explained that the proposed change was an attempt to standardize this agreed statement with procedures established in the Inspection Protocol. Elliott agreed to review the proposal and provide alternative text that more completely captured the procedures necessary to conduct this inspection. Elliott stated that the proposed text in paragraphs 1(a)(iv) and 2 were redundant and Ilin responded that they were inserted to provide clarity. The sides agreed to discuss these changes at a future meeting.
--------------- Trident i SLBMs ---------------
10. (S) With regard to the agreed statement on Trident I SLBMs, Elliott said there was no need to insert the proposed Russian text, "these SLBMs will be launched from land-based launchers" since the previous sentence already stated that the remaining Trident I SLBMs shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. Ilin agreed to review the text and discuss the issue during the next meeting. Elliott said the Trident I launchers were used for purposes other than to launch sea-based cruise missiles, including special operations uses, so the Russian proposal to specify their use for only launching sea-based cruise missiles was incorrect. Ilin stated the uses of the launchers must be clearly defined. Elliott proposed altering the agree
ment to state that the launchers would not be used for launching SLBMs. ------------ Rapid Reload ------------
11. (S) Elliott read the U.S. proposal on rapid reload. Ilin responded that the Russian side felt the rapid reload agreed statement reflected sentiments present during the Cold War. Ilin read a new Russian version of the agreed statement which included the concept to "not keep ICBMs and SLBMs with RVs installed in loading tubes at storage facilities" and provided a copy of this proposal. Begin text of Russian-proposed statement: Document of the Russian side February 9, 2010 Agreed Statement On the prohibition of the production, testing and deployment of systems for rapid reload of ICBM and SLBM launchers The Parties agree that the production, testing and deployment of systems for the rapid reload of ICBM and SLBM launchers is unwarranted and should not be pursued by either Party. The Parties commit not to maintain ICBMs and SLBMs with warheads located on them, including those in launching tubes (containers), in storage facilities. End text.
----------------------- other Agreed statements -----------------------
12. (S) Ilin provided copies of two additional proposed agreed statements. The first was an agreed statement on the use of telemetric data. Begin text: Document of the Russian side February 9, 2010 Agreed Statement On the Use of Telemetric Information Considering that the exchange of telemetric information on missile launches of the Parties is a sensitive transparency measure, which, under specific circumstances, is capable of inflicting harm on the national security of a Party, the United States of America and the Russian Federation agree that telemetric information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party, received independently or within the framework of a bilateral exchange, shall not be used for purposes related to the development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile defense systems. End text.
13. (S) The second was an agreed statement on the transfer of Tridents II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. Begin text: Document of the Russian side February 9, 2010 Agreed Statement On the movement of SLBM "Trident-II" missiles, transferred by the US to equip the Navy of Great Britain The Parties agree that, in order to increase transparency in relation to the use of "Trident-II" SLBMs, transferred by the United States of America to equip the Navy of Great Britain, the United States of America shall provide notification to the Russian Federation about the time of such transfer, as well as the unique identifier and the location of each of the transferred missiles. The Parties agree that, upon conclusion of the life cycle of "Trident-II" SLBMs transferred by the United States of America to equip the Navy of Great Britain, the United States of America will send notification to the Russian Federation about the time and method of elimination, as well as the unique identifier for each of the transferred missiles. End text.
14. (S) Ilin questioned why the sides had not discussed the proposed agreed statements concerning the Leninsk Test Range or the CorE facility at Davis-Monthan AFB and Elliott responded that the MOU WG was addressing the Leninsk issue and the agreed statement on heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB may not be necessary pending resolution of the definition of "deployed" and "non-deployed" heavy bombers. He recommended the sides defer discussion on those two agreed statements for the time being.
15. (U) Documents exchanged: - Russia: -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement on the Movement of SLBM "Trident-II" Missiles, Transferred by the US to Equip the Navy of Great Britain, dated February 9, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement on the Prohibition of the Production, Testing and Deployment of Systems for Rapid Reload of ICBM and SLBM Launchers, dated February 9, 2010; and -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement on the Use of Telemetric Information, dated February 5, 2010
16. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Mr. Ahlm (RO) Mr. Albertson Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Lt Col Goodman LTC Litterini Amb Ries Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. C. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Luchaninov Gen Orlov Gen Poznikhir Gen Venevtsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING